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Preface 
Sentential force and specificity both have a long and independent history in linguistic 
research.  Both  concepts  describe  aspects  of a senten  ce  that can  only  be captured by 
taking into account the  interface between syntax  and semantics on the one hand,  and 
between  semantics  and  pragmatics  on  the  other.  This  becomes  quite  clear  in  this 
.  volume,  which  focuses  on  sentence  types,  sentence  modality,  (in)definiteness  and 
specificity  as  weIl  as  on  the  impact  that  information  structure  may  have  on  these 
phenomena. 
In  their  contribution  Exclamative  Clauses  at  the  Syntax-Semantics  Inteiface, 
RAFFAELLA  ZANUTTINI  &  PAUL  PORTNER  offer  a  new  perspective on  the concept of 
clause type by arguing that the class of exclamatives is syntacticaIly characterizable in 
terms of a pair of abstract properties and·  that these properties encode two components 
of meaning which uniquely define the semantics and pragmatics of exclamatives. 
HORST-DIETER  GASDE  in  his paper Yes/no questions in Mandarin Chinese revisited 
argues that Mandarin Chinese has two functional categories which trigger interrogative 
force: a ForcelPhrase, at the top position of the sentence, which hosts the sentence-final 
interrogativity particle ma, and a Force2Phrase, which is sentence-internal and provides 
a  position  for  the  assertive  shi-bu-shi  as  weIl  as  for  an  operator  that  licenses  the 
interrogative verbal A-not-A form.  Since the interrogative particle ma has  scope over 
the whole sentence, it  allows for more variety in information structure as  wen as  the 
occurrence of (core) adjuncts, which operate over propositions. 
KLEANTIIES  K.  GROHMANN  with  Clausal  Tripartition,  Anti-Locality  and 
Preliminary Considerations oj  a Formal Approach to Clause Types sketches a syntactic 
framework  that takes  into  account that movement dependencies  also  displaya lower 
bound  or  anti-Iocality  effect.  Splitting up  the  syntactic  sentence  structure  into  three 
Prolific  Domains  (a  thematic  domain  e,  an  agreement  domain  ep,  and  a  discourse 
domain 0)),  he formulates .an Exclusivity Condition that bans movement within such a 
domain. Since,  consequently,  wh-movement is  then  impossible within  0),  Grohmann 
deprives the wh-phrase of indicating interrogativity and only permits it to mark focus. 
REMUS  GERGEL  with  From Simple  Predicators  to  Clausal Functors:  The  English 
Modals through Time  and the  Primitives oj  Modality tries to shed some light onto the 
his tory of English modals including the modern stages of the standard·  dialects: He first 
discusses the relational nature of modality and the existence of a predicational node at 
all recorded stages of English and second, the prepositional nature of any modalnode. 
The assumption of the Pr-head is supported by semantic arguments starting off from the 
dual nature of most modals in English. 
In  her contributi<;m  Sluicing  Phenomena,  KERSTIN  SCHWABE  investigates  the  role 
information  structure  plays  with  respect  to  the  interpretation  of  elliptical  wh-
interrogatives. By showing that the indefinite relatum of the wh-phrase must always be 
F-marked  and  also  allow  a  specific  interpretation,  she  presents  an  explanation  why 
indefinite relata cannot occur in presuppositional contexts. 
KLAUS  VON  HEUSINGER  in  Specijicity and Dejiniteness in  Sentence  and Discourse. 
Structure  shows,  supported  by  Turkish  data,  that  pretheoretical  characterizations  of 
specificity can only describe a restricted set of specific expressions. He argues that the 
reference  of a  specific  expression  depends  on  the  "anchor"  expression.  Once  the 
reference for the anchor expression is determined, the reference for the specific term is 
also determined, giving a specific reading of the indefinite. 
v The paper Specijics by BART  GEURTS  relates  specificity and  presupposition to  each 
other by subsuming them under a concept, which he calls 'backgrounding'. He regards 
indefinites as  always denoting properties. If  an indefinite occurs as  an  argument, it may 
be construed as  specific or non-specific depending on  whether it is  backgrounded or 
not.  He argues  that this  'background' concept sheds a new  light on  presupposition as 
weH as on a number of phenomena that previously)acked a systematic account. 
Within the  SDRT framework,  NICHOLAS  ASHER  demonstrates  in  his  paper Deixis, 
Binding  and  Presupposition  how  the  discourse-based,  anaphoric  theory  of 
presuppositions accounts for the deictic use of definites. He shows that in many of these . 
uses, presuppositions are anaphorically bound to the discourse context via a particular 
discourse relation, 'Anchoring', whose semantics and conversational function is directly 
linked  to  the  participant's  conversational  goals.  Anchoring,  when  accepted  by  all 
participants, leads to a mutual belief in coordinated reference. 
In the final contribution About the Whereabouts of  Indefinites, WERNER FREY argues 
that there are three different dbmains in the German·  middle field which are relevant for 
the  interpreation  of an · indefinite.  He shows  that the  so-caHed  'strong'  reading  of an 
indefinite  is  the  basic  one  and  that  the  'weak'  interpretation  needs  special  licensing 
which is mirrored by special syntactic requirements. 
This volume contimles  the discussion on  sentence types  and  referentiality which  was 
started with ZASPll., 23 Information Structure and the Referential Status of  Linguistic 
Expressions - cf. the table of contents on p. iv. The contributions by Raffaella Zanuttini 
&  Paul Portner, Kleanthes K. Grohmann, Kerstin Schwabe, Klaus von Heusinger, Bart 
Geurts and Werner Frey were presented at the workshop Sentence Type and Specijicity 
which took pi ace  in  March 2001  at  the ZAS  Berlin. The papers by Nicholas Asher, 
Horst-Dieter Gasde and Remus Gergel have been included as  they are essential to the 
topic of this volume. 
Special thanks go to Mechthild Bernhard and Paul David Doherty for their helping 
hands in preparing the contributions for publication. 
Klaus von Heusinger 
FB Sprachwissenschaft 
Universität Konstanz 
Fach D 185 
D-78457 Konstanz 
Germany 
Email: klaus.heusinger@uni-konstanz.de 
Kerstin Schwabe 
Zentrum für Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft 
Typologie und Univ~rsalienforschung 
Jägerstr. 10-11 
D-10117 Berlin 
Germany 
Email: schwabe@zas.gwz-berlin.de 
vi Exclamative Clauses at the Syntax-Semantics  ~nterface* 
Raffaella Zanuttini  &  Paul Portner 
Georgetown University 
zanuttir@georgetown.edu  portnerp@georgetown.edu 
Exclamative clauses exhibit a structural diversity which raises the question of whether 
they form a clause type in the sense of Sadock & Zwicky (1985). Based on data from 
English, Italian, and Paduan, we argue that the class of exclamatives is syntactically 
characterizable  in  terms  of  a  pair  of  abstract  syntactic  properties.  Moreover,  we 
propose  that  these  properties  encode two  components of  meaning  which  uniquely 
define  the  semantics  and  pragmatics  of  exclarnatives.  Overall,  our  paper  is  a 
contribution to the study of the syntaxlsemantics interface and offers a new perspective 
on the notion of clause type. 
1.  Exclamatives and the notion of Clause Type 
Sadock and Zwicky (1985) define clause types as a  pairing of  grammatical form and 
conversational use.'  In this paper we discuss exclamatives within the context of this 
notion  of  clause  type.  We argue  that  exclamatives  are  not  a  purely  semantic  or 
pragmatic category  expressed  by  a  variety  of  unrelated  syntactic  forms;  rather,  the 
diverse realizations  of  exclamatives  all  share certain  syntactic characteristics.  These 
represent the defining semantic properties of this clause type. Thus, ours is  a  study of 
the syntaxlsemantic interface and its application to the study of exclamatives, and to the 
notion of clause types more generally. 
The syntactic part  of  our claim  is  both  interesting  and  difficult  because  of  the 
diversity of forms which are plausibly to be categorized as exclamatives. Consider, for 
example: 
(1)  a.  What a nice guy he  is! 
b.  The  things he says! 
We havc benefited from discussion accompanying presentations of this work at Georgetown and Yale 
Universities, and the University of  Padova. We are also grateful to the audiences at the Workshop on 
'Minimal Elements of Linguistic Variation'  in Paris, the Workshop on 'Spoken and Written Texts' at 
the Univcristy of Texas at Austin, the  Going Romance conference at the  University of  Utrecht and 
ZAS in Berlin. In particular, we  would like to thank HBctor Campos, Ralph Fasold, Elena Hetburger, 
Roumi Izvorsky, Cecilia Poletto, Manuela Ambar, Hans Obenauer, Manfied Krifka, Larry Horn, Bob 
Frank, and  the  participants in our  graduate  seminar on  clause types. We  would  like to  extend  our 
special thanks to Paula Beflinch, both  ibr providing all of  thejudgments and for extensive discussion 
of our  ideas.  This research  was  supported  in  part  by  a Georgetown  University  Graduate  School 
summer grant. 
More precisely, the set of clause types within a language forms a closed system in that: 
I.  'There  are  sets  of corresponding sentences, the members of  which  differ  only  in  belonging  to 
different types.' 
2.  'The  typcs  are  mutually  exclusive,  no  sentence being  simultaneously of  two  different types' 
(Sadock 8z Zwicky 1985: 158). 
ZAS Papers in Linguistics 24, 2001, 1-46 Raffaela Zanuttini & Paul Portner 
(2)  a.  Che car0  che  k!  (Italian) 
what expensive that  is 
'How expensive it is!' 
b.  Che libro  ha  comprato Gianni! 
what book has bought  Gianni 
'What a book Gianni bought!' 
In  (l)a, we  have  what  appears  to  be  a  WH  movement  structure,  similarly  to  an 
interrogative but without subject-auxiliary inversion. Example (1)b appears to have the 
structure of  a noun phrase which includes a relative clause. Example (2)a, from Italian, 
is like (1)a in that it involves a WH constituent and no inversion, but contains an overt 
complementizer; it contrasts with (2)b, which also shows the WH constituent but lacks 
the  complementizer. It  is  natural  to  wonder  whether  these  examples  have  anything 
syntactic in common. 
Given the diversity in (1)-(2), it's not possible to identify a single construction to be 
labeled 'exclamative'.'  We will  argue, though, that all of these forms do share certain 
abstract syntactic properties, and that having these properties is sufficient to identify a 
sentence  as  an  exclamative.  As  we  will  see,  these  properties  are  rooted  in  their 
connection  to  the  semantics  of  the  clause type.  More  specifically,  they  encode  the 
essential  semantic components which together yield  the meaning of  an  exclamative. 
Since these properties may be present in a variety of  syntactic forms, they do not yield a 
set  of  structures  which  are  syntactically  similar  in  any  immediately  obvious  way. 
Hence, exclamatives are a category which can only receive a natural characterization at 
the interface. 
This overall picture is quite simple in the abstract, but at the practical level it requires 
a great deal  of  detailed work on the syntax and semantics of exclamatives. In both of 
these  areas,  we  build  on  some existing  work,  though  compared  to  other  types  like 
interrogatives and declaratives, there is relatively little available. The fundamental idea 
we  will pursue is that there are two syntactic components necessary to make a clause an 
exclamative. These encode the two key semantic properties of exclamatives: 
I.  Exclamatives  are  factive.  This  is  represented  in  the  syntax  by  an  abstract 
morpheme FACT  which  brings  about  a CP-recursion  structure  (cf. Watanabe 
1993). 
2.  Exclamatives denote a set of alternative propositions, similarly to interrogatives. 
This  is  represented  by  a  WH operator-variable  structure  parallel  to  that  of 
questions. 
In section 4 we will see how these two semantic properties combine to give the intuitive 
interpretation  of  exclamation;  in  section  5  we  will  see  how  the  two  syntactic 
components which  encode them allow an account of  the diversity of  structures in (1)- 
2  In  this respect, we agree with Michaelis & Lambrecht (1996). Their approach lo this issue, within a 
construction  grammar  framework,  is  to  relate  individual  constructions  like  thosc  in  (I)  using  an 
inheritancc  hierarchy.  111  this  way,  the  various  exclamarive  sentences  can  derive  their  common 
properties from an  'Abstract Exclamative Constructiorl'  while not  sharing  any  structural features in 
common. Our analysis differs from theirs in that we argue that all exclamatives do in fact share certain 
defining  syntactic  properties,  and  that  these  properties  are  essential  to  their  compositional 
interpretation as cxclamatives. Exclamative Clauses at the Syntax-Semantics Interface 
(2). The properties of  WH operators in  exclamatives are in  some cases different from 
those in interrogatives, and we will explore the differences in some detail in section 6. 
A prerequisite for our project is an ability to determine whether a given clause is an 
exclamative. This is  not  a trivial  task, since other clause types may express a similar 
pragmatic function, as in (3). 
(3)  a.  He's so cute!  (Declarative) 
b.  Isn't he the cutest thing!  (Interrogative) 
Of  course this is not a difficulty which is restricted to the study of  exclamatives; there 
are  declaratives  which  function  to request  information,  interrogatives  which  give an 
order, and so forth. Unlike with these latter cases, however, there does not appear to be 
an  implicit  consensus  in  the  syntax/semantics  community  as  to  precisely  which 
sentences count  as  members  of  the  exclamative  clause type.  Perhaps  this  is  simply 
because they have been studied less. Whatever the reason may be, our first task will be 
to establish some explicit criteria which allow us to determine whether a given clause is 
an exclamative. We'll undertake this in section 3. 
As the last paragraph makes clear, we do not label just  any clause which can be used 
to 'exclaim', in the intuitive sense, an exclamative, just  as we would not call Could you 
come in  ut 9:00  tomorrow? an imperative simply because  it can  convey an order. In 
other words, we distinguish the illocutionary force of a clause from  its grammatically 
encoded  function.  The  illocutionary  force  of  a  sentence,  as  defined  by  e.g.  Searle 
(1965),  incorporates  the  Gricean  analysis  of  meaning  as  intentional:  'In  speaking  a 
language I attempt  to  communicate things  to  my  hearer  by  means of  getting him  to 
recognize  my  intention  to  communicate  just  those  things'  (Searle  1965:  258).  A 
sentence would thus have the illocutionary force of  ordering if  and only if the speaker 
intends  to  impose  an  obligation  by  getting  the  hearer  to  recognize  this  intention. 
According to such a definition, since someone saying Could you come in ut 9:00?  may 
have the relevant  intention,  the  sentence  would  in  such cases have the  illocutionary 
force of  ordering. But this  shouldn't  lead  to the conclusion  that  it  is an  imperative. 
Crucially its form is that conventionally associated with the force of  asking. We label 
the  force  conventionally  associated  with  a  sentence's  form  its  sententiul force, 
following Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet (1990). In  some cases, such as our example, a 
sentence whose  sentential  force is that of  asking may have the illocutionary force of 
ordering." 
Likewise  with  exclamatives,  we  need  to  distinguish  illocutionary  force  from 
sentential  force. While members  of  various  clause types  may be  associated  with  the 
illocutionary  force  of  exclaiming, only  members  of  the exclamative clause type  are 
conventionally associated with this sentential force. Certain structures have traditionally 
been seen as clear examples of this clause type, for example: 
(4)  a.  What a nice guy he is! (cf. "What a nice guy is he?) 
b.  How very tall she is! (cf. *How very tall is she'?) 
It isn't clear whether this kind of example should be seen as having the illocutionary force of asking in 
addition to that of  ordering. While interesting, this issue doesn't affect the point that it is necessary to 
distinguish the grammatically encoded force from other types of force. Raffaela Zanuttini & Paul Portner 
Both of these have an initial WH constituent, but they differ from interrogatives in that 
they  cannot  occur  with  subject-auxiliary  inversion.  In  addition,  their  WH  phrase 
contains an  extra element not  possible  in  interrogatives, a  in  (4)a and  very  in  (4)b. 
Despite the presence of  such clear cases, the criteria developed in section 3 will prove 
useful for two reasons: First, they will help us to decide the status of examples like (3)a 
and (3)b in  which the illocutionary force is  not equivalent to the sentential force; and 
second, they  will  reveal  some of  the important properties of  excla~natives  which  any 
theory of this clause type must explain. 
Returning  to  the  broader  question  of  how  the  concept  of  clause  type  fits  into 
grammatical theory, exclamatives provide a good place to begin the study of this issue. 
They  are  less  well-studied  than  the  other  types  of  declarative,  interrogative,  and 
imperative. Moreover, their many similarities to interrogatives may make it easier to see 
precisely which aspects of  structure are relevant to distinguishing one clause type from 
another. And finally, the diversity of structures which appear to exemplify this type, as 
in  (1)-(2), poses a particular challenge for the idea that there can be a useful theory of 
the grammar of clause types at all. Hence, in additjon to being of interest for what it can 
show us about the nature  of  exclamatives in  particular, this paper also works towards 
the goal of understanding clause type systems more generally. 
2.  Previous approaches to the syntax of force 
Before we examine in  detail the nature of  exclamatives, we will consider some of  the 
ideas present  in  the  literature concerning  the nature of clause typing. One prominent 
idea is that a force-indicating feature or operator is central to the analysis of individual 
clause  types.  Thus,  for  example,  we  have  imperative  force  features  and  question 
operators  used  to  motivate  movement  in  these  types.  As  we  suggested  in  the 
introduction, however, we will not pursue this approach. For one thing, such an element 
does  not  seem  helpful  in  accounting  for  the  diversity  of  structures  found  among 
exclamatives. In  particular, it is hard to see how such a morpheme would let us unify 
clausal  and  nominal  exclamatives, as  in  (1)a-(l)b; even  the  diversity  within  clausal 
exclamatives seems too  much  for a  single force feature  to  account for (Zanuttini & 
Portner 2000). Moreover, even for the clause types  where the idea has  been  pursued, 
there are many problems with the proposal that force is syntactically realized in terms of 
a single element or feature. In this section we will point out these difficulties. 
In  most cases, a force indicating element has  been  proposed  for the analysis of  a 
particular  clause  type  (almost  exclusively  imperatives  and  interrogatives4). Authors 
focusing on  other issues will  at times invoke a force indicating feature for a narrow 
range of cases. For example, an illocutionary feature has been used to trigger the verb- 
initial  order of  non-negative,  non-polite-form  imperatives  in  Spanish  or  Italian  (e.g. 
Rivero 1994a, Rooryck 1992, Graffi 1996). The goals of  such papers aren't necessarily 
to consider the full range of  structures which exemplify a particular clause type, and so 
they are of less relevance to us here. Others make more general claims about at least one 
clause  type;  among  them  are  Pollock  (1989), Cheng  (1991),  den  Dikken  (1992), 
Platzack  and  Rosengren  (1 994),  Rivero  (1 994b), Henry  (1 995,  1996), Michaelis & 
Lambrecht  (1996), Rivero & Terzi  (1995),  Rizzi  (1997), and  Han  (1998). Of  these, 
4  Wechsler (1991) is an exception, considering declaratives is  some detail as well Exclamative Clauses at the Syntax-Semantics Interface 
Platzack & Rosengren  and  Han  specifically make claims about how  clause types  are 
marked in general, not limiting their claims to a particular type. 
We begin by outlining some of the proposals which use a force-indicating element in 
the analysis of  imperatives and interrogatives. In general, we find three main points of 
view  concerning  the  location  of  the  force-indicating  element:  (i)  force  is  always 
represented in C; (ii) force is consistently associated with one projection within a given 
language, but whether this projection is I or C may vary from language to language; and 
(iii) force is underlyingly represented in  I, though  it may undergo movement to C in 
some  circumstances.  Beginning  with  imperatives,  certain  Romance  and  Balkan 
languages, among them Spanish, Italian, and Modern Greek, have morphological forms 
particular  to  positive, non-polite-form  imperatives. This  is  illustrated  by the contrast 
between the imperative and declarative in (3,  from Italian. The imperative verb in (5)a 
is morphologically unique in that it only occurs as a second person form in imperatives 
(though it can be a third person indicative); it has a unique syntax as well, obligatorily 
preceding the object clitic le. 
(5)  a.  Telefonale!  (Italian) 
call.imp-her 
'Call her!' 
b.  Le  telefoni  troppo. 
her call.indic.2sg  too-much 
'You call her too much.' 
Much  of  the literature on Romance imperatives proposes that  the word  order in  (5)a 
results from the verb moving to C. The trigger for such movement is the presence of 
some element associated with the force of imperatives. 
Preverbal  markers  of  sentential negation  are incompatible with  imperatives of  this 
kind.  A  suppletive verbal  form  (drawn  from the indicative,  subjunctive, or infinitive 
paradigms) is used instead. In (6)b from Italian, the verb takes its infinitival form: 
(6)  a.  *Non telefonale! 
neg  call.imp-her 
b.  Non telefonarle! 
neg  call.inf-her 
'Don't call her!' 
Both Rivero & Terzi (1995) and Han (1998) utilize the proposed imperative operator in 
C to account for this incompatibility. Rivero & Terzi claim that the negative marker, a 
head which intervenes between I and C, blocks the verb's ability to move to the force 
indicator. Crucial to this approach is the assumption that the verb and negation cannot 
form a unit and move together to C. A difficulty is that other constructions within these 
languages do seem to show the verb forming a unit with negation (e.g. so-called Aux- 
to-Comp constructions,  Rizzi  1982). Moreover,  in at  least one language discussed by 
Rivero & Terzi, Serbo-Croatian, the verb can form a unit with  negation, as shown by 
the  fact  that  a preverbal  negative  marker  is  compatible  with  a  verb-initial  order  in 
imperatives (as well as other clause types). This raises the question of why this option is 
possible in Serbo-Croatian and not in other languages. 
Han responds to these issues by allowing the verb to move to C in  all cases. In the 
presence  of  a  preverbal  negative  marker,  she claims  that  the  resulting  structure is Raffaela Zanuttini & Paul Portner 
semantically uninterpretable. Specifically, the following structure is derived (Han  1998: 
42): 
Following  Kayne's  (1994)  definition  of  c-command,  the  negative  marker 
asymmetrically c-commands the verb (within I), and thus takes scope over it. She makes 
two other crucial assumptions as well: first, that the verb takes over the force-indicating 
function of the imperative operator, and second that in general a sentence's force cannot 
be  negated  or  be  within  the  scope  of  negation  (these  alternatives  are  not  clearly 
distinguished). Hence, she concludes that  the configuration  in  (7) is  semantically ill- 
formed. 
Difficulties arise for these  approaches  when  they  attempt to extend their  ideas to 
languages  which  do allow  negated  imperatives. Rivero & Terzi  discuss  the  case of 
Ancient Greek, which lacks a special syntax for imperatives. The only case which gives 
rise  to  verb-initial  order,  for  imperatives  as  well  as  declaratives,  is  when  this  is 
necessary  to provide an  enclisis  site for second-position clitics. They account for the 
lack  of  an  inversion  operation  specific to  imperatives  by  proposing  that  the feature 
encoding imperative force is located in I rather than C in this language. Han, in contrast, 
maintains for languages that allow negated imperatives the idea that force is encoded in 
C.  There  are  two  classes  of  such  languages.  On  the  one  hand,  French  and  other 
languages  with  post-verbal  negative  markers  can  form  negative  imperatives  simply 
because I to C movement can  take place without movement  of  the negative  marker, 
which therefore will not take scope over the force indicator. She assumes the not of Do 
not do that! to be like French pas in this regard. On the other hand, Han assumes that in 
English examples like Don't do fhnt the negation does move along with the auxiliary to 
C. However, the resulting configuration differs from that derived for Italian, Spanish, 
and Modern Greek in that n't does not end up c-commanding the force indicator: 
Notice that in  (8) I is adjoined to negation, and not the other way around as in (7). For 
this reason, do, which is in I and has taken over the function of the imperative operator, 
c-commands negation.  The resulting  scope configuration  is  interpretable, as negation 
does not take scope over directive force. 
Turning now  from  iinperatives to  interrogatives, many  authors have accounted for 
verb-movement in  the latter in terms of an element in C which indicates that the clause 
is  a question. This element has been  instantiated  as the Q morpheme or WH feature 
originating  with  Katz  &  Postal  (1964)  and  Baker  (1970)  and  employed  in  much 
subsequent work.  This element bears  an  obvious similarity to the one invoked  in  the 
case of  imperatives,  and  so it is tempting to  view  it as a force-indicating element as 
well. (Of the works we are aware of, only Han's explicitly postulates a force-indicating 
element in C for interrogatives.) A problem with doing this is that this feature is utilized 
in  both  main  and embedded clauses, and it is not  typically  assumed  that  embedded 
clauses have force. We can think of two possible directions to pursue here. It might be 
that the Q morpheme or WH feature only counts as a force-indicator in root clauses, and 
that when  selected by  a higher predicate it is semantically inert. Alternatively, it could Exclamative Clauses at thc Syntax-Semantics Interface 
be  that  sentential force is represented in  both  root  and embedded  clauses, but  in  the 
latter case it is ignored by subsequent semantic computation.' 
Most discussions of the Q morpheme or WH feature assume it to be located in C.  An 
interesting  variant  is that  of  Rizzi  (1996). He proposes  that  in  root  clauses the WH 
feature is underlyingly  associated with  I; it then  moves to C in  order to instantiate a 
configuration  of  spec-head agreement  with  an  appropriate wh  operator in  [spec, CP]. 
Thus, as with imperatives, within the discussion  of  interrogatives we find both I and C 
considered as the possible locus of force. 
In  light  of  this  brief  summary, we  can  now  see why  invoking a force-indicating 
element has not been able to explain the concept of  clause type. A serious  with all of 
the theories we have considered so far is that they are applicable to only a subset of the 
structures which  comprise each  type.This is most  clear  in  the case of  imperatives. 
Recall  that  the  basic  facts  in  Italian,  Spanish,  and  Modern  Greek  are  that  the 
morphological form  specific to imperative meaning cannot be negated, as in (6)a, but 
sentences  with  imperative meaning  in other morphological  forms may  be. This class 
includes both the suppletive forms used for negative sentences, as (6)b, and those used 
to  express  polite  imperatives.  Since these  types  of  imperative  do  not  involve  verb 
movement  to  C,  according  to  Rivero & Terzi's  and  Han's  assumptions  they  do not 
contain the force-indicating element. Despite this, they share the same sentential force 
as the non-suppletive forms; that is, they are conventionally associated with the force of 
ordering just  as much as so-called 'true  imperatives'. Han appears to  dispute this and 
claim that force is not syntactically represented in those suppletive imperatives based on 
subjunctive  or  infinitive  morphology,  suggesting  instead  that  it  is  indicated  'via 
inference'  (p. 57). Han's idea is  that  the  infinitive/subjunctive  operator expresses an 
irrealis  interpretation  compatible with  directive  force, and  presumably  incompatible 
with  other forces like assertion. This approach  seems to con the pragmatic  notion  of 
illocutionary  force  with  sentential  force.  As  noted  in  the  Introduction,  pragmatic 
inference may lead any clause type to be interpreted with  any  illocutionary force, e.g. 
declarative as a question, etc., but this is an aspect of interpretation beyond the pairing 
of  form  and  sentential  force which  defines clause  type.  An  alternative  approach  to 
dealing with  those imperatives that do not show verb movement would be to suggest 
that  force is  represented  in  both cases, but  only triggers  overt movement in one (e.g. 
because it's  'strong'  in  one case and  'weak'  in  the other); this  is Han's approach to 
those suppletive imperatives based  on indicative morphology. Saying either that force 
comes 'via  inference', or that the syntactic properties of  the force-indicator vary from 
case to case, amounts to abandoning the idea of  a uniform representation for sentential 
force. 
This possibility  would  be implausible  if  we were  working  with  a notion  of illocutionary force, hut 
given  our narrower  concept of  sentential  ibrce,  it is  more likcly  to  he  workable.  In line  with  the 
dynamic semantics idca that the  meaning of  a sentence  is  context changc potential  (or CCP, Kamp 
1981, Heim  1982, among others), u.c might treat a scntential force a5  giving a sentence a certain kind 
of CCP. For inslance, the hrcc of assertion creates a CCP that updates the cm~mon  ground, whereas 
that  (I[  an imperative affects the hearer's obligations. The meaning of the hrcc indicator would then 
be to map any proposition  onto the appropriate kind of CCP. For example, the CCP of a declarative 
sentence expressing proposition  p  is  the  function  f which  maps any context C onto C' which  only 
differs from C in that p is in the new common ground. The effect of the f11rce indicator can always he 
'undone', retrieving tiom f the underlying propositional content: iff is applied to the empty context, 
i.c. that with nothing in the common ground, p can bc recovercd as the sole element of KC). 
6  Since  they  do not  work  with  a  force  indicator,  Michaelis  & Lamhrecht's  (1996)  approach  is  not 
suhject to this criticism. Raffiela Zanuttini & Paul Portner 
A similar problem arises in some languages with interrogatives. In Paduan, for example, 
while positive yeslno questions involve inversion, those negated by  the usual marker of 
sentential negation, no, do not:' 
(9)  a.  Vien-lo?  (Paduan) 
comes-s.cl 
'Is hc coming?' 
b.  *No vien-lo'? 
neg comes-s.cl 
c.  Nol  vien'? 
neg-s.cl  comes 
'Isn't he coming?' 
If  inversion  results  from  the presence of  a force indicating feature  in C, the lack of 
inversion  in  (9)c  would  lead  one to  conclude that there  is  no  such  feature.  That is, 
negative questions, like the negative imperatives discussed  above, would  differ from 
their non-negative counterparts in lacking the syntactic representation of force. And yet 
they are just as fully interrogatives as their non-negative counterparts. The alternative of 
saying the force-indicating feature is strong in positive clauses but  weak  in  negative 
ones gives up on  the idea that the members of  a clause type are unified by sharing a 
single syntactic feature. 
The basic problem we are faced with  is that  the syntactic operation giving rise to 
verb-initial order does not correlate with the expression of force which defines a clause 
type. Thus, in the languages under discussion at least, there is no justification  for tying 
the  verb's  behavior  to any  feature which encodes  force or  clause type. It  would  be 
simpler to have a single feature triggering all cases of verb movement to C. In  Italian 
and Spanish this  would  bring together positive imperatives and interrogatives, leaving 
aside their negative counterparts as well as declaratives." 
The approach  to  exclamatives  which  we  will  pursue here doesn't  rely on  a force- 
indicating feature or operator at all. While it's possible that such an element is present, 
it  is  not  what  shapes  the  members  of  the  class.  Rather,  what  is  shared  by  all 
exclamatives  is  the  need  to  represent  in  the  syntax  those  two  semantic properties 
mentioned in the introduction: that exclamatives are factive and that they denote a set of 
alternative propositions.  It  is worth wondering whether semantic properties other than 
force could be  helpful  in  solving the problems  mentioned  above for the analyses  of 
imperatives and interrogatives, but we will not pursue this in the present paper. 
'  Paduan is a Romance variety  spoken in the Italian city of Padua. As shown hy Porlner & Zanuttini 
(1996), Paduan  110  actually  has  two,  syntactically distinct  forms.  One  is  thc  ordinary  marker  of 
negation, while the other is  a clitic and carries, in  addition  to negative meaning, a particular  scalar 
implicature described in the reference cited. Here we focus on ordinary negation. In the Paduan data, 
the gloss s.cl stands for 'subject clitic'. 
"his  line  of  reasoning  follows  the  assumption  made  by  many  in  the  literature  that  positive 
interrogatives in Italian and Spanish involve inversion. The matter is subject to debate hecause of the 
range of  subject positions available in these languages. Paduan presents a more clear case; the relative 
order  of  verh  arid  clitics  provides  direct evidence  for inversion  in  all  positive  interrogatives and 
imperatives. Exclamative Clauscs at the SynTax-Semantics Interface 
3.  Criteria for identifying exclamatives 
In  this  section  we  establish  a number of  criteria for identifying exclamative clauses, 
drawn from Zanuttini & Portner (2000) and Portner & Zanuttini  (2000). We identify 
three properties which distinguish exclamative clauses and show how they give rise to 
criteria which help us pick out members of this type. The three properties are: factivity, 
scalar implicature and  inability  to function in  questionlanswer pairs. At  this point our 
goal is only to establish criteria; we will provide an analysis of each of the properties in 
section 4. 
Like us, Obenauer (1994, section 2.4) also provides criteria for determining the class 
of exclamatives. Concentrating on data from French, he focuses on certain WH phrases, 
like quelle chance ('what luck') and quel g&ie  ('what genius'), that can only occur in 
exclamatives. 
(10)  a.  Quelle chance tu  as  eue! (Obenauer 1994: 364) 
what  luck  you have had 
'What luck you've had!' 
b.  *Quelle chance as-tu  eue! 
what  luck  have-you had 
'What luck have you had!' 
He then  takes  their  syntax  to be  definitive  of  the  syntax of  exclamatives in  general. 
Thus,  since  these  WH phrases  disallow  inversion  and  cannot  remain  in  situ,  he 
concludes that if  a WH structure is to be classified as an exclamative in this language, it 
must not involve inversion or WH in situ. This classification appears to accurately pick 
out the class of  WH exclamatives in French. Notice, however, that Obenauer's criteria 
are purely  syntactic, and  so they can  only be  counted on to single out a syntactically 
relevant  class  (similarly  to  Rivero & Terzi's  class  of  imperatives  involving  V  to C 
movement). This  methodology  cannot  assure us  that  all  sentences  with  the  relevant 
sentential force get classified as exclamatives. Since the notion of clause type which we 
investigate in this paper is defined as a pairing of form and sentential force, we need to 
make  sure that  the  criteria  are not  too  narrow, thus picking  out only  a syntactically 
coherent subset of the clause type. In other words we need to make sure that we are not 
leaving out other types of exclamatives  in the same way that some of the literature on 
imperatives left out those which do not involve verb movement to C. 
For  these  reasons,  our  criteria  for  exclamative  status  will  be  built  on  the  three 
semantic properties outlined above. The first property, factivity, was first pointed out by 
Grimshaw (1979).' The factivity of exclamatives is shown by two facts. First, they can 
only be embedded under factive predicates, as seen in (1 1):10"1 
P  Michaelis & Lambrccht  (1996) incorporate a similar property, 'presupposed open proposition'  into 
their account. Though it is not  formally defined, this property  is paraphrased in  a way that makes it 
appear equivalent to Grimshaw's notion of factivity. 
"'  This is not to say that all fnctives allow exclamative complemcnts. For instance, regret doesn't  allow 
WH ci~mplcments  in general, as pointed out by a reviewer. 
I  I  The effects of factivity arc somewhat different in WH comple~nents  than in declaratiw complements, 
as discussed in Berman (1991). Note also that the non-factive predicatc helieve has a special factive 
use in  sentences of thc form I can'r believe ... or  Yr,u wuuldn't believe ..., and as expected in these 
cases it can have an exclamative complement: I cun'r believe how' ver)]  cute he is! Raffaela Zanuttini & Paul Portner 
(1 1)  Mary knowsl"thinksl*wonders  how very cute he is. 
Second, when they are embedded under a verb like know or realize, in the present tense 
and with a first person subject, this verb cannot be negated, as seen in (12): 
(12)  '"1 don't knowlrealize how very cute he is. 
Intuitively, the problem with (12) is that denying the speaker's knowledge con with the 
factive presupposition generated by the ex~lamative.'~ 
The second property, what we refer to as scalar inzplicuturc, makes more precise the 
intuition  that exclamatives convey that something is surprising or noteworthy in  some 
way.  Exclamatives  introduce  a conventional  scalar  implicature to the  effect that  the 
proposition they express lies at the extreme end of some contextually given scale. Thus, 
we take How very cute he is! to express the proposition  that he is very cute (in fact, it 
presupposes  it, due to factivity) and to implicate that his degree of  cuteness is greater 
than  the alternatives  under  consideration.  This  must  be  a conventional,  rather  than  a 
conversational,  implicature  because  it  is  non-defeasible  (as  seen  in  (13)a)  and 
detachable (as in  (1 3)b, which shows that the implicature is tied to the sentence's form 
not its semantic content): 
(13)  a.  ??How very cute he is! -though  he's not extremely cute 
b.  He's quite cute! -  though not extremely cute. 
This  property  explains  two  facts.  The  first,  pointed  out  by  Elliott  (1974),  is  that 
exclamatives cannot be embedded under it isn't anzuzing, though they can be embedded 
under its positive counterpart: 
(14)  a.  "It isn't amazing how very cute he is! 
b.  It is amazing how very cute he is! 
The second, related property  is  that  (14)a becomes  good  if  it  is questioned, whereas 
(14)b becomes ungrammatical: 
(15)  a.  Isn't it amazing how very cute he is? 
b.  "Is it amazing how very cute he is? 
The intuitive reason  why (14)a is unacceptable is that  it denies the amazingness of  his 
cuteness,  and  this  amounts  to  contradicting  the  scalar  implicature.  A  parallel 
explanation holds for (15)b, where the interroiative questions the amazingness of his 
cuteness, thus casting doubt on the implicature. In  contrast, (15)a IS acceptable because 
a negative question expects a positive answer, and thus the pragmatics of this sentence 
supports the implicature of extreme cuteness. 
The third property distinguishing exclamatives from interrogatives and declaratives 
is  their  inability  to  function  in  questionlanswer  pairs.  Obviously,  interrogatives 
characteristically serve to ask a question. Exclamatives may not do so. 
I?  In  ccrtain  pragmatic  circumstances,  an  exclamative  may  servc  to  provide  new  information.  For 
instance, when I return from sceing my friend's baby fix the lirst time, 1  may say Cvt~~t  a cure baby he 
i.s!  We can see this case as introducing thc proposition that the hahy is very cute via accomlnodation 
(Lewis 1979). parallel to examples like I didn't know that she had a new baby. Exclamative Clauses at the Syntax-Semantics Interface 
(1 6)  A:  How tall is he? 
B:  Seven feet. 
(17)  A:  How very tall he is! 
B:  *Seven feet. / He really is! / Indeed! / No he's not! 
The response Seven  feet  in (16) provides the information requested by A's question; that 
is, it  is an  answer. (Theories of  the semantics and pragmatics of  questions provide a 
more formal and precise characterization of what it is to be an answer. For our purposes, 
we may leave the notion at the intuitive level.) In contrast, the same response in (17) is 
unacceptable  when  taken  as an  answer; to the extent that  it's  acceptable, it  indicates 
agreement with A's presupposition, like He rea1l.y  is!  and the other responses given. 
Another criterion arising from the fact that exclamatives do not introduce a question 
into the discourse is their contrast with interrogatives in patterns like the following: 
(1 8)  How tall is he? Seven feet or eight feet? 
(19)  How very tall he is! *Seven feet or eight feet? 
In (18),  the second phrase serves to narrow the preceding question, indicating that the 
answer is to be drawn from the set {seven feet, eight feet). In this light, it is clear why 
(19) is unacceptable. The exclamative does not introduce a question, so there's nothing 
for the follow-up phrase to narrow. 
The final  criterion  for  identifying  exclamatives  is  that,  unlike  declaratives,  they 
cannot be used as answers:I3 
(20)  A:  How tall is Tony's child? 
B:  'Wow very tall he is! 
With this  set of  criteria,  we  can  now  determine  whether  a  sentence  whose  status is 
unclear should be categorized as an exclamative. We can illustrate with examples (21)- 
(22) below: 
(21)  a.  Who could be cuter than you? 
b.  Isn't he the cutest thing? 
(22)  He's so cute! 
" Ccrtain yes/no exclamatives may be exceptions here. Though the English cxclamative in (i), pointed 
out by McCawley (1973), is not clearly a full clause, its Italian counterpart in (ii) is: 
(i) A: Is Tony's child tall? B: And how! 
(ii) A: E' alto il  hamhino di Toni'? 
is  tall  the child  of Tony 
B: Eccome  se  i: allo!  (Italian) 
and-how il.  is tall 
We speculate that the conjunction which introduces B's utterance has something to do with why these 
arc acceptohle. Perhaps they conjoin an elliptical answer with the exclarnativc, as YES he  is - and how! 
or  Yps, rrnd how he's fall! 
Another possible exception is the type seen in Boy, is he! or /s  he ever! (McCawlcy 1973). We are not 
certain  that  thcse  cases  are truly  exclamatives,  however.  They  may  he  pronounced  with  falling 
intonation.  like  a  declarative  and  unlike  And  how!  They  may  be  examples of  Sadock's  (1971) 
'Queclaratives', sentences with the form of questions hut the pragmatic force of assertion. Raffacla Zanuttini & Paul Portner 
With regard to the rhetorical WH question (21)a, we can see that it may be embedded 
under  a  nonfactive  predicate  ((23)a), and  under I don't know  ((23)b); thus  it  is  not 
factive.  It  may be answered  ((23)c) and it  does  introduce  a question  which  may be 
narrowed ((23)d),  thus patterning with interrogative and not with exclamatives. 
(23)  a.  1 wonder who could be cuter than you. 
b.  I don't know who could be cuter than you. 
c.  A:  Who could be cuter than you? 
B:  Nobody. 
d.  Who could be cuter  than  you?  Your  brother  or your  sister? Not  even 
them! 
We cannot construct examples with (21)a that allow us to test for the scalar implicature 
of exclamatives. Who could he cuter than you  may not be embedded under amazing at 
all, and so we cannot attempt to embed it under It isn't amazing  ... or Is it amazing.,.. (In 
general,  questions  may  not  be  embedded  under  urnuzing.  Given  this,  we  may  use 
embeddability under amuzing as an additional criterion to distinguish exclamatives from 
interrogatives.) 
The rhetorical  yeslno  question  (21)b can  be  answered,  as  seen  in  (24),  and thus 
behaves unlike exclamatives: 
(24)  A:  Isn't he the cutest thing?  B:  Yes 
The other criteria are inapplicable, since a yeslno question cannot be embedded without 
major alteration of its structure. (One is hardly tempted to consider clauses introduced 
by whether or if' as exclamatives, even in cases like It isn't even a question whether he's 
the  cutest  thing!) The only  evidence available,  then,  namely  the  fact  that  it  can  be 
answered, leads us to consider (21)b an interrogative. 
Finally, declaratives with so and such like (22) may be embedded under non-factive 
predicates ((25)a) and under I don't know ((25)b), thus failing the factivity test. When 
embedded under amazing, the sentence may be negated  ((25)~)  or questioned ((25)d), 
illustrating it lacks the scalar implicature of exclamatives. Moreover, it may serve as an 
answer ((25)e), once again patterning with declaratives and not e~clamatives.'~  '' 
(25)  a.  I think he's so cute. 
b.  ?I don't KNOW that he's so cute. 
c.  It isn't amazing that he's so cute. 
d.  Is it amazing that he's so cute? 
e.  A: Is he cute? B: He's so cute. 
In  the rest of  this  paper,  we classify sentences as exclamatives  based  on  these tests, 
though for reasons of space we will not give the full set of examples. 
''  The  first  three  exalnples  are  natural  with  contrastive  intonation  on  so,  know,  and  urnuzing, 
rcspeclively.  Note  that  (25)h has  the  same  intonation  and  interpretation  as  the  scntencc  with  an 
ernhcdded  declarative 1 clon't  KNOW that he's 6'5" cited in  footnotc 24. We take  this  as further 
evidencc that it is an embedded declarative.  '' Michaclis & La~nbrecht  (1996) consider examples with such and so to he true exclamatives, but they 
do not have explicit criteria for distinguishing exclamatives from other clause types. Exclamative Clauses at the Syntax-Semantics Interlace 
4.  The semantic and pragmatic analysis of exclamatives 
Our goal in this section is to provide a precise characterization of the sentential force of 
exclamatives. After outlining our proposal  in section 4.1, we'll  show how it is able to 
capture  the  informal,  qualitative descriptions  of  what  exclamatives  do in  terms  of 
notions like  'surprise',  'unexpectedness',  'emotional  reaction',  and  'extreme quality' 
(section 4.2). We'll also discuss how it is able to explain the various semantic properties 
of  exclamatives outlined above (section 4.3). Drawing on our own previous work.  in 
this  section and those following we'll  make extensive use of  data from Paduan. The 
reason for focusing on this language will become more apparent in section 5, where its 
unique syntactic properties become relevant. 
As  we  discuss their  semantic  analysis, it  is  convenient  to  divide  exclamatives in 
Paduan into two groups. Parallel to the distinction  between  WH and yeslno questions, 
we find both WH and \yesInou exclamatives: 
(26)  Che roba che  1  magna!  (Paduan) 
what stu  that he eats 
'The things he eats!' 
(27)  No  ga-lo  magni tuto! 
neg has-s.cl  eaten  everything 
'He ate everything!' 
Example (26) is introduced by a WH constituent, and rates some of the things that he 
eats as surprising compared to other, more normal food. In contrast, the example in (27) 
lacks a fronted WH constituent; it compares the true proposition that he ate everything 
to the alternative that he didn't, rating the former as less likely. 
4.1.  Two components of the force of exclamatives 
The analysis we propose has two main components: factivity  and widening."  We will 
discuss how these two aspects of the meaning are syntactically represented in section 5; 
for now, let us use R+,,cri,i,,  to refer to the representation of  factivity in  the syntax and 
R,ui,~,,l,,x  to refer to that of widening. The role of Rfi,cr,,,,,i,. is straightforward. It introduces 
a presupposition  that the propositional content of  the exclamative is true. In  terms of 
(28), this informally means that it is presupposed that he eats something. 
(28)  a.  Che roba che  1  magna! 
what stu  that he eats 
'The things he eats!' 
b.  The things he eats! 
As  for the contribution  of  widening, we  assume that  R,vidm;,,p has the  semantics of  a 
quantificational operator. To see the role of this operator, let us consider the following 
context. We're discussing what hot peppers some of our friends like to eat. The domain 
of quantification  for R,v,do,,,,R,  let US call it Dl, is  u set of  peppers  which  contains (in 
increasing order of spiciness): poblano, serrano, jalapefio,  and giiero. Our friends who 
16  This concept of widening is related to that used by Kadmon  Xr Landman (1993) in thc analysis of (my. 
13 Raffaela Zanuttini & Paul Portner 
like spicy food tend to eat the poblanos,  serranos, and occasionally jalapeiios.  About 
one of  them, we say (28). In this context, the sentence implicates that he eats all types of 
peppers, not only all those in Dl but also, for example, the habanero, which is so spicy 
that it often makes people ill. Uttering (28) thus causes the domain of R,,,i,i,,,i,,,, Dl,  to be 
expanded to D2, including  this  additional  type.  This expansion  of  the domain  is the 
widening component of meaning of exclamatives. Widening, in this  sense, is closely 
related to  Obenauer's  (1994, p.  355) description  of  the meaning of  exclamatives: the 
WH phrase  binds  a  variable  for which  an  appropriate  value  cannot  be  found in  the 
contextually given domain. In order to find the appropriate value, one must look outside 
of  the domain. Though Obenauer's  semantic ideas are not  spelled out in  more detail 
than this, they clearly bear a close intuitive similarity to our own proposal. 
The  factivity  and  widening  components can  be  seen  as  related  to  one  another.'' 
Given that exclamatives are presupposed, certain functions for root occurrences of them 
are ruled out. Their sentential force cannot be that of assertion, since that would conflict 
with the presupposition  that the information is already known  (though they could, via 
presupposition  accommodation, indirectly  introduce new information). They cannot be 
questions,  because  it  would  be  pointless  to  ask  a  question  where  the  answer  is 
presupposed  to  be known. Finally, they  cannot be  imperatives because one wouldn't 
give an  order to do something which  one knows will be the case any~ay.'~  Assuming 
that each type of root clause must have some function, another type of function must be 
available for exclamatives. The role of affecting, in particular widening, the domain is a 
plausible one for them to have. 
Our goal in  the rest of this section will be to formalize the contributions of  factivity 
and widening. As discussed in the speech act theory literature (e.g. Austin  1962, Searle 
1965),  the  illocutionary  meaning  of  a  sentence  is  made  up  of  two  components,  a 
propositional  part  and  a force. Building on their  syntactic similarity to questions, we 
propose that the propositional part of the meaning of  exclamatives is identical to that of 
questions, while  the  force will  differ.  In  particular,  we'll  work  with  one prominent 
approach  to  the  semantics  of  questions,  the  proposition-set  view  (Hamblin  1973, 
Karttunen  1977, Groenendijk  & Stokhof  1984), according to which  questions  denote 
sets  of  propositions.  We'll  follow  Karttunen  in  particular  in  treating  questions  as 
denoting their set of true answers. (The other proposition-set views could also be used.) 
Thus, the question  What does he eat? might denote a set like {'he eats poblanos',  'he 
eats serranos', 'he eats jalapefios']. This same set would be the propositional content of 
(28)a, as given in (29).19 
(29)  [[ che roba che I  magna!]] = {p  : p is true and 3 a [p = 'a is a pepper and he eats 
a']) = ('he eats poblanos', 'he eats serranos', 'he eats jalapefios') 
Now we are able to examine how we can define widening within our approach. To do 
this, we need to discuss the notion of the domain of  quantification for R,+,,,,,,,,,,.  In WH 
exclamatives, this  is intuitively thought  of  as the set from which  values for the WH 
phrase may be drawn; in  (28), it  would be the set of  peppers D = {poblano, serrano, 
17  This point was suggested to us by Manfred Kritka (personal communication). 
18  These points are related to the preparatory conditions on speech acts discussed by e.g. Searle (1965) 
IY  Note lhat wc differ from traditional  speech act theory, according to which the propositional part of a 
sentence's meaning is  taken  to be a single proposition.  We think of  it more broadly, as the semantic 
object in terms of which the sentence's illocutionary forcc is defined. Exclamative Clauses at the Syntax-Semantics Interlice 
jalapefio,  giiero). The semantics of  the  clause must  then  be  given  in  terms  of  this 
contextually provided domain of quantification for R,,,,i,,,,t,  and an ordering on a subset 
of  D; this  is  represented  by  a  subscript  as  in [  Sn D,,.  Given  this,  we propose  that 
widening consists in the context change in (30): 
(30)  Widening: For any clause S marked by R,,,,,,,,,,,,,  widen the initial domain of 
quantification for R,,d  ,,,,,,,  Dl,  to a new domain, D2, such that 
(1)  USllm.,-USI1n1.~~0and 
(ii)  b'xVy[(,r~Dl&y~(D2-DI))-+x~~]. 
Here, [IS]  D2.i  is the set of  true propositions of  the form 'he eats x', where x is drawn 
from the new domain D2, while US1  is the corresponding set for the old domain Dl. 
Saying that the difference between these two, [  S]  u2,,  - [  S]  ol,,,  must be non-empty 
amounts to requiring that new things that he eats be added to the domain. In the scenario 
outlined  above, D2 would  differ  from  Dl in  containing  habaneras, an  the  sentence 
would say that he even eats this very spicy pepper. Thus, the analysis can  be seen as 
representing the intuition that (28) says that he eats any kind of pepper, and that if there 
is any sort he doesn't eat, it's beyond even the widened domain D2 and thus so far out 
that it's not worth considerati~n.~~ 
Turning to yeslno exclamatives, note that the Paduan example (27) above contains an 
instance of negation. Before we can discuss how  widening applies to this case, let us 
point out some relevant facts which may be observed in negative yeslno questions. Let's 
look at the following examples: 
(31)  a.  Did he eat everything? 
b.  Didn't he eat everything? 
With  regard  to  (31)a, the true answer might  be either  he  clid or  he  didn't. Thus, its 
propositional  content  is  either  ('he ate everything')  or  ['he didn't  eat  everything'}, 
depending on  which  is  true.  In  contrast, because  (31)b  is  a  negative  question,  it  is 
implicated that the true answer should be he did; thus, the propositional content of the 
question  must  be  ('he ate everything')."  Returning  now  to the  yes/no  exclamative, 
20  One could consider the possibility that the ordering represented by -: is not part of the explicit content 
of widening, hut rather that (30)(ii) is a pragmatic implicature which results from the simpler (30)(i). 
A case where this would potentially  be problematical  is the following: suppose that in the context of 
(28), thc hearer has simply not been thinking of the jicama (a type of  root vcgetable. Then, one might 
expect that !28)  could he uttered to draw attention to the fact that thc set of  relevant vegetables must 
he expanded. But  such a use seems impossible,  unless thc jicama  can  he  construcd  as extreme on 
sornc relevant scalc, for example 'unfamiliarity'; it can't hc an ordinary vegetable which the hearer has 
simply  Sailed  to  consider. This point  suggests that part  (ii) of (30) is  needed. However, there is a 
possible  alternative.  Suppose we  require  that  any  domain  of  quantification  for  Rwidening  be +- 
inclusive, in the sensc that if  x and y are in D and x -: z  + y, then z is in D. In that case, it would only 
be possible  to widen,  as  in  (30)(i), by  adding  an  clerncnt which  is  extreme on the < scale. Thus, 
(30)(ii)  might  be  unnecessary.  We  don't  takc  a  stand  on  the  choice  hctween  these  alternative 
formulations here.  '' If the implicature is falsc and the hearer answers by canceling it (No,  he DIDN'T), we can think of this 
in two ways. One possihility is that we take the scrnantics of a negative yeslno question to be the same 
as the positive one; then the propositional  content of the negative question would be  {'he didn't eat 
cveryrhing') in this case. The other possibility  is that thc negative question has no true answer when 
ils impljcature is false; in this instance, its meaning would be thc empty sct. Raffaela Zanuttini &Paul Portncr 
repeated below, its negation plays a similar role to that in  the negative yeslno question 
(31)b: 
(32)  No  ga-lo  magnh  tuto!  (Paduan) 
neg has-s.cl  eaten  everything 
'He ate everything!' 
Because  of  the  negation,  (32)  can  be  used  to  conventionally  implicate  that  he  ate 
everything. A situation in which this might be uttered is one where we are talking about 
a child who rarely eats all of his meal. On a particular occasion, however, he does. The 
fact that (32) is used  in contexts where the child has eaten everything confirms the idea 
that it is appropriate to think of it as having a meaning analogous to (31)b. 
Another thing we have to decide before the definition of widening can be applied to 
yeslno cases is what the domain of quantification for R,+,i,i,,,i,,,  would be. Since there is 
no WH word, we can't appeal to the set of possible values for the WH word, as we did 
above. We propose that this type of yeslno exclamative involves widening the domain 
of  events under  discussion; that  is,  we  go  from  talking  about  'normal'  events of  a 
certain type to considering even exceptional ones. In  the case of (32), Dl would be the 
set of normal eating situations for the child we're talking about. R,videni,,i:  would then say 
to widen Dl to D2 so as to add true propositions to the original proposition-set. Since a 
yes/no exclamative, like a yeslno question, denotes either a singleton set or the empty 
set, in order for this to be possible, two conditions must hold: First, the proposition  'he 
has  eaten everything'  must  be  true with  respect  to D2. And  second, this proposition 
must  not  be  true with  respect to Dl; that  is, we  must  have  added to the domain  an 
unusual  case  in  which  he  has  eaten  everything."  Noting  the  existence  of  such  an 
unusual case is precisely what (32) does. 
Next we turn to a definition of factivity as it applies to exclamatives. Definition (33) 
says that any proposition which has been added to the denotation of the clause through 
widening is presupposed to be true: 
(33)  Factivity: For any clause S marked by R+~tLtrvrn  .  every p E  USI] DZ,+  -  (IS1  DI,< is 
presupposed to be true. 
In the case of (28),  the factive presupposition is that he eats this hottest pepper of all, the 
habanero. In the case of the yeslno exclamatives like (32), recall from the discussion of 
widening that its denotation with respect to the initial domain Dl is the empty set, while 
that with respect to the new domain D2 is {'he ate everything'). The characterization of 
factivity in (33) generates a presupposition that this new proposition in [I SI] D~,,  is true; 
i.e. it's presupposed  that he ate everything. Notice  as an  aside that  according  to  this 
reasoning the presupposed proposition.  'he ate everything', is not negative, despite the 
presence of no. In this way, we can account for the description of this case as containing 
'expletive negation'  (see also Partner & Zanuttini 2000). 
7,  -  The proposi~l  would work equally well if the proposition-set  is empty with respect to Dl or if it is {'he 
didn't eat everything'). In either case, 'he ate everything'  will he in (ISnoz.,  Usno,.,. 
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4.2.  Widening and informal descriptions of exclamatives 
With this formal proposal in hand, we turn next to a discussion of how it can capture the 
intuitions  behind  various  qualitative  descriptions  of  the  use  of  exclamatives.  One 
frequently finds concepts like 'unexpectedness', 'extreme degree' and 'speaker's strong 
feelings'; for example, Michaelis & Lambrecht (1996: 239) consider 'scalar extent' and 
'assertion  of  affective stance: expectation contravention'  to be definitive properties of 
all  exclamatives. We do not  build  our  analysis on  these concepts  because  they  are 
difficult to make precise and because (as we will  see) they do not always seem to be 
present.  Instead,  we  will  show  that  that  these  properties,  to  the  extent  that  they 
characterize exclamatives accurately, can be derived from our concepts of factivity and 
widening. 
One intuition is that exclamatives convey an unexpected fact. One way to think about 
this  would  be  to  take  an  example  like  How  tall  MuffL  is!  as  saying  that  it  was 
unexpected that she is tall. This cannot be correct in general, however, given examples 
like What a delicious dinner you've  made! or What a nice house you've got!  In  these 
cases, the speaker doesn't mean to imply that he or she didn't expect a good dinner or a 
nice house. Rather, the speaker implies that Muffy is taller than expected (the dinner is 
more delicious than expected, the house is nicer than expected). This way of describing 
the meaning of exclamatives is completely in accord with our approach, since widening 
the domain  amounts to  adding possibilities to those in  the previously expected range. 
However, our approach makes clear that exclamatives have a different meaning from 
declaratives of the form 'It is unexpected that p'. Though exclamatives also convey the 
sense of  unexpectedness, they do so through a different sentential force. That is, while 
the declarative It  is unexpected that she is as tall as she is and the exclamative How tall 
she  is! end up contributing similar information to the conversation, they do so through 
different routes: the former through assertion and the latter through widening. 
Another  way  we  could  describe  the  meaning  and  function  of  exclamatives  is  by 
saying that they mark the fact that an entity has some property to an extreme degree (cf. 
among others Milner  1978, Gkrard  1980). For example, How  tall Muff  is! says that 
Muffy has the property of tallness to a very high degree. While this is certainly correct, 
it cannot be a complete description since it doesn't explain how the exclamative differs 
from  declaratives  like  Mu&  is  very/quite/extremely  full.  Our  analysis  in  terms  of 
widening can account for the intuition behind descriptions in terms of  'extreme degree'. 
With a scalar word like an  adjective as the head of  the exclamative's WH phrase, the 
domain of quantification for RlVrdenini:  is a set of heights. These heights are organized into 
a scale, and a domain will naturally be taken as a continuous subpart of the scale, in that 
if  5'10" and 6'  are in  domain of  quantification, 5'1 1" will naturally be as well. Saying 
that the force of exclamatives involves widening the domain means that the subpart of 
the scale considered relevant for the case at hand must be extended. This will result in 
the inclusion  of  new  heights previously  considered too great for consideration, one of 
which will be that of Muffy. 
In order to make this reasoning more precise, we'd need to cast it in terms of theories 
which have been developed to account for the vagueness of scalar terms, comparatives, 
and  the like (e.g. Russell  1905, Cresswell  1976, Hoeksema  1983, von  Stechow 1984, 
Rullmann 1995, Kennedy 1997). In particular, the semantics must be framed in terms of 
degrees (e.g. of  tallness) rather than simple quantities (like heights). Simply talking in 
terms of the latter wouldn't allow us to explain why extensions of  the domain must be 
in a certain direction (in the case at hand, towards greater rather than lesser heights). We 
will leave working this out further to future research. Raffaela Zanuttini & Paul Porltier 
A  final  way  one might  try  to  describe the meaning of  exclamatives, in  particular  in 
contrast  to  declaratives, is  by  saying  that  they  express  the  speaker's  strong feeling 
towards  what  is being  said. As it  stands, this characterization  is too vague to tell us 
much  about the function of  exclamatives; after all, it  doesn't tell us much about what 
exclamatives do to simply know that one who says How tall Mufi is! has some feeling 
towards this fact. There are various ways in  which we might try to make this intuition 
more precise. One possibility is to frame the contribution of  exclamatives as conveying 
an emotional reaction of some sort. Thus, How cute Shelby is! can be seen as expressing 
adoration and What n vicious dog I met on rn-y hike ride! as expressing fear. The sense 
that emotion is involved in  these cases arises from the particular lexical items, and the 
scales they  introduce, along with the force of  widening. If  Shelby is cute to  a degree 
beyond what was contemplated before, this is naturally seen as the cause of adoration; 
likewise, if the dog the speaker met is vicious beyond what we had thought possible, it 
is plausible to conclude that it caused fear in  the speaker. Furthermore, there are cases in 
which it's not so clear that any emotional reaction is being expressed by an exclamative: 
How tall she is! or What a cool clay it was yesterday in New DeNzi!  Of course these may 
be seen as conveying emotion, though  in  many contexts it seems more relevant to say 
they simply indicate something surprising. But at this point, our concept of  widening is 
able to provide a more formal characterization of the same idea. With the example What 
a  cool  day it was yesterday  in New Delki!,  widening  means that  the  temperature  is 
below  what  we  had  considered as  a  relevant  possibility  before;  learning  that  one's 
expectations are not met is precisely  what gives rise to a feeling of  surprise. However, 
this is the kind of case which very clearly need not generate an emotional reaction in the 
ordinary sense (for instance, if we take the exclamative as an offhand remark made over 
the morning paper's weather section). 
To sum up, we have suggested that our notion of widening can account for various 
informal  ways  in  which one can  describe  the function  of  exclamatives. The primary 
advantages of our approach are (i) that it is more precise, and (ii) that it makes clear the 
difference in  force between exclamatives and declaratives like It  is surprising  that. . . 
which assert closely related content. 
4.3.  Returning to the tests for exclamative status 
Next  we will show how our formal analysis of  the meaning of  exclamatives is able to 
explain the data underlying the various tests for exclamative status introduced in section 
3.  Recall  that  the  tests  fell  into  three  categories:  factivity,  scalar  implicature,  and 
question-answer relations. We will look at each in turn. 
4.3.1.  Factivity 
The reason  our analysis is able to account for the factivity facts is simple: we have 
directly incorporated a factivity component into the semantics (see (33)). One effect of 
factivity is that exclamatives are incompatible with non-factive predicates, as was seen 
in  (I I). This follows from the presuppositional status of  exclamatives, along with the 
point,  noted  by  Grimshaw  (1979), that  non-factive predicates  are incompatible with 
factive co~nplements  in  general. That is, they are not merely non-factive, they are anti- 
factive. The following data makes this point ((34)a is from Grimshaw  1979; see also 
Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1970): Exclamat~ve  Clauses at the Syntax-Semantics Interface 
(34)  a.  "John proposed the fact that they had gone to the movies, 
b.  John regretted the fact that they had gone to the movies. 
Our factivity  principle  can  also explain  the ill-formedness of  examples like (12)  and 
(35) below: 
(35)  *I don't know how very tall Tony is 
The embedded exclamative is  impossible  because of  an  incompatibility  between  the 
factive presupposition and the lack of speaker's knowledge asserted by the sentence. To 
show that  this  intuition  follows within our formal  implementation  requires  a certain 
amount  of  detailed work. First,  we need to  go over  both  the presupposition  and the 
assertion of (35). We'll begin our discussion by looking at the positive version, (36): 
(36)  I know how very tall Tony is. 
In order to calculate the factivity presupposition for the embedded exclamative, we must 
compare its denotation with respect to two domains, Dl and D2, each a set of heights 
(or  more  accurately,  degrees  of  tallness).  D2  is  the  actual  domain  at  the  time  the 
sentence is used, while Dl is some other, smaller domain salient in  the context. In  the 
case of (36), we seem to be comparing Tony's actual height to what would be expected 
for a man like him. Supposing he is 6'5", but that men like him are typically no more 
than 6' tall, the two domains might be as  follow^:^' 
Given these two domains, it is presupposed via the definition of  factivity in  (33) that 
Tony is 6'5". 
Notice that even in  the case of an embedded exclamative like (36), we make use of 
two domains as part  of  the calculation  of  factivity. With  root exclamatives, the two 
domains were those associated with widening. Since we have identified widening as the 
force of  exclamatives, we don't  expect it to  occur  with  embedded examples as well 
(since they lack an  independent illocutionary force). So, one might ask, what are these 
two domains? Looking at example (36), it appears that the two domains stand in  the 
kind of relationship which would be appropriate for widening at the root level. Thus, Dl 
re the 'expected'  values while D2 also contains more extreme values, one of which we 
know  to be  the true one. If  such  a Dl and  D2 are  not  available in  the context, the 
exclamative cannot be  used.  This would  only  come about  if  either of  the following 
conditions were to hold: (i) we didn't have an expected range of values, or (ii) we didn't 
know what the true value was. But of course a failure in  (i) would go against the very 
raison d'&tre of  exclamatives, while a failure in (ii) would imply that factivity does not 
hold. 
Given this factivity presupposition for the embedded exclamative in  (36), we must 
now  consider  what  the  larger  structures  containing  it  presuppose.  As  observed  by 
''  We present thc degrees of height under consideration as specific numerical measurements (interpreted 
as 'at  least n', so that all of  the measurements in  (37)h may he true). Only rarely would this be truly 
appropriate  (c.g.  in  talking  about basketball  players), but  it's  simpler than  discussing the example 
using terms like 'average height', 'a bit taller than average', 'pretty tall', ctc. 
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Karttunen (1973), a sentence of  the form V -, where V is an attitude verb like helieve, 
know, claim, hope, etc., presupposes that believes whatever - presupposes. Thus, Mary 
kn0w.r that it stopped raining presupposes that Mary believes that it was raining before. 
Hence, given the context we have set up, (36) presupposes that the speaker believes that 
Tony  is  6'5". Example  (35)  has  the  same presupposition,  since  negative  sentences 
inherit the presuppositions of their positive counterparts. 
Recall that our goal is to show that this presupposition for (35) is in con with what it 
asserts. Given that we are treating exclamatives semantically like interrogatives, we can 
interpret  know  plus  an  exclamative  in  parallel  to  kiinw  plus  an  indirect  question. 
Continuing to follow Karttunen's  (1977) semantics for questions, (38) means that the 
speaker knows each (true) proposition in the denotation of how tall Tony is. 
(38)  I know how tall Tony is. 
Applied  to  (36), this  means  that  the  speaker knows that Tony  is 6'5". The negative 
counterpart (35) thus asserts that the speaker does not know that Tony is 6'5". But this 
is in  con with  the presupposition that the speaker believes Tony is 6'5".?This  con we 
claim, is the reason for the ungrammaticality of (35). 
4.3.2.  Scalar implicature 
Next we will use our analysis of widening to explain the facts attributed in  section 3 to 
the  scalar  implicature of  exclamatives. These were  (14)a and (15)b, repeated  below 
along with their Paduan counterparts: 
(39)  a.  *It isn't amazing how very cute he is. 
b.  *No ze incredibile che  belo che el  ze. 
neg is incredible  how cute that s.cl is  (Paduan) 
(40)  a.  *Is it amazing how very cute he is? 
b.  *Ze incredibile che  belo che el  ze'?  (Paduan) 
is incredible  how cute  that s.cl is 
Recall  that  we  explained  the  ungrammaticality  of  these  examples  in  terms  of  an 
incompatibility  between  the scalar implicature of  the exclamative and  the denying or 
questioning of  the predicate  amazing. Here we will treat the scalar implicature as an 
effect of the comparison between two domains, the correlate of  widening for embedded 
exclamatives discussed in section 4.3.1. We will show that this aspect of the meaning of 
exclamatives is incompatible with negating or questioning anlazing. (We will only go 
over the explanation in detail in the case of negation (39); things work similarly for the 
question (40).) 
24  The only way the assertion and presupposition of (35) could fail to be contradictory would bc the odd 
situation  in  which  thc  speaker  believes  Tony  is  6'5"  (which  he  is)  hut  lacks  the  right  kind  of 
justification for this belief to  he knowledge (and knows his or her juslification  to be inadequate). But 
if  one is remarking on one's lack of adequate justification  for p, it's odd to simultaneously presuppose 
that onc belicves p. We think this is the source of the ungrarnmaticality of' the sentence even in  this 
kind of  content. The sentence which is naturally used  to rcport this type of situation, I don't KNOW 
that Tony's h'S", differs in that it doesn't presuppose the speaker's helief that Tony is 6'5",  but rather 
just implicates it. Exclamative Clauses at the Syntax-Semantics Interface 
In  order to make the explanation precise, we need to make a detour into the details of 
the meaning  of  amazing. Let us consider  some additional data contrasting minimally 
with (39). 
(41)  a.  It's amazing how cute she is. (embedded Q, no experiencer) 
b.  It's amazing how very cute she is. (embedded E, no experiencer) 
(42)  a.  I'm amazed at how cute she is. (embedded Q, experiencer subject) 
b.  I'm amazed at how very cute she is. (embedded E, experiencer subject) 
The  two  examples  in  (41)  lack  a  thematic  subject,  like  (39), contrasting  with  the 
experiencer subject sentences in (42). (41)a and (42)a differ from their (b) counterparts 
in containing an embedded question, as opposed to an embedded exclamative. 
The incompatibility with negation noted in  (39) only holds with the experiencer-less 
construction. Negation is fine when the experiencer subject is present: 
(43)  I'm not amazed at how very tall she is 
This shows that it's amazing ... has a different meaning from I'm amazed at .... We will 
use the contrast between  (41) and (42) to determine what this meaning difference is, 
with the ultimate goal of seeing precisely what the experiencer-less amazing means and 
why  it is incompatible with negation. The first thing to note is that the two examples 
(41)a  and  (41)b  are  synonymous. We know  that  the embedded  exclamative in  (41)b 
involves a relation between two domains parallel to that which contributes widening at 
the root level. We also know that questions do not involve widening. Thus, for the two 
sentences to be  synonymous, this  comparison  of  two domains  must be coming from 
somewhere other than the embedded question  in  (41)a. The only plausible candidate is 
amazing  itself.  We  thus  hypothesize  that  the  meaning  of  amazing, when  it  lacks  a 
thematic  subject, makes  a contribution  parallel  to  that  of  an embedded exclamative; 
more  precisely,  it  asserts  the  existence  of  two  domains  Dl and D2, the  former the 
expected range and the latter an extension of this which includes the value presupposed 
to be true. Given this, negating this version of  amazing, as in (37)  above, will lead to a 
contradiction  between  the presupposition, from the exclamative, and denial, from the 
negation of amazing, that two such domains exist. 
The  experiencer  sentences  with  amazed  at  differ  in  that  they  have  additional 
entailments pertaining  to the  (denotation of  the)  subject. Thus, the examples in  (42) 
imply that the subject has a specific kind of subjective experience, a feeling of  'marvel'. 
This aspect of  its meaning is over and above the comparison of two domains present in 
the  meaning  of  the  sentences  in  (41). It  is  this  difference  which  accounts  for  the 
grammaticality of (43). In  this case the negation may be taken as denying the subjective 
experience of marvel, and not the domain comparison, and so it can be compatible with 
the  interpretation  of  the  embedded  exclamative.  This  contrasts  with  (41), where 
negation may only be seen as denying that a Dl and D2 of the relevant sort exist. 
This way of  looking at the meaning of amazed at also explains another fact: when the 
subject is other than I, examples with an embedded question, (44)a, and those with an 
embedded exclamative, (44)b, differ in meaning: 
(44)  a.  Linda is amazed at how cute the baby is. 
b.  Linda is amazed at how very cute the baby is Raffaela Zanuttini & Paul Purtner 
While  in  both  cases  an  expected  and  a  widened  domain  are compared,  there  is  a 
difference in  terms  of  whose  expectations  are  at  issue. Example  (44)a says that  the 
degree of cuteness exceeds what the subject expected; (44)b implies in addition that the 
speaker also finds her degree of  cuteness exceptional. This difference can  be  brought 
out in a situation where the subject's and the speaker's expectations differ. For instance, 
suppose that Linda does not in  general think that babies  are cute, whereas the speaker 
finds each  and  every  baby  darling.  In  such  a  situation,  while the use  of  (44)b may 
implicate  that  the  speaker  finds  the  baby's  appearance  especially  worthy  of 
exclamining, (44)a does not. We may explain this difference as follows: In (44)b (as in 
(42)), both amazed at and the embedded exclamative bring about a comparison of two 
domains. The expected domain Dl relevant for amazed at re the subject's expectations, 
while the Dl associated with the embedded exclamative has to do with the speaker's. In 
this  way,  with  an  embedded exclamative both  the  speaker  and  the  subject must  be 
committed to the situation's  being worthy  of exclaiming. In  contrast, with (44)a only 
amazed at brings in an expected domain (Linda's); the embedded question does not. 
4.3.3.  Questionlanswer relations 
Finally  we  return  to  the  facts  showing that  exclamatives  may  not  be  answered  and 
typically may not be used as an answer. The first point follows from the simple fact that 
the function of exclamatives is not to introduce a set of alternatives into the discourse in 
the  way  questions do.  Rather, we  have  proposed  that  their  function  is widening  the 
domain. The specifics of our account of  widening don't  play a role here; the point is 
simply that the force of exclamatives does not affect the discourse in a way which opens 
the door for answering. 
Exclamatives typically cannot be used as an answer because they are factive (though 
we  noted  a possible exception  in  note  13). In  general,  a  sentence being  used  as an 
answer may not presuppose the information which provides the answer, as pointed out 
by  Grimshaw  (1979). Thus,  (45)  is  unacceptable  because  It's  odd  that  ...  is  factive 
(Grimshaw's example (l54),  p. 321): 
(45)  A:  Did Bill leave? 
B:  *It's odd that he did. 
Since exclamatives are factive, we expect them to be impossible as answers. 
4.4.  Conclusion 
In  this  section,  we  have  identified  two  semantic  properties  which  characterize 
exclamatives:  they  are  factive  and  they  trigger  the  operation  of  widening.  These 
semantic components together can explain all of the data which motivated our criteria, 
and could capture various informal ways of describing the contribution of exclamatives. 
5.  The structure of exclamatives 
We now turn  to  the  'form'  side of the formlmeaning pairing which is the basis of the 
concept of  clause type.  Our picture  of  the  syntaxlsemantics interface suggests that  a 
clause should be  an exclamative if  and only if  these two components are structurally 
represented.  In  this  section, we  argue  that  this  is  so, looking  at  data  from  Paduan, Exclamat~ve  Clauses at thc Syntax-Semantics Intcrface 
English, and Italian. In particular, we propose that widening is tied to the presence of a 
WH  operator.2'  The  widening  operation  discussed  in  section  4  requires  a  set  of 
alternative propositions, and the WH operator provides this set of alternatives in just the 
same way  as  it  does  in  an  interrogative.  In  addition,  we claim  that  the  factivity  of 
exclamatives is represented by  a CP layer of  structure. The purpose of this section is to 
support the idea that factivity is syntactically represented in the CP-domain. 
5.1.  CP-recursion: some initial evidence from Paduan 
Paduan provides direct evidence that exclamative clauses contain an extra CP layer of 
structure.  We  will  identify  three  ways  in  which  WH exclamatives and  questions in 
Paduan differ ~yntactically,~  and then show how these differences can be explained by 
proposing  a  second  layer  of  CP for  exclamatives.  In  Section  5.2  we  will  provide 
arguments that exclamatives in other languages, in particular Italian and English, have a 
similar structure. 
The first contrast between  exclamatives and  interrogatives in  Paduan  is  in  the  linear 
order of  the WH phrase with respect to left-dislocated constituents (cf. Beninci 1996). 
WH constituents in questions can follow, but cannot precede, left-dislocated elements: 
(46)  a.  A  to  sorela, che  libro vorissi-to regalar-ghe?  (Paduan) 
to your sister, which book want-s.cl give-her 
'To your sister, which book would you like to give as a gift? 
b.  "Che libro, a to sorela, vorissi-to regalar-ghe? 
(47)  a.  To  sorela, a  chi  la  ga-li  presenti? 
your  sister,  to who her have-s.cl introduced 
'Your sister, to whom have they introduced her? 
b.  *A chi, to sorela, ghe la ga-li presenth? 
In  contrast, complex WH constituents in exclamatives may precede the left-dislocated 
element:27 
(48)  a.  Che  be1  libro,  a  to  sorela, che  i  ghe  ga  regalh! 
what nice book, to your sister, that s.cl  her  have  given 
'What a nice book, to your sister, they gave her as a a gift!' 
b.  In che  be1  posto, to  $010, che te  lo  ga  mandi! 
in what nice place, your  son, that s.cl him have  sent 
'In what a nice place, your son, you sent him!' 
We can summarize Beninch's (1996:41) conclusions about the possible relative orders 
among left dislocated elements and WH constituents as follows: 
(49)  Left dislocation - WH exclamative - Left dislocation - WH interrogative 
25  Based on data from Dutch, Corver (1990, Ch. 5) argues that the WH operator wat ('what') in CP  can 
hnction to mark a clause as cxclamative. 
16  The precise characterization of all of the suhtypes of  exclamative clauses in  Paduan is quite complex. 
See Zanuttini & Portner (2000) for detailed description. 
27  Simple oncs may not, nor may WH phrases headed by adjectives or adverbs. We discuss these facts in 
detail in section 6. I. Raffaela Zanuttini & Paul Portnet 
The pattern of  behavior of  WH phrases in exclamatives is in this way similar to that of 
WH phrases in relative clauses, discussed by Rizzi (1997). 
The second way in which questions and exclamatives in Paduan differ is with respect 
to the nature of the element in the C position. The WH constituent in an exclamative co- 
occurs  with  either  the  complementizer  che  or  the  complex  head  [V no  V]  (plus 
associated clitics) in C: 
(50)  a.  Cossa che 1  magnava! 
what  that s.cl ate 
'What things he ate!' 
b.  Che  libro  che  te  lezi! 
what book  that  s.cl  read 
'What a book you are reading!' 
(51)  a.  Cossa [no  ghe dise-lo]! 
what  neg him says-s.cl 
'What things he's telling him!' 
b.  Che libro  [no lezi-to]! 
what book neg read-s.cl 
'What a book you are reading!' 
In  contrast, co-occurrence of  the WH phrase and the complementizer  che or no+V  is 
never possible in matrix questions: 
(52)  a.  "Cossa che  I  magnava'? 
what  that  s.cl ate 
'What did he eat?' 
b.  *Cossa no  ga-lu  magni? 
what  neg  has-s.cl  eaten 
'What didn't she eat?' 
A  final  difference  between  Paduan  WH  questions  and  exclamatives  concerns  the 
obligatoriness  of  movement:  overt movement is obligatory  in  exclamatives but  not in 
questions (Beninci 1996, GCrard  1980, Obenauer 1994, Radford 1982). 
We  take  the  similarities  we  have  examined  to  suggest  that  questions  and 
exclamatives both  involve movement of the WH constituent  to  a CP position. At the 
same time, we take the observed differences to suggest that the requirements that must 
be  satisfied  in  the  two  cases  are  not  identical.  In  particular,  we  hypothesize  that 
exclamatives involve movement to a position which is structurally higher than the one 
involved in questions: 
(53)  Questions:  CP' 
/\ 
WH  C ' 
A 
C  IP 
I  I\ 
v  @ Exclamative Clauscs at the Syntax-Semantics Interface 
(54)  Exclamatives:  cp2 
/\ 
WH  C ' 
A 
C  CP' 
(XP)  C '  ,'-'-. 
C  IF' 
I 
che/no+V  A 
d 
Given  these structural analyses of  the two clause types, the properties  differentiating 
exclamatives from interrogatives are derived as follows: 
The WH phrase  occurs  in  the higher  CP in  the syntax, leaving room  for another 
phrase in the spec of the lower CP. 
The lower C0 is always filled, either by  che or by no plus the verb; the fact that the 
WH phrase  is  in  the higher  projection  allows for  the  presence  of the without  a 
doubly-filled-COMP filter ~iolation.~" 
The higher specifier of CP position must be filled, giving rise to the obligatoriness of 
movement in exclamatives. 
We speculate that yeslno exclamatives also use both layers of  CP structure, though we 
don't  have the same kind of direct evidence available with WH exclamatives. In  (55) 
and  (56)a,  the  obligatory  boy  or  ecome  can  be  seen  as  residing  in  the  higher  CP. 
However, the negative inversion (56)b would have to be seen as containing an abstract 
operator in this position. 
(55)  *(Boy) if syntax isn't fun! 
(56)  a.  *(Ecome) se  1  ga  pianto!  (Paduan) 
and how if  s.cl  has  cried 
'And how she cried so!' 
b.  No  ga-lo  magna  tuto! 
neg  has-s.cl  eaten  everything 
'He's eaten everything!' 
We leave a more detailed analysis of yes/no exclamatives to future work. 
Besides the empirical  arguments concerning Paduan  given  above, there is another, 
more theoretical point which supports the idea that exclamatives may involve an  extra 
layer of CP structure. This arises from the factivity of exclamatives. It has been argued 
by Watanabe (1993) that factive complement clauses involve CP-recursion. Assuming 
that  this  is  correct,  it  is  plausible  to  suggest  that  the  factivity  of  exclamatives  is 
syntactically  encoded  by  the presence  of  the  extra CP layer  (i.e. CP'  in  (54) is the 
Rfj,,,i,i,,  of  section  4.1).  We will  discuss the connection to  factivity in  more detail in 
section 5.2. 
'R  Emhedded WH questions may contain chc. Thus whatever principle rules out a doubly-filled-COMP 
in root interrogatives is not operative in embedded contexts. Raffaela Zanuttini & Paul Porlnc~ 
Stepping back for a moment, we'd  like to point out for future research  the number of 
connections among the categories of NP, factive complement clause, and exclamative. 
To begin with, some exclamatives in English have the structure of noun phrases: 
(57)  a.  The things he eats! 
b.  The things he does to impress his friends! 
In addition, others resemble free relatives, as seen in (58): 
(58)  a.  What things he eats! (cf. What things he eats I eat too.) 
b.  What he does to impress his friends! (cf. What he does to impress his 
friends bothers me.) 
Admittedly there are differences between the ordinary free relative construction and the 
subtype of exclamatives in (58); for instance, a free relative allows who as its WH word 
(I like who he  likes),  but  an exclamative doesn't  (*Who he likes!).  Nevertheless,  the 
overall affinity between exclamatives and NPs in English supports treating the cases in 
(58) as free relatives in terms of their structure. Rizzi (1997) argues that Italian relatives 
involve  WH  movement  to  a  higher  projection  than  interrogatives.  Given  that  the 
exclamatives  in  (58) have the structure of  free relatives, this  supports our contention 
that exclamatives in general involve multiple layers of structure in the CP-domain. This 
way of looking at things suggests a link to the analysis of factives more broadly. Factive 
complement clauses have been argued to involve structure above the basic CP level, and 
this structure has been identified both as a CP (Watanabe 1993) and as an NP (Kiparsky 
& Kiparsky  1970). Furthermore, Koster (1994) mentions that clausal complements of 
factives in  Dutch behave like NPs  in that they are obligatorily in  pre-verbal position. 
The overall picture that  emerges here is that factives in general, and exclamatives in 
particular,  are  expressed  with  structures  containing  a  CP  plus  another  maximal 
projection  above. This higher projection has  been  analyzed as an  NP or a CP. In  the 
long  run  we'd  like  to  investigate  whether  it  may  indeed  be  of  either  category,  or 
whether  it  has  a  uniform  analysis  with  the  surface  properties  of  one  or  the  other 
emerging in different languages or contexts. 
5.2.  The syntax of factivity 
In  the  previous  section  we  discussed  evidence  that  exclamatives  contain  a  more 
articulated  CP structure than  interrogatives. We will now provide arguments that this 
extra  structure is  connected to  one of  the  two  semantic properties  that  characterize 
exclamatives, namely factivity. In  doing so, we build on the work of Watanabe (1993), 
who  argues  that  factive complement clauses involve  CP-recursion.  He proposes  the 
following  structure  for  embedded  factive  declaratives,  where  FACT  represents  a 
'factive operator': 
(59)  a.  John regrets that he fired Mary. (Watanabe 1993: 527) 
b.  ... [CP  [Ic thati [CP FACT [tc ti1  ~~11111 
He  presents  both  empirical  and  theoretical  motivations  for  such  structure.  On  the 
empirical  side, he  uses  it  to  account  for  the  well-known  observation  that  adjunct 
extraction is more difficult from factive clauses than from non-?active ones; the factive Exclamative Clauses at thc Syntax-Semantics Interface 
operator  occupies  the  specifier  of  (the  lower)  CP, thus  blocking  movement  of  the 
adj~nct.~"  On the theoretical side, he adopts the proposal of Authier (1992) that a clause 
with any type of material  in the specifier of  its highest CP is typed as a WH-clause. In 
(59) regret selects a non-WH complement; hence, the top CP layer of  its complement 
clause  must  have  an  empty  specifier  so as  not  to  be  typed  as  a  WH clause.  This 
motivates  the presence  of  an  additional  CP layer  above the  one hosting FACT. The 
derivation indicated in  (59)b involves creating this  second CP by raising thut. This is 
necessary  to  allow  FACT  to  be  selected  by  the  higher predicate;  the  idea is  that  a 
configuration  in  which  the  two  CPs  share  the  same  head  allows  regret  to  have  a 
selection relation towards both of them. 
Watanabe makes a similar proposal for embedded topicalization like (58): 
(60)  a.  John said that this book, Mary should have read. (Watanabe 1993: 524) 
b.  ...  LCP  [[C  thati [cp  this book [[c ti] IP]]]]] 
For us, the main relevance of his analysis of embedded topics is that they show overtly 
that the specifier of  the lower CP is occupied. Since FACT and the topic compete for 
the same position, this predicts that embedded topicalization  should be impossible in 
factive complements. This prediction is borne out in the following examples, as noted 
by Iatridou & Kroch (1992) and Watanabe (1993): 
(61)  a.  *John regrets that Mary he fired. 
b.  *John regrets Mary that he fired. (Watanabe 1993: 528) 
While (61)a is certainly better than Watanabe's (61)b, it is nevertheless unacceptable. 
Given  recent  theoretical  work  on  the nature  of  the CP domain  (Rizzi  1997, 
Beninck 2001, among others), the syntactic analysis of this type of data needs to be 
revisited. In  particular, we now take the CP domain to provide several positions for 
clause-initial  elements, differentiated  by  their  semanticlpragmatic  function, and  so 
(61) can't simply be explained in terms of  competition for a single specifier position. 
Moreover, on the empirical side it seems at best partially correct to say that factive 
complements are incompatible with a clause-initial topic. As pointed out to us by  a 
reviewer, data like the following are acceptable: 
(62)  Mark didn't understand the first part of  your thesis. In  fact, he regrets that most 
of  it he was unable to understand. 
Assuming  that  Iatridou  &  Kroch  and  Watanabe's  basic  intuition  is  correct,  the 
question is whether a more sophisticated understanding of the structure of CP allows 
us to accommodate data like (62) as well. 
Without  undertaking  the  whole project  of  reinterpreting  Iatridou  &  Kroch  and 
Watanabe's idea in  Rizzi-style terms,  it does seem to us that the embedded topic in 
(62) has a special status. It is clearly focused and constrastive with the first part  of 
your  thesis.  The  split-CP framework  provides  separate  positions  for contrastive 
topics (Rizzi's "focalized elements")  and neutral topics, and perhaps only the latter are 
Watanabe also comments on the impossibility  of  complernentizer  deletion in factive complements. 
However, his explanation of this property is presented as a speculative remark and requires additional 
assumptions not relevant hcre, so we will not discuss it further. 
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in  complementary distribution  with  the factive operator. In  any case, what  we care 
about here is the question  of  whether there is  evidence independent of  exclamative 
constructions  for  the  presence  of  a  factive  operator  in  the  syntax.  The work  of 
Watanabe and Iatridou & Kroch can still be seen as providing such evidence as long 
as they  have shown an incompatibility between  factivity and some particular variety 
of topical element. 
Returning  to  the  analysis  of  exclamatives,  we  adopt  the  idea  that  factivity  is 
represented  by  a  factive  operator  in  the  CP  domain  and  suggest  a  more  precise 
representation for (63): 
(63)  a.  Che  alto  che  1  ze!  (Paduan) 
what  tall  that  s.cl  is 
'How tall he is!' 
b.  ICP  the alto [[c 01  [CP FACT [C chel PI11 
In  this construction, two specifiers of  CP are needed  in  order to host both the factive 
operator and the WH phrase. 
A side issue that arises here is how WH-movement of clze alto is able to move past 
the factive operator, given the island effects attributed to this operator by Watanabe. We 
suggest that FACT does not have the right feature content to count as an  intervening 
potential  attractee  for WH movement to  the  higher  CP; specifically,  it has  no WH 
feature. This  way of  looking at WH exclamatives still  allows an explanation  of  why 
extraction is not possible from embedded factives like (59). Movement of a WH phrase 
to the specifier of  the highest embedded CP in  (59) would type the clause as WH, and 
this  would  be  incompatible  with  the  selectional  requirements  of  regret.  (In  the 
complement of a non-factive, the Spec of CP will not be filled by FACT; once the WH 
phrase lands there, the complementizer can raise to prevent the clause from being typed 
as WH.) Direct movement from the embedded IP to the ~nain  clause's specifier of CP is 
ruled out by  whatever forces successive cyclic movement; in Chomsky's (1998) terms, 
this  would  be  the  fact  that  only  the  periphery  of  a  phase  is  visible  to  subsequent 
derivation. 
We  may  now  see  how  the  structure  proposed  in  (63)b  types  the  clause  as  an 
exclamative. In  root contexts, the mere presence of  the factive operator suffices, as no 
other clause type is compatible with factivity when unembedded. As mentioned earlier, 
this  is  so because it does not  make sense to assert, order, or ask about a proposition 
which is presupposed to be true. In embedded contexts, the structure is rather similar to 
embedded factive declaratives like (59), but the combination of the WH element and the 
factive operator distinguishes exclamatives from all other types. On the one hand, while 
embedded  interrogatives  would  contain  a WH feature, they  are  not  compatible with 
factivity; on the other, embedded declaratives could have the factive operator, but  are 
incompatible with the WH constituent. 
We can  now turn  to how these ideas may be applied to a more precise analysis of 
nominal exclamatives as in Engli~h:~' 
''  One qucstion that ariscs at this point is how an nominal structure like (61) could have the clause-like 
interpretation  of a proposition associated with  a sentential force. For readers who rnay  he intercsted, 
let us sketch how such a rcading can be cornpositionally derived, comparing its derivation with that of 
an ordinary relative. 
In  the case of a simple noun  phrase containing a relative clause, the 1P containing a gap denotes an 
open  proposition  (i.e. a  proposition  relative  to  an  assignment  function). The role  of  the  relative Exclamative Clauses at the Syntax-Semantics Interface 
(64)  a.  The things he says! 
b.  [IIP  [ID the1 INP  things [W  WH [Ic 0 [CP FACT [C 01  [IP he sa~slllllllll 
The key novel feature here is the presence of n~ultiple  layers of CP within the relative 
clause. In  theoretical terms this  is again motivated by the need to represent both WH 
and factivity. It receives empirical motivation from Rizzi's (1997) study of the structure 
of the CP domain. He argues that the CP projection  occupied by  relative pronouns is 
structurally  the  highest  in  the  clause. This  leaves  the  lower  projections  of  the  CP- 
domain open to host other material. For example, drawing on  Italian data he provides 
cases of  embedded clitic left-dislocation within a relative clause. The relative pronoun 
must precede the left-dislocated element il prenzio Nobel, contrasting with interrogatives 
where it must follow: 
(65)  a.  Un  uomo a  cui,  il premio Nobel, lo daranno  senz'altro. 
(Italian, Rizzi 1997) 
a  man  to whom the prize Nobel  it  will-give without-other 
'A man to whom they'll  undoubtedly give the Nobel Prize' 
b.  Il premio Nobel, a  chi  lo  daranno? 
the prize Nobel  to who  it will-give 
'The Nobel Prize, who will they give it to?' 
If  Rizzi is correct, it is plausible to claim that the relative pronoun in (64) is quite 
high  in  the clause, and not in  competition with the factive operator for a  single 
structural  position.  Drawing  this together with  what  we've  said  about (63),  we 
propose  that  all  exclamatives contain  a  factive  operator  in  the  specifier  of  a 
particular CP projection. This factive operator is incompatible with a certain type 
of topic, but is compatible with certain WH operators and contrastive topics. 
To summarize, we have claimed that the syntax of exclamatives is determined by the 
need to encode the two semantic components which characterize this clause type. They 
must  provide  a  set  of  alternative propositions,  required  by  widening,  and  they  must 
represent factivity. The set of alternative propositions is provided through the presence 
of  a WH operator-variable structure, just  as with interrogatives. Factivity is represented 
by  an operator within the CP domain. A phrase is classified as an  exclamative at the 
interface if it has these two syntactic properties. 
pronoun is to turn this into a predicate; for example, whom he met would denote the set of entities he 
rnct  (or the  characteristic  function  thereof). This set is  then  comhincd  with  thc  head  noun  by  set 
inlersection, so that, for instance, women he mcr  denotes the set or entities x  such that x is a woman 
and he met  x  (or more precisely, its characteristic  function). This is an ordinary NP denotation, and 
can hc comhincd with thc determiner without difficulty. 
In  the case of the exclamative, we would suggcst that the relative and head  noun do not combine hy 
intersection. Rachel-, the meaning of the relative pronoun  is such that it causes the clausc to take the 
head noun  as an argument and yield  a sentence meaning. In the case of the women whom he met, he 
met  would  continue to denote  an open propositioo, hut  the relative  pronoun  would  turn  this into a 
function from N meanings to sentence meanings. Thus, whom he met would  denote hP[he met some 
PI, and wonten whom he mer would denote the proposition that he met women. Due to the presence of 
the  factive  operator,  this  proposition  is  presupposed.  Finally,  according  to  our  principles  this 
proposition is then associated with exclamative force at thc DP level. Raffaela Zanuttini & Paul Porlner 
6.  The syntax of the WH phrase in exclamatives 
The account we have given so far of the way in which clauses are typed as exclamative 
is quite simple: they must have a factive operator and a WH  phrase. These two elements 
correspond to the two semantic components which distinguish exclamatives from other 
clause types.  However, as mentioned  in  the Introduction, exclamative clauses exhibit 
significant diversity  in  their structure. This raises  the question of  whether our simple 
proposal is too simplistic. We will  argue that it is not. Focusing on WH  exclamatives, 
we will see that, amidst all of their diversity, what consistently distinguishes them from 
other clause types is the presence of the WH  phrase and factive operator. 
We think  that  the  key  to understanding  the  diversity  of  exclamative clauses  is  a 
detailed understanding  of  the WH  phrases they contain. Not all WH phrases are alike. 
Some only  occur in  exclamatives, while  others may  occur  in  both  exclarnatives and 
interrogatives. A close examination of  the internal makeup of the former group reveals 
that they  contain  a morpheme not present  in  the latter. This morpheme has a special 
relation to the factive operator. As a consequence, this class of WH  phrases occupies a 
position very high in the CP field. WH  phrases which  may occur in both exclamatives 
and interrogatives, in contrast, occupy a lower position. This difference in position leads 
to a number of other structural consequences. In  Italian, for example, the WH  phrases 
which only occur in  exclamatives differ from the others in that they require the presence 
of the complementizer che and can be followed by  a left-dislocated element. 
Our appeal to a number of positions for WH  phrases is in  accord with a number of 
other proposals  in  the literature  (e.g., Rizzi  1997 and Beninch to appear). Our study 
allows us to make a contribution to this approach by  pointing out the relevance of some 
novel  data. In  addition, because exclamatives are factive, we are able to tie proposals 
concerning the syntactic representation of  factivity to this literature on the positioning 
of  WH phrases. We will  attempt to present our findings in  a way  which is neutral  on 
various  issues  of  detail  concerning  the  structure  of  the  'left  periphery',  since  the 
considerations which we bring up add to, rather than  modify, the set of arguments that 
have been put forth. 
6.1.  Italian and Paduan 
6.1.1.  Two classes of WH phrases in Italian 
As mentioned above, we may distinguish two groups of WH  phrases. One only occurs 
in exclamatives, while the other may occur in both exclamatives and interrogatives. 
1. Some WH  phrases that occur in exclamatives do not occur in interrogatives: 
(66)  a.  Che  tanti  libri  che ha  comprato! 
which  many books that has bought 
'How very many books s/he bought!' 
b. *  Che tanti libri ha comprato? 
which many books has bought 
(67)  a.  Che  alto che  C! 
which tall  that  is 
'How very tall he is!' Exclamative Clauses at the Syntax-Semantics lnterlhce 
b.  The  alto  C? 
which  tall  is 
The WH phrases in  (66)-(67) have a number of other properties which also need to be 
explained. First, they must cooccur with the complementizer  he:^' 
(68)  a.  The  tanti  libri  ha  comprato! 
which many books has bought 
b.  The alto  C! 
which  tall  that is 
And second, as mentioned above they allow a left-dislocated constituent to their right: 
(69)  a.  Che  tanti  libri,  a tua sorella, che le  hanno regalato! 
which many books to your sister that her have  given 
'How very many books they gave to your sister!' 
b.  Che  be1 posto, a Giorgio, che (gli) hanno assegnato! (Benincl to appear) 
which nice place, to Giorgio, that him have assigned 
'What a good place they assigned to Giorgio!' 
2.  All  WH phrases  that  occur  in  interrogatives  also  occur  in  exclamatives.  For 
e~ample:'~ 
(70)  a.  Chi  inviterebbe  per  sembrare  importante! 
who would-invite for to-seem  important 
'The people he would invite to seem important!' 
b.  Chi inviterebbe per sembrare importante? 
(71)  a.  Cosa farebbe  per  i  suoi gli! 
what would-do for  the his  children 
'The things he would do for his children!' 
b.  Cosa farebbe per i suoi gli? 
(72)  a.  Quanto  6  alto! 
how much  is  tall 
'How tall he is!' 
b.  Quanto C alto? 
-  - 
"  Radford (1997: 101) only reports che+ADV as requiring the complcmentizer, saying that che+ADJIPP 
merely prefers its presence. He doesn't consider che trrnn+N. The data in this paper are hased on the 
judgments of the first author. We find the examples with adjectives and adverhs to pattern the same as 
onc another. As Redford notes, however, there appears to he significant varialion, perhaps regionally 
based.  ''  Root cxclamatives with chi and cosa are most productive with a verh in the conditional, and for same 
speakers with negation, though Rigamonti (1981:78) reports Che cosa/Cosa/Che mi tocca fare! ('The 
things I  have to do!') and Chi mi tncca inconrrare! ('The people I  havc to meet!'). In this paper we do 
not focus on these factors. Wc discuss the role of  the negative marker in Portncr & Zanuttini  (1996, 
2000). 
The WH words dove ('whcre'), come ('how'), and quando ('when') behave like chi ('who') and cosa 
('what').  PerchC  ('why'),  like  its  English  counterpart,  fails  to  occur  in  root  exclamatives,  but  is 
possible embedded (*Perch&  I'ha fatto!  vs. Sapessi perchi l'hrrfutro!  'You  should hear why he did 
it!'). Raffaela Zanuttini & Paul Portner 
(73)  a.  Quantilquali  libri  ha  comprato! 
how manylwhich  books  has  bought 
'How very manylwhat books slhe bought!' 
b.  Quanti libri ha comprato? 
In contrast to those WH phrases that only occur in exclamatives, these do not allow the 
complementizer: 
(74)  a.  *Chi  che inviterebbe  per sembrare importante! 
who  that would-invite for to-seem  important 
b.  "Cosa  che farebbe  per  i  suoi  figli! 
what  that would-do for  the  his  children 
c.  *Quanto  che  C alto! 
how much that is  tall 
d.  ??Quanti/quali  libri  che  ha  comprato! 
how manylwhich  books  that has bought 
'How (very) many books sfhe bought!' 
The judgement concerning (74)d is less than clear. It seems better than chi  and cosa, but 
worse than che alto and che tanti libri in (68). 
These  WH  phrases  also  disallow  a  left-dislocated  constituent  to  their  right,  for 
example:" 
" There is onc WH wurd which we have not included in  our discussion. Come ('how') essentially falls 
into our second  group, hut  it raiscs some additional issues  which  lead  us  to ovoid  building  on it  in 
what  follows.  Like  WH phrascs  in  our  second  group,  it  may  occur  in  both  excla~natives  and 
intcrrogatives and disallows che and left dislocation to its right, as seen in (i): 
(ia)  Come (%he) 6  stata  hrava! (cf. Radford 1997: 102) 
how  (that)  is  been  good 
'How good she was!' 
(ih)  Comc 6  stata?  (Answer: Brava.) 
how  is  been 
'How was she?' 
(iia)  Come (*chc) canta  hcne! 
how  (that)  sings  wcll 
'How she sings well!' 
(iih)  Come canta?  (Answer: Bene.) 
how  sings 
'How docs she sing'?' 
However, the exclamative and interrogative differ in that the exclamative may contain a modifier in 
the predicate, here hravu or hene in (ii), which is not present in the corresponding interrogative. (The 
interrogatives may marginally contain this extra modifier, hut this gives rise to an interpretation for 
come dil'ferent from that in the exclamative: cf How does she sin8 well? Answer: By takin~  steroids.) 
 hi^ r.  asea  '. . .  dn issue  .  concerning the syntactic analysis of thc exclamatives, in particular thc relationship 
hetwcen  come and the constituent it seems to modify. Rndford (1997) cuncludes that the two do not 
form a unit  at any  lcvel. However. this leaves unexplained  the  relationship  with  thc corresponding 
intcrrogatives, where come might be thought to have moved  from the position of  hrtlvuhene. Notice 
as wcll thal (iia) is plausibly also treated as a yeslno exclarnalive, that is one used lo exclaim ahout the 
proposition that she sings well  (as apposed to  not singing well), in  addition  to its reading as a WH 
cxclamative. Furthermore, we note that French has two lexical items corresponding to come: comme, 
which is p~~ssible  only in cxclamatives, and cornrrrenr, used only in  interrogatives. For thcse reasons, it 
is hest to put come aside for thc time being. Exclamative Clauses at the Syntax-Semantics Interface 
(75)  a.  *Cosa, a  tua  sorella, (che) le  hanno regalato! 
what  to your sister  that  her have  given 
3. Finally, WH phrases formed with che+N are an intermediate case. Like the elements 
in (70)-(73), they may occur in  both  exclamatives and interrogatives, but unlike them 
they allow the complementizer. A left-dislocated element is also possible: 
(76)  a.  Che  libri  (che) ha  comprato! 
which books that  has bought 
'What books slhe bought!' 
b.  Che  libri,  a  tua  sorella, (che)  le  hanno regalato! 
what books to your sister  that  her  have  given 
'What books they gave your sister!' 
We'll  treat  this  type  of  WH phrases as ambiguous  between  the  two  classes  of  WH 
phrases. This explains their range of properties and will receive further support below. 
We refer to the WH phrases that only occur in exclamatives as 'E-only'  WH phrases 
(cf.  (66)-(67)).  In  what  follows,  we  will  discuss  the  question  of  why  E-only  WH 
phrases, but  not  the  others in  (70)-(73), have the two syntactic properties  mentioned 
above: cooccurrence with the complernentizer and with a left-dislocated element to their 
right. 
Before  we  move  on,  it  is  important  to  make  clear  the  connection  between  the 
presence of  an  E-only WH phrase and the status of a clause as an exclamative. While 
the presence of an E-only phrase forces the clause to be exclamative, exclamatives can 
also be formed with other WH phrases (cf. (70)-(73)). This also makes the point that 
exclamatives cannot be defined by  the cooccurence of complelnentizer che with a WH 
phrase.  While all such  cases are exclamative, there are other types  of  exclamative as 
well. A general account of this clause type must encompass all varieties. 
6.1.2. The internal structure of WH phrases: some technical issues 
Over the  next  two subsections we will  present an  argument that E-only WH phrases 
contain an element, a morpheme glossed as 'E-only',  which is not shared by those WH 
phrases  that  can  occur  in  interrogatives.  This  element  requires  the  presence  of  the 
factive operator, explaining why such WH phrases only occur in exclamatives. We will 
show how  their  syntactic representation explains the facts noted in  section 6.1.1 : they 
must cooccur with  the complementizer che and they allow a left-dislocated constituent 
to their right. In  contrast, other WH phrases may or may not cooccur with the factive 
operator, and they receive a less highly-articulated syntactic structure which  results in 
their incompatibility with a following complementizer and left-dislocated constituent. 
The possibility  or  impossibility  of  having  the  E-only  morpheme  in  a  given  WH 
phrase  depends  on  the  phrase's  morphological  makeup.  Hence,  our  first  step  is  a 
detailed investigation of the internal structure of  the WH phrases. With regard  to the 
issues \ye are concerned with here, the internal  makeup of  WH phrases  in  English  is 
particularly  transparent.  Consider  how  many  hooks,  a  case  where  three  different 
components are explicitly and separately realized. The morpheme how indicates that we 
have WH quantification. Many provides a specification of  the  'measure'  by which the Raffaela Zanuttini & Paul Portncr 
WH element quantifies, indicating that we are counting numbers of  individual^.'^ Books 
provides the sortal, indicating that these. individuals are books. 
(77)  how many  books 
WH MEASURE SORTAL 
(78)  qu-anti  libri  (Italian) 
WH+MEASURE  SORTAL 
Notice that many in this case is playing a different semantic role from that in He  bought 
many books, since it does not indicate a large number, but merely the fact that some 
number is being asked for. The Italian  counterpart of  how many hooks is quanti libri, 
where quanti expresses both WH quantification (qu-) and measure (-ant-),  along with 
agreement (4). 
The E-only counterparts of  lzovv  many and quanti are how very many and che tanti, 
respectively. The English form suggests that the obligatory exclamative nature of these 
phrases  is  marked  by  an  additional  element, lexicalized  as  very  in  English,  which 
modifies the specification of rnea~ure:'~ 
(79)  how  very  many  books 
WH E-ONLY  MEASURE  SORTAL 
In  Italian, we propose  that  the role  of  very in  marking the E-only  nature  of  the WH 
phrase  is filled by  tanri ('muchlmany'). More specifically, tanti should be viewed as a 
combination oft- and -urzt-, where -ant- is the same morpheme occurring in quanti and 
indicates measure. The morpheme t- corresponds to very in (79): 
(80)  che  t-anti  libri 
WH  E-ONLY+MEASURE SORTAL 
As we'll  see, for morphological reasons the E-only marker only occurs in Italian when 
the WH element is che. 
Recall that, when che is followed by  an NP, it has two syntactic analyses, as an E- 
only WH phrase  and  as a non-E-only WH phrase. We propose that  the E-only form 
'  In Ihct,  we arc prr~bahly  collapsing two concepts here: we  are measuring  an amount and computing 
this amount relative the count domain of individuals.  In a case like how much nzilk, wc continue to 
llleasure amount, hut we  compute the amount relative to a measure appropriate to the mass domain, 
like liters. 
IS  Of  coursc  vei-y,  like  the  corresponding  Italian  element  tunri,  can  occur  in  non-exclamative 
constructions where no E-only mr~rpheme  would play a rolc. It is only  in the presence of how or che, 
respcctivcly, that  lhese elements indicate the exclamative  nature of the phrasc. It could he that very 
and  tunti are amhiguous  betwcen E-only markers,  which  occur in  thcse  constructions, and ordinary 
modifiers. One point in favor of such an approach is thc hct that not even nearly synnnymous words 
can have the function of marking the phrase as E-only:  .C?how extremely frrll, "whuf some hook (cf. 
wlzrrt a hook), and *rh? ~nolto  alto ('how very tall'). Alternatively, there may he a single lorln of each, 
one whose potential  to function as an E-only element is only triggered in the right syntactic context. 
Note that nothing can intcrvene between the WH word and these E-only markers: *how nor very tall, 
"what mun)'  an enjoyahl~  evening, *chr cosi tanti lihri ('how  so many books'). This shows that the 
syntax of these cases is somehow special. Exclamative Clauses at the Syntax-Semiintics Interface 
contains a null morpheme, indicated by e ,  which represents the fact that the phrase is E- 
only: 
(81)  che  E  libri  (... che  ha  comprato!) 
WH  E-ONLY SORTAL  that  has  bought 
This case has a different interpretation from clze tunti libri. Because the latter contains 
anti, which indicates MEASURE, it exclaims over the number of  individual books. In 
contrast, (81), which does not contain a MEASURE, has to do with some quality of the 
books. Thus, it means 'what books'. 
The non-E-only WH form of che libri has the following structure: 
(82)  che  libri 
WH  SORTAL 
(82) occurs in both  exclamatives and interrogatives, making the point that the E-only 
morpheme  is  not  required  to  make  a  clause  exclamative.  This  phrase  lacks  a 
specification of MEASURE, and so do not quantify over quantity or amount. Rather, it 
simply quantifies over books. This is particularly clear in the interrogative use, where it 
simply means 'which books'; in exclamatives, it means 'what books'  like (81). 
WH phrases containing che plus an adjective or adverb are similar but not identical 
to those containing nouns. They may or may not contain tanti, but in either case are E- 
only forms. They have a structure parallel to (81), as seen below: 
(83)  che  tantol~  + 0  alto 
WH E-ONLY+MEASURE  SORTAL 
As  with  (80), tanto represents both  the E-only morpheme  and measure. The element 
~ndicated  with  0  is  simply  a  null  version  of  -ant,  the  measure  component  of 
tanto/quanto. 0,  like -ant, is a bound morpheme, and must be combined with E  to yield 
a  null  version  of  tanto.  Tarzto  or this  null  counterpart  must  be  present  because WH 
phrases  headed  by  an  adjective  or  adverb  must  always  contain  a  specification  of 
measure. The reason for this is simply that these WH phrases always quantify over an 
amount  or  quantity  (in  the  formal  semantic  literature  on  adjectives,  these  are often 
referred  to  as  degrees).  For  instance,  when  we  talk  about  height,  we  are  always 
concerned with the degree of height; there is no meaning parallel to (82), something like 
'what tall (thing)', lacking MEASURE. 
Given that a specification of  measure must be present, and that this goes along with 
the  E-only  morpheme  as  part  of  tantole  + 8, che+ADJIADV  cannot  receive  an 
interrogative interpretation comparable to (82). Interrogative WH phrases headed by an 
adjective or adverb always contain quanto, which as mentioned above marks measure 
with -ant-: 
(84)  qu-anto  alto 
WH+MEASURE  SORTAL 
The cases so far discussed contrast with the non-E-only WH phrases chi, cosa, and (less 
clearly) quunto+APIADVP/NP.  We suggest  that  chi  and  cosu  are  not  E-only  WH 
phrases because they cannot incorporate the E-only morpheme. Specifically, none of the Raffaela Zanuttini & Paul Porlncr 
markers  of  E-only  status  (tunto,  its  null  counterpart,  or  E) can  t  within  the  already 
morphologically complex word. For example, chi is essentially the combination of WH 
(clz-) and the sortal HUMAN. Because this combination is lexicalized, it is impossible 
to insert material between WH and the sortal. A similar explanation may be given for 
the  forms  introduced  by  quunto.  Quanto  lexicalizes  both  the  WH  and  measure 
components of the WH phrase, and so it is impossible to introduce an E-only marker in 
the appropriate position. 
6.1.3.  The relation between the WH phrase and the layers of CP 
Having analyzed in  some detail the structure of  WH phrases, we can  now provide an 
account of  the pattern  outlined in  section 6.1.1. There we observed that, in  Italian, E- 
only WH phrases obligatorily co-occur with the complementizer che and allow a left- 
dislocated  constituent  to  their  right.  In  non-E-only  WH phrases,  we  find  the  same 
behavior as in interrogatives, namely the verb immediately following the WH phrase (in 
c",  we assume) and no following left-dislocated element. In this section we will connect 
the presence  or absence  of  the E-only marker  in  the WH phrase to these properties. 
Moreover,  with  regard to  non-E-only  WH phrases,  we  will  differentiate  in structural 
terms those cases in which they occur in  interrogatives from those in which they occur 
in exclamatives. 
Our  approach  to  this  contrast  builds  on  the  proposal,  discussed  earlier,  that 
exclamative  clauses  contain  more  structure  in  the  CP domain  than  interrogatives. 
Moreover, we must  incorporate  the  factive  operator  present  in  exclamatives but  not 
interrogatives. In Watanabe's analysis, FACT was licensed by the higher predicate; this 
raises  the  question  of  what  licenses  it  in exclamatives.  Given  that  all  exclamatives 
contain  a  WH operator,  it  is  natural  to  suggest that  this  is  the li~enser.~'  Thus, we 
propose that FACT is always in  a specifier position  lower than the one where the WH 
phrase is located. This may be implemented either through a selection mechanism from 
the head whose specifier hosts the WH phrase or by postulating an interpretable feature 
on  the  factive operator  which  may  be  checked  by  the WH phrase. We may  tie  the 
presence of the factive operator to the need to place WH phrases in a higher position in 
exclamatives than  in  interrogatives. Since the factive operator occupies a specifier of 
CP, the. WH phrase  in  exclamatives must  be  in  a higher  specifier  position  than  in 
interrogatives. 
Though all exclamatives contain more structure than interrogatives, we propose that, 
within the class of exclamatives, E-only WH phrases occupy a higher position than their 
non-E-only counterparts. This we take to be the result of the E-only morpheme needing 
to  be  licensed  in the  specifier of  a higher  functional projection. Its being  in  a higher 
position makes room for a left-dislocated element in a lower specifier. 
We may  summarize these  ideas  with  Table  1. Both  of  the exclamative structures 
contain the factive operator, regardless of  the type of  WH phrase, while interrogatives 
do  not.  Thus,  the  CP  structure  of  exclamatives  is  always  richer  than  that  of 
interrogatives.  Moreover, E-only WH phrases  occupy a higher  CP layer than  non-E- 
only phrases, even when  the latter occur in  exclamatives; this makes room for a left- 
dislocated element in the former case alone. 
36  This proposal may also allow an explanation for the fact, noted  hy Ernonds (1985) and discussed in 
Ohenauer (1994), that pied-piping is more restricted  in cxclamatives than in  inlerrogatives (cf. *With 
/?ow nzuny  lurlguages she  is  fun~iliur!  vs.  With how  nzuny  lnnguuges  is  she familiur:)). If  thc WH 
phrase is too deeply cmhedded in the rntlved constituent, perhaps jt  cannot liccnse the factive operator. Exclarnat~ve  Clauses at the Syntax-Semantics Interface 
The next issue is why the complementizer is present with E-only WH phrases, while the 
verb is in  C with the others. The generalization that emerges is that it is  filled by  the 
verb when spec, CP' is occupied by an operator, whether FACT or WH. This amounts 
to extending to the factive operator the intuition that a WH operator must enter into a 
relation with the verb or a feature on inflection realized  on the verb. If  spec, CP' does 
not  contain  an  operator, its head is occupied by  the complementizer che. We see the 
complementizer in  exclamatives as a way to fill the C'  position  when  verb movement 
has not been triggered by the presence of  an operator. 
A side issue that arises at this point is why an  analysis allowing verb movement is 
not possible with E-only WH phrases. Specifically, what would be wrong with having 
FACT in spec, CP',  thereby triggering inversion? Assuming that the highest C'  requires 
the presence of  CP~,  there are two cases to consider. The first is that a left-dislocated 
element is in  the specifier of CP'.  This phrase would intervene between the WH phrase 
and factive operator, blocking the licensing of  the latter. The second possibility is that 
nothing is in  the specifier of CP';  but  then  both  the specifier and the head would be 
empty, and  this  might be  ruled  out by  a general  principle that every phrase  requires 
suitable 'lexical support'. 
Turning now to Paduan, it differs from Italian  in that the complementizer che may 
occur  with  non-E-only  WH phrases,  in  addition  to  E-only  ones  as  in  Italian.  For 
example: 
(85)  a.  Chi  che  1  ga  fato  inrabiare!  (Paduan) 
who  that  s.cl has  made  to get angry 
'The people he made angry!' 
b.  Cossa  che  I  magnava! 
what  that  s.cl  ate 
'What things he ate!' 
spec,cpl  C" 
(Left-dislocation)  che 
FACT  V 
non-E-only WH  V 
We analyze this as showing that only WH operators trigger verb movement in Paduan; 
FACT in spec, CP' cooccurs with the complementizer, just  as a left-dislocated element 
does. Otherwise matters are the same as in Italian. This is summarized in Table 2." 
Table 1 : Distribution of elements in  Italian WH constructions 
spec,cp2 
FACT 
non-E-only WH 
Exclamative 
Exclamative 
Interrogative 
spec,cp3 
E-only WH 
Table 2: Distribution of elements in Paduan WH constructions 
" As  seen  in  (51) ahove, non8-only WH phrases rnay  also cooccur  with  nn+V  in C".  This type  of 
inversion is also possihlc in  interrogatives  with  a particular  pragmatic  function (Portner & Zanuttini 
1996, 2000). Presu~nably  this  structure is possible in  Italian  as  well, though  it is  impossible to see 
clear  evidence for the  inversion.  Within  the  framework  represented  hy  Table 2, no+V  would  he 
licensed in cuby  either a WH or factive operator, just like simple inversion in Italian. 
Exclamative 
Exclamative 
Interrogative 
spec,cp2 
FACT 
non-E-only WH 
spec,cp3 
E-only WH 
spec,cpl  c0 
(Left-dislocation)  che 
FACT  che 
non-E-only WH  V Rnffaela Zanuttini d  Paul Portner 
6.2.  English 
English  is like Italian and Paduan  in  that  the set of  WH phrases  which  can  occur in 
exclamatives  differs  from  that  which  can  occur  in  interrogatives.  This  difference 
manifests  itself  in  a  rather  different  way,  however.  Some  of  the  properties  that 
distinguish  E-only  WH  phrases  in  Italian  don't  play  a  role  in  English:  an  overt 
complementizer is never present, and left-dislocated  elements may not follow the WH 
phrase. Instead, the two classes fundamentally differ in  whether or not  they  occur in 
root  clausal  exclamatives at all.  In  this  section, we  will  examine the  nature  of  WH 
phrases in English exclamatives 
6.2.1.  Some properties of WH phrases in English 
I. Some WH phrases that  occur in  exclamatives  do not occur  in  interrogatives. We 
continue to label them 'E-only WH phrases': 
(86)  a.  What a nice guy he is! (cf. *What a nice guy is he?) 
b.  How very tall she is! (cf. *How very tall is she?) 
2. All  WH phrases  that  occur  in interrogatives may  also occur  in  embedded clausal 
exclamatives: 
(87)  a.  It's amazing who/what/what book she saw. 
b.  It's amazing how tall she is. 
c.  It's amazing how quickly she reads. 
However, not  all  WH phrases  that  occur in  interrogatives  also occur  in root  clausal 
exclamative~:'~ 
(88)  *Who/what/what book she saw! (cf. Wholwhatlwhat book did she see?) 
(89)  a.  How tall she is! (cf. How tall is she?) 
b.  What books he reads! (cf. What books does he read?) 
We will argue that, as with the corresponding cases in Italian, the WH phrases in (89) 
are ambiguous between E-only and non-E-only forms. 
Elliott (1974) and Grimshaw (1977, 1979) point out the inability  of simple WH words like who and 
what to occur in root clausal cxclamatives. However, they point out that these WH words may occur 
in  embedded exclamatives, as seen above. According to them, the fact that anlazing does not embed a 
clause introduced by  whether shows that it cannot take an  interrogative complement. Hence, amazing 
has an exclamativc complement in (X7)a. 
Lahiri  (1991) disputes Elliott's and  Grimshaw's conclusinn. He takes  the  nngrammaticality  (88) to 
show that  who cannot introduce  an exclamativc  clause, and  thus concludes that thc complement  in 
(X7)a is interrogative rather than exclamative. As will  be shown in  this section, we  maintain  the idea 
that  (87)a embeds  an  cxclamative.  Lahiri  also points  out  that  anzuzing  can  take  a  multiple-WH 
complement, as in  If is  anlazing  which men  love which wonten (Lahiri  1991: 26). He takes this as 
cvidcnce  that amrizing can  embed a interrogative, presumably hecause of the contrast with  *What a 
nice man loves what a nice woman! From our perspective, what this shows is that E-only WH phrases 
cannot occur in multiple-WH structures, and while this is an interesting observation, it does not show 
(hat complements containing lnultiple WH phrases cannot be exclamative. Exclamative Clauses at the Syntax-Semantics Interface 
3. There is another strategy for forming root exclamatives in  English. These have the 
structure of a noun phrase with a relative clause:'" 
(90)  a.  The people who/that/0 she would invite! 
b.  The things whichlthatl0 he would do for his children! 
c.  The book whichlthatl0 I saw! 
These, in a sense, cover the territory of the cases which can't be expressed using a root 
clausal  exclamative; for example,  (90)a means  what  *Who she  w*ould invite!  would 
mean, if it were grammatical. However, the distinction between E-only and non-E-only 
WH phrases is irrelevant here, since the WH words in nominal exclamatives are simply 
those otherwise available in relative clauses. 
The pattern which needs to be explained is why certain WH phrases, the E-only ones, 
are able to occur in  root clausal exclamatives, while others are not. As we did for Italian 
and Paduan,  we  will  first examine the internal  structure of  the WH phrases, and then 
turn to their distribution. 
6.2.2.  E-only and non-E-only WH phrases 
The clear  cases  of  E-only  WH phrases  in  English  are  how  very  muny+NP,  how 
ver.y+APIADVP  and what  a+NP. Each  case contains  an  element  not  present  in  the 
corresponding irlterrogative  WH phrases,  namely  very  and  a; we propose  that  these 
represent the E-only nature of the phrase: 
(91)  a.  how  very  many  books 
WH  E-ONLY MEASURE  SORTAL 
h.  how  very  much  water 
WH  E-only  MEASURE  SORTAL 
c.  how  very  0  tal l 
WH E-ONLY MEASURE  SORTAL 
The most straightforward cases are (91)a-(91)b, where cach component of the phrase is 
overtly and separately expressed. In (91)c, we propose that measure is encoded by a null 
counterpart of much, parallel to the role of much in  (91)b and tuntole  + 0 in  (83). As 
mentioned in  the discussion of  Italian, the existence of  an  abstract element indicating 
measure  is  supported  by  the  semantics  of  adjectives.  Contemporary  theories  of  the 
semantics of  adjectives, in  particular as they have developed  in  connection  with  the 
analysis of comparatives, claim that adjectives always contain a specification of degree, 
so that She is tall is analyzed as 'she is d-much tall'. Empirical support comes from the 
Fact that an overt instance of much may express degree in comparative exclamatives, as 
well as interrogatives: 
(92)  a.  How very much taller (than him) she is! 
b.  How much taller (than him) is she? 
In  these cases, much  expresses the degree-difference between  the heights of  the two 
individuals.") 
3')  These slruclures are rl~enlioned  by Elliott (1974: 243); Michaelis & La~nbrecht  (1996) also include 
them within their class of exclamatives. Rafhela Zanuttini & Paul Portner 
Like the Italian  che lihri ('what books')  in  (81),  English what a  +NP exclaims over 
some quality of  individuals and not their number. It therefore lacks a specification of 
measure 
(93)  what  a  guy 
WH  E-ONLY  SORTAL 
It's natural  to suppose. that u represents the phrase's E-only nature, since it is the extra 
element not present in interrogatives." 
Because  they  can  occur  in  both  interrogatives  and  root  clausal  exclamatives, we 
propose  that  what+Npl  and  how+A  are  ambiguous  between  non-E-only  and  E-only 
analyses. As for what+ Npr,  it has two structures which, though identical in appearance, 
differ in  terms of  whether the determiner  is present.  The reason  for this can be  seen 
from a comparison with the corresponding singular forms. Recall that what a+  Nsg is E- 
only, while what+N,,  is not E-only. Given that the determiner for plural indefinite NPs 
in English is null, we may view the E-only form of what hooks as containing this empty 
determiner, the counterpart of a in  (93). Thus, the exclamative form of  what bonks is 
(94)a. In contrast, the interrogative version is simply (94)b, parallel to what hook. 
(94)  a.  what  books 
WH  E-ONLY  SORTAL 
b.  what  books 
WH  SORTAL 
Turning now  to how+A, the E-only  analysis (95)a parallels Italian  che alto (cf. (83)). 
The non-E-only  analysis in  (95)b is the counterpart of how very tall lacking the E-only 
marker very (cf. (9  1 )c).~' 
(95)  a.  how  8  tall 
WH  E-ONLY+MEASURE  SORTAL 
b.  how  0  tall 
WH  MEASURE  SORTAL 
6.2.3.  Nominal and clausal exclamatives 
Having examined the internal  makeup of  WH phrases in English, we can  now turn to 
their  distribution  in  exclamatives and  interrogatives.  The embedded  cases, where  all 
WH phrases can  occur  in  exclamatives, is more parallel  to Italian  than  the root one, 
where  non-E-only  WH phrases  are impossible. However, even in  embedded contexts 
40  The sortal is the description of difference-degrees provided hy thc comparative clause, taller than him. 
The semantics of (92)h is roughly the following: 
for-which(d)[d is a degree of tallness & d' is his dcgree of  tallness & d" is her dcgree of  tallness & 
<i+d'=d"\ 
" in this  paper  we  won't  examine the  details of  phrase structure  within  complex WH phrases.  See 
Corver (1990, Ch. 5) and Nelson (1997) for relevant discussion. 
''  Italian che rilro differs from English how tall because there is no overt or covert morpheme in Italian 
which  cxpresscs  measure  alone. Measure  is  always  expressed  in  cornhination  either  with  E-only 
(tunto) or with  WH (qurinto). This appears to he connected  to the fact that measure is expressed in 
Italian APs via the hound  morpheme -ant-, whereas in  English it's expressed via the null counterpart 
i~l'nfuch  (i.~,  d-much). Exclomative Clauscs at the Syntax-Semantics Intrrfacc 
the languages differ in  that in English a left-dislocated element may not follow the WH 
phrase: 
(96)  *It's amazing what a nice book, to your sister, they gave her as a gift 
Thus, in English there is no evidence for a third level of CP structure like that postulated 
for Italian. We therefore place E-only and non-E-only WH phrases in  the same position 
in embedded exclamatives, namely the specifier of CP'.  Thls is summarized in Table 3. 
Exclamative 
Exclamative 
Table 3: Distribution of elements in English embedded WH constructions 
- 
This analysis of  embedded exclamatives  leaves open why non-E-only WH phrases do 
not occur in root exclamatives. There is no fundamental incompatibility between these 
WH phrases and an exclamative interpretation, given that they are possible in embedded 
contexts. We thus take this to be a somewhat superficial difference between English and 
Italian. Within the perspective presented here, it is natural to suggest that this difference 
concerns the licensing of  the factive operator. Specifically, we would say that English 
E-only  WH phrases  may  license  FACT,  while  non-E-only  ones  may  not.  In  root 
exclamatives,  then,  we  must  have  an  E-only  WH phrase.  In  embedded  clauses,  in 
contrast, the higher predicate is able to license FACT, just  as in  Watanabe's proposal 
for embedded factive declaratives. For this reason, embedded exclamatives are allowed 
regardless of the type of WH operator present, while root cases require an E-only WH 
phrase." 
A remaining issue concerns the status of nominal exclamatives like those in (90). We 
have  argued  in Portner  & Zanuttini  (forthcoming) that  they  are not  simply  ordinary 
noun phrases used for the function of exclaiming. In that paper wt argued that they also 
have the two syntactic components, which  mark an  exclamative, namely the WH and 
factive operators. As for the WH operator, the relative pronoun can fulfill this role. The 
factive operator  is in  the extra [spec,CP] provided  by  an  additional CP layer, as with 
clausal  ex~lamatives.'~  Thus,  despite  the  differences  between  nomjnal  and  clausal 
spec,cp2 
E-only WH 
non-E-onlv WH 
Interrogative 
43  As  ohserved  in  note  32, the  data in  Italian  is  in  some  respects  similar  to  that  in  English.  Root 
exclamatives with chi  and cosn are less than perfect, unlcss they occur with a conditional verb form or 
negation. We don't treat  their marginality  in  the samc way  as the English cases simply because we 
judge them to be grammatical, though difficult to interpret, in contrast to thc English cases which are 
fully ungrammatical. Perhaps what is going on in  Italian is that, because the word order is the same, it 
is  difficult  to  distinguish  root  exclamatives  introduced  by  chi  or  cosa  from  the  corresponding 
interrogatives.  Whencver  we  have  a  means  of distinxuishing the  two,  through the presence  of  an 
cmbcdding  predicate,  negation,  or  non-indicative  verb  form,  it  bccomes  casier  to  observe  the 
exclamative interpretation. In English, in contrast, the same kind  of ambiguity docs not arise, since 
subject-verb inversion clearly marks a root clause as interrogative. 
spec,cpl  C" 
FACT  0 
FACT  (ZI 
I non-E-only WH  V 
44  Anothcr alternative is that the definite article the marks the clause as, in  effect, factive. The definite 
article triggers an existence prcsnpposition: in the case of  The  people she would invite!, that there are 
people she would invite. This is equivalent to the factive presupposition  required by the exclamative, 
namcly  that she would  invite some peoplc. If this is right, the definite article would fulfill the role of 
marking the phrnsc as ihctive, and no othcr factive operator would he requircd. Raffaela Zanultini & Paul Portnc~ 
exclamatives, the two classes share the key syntactic components which  make for an 
exclamative: a WH operator and a syntactic marker of factivity. 
6.3.  Remarks 
In  this  section  we  have  departed  somewhat  from  the  paper's  main  focus  on  the 
syntaxlsemantic interface, concentrating instead on the internal makeup of WH phrases. 
Our goal has been  to relate the morphological properties of  the WH phrase to certain 
syntactic properties of  exclamatives and interrogatives. Not all WH phrases that occur 
in interrogatives also occur in exclamatives. In terms of our analysis, what differentiates 
an exclamative from an interrogative is the presence of a factive operator. Therefore, we 
see those WH phrases that only occur in exclamatives as requiring the presence of this 
factive operator. 
While  we have identified certain material, in  particular tanto, very, and a (in how 
very+ADJIADV and what a+N), as marking a phrase as E-only, we have not considered 
why these elements in particular are used. Are they arbitrary choices? On the one hand, 
the  interpretations  of tunto and very have a clear similarity to one component of the 
meaning of  exclamatives, namely  widening. It  therefore might be suggested that they 
have the semantic role of marking widening, in addition to whatever syntactic role they 
might have. On the other hand, English a does not seem especially well-suited for this 
function,  leaving  open  the  possibility  that  the  choice  of  E-only  markers  is  indeed 
arbitrary. 
Another issue is the nature of the relationship between E-only WH phrases and the 
factive operator. It may be that it is purely syntactic, so that FACT licenses the E-only 
element (even as the latter may also license the former). Alternatively, if  E-only WH 
phrases  mark widening, there may  be  some semantic relationship. Thus far, we have 
seen  widening  and  factivity  as  two  co-occurring  but  independent  components  of 
meaning  in  exclamatives,  but  perhaps  widening  only  makes  sense  if  the  clause  is 
fa~tive.~~  This remains to be further investigated. 
7.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have investigated the characterization of exclamative clauses. Our main 
theoretical point has been that, despite their syntactic diversity, it is possible to give a 
uniform  analysis which  meets the definition  of  clause type  as  a pairing of  form and 
function (Sadock & Zwicky  1985). We have argued that the syntactic representation of 
exclamatives must realize their two central semantic properties: factivity and widening. 
Moreover,  any  clause  which  realizes  these  two  components  is  an  exclamative.  In 
concrete terms, factivity is encoded through a factive operator of the sort discussed by 
e.g. Watanabe (1993), and widening depends on  the presence of  a WH operator. This 
way  of  looking  at  things  implies  that  the  category  of  exclamatives  can  only  be 
understood at the interface, since the cooccurence of these two operators in the clause is 
only motivated by the semantic and pragmatic components. 
45  Paduan  has  a  clitic  form of the  negative  marker  no which  contributes a  meaning  very  similar to 
widening  (cf.  Portner  & Zanuttini  1996, 2000).  It  occurs  both  in  exclatnatives  and  (rhetorical) 
interrogatives. If  this  semantic function, which  we have  previously  characterized as a conventional 
implicature,  is  in  fact  identical  to  widening,  wc  cannot  say  that  widening  is  necessarily  tied  to 
factivity. Exclamative Clauses at the Syntax-Semantics Interface 
In  addition,  we  have  made  a  number  of  significant  side  contributions.  First,  we 
developed a number of descriptive criteria for identifying exclamative clauses (see also 
Portner & Zanuttini  2000,  Zanuttini  & Portner  2000  ). These  make  it  possible  to 
distinguish  exclamative  clauses  from  pragmatically  similar  declaratives  and 
interrogatives. Given that exclamatives are often  syntactically, as well as functionally, 
similar to interrogatives, it is especially important to be  able to distinguish these two 
types. Our analysis allows us to understand the syntactic similarities and differences 
between  these two types:  they  share the presence of  a WH operator,  reflecting their 
shared  need  to  denote  a  set  of  alternative  propositions,  but  differ  in  whether  a 
representation of factivity is present. Second, we elaborated on the relationship between 
factivity and the syntactic structure in the CP-domain. Building on data and ideas from 
the literature, we propose that the extra structure present in  exclamatives is needed  to 
realize the factive operator in a way similar to embedded declarative factives. And third, 
we investigated the internal structure of the WH phrases that occur in  exclamatives and 
interrogatives.  This allowed us  to  better understand  how  the different components of 
WH phrases  relate to  one  another and  to other elements  in  the clause, including  the 
factive operator, complementizer, and higher predicate. 
While  for  the  most  part  we  have  focused  on  clausal  structures  similar  to  WH 
interrogatives,  our discussion has extended to other varieties of  exclamatives.  On the 
one hand, we have brought in yeslno exclamatives of the kind in (97). On the other, we 
have discussed English nominal exclamatives like (98). 
(97)  No  ga-lo  magni tuto!  (Paduan) 
neg  has-s.cl eaten  everything 
'He ate everything!' 
(98)  The things he eats! 
Despite their superficially different appearance from "core"  cases of exclamatives, these 
represent the two components of  exclamative meaning, and so fall within our uniform 
characterization. 
Our study of  exclamatives makes a contribution to the study of clause types in that it 
provides a rather different perspective on how clause types are marked. In  much of the 
literature, one finds an  identification  of  clause type  with  the  syntactic expression  of 
illocutionary force. One more minor point we have. discussed is that illocutionary force 
is  not  the appropriate  concept; sentential force is. More significantly, in  the case of 
exclamatives there is not a single element which is present in all and only exclamatives. 
Thus, there is nothing  to play  the  role  of  force-indicator. Instead,  the clause type is 
marked by  the cooccurence of  markers of  two defining  semantic characteristics.  This 
leaves open the question of whether sentential force is represented in the syntax at all. 
In  some cases there is an element which could plausibly play the role of force indicator 
(e.g. very  in English bolt' very tall), but  we do not have evidence that one is present 
throughout  the  range  of  cases.  It  is  of  course  possible  that  force  is  syntactically 
represented, but the data we have are also compatible with the hypothesis that force is 
implemented  in  the  semantic  or  pragmatic  components,  without  needing  any 
grammatical realization.  More generally, our work  shows that  we  must keep separate 
the  questions  of  how  force  is  indicated  and  how  clause types  are  marked.  Such  a 
perspective  might  also be  useful  for the study of  imperatives  and  interrogatives. For 
these types, an element in C has sometimes been cited as the force-indicator (e.g. Rivero Raffaela Zanuttini Kr Paul Porlner 
1994,  Rivero  &  Terzi  1995,  Han  1998).  However,  the  re  of  this  element,  verb 
movement, is not uniformly present throughout the full range of cases. This casts doubt 
on the hypothesis that a force-indicating element is necessary because it functions as the 
marker of clause type. From the perspective of this paper, the relevant questions would 
not  necessarily focus  on  force; rather, we would  ask what semantlc properties  both 
uniquely identify each type and are represented in the syntax, thus creating the pairing 
of  form and function which comprises a clause type. These properties  might include 
force, but -  as we see with the case of exclamatives -  need not. 
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This article discusses some syntactic peculiarities of  Chinese yeslno questions. Starting 
from the observation that Standard Mandarin shares significant typological features with 
prototypical  SOV languages, Chinese is treated as an underlyingly verb-final  language. 
Based  on this heuristic  principle, A-not-AB, AB-not-A and AB-not questions are uni- 
formly  derived by  means of  one simple raising rule that  operates within the sentence 
constituent V'. This novel idea is elaborated on in great detail in the first part of the ar- 
ticle. In contrast to the prevailing trend, it is argued that the question operator contained 
in A-not-A and A-not sentences CANNOT be raised to "Comp".  In consequence, A-not-A 
and  A-not  questions  are "typed in the head  position of  a sentence-internal  functional 
phrase that we call Force2 Phrase (F2P) in the present paper. This position is not to be 
confused with Drubig's  (1994) Polarity1 Phrase (PollP), in the head position of which 
assertive negations  and an abstract affirmative element are located. The existence of a 
head position F2" other than Poll0 is supported by the fact that F2" can be occupied by 
certain overt question operators, such as assertive shi-hu-shi, which are compatible with 
negations. In contrast to the assertive question operator shi-hu-shi which is obligatorily 
associated with information focus, non-assertive shi-bu-shi serves as a compound focus 
and question operator whose focus feature is complex insofar as it is composed of two 
subfeatures: a contrastivity  and  an exhaustivity  subfeature. Non-assertive shi-bu-shi is 
obligatorily  associated  with  identificational  focus  in  the  sense  of  Kiss  (1998).  In 
accordance with some basic ideas of Chomsky's checking theory, the two subfeatures of 
the complex focus feature carried by the non-assertive shi-hu-slli operator check a corre- 
lating subfeature in the head position  of  a corresponding functional phrase (Contrastive 
Phrase and Focus Phrase, respectively). The question feature contained in the non-asser- 
tive shi-hu-shi operator is attracted by the head of Force1 Phrase (FI') at the level of LF. 
Due to the fact that FI" is sentence-final, the question feature of non-assertive shi-bu-shi 
must  be  Chomsky-adjoined  to  FI'.  Unlike  identificational  focus  phrases  which  are 
inherently contrastive, topics are non-contrastive in the default case. As separate speech 
acts,  they  are  located  in  a  c-commanding  position  outside  the  sentence  structure. 
Semantically, there is a difference between Frame-Setting Topics and Aboutness Topics. 
As shown in  the article, both A-not-A and A-not questions on the one hand  and yesfno 
questions ending with ma on the other can be used in neutral  and non-neutral contexts. 
The decisive advantage  of  mu  questions,  however,  is  that  their question  operator has 
scope over the whole sentence. 
The present  paper  has  been  written  within  the  context of the DFG  project  'Syntax of C-Domain' 
launched  at  the  Zcntrum fiir  Allgcmeine Sprachwissenschaft, Typologie und  Universalienforschung 
(ZAS),  Bcrlin,  in  co-operation  with  the  research  group  'Sprachtlieoretische  Grundlagen  der 
Kognitionswissenschaft' at thc Universitit Leipzig. The participants in the ongoing project are Andr6 
Mcinunger, Kerslin Schwabc. and  the  author of  this paper.  I  am  very  grateful to Anita  Steube and 
Bernhard Druhig lor many  years of support which  have greatly stimulated this project. In addition, I 
am  indcbted  to  Marie-Claudc Paris, Xu  Liejiong, Liu  Danqing  and  Ewald  Lang,  who  provided 
cnlightening and thoughtful comments on  previous versions of this paper. Last hut not  least, I owe a 
special debt to Paul David Doherty for his careful revision of this text. 
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1.1.  Sentential Force in natural languages 
Natural  languages  make use  of  various universal  strategies  in  expressing  'sentential 
force' in the sense of Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet (1990). 
In the simplest case, sentential force, i.e. the semantic correlate of  'sentence type', is 
made manifest by means of intonation contour and word order. This case is realized, for 
example, in all Germanic languages, where a combination of rising final intonation and 
verb-subject word order is operative  in yeslno questions. Furthermore, sentential force 
can  be  denoted  morphologically.  Russian  imperative  sentences, for instance,  display 
distinctive morphological forms on the verb involved. Moreover, sentential force can be 
signaled by certain lexical elements, such as  special particles. An example would be the 
role of enclitic li in interrogative sentences of Russian and other Slavic languages, not to 
mention  the role  of  clausal  typing particles  in  numerous  East  and South East  Asian 
languages.  Finally,  sentential  force  can  be  expressed  by  affixes,  phonological 
alternations and missing elements. 
In  view of the syntactic, morphological, lexical and prosodic resources of languages, 
it is not a surprising fact that, despite certain similarities with regard to the presentation 
of declarative, interrogative and imperative sentences, we can find important differences 
between various languages in the system of  sentence types, especially as far as the spe- 
cificity of functions within a particular sentence type is concerned.' 
The present paper deals with Chinese yeslno questions. 
Unlike wh-questions  and disjunctive questions2, yeslno questions can be conceived 
as a request that the person you  are addressing should tell  you  whether the proposition 
you have supplied him is true or not'. 
Based on the dimension of the regular association  of  'form'  and  'use',  there are at 
least three different subtypes of yeslno questions, which shall be discussed in this paper. 
1.2.  A proposal for a discourse-based model of Chinese sentences 
My subsequent syntactic descriptions are based on the following model of the Chinese 
sentence: 
(I. I) TOPIC  > FI ' > FocP > IP > ContrP > F2P > PolP  V' 
with > for 'preceding + dominating', F1  for 'Forcel',  FocP for 'Focus Phrase',  IP for 
'Infl(ection) Phrase', ContrP for 'Contrastivity Phrase', F2P for 'Force2 Phrase', PolP 
for 'Polarity Phrase', and V for 'verb1 predicative adjective'. 
I  Cf. Sadock and Zwicky  (1985), p. 160. 
Disjunctivc questions, which consist of  two yeslno questions connected hy  the element or, are often 
called  'alternative  questions'.  Dis,;unctivc  questions  and  wh-questions  share  thc  fcature  that  they 
cannot he answercd with 'yes' or 'no' 
'  Cf. Sadock & Zwicky (19X5), p.  155. R~llowing  Groenendijk & Stokhof (1997: 1072), I start from the 
position that a question requires a change in information ABOUT THE WORLD, but not a CHANGE IN THE 
WORLD  ITSELF.  Givcn this, asking a question  is a basic speech act.  But see Vanderveken's  (1990) 
typology, according to which asking a question helongs to the basic speech act type of directives: 'I 
(hereby)  ask  you  to  answer  (the question) Q'.  As  for details about  the  different  'pragmatic'  and 
'scmantic' approaches to the interrogatives see Groenendijk & StokhoF(1997). Yeslno questions in Mandarin Chinese revisited 
In  this  model, only the constituent V' headed by  a verb or a predicative  adjective is 
obligatory in every complete sentence. 
1.2.1. IP is only projected in categorial sentences. This is due to the fact that categorial 
sentences express an overt predication  relation  between  an  initial  constituent  functio- 
ning as a 'notional  subject', and the subsequent sentence part functioning as a 'notional 
predicate'.  Kiss (1994) claims that  'topic-prominent'  languages realize categorial and 
thetic judgments in different syntactic structures. Whereas in categorial judgements  the 
subject argument of the verb appears in a VP-external position, thetic judgements  are 
expressed in  structures in which all arguments of  the verb remain within VP. Provided 
that this is correct, Chinese is a topic-prominent language needing IP to accommodate 
the unmarked syntactic subject in categorial ~entences.~  More precisely, I reason that 
spec-IP is a topic-position reserved for the unmarked subject in active sentences and the 
direct object in passive structures. 
Nevertheless,  the claim  that  the Chinese sentence contains an  Inflection Phrase is 
problematic  in  some ways,  since  Chinese has  neither  verb-subject  agreement  nor  a 
morphological category of ~ense.~  Moreover, there is no distinction between finite and 
non-finite clauses in  Chinese, as demonstrated by  Xu  (1985186: 346ff.; 1994: 323ff.) 
and Y. Huang (1994: 27-33,  157ff., 265f.).",  Huang (2000: 37) concludes that "there 
are only finite clauses in Chinese".' 
1.2.2. FI' is the functional phrase where information about whether a given sentence is a 
statement, a question, a command etc. is located  in the default case. One typological 
peculiarity of Chinese is that the head of this phrase, as an immediate result of its right- 
peripheral position, does not project a Spec position8. A second typological  peculiarity 
of  Chinese is that  A-not-A  and A-not questions  are typed  in  the head position  of  a 
'  Contrary  to  categorial  sentences,  thetic  sentences  do not  express predication  about  something  or 
somebody. Compare the catcgorial  sentence (i) containing an  IP with the thctic sentence (ii) lacking 
an IP: 
(i)  Keren  lai-le. 
guest  come-ASP 
'The guest has come' 
(ii) Duimian  lai  le  yi  qun  haizi. 
ovcr therc comc PART one group  children 
'There is a gmup of children coming over there.' 
As  ti~r  the difference between  categorial and  thetic judgements,  cf. von der Gahelentz (1901: 369f., 
372). Kuroda (1972.73).  and Sasse (1987), for example.  '  Concerned  with  different quantifier  scope facts  characteristic  of English  and  Chinese, Aoun  & Li 
(1989: 152; 1993: 22f.) argue that subjects in English are generated at D-structurc in the Spec of VP 
position and raised to the Spec of Infl position at S-stru~.ture,  whereas subject raising is not available 
in Chinese because of the "degenerate nature of InfY in this language. So the subject is base-generated 
in  Spcc of VP position  and stays in  this position at S-structure. In contrast, Hornstein (1995: 164f.) 
claims  that  Chinese  subjects are directly  generated  in  Spcc ArgS,  without  a  copy  in  VP-internal 
position. 
6  See also Y. Huang (1995; 2000). Contrary to this, C.-T. J. Hueng (1984; 1987; 1989) and others tried 
to show that a difference hctween finite and non-finite scntenccs does exist. Their examples and test 
criteria, however, were disproved by Y. Huang and Xu.  '  Y. Huang's position is indeed the most plausible conclusion compared  with the two alternatives: (i) 
therc  are neither  finite  nor  non-finite  clauses in  Chinese; (ii)  there  are only  non-finite  clauses  in 
Chinese. 
X  In this respect, 1 lbllow Whitman (1997), cf. scction 7. Horst-Dieter Gasde 
clause-internal functional phrase that I will call F2P. This phrase is head-initial, unlike 
FI'. Both functional phrases, F1' and F2P, are in  complementary distribution, for every 
sentence must be typedy,  but no senterlce can be typed twice. 
These assumptions conflict  with Rizzi's  (1997: 287) tenet that  the force-finiteness 
system  as the  essential  part  of  the C  system is present  in  all  "non-truncated  clausal 
structures"."'  Furthermore, these  assumptions  are  at  variance  with  Huang (1982), Li 
(1992) and Ernst (1994) who postulate that the question operator in A-not-A questions 
must  raise  to  Comp  at  LF.  Finally,  our  assumptions  deviate  from  the  approach  of 
Schaffar  &  Chen  (2001)  who  accommodate  the  illocutionary  question  operator 
contained  in  A-not-A  questions  in  Drubig's  (1994:  23) Polarity1  Phrase (PollP). In 
contrast to Schaffar and Chen, I will argue that illocutionary operators on the one hand 
and elements like assertive negation (bulmei)  on the other should not be accommodated 
in the same functional head position, even more so since they are not strictly comple- 
mentary, as I will show. 
1.2.3.  In connection with identificational foci in the sense of  Kiss (l998), FocP and the 
functional Middle Field category ContrP pertain to the focus-background system of the 
sentence ytructure. As such. they are present "only if  'needed"'  (Rizzi 1997: 288). 
1.2.4.  Following Lippert  (1965).  Altmann  (1981), Jacobs  (1984),  and Krifia (2000; 
2001b), TOPICS  are perceived  as separate speech acts. Consequently, 1 claim that they 
are located outside the sentence structure, though in a c-commanding position. 
1.2.5.  (1.1)  is  a  strictly  discourse-oriented  sentence model  predicated  on  the  Strong 
Lexicalist Hypothesis. 
Rizzi  (1997:  281) suggests  that  any  structural presentation  of  a clause consists  of 
three layers:  1. the lexical layer headed by the verb, the structural layer, in  which theta 
assignment  takes  place,  2.  the  inflectional  layer,  headed  by  functional  heads 
corresponding to concrete or  abstract  morphological  specifications  on  the  verb,  and 
responsible for the licensing of argumental features such as case and agreement, 3. the 
complementizer layer containing a force-finiteness system"  and a topic-focus system. 
Following Rizzi, Platzack (1999) advocates a model where a V-domain, an I-domain 
and  a  C-domain  exchange  information  with  systems  of  thought  via  the  designated 
interfaces Thematic Form  (TF), Grammatical  Form  (GF) and  Discourse  Form  (DF). 
Whereas at TF thematic information is exchanged, and at GF grammatical meanings are 
exchanged, DF is the interface level  at which pragmatic information and  information 
regarding sentence type is exchanged. 
Similarly, Grohmann  (2000) splits the clause into three domains with a %-domain  for 
thematic relations, a cp-domain for agreement properties and a w-domain for discourse 
information. 
'J  Cf. Chomsky & Lasnik (1977: 445) and Cheng (1991). 
'"  A-not-A and A-not yeslno questions are by  no means truncatcd structures. 
"  According to Riszi, ForccP is considered as the interface hetween  a propositional content expressed 
hy 1P and the superordinatc structurc (a higher clause or thc discourse), whereas FinP "faces inside" 
expressing  a  distinction  rclatcd  to  finiteness  (ibid.,  p.  2831.).  As  mentioned  ahovc,  a  clear-cut 
distinction  hetwecn finilcness  and non-finiteness in  Chinese clauses does not  cxist. I  infer from this 
that FinP as a special functional projection is "not needed"  in Chinesc. Ycsino questions in Mandarin Chinese revis~ted 
It seems, however, that Rizzi's, Platzack's and Grohmann's assumptions are too strong. 
In  fact,  all  of  the  domains  suggested  are  interspersed  with  elements  conveying 
information that  is associated with categories like force-finiteness and topic-focus,  as 
we will see in this paper. 
1.3.  Organization of the paper 
The present paper is organized as follows: 
The first two sections lay out the specific background which my  subsequent claims 
about major properties of  A-not-A and A-not questions will be  based on: Section 2 is 
mainly  devoted  to  the  discussion  of  some typological  peculiarities  of  Chinese. The 
section  starts  from  certain  SOV  remains  in  Pre-Qin  Chinese,  SOV  tendencies  in 
Northern  dialects, and  significant features shared by  prototypical SOV languages and 
Standard Mandarin. Based on the preposition-postposition  parameter,  Chinese is des- 
cribed as a postpositional language. It ensues that Chinese is treated as an underlyingly 
verb-final language in section 3. 
In  section 4, I argue for a unified derivation of A-not-AB, AB-not-A  and A(B)-not 
questions.  This  novel  conception  conflicts  with  the  influential  approach  of  Huang 
(1991). Moreover, I claim that A-not-A  and A-not questions are "typed"  in  a sentence- 
internal  functional  head  position  other  than  Pol lo, a  position  introduced  by  Drubig 
(1994) to  accommodate an (abstract) affirmative element and (assertive) negations. In 
contrast to the prevailing trend, it is further argued that the question operator in A-not-A 
and A-not sentences cannot be raised to "Comp".  This implies that FI' is not projected 
in  A-not-A  and  A-not  questions,  differently  from  yeslno  questions  ending with  the 
question particle ma. 
My postulate that A-not-A  and A-not questions contain an  abstract question feature 
<Q> in F2" is underpinned by additional evidence provided in  section 5, where I focus 
attention on some overt question operators, which are all located  in F2", as I contend. 
One of them is the assertive question operator shi-hu-shi. 
111 section  6, the  role  of  non-contrastive  and  contrastive  topics  in  Chinese yes/no 
questions is considered. Topics are divided into two basic types: Frame-Setting Topics 
and Aboutness Topics. 
Section 7 is about the properties and the syntactic anchoring of identificational focus 
phrases in  Chinese yeslno questions. The section concentrates on the compound focus 
and question  operator shi-hu-shi, not  to be confused  with  assertive shi-bu-shi. I posit 
that the focus feature carried by non-assertive shi-hu-shi is composed of  a contrastivity 
feature, [+contr], and an exhaustivity feature, [+exh], checking a correlating feature in 
the head position of  ContrP and FocP, respectively, a procedure that may happen at S- 
structure or at LF. The question feature of this operator is claimed to undergo LF raising 
in the result of  which it is Chomsky-adjoined to FI'. There is no sentence position in 
which  identificational focus phrases  uniformly  occur, as the  S-structural positions of 
subjects, direct objects and adjuncts marked by the shi-hu-shi operator at issue show. 
In  section 8, the pragmatic use of  A-not-A questions and nzcr  questions is discussed. 
It  is claimed that both types of yeslno questions can be used in neutral and non-neutral 
contexts. However, mu questions have the decisive advantage of their question operator 
having scope over the whole sentence. Horst-Dieter Gasde 
2.  Chinese as a postpositional language 
My proposal for a uniform derivation of all A-not-A and A-not questions which shall be 
described in  section 3 is predicated on  the hypothesis  that Chinese is a postpositional 
language with an OV word order at the level of D-structure. This section aims to give 
reasons for this hypothesis. 
2.1.  SOV remainders in Pre-Qin Chinese and SOV tendencies in northern 
dialects 
Liu  (2000) claims that Chinese has  never been  a typical  SVO language, though SVO 
has  been  the basic order in  Chinese clauses since its earliest record. As elaborated by 
Liu, Pre-Qin  Chinese  contained remains  of  an  earlier  SOV word  order manifesting 
themselves by the preverbal position occupied by interrogative pronouns and pronouns 
in  negative sentences. With reference to the fact that Chinese is closely  related  to the 
Tibeto-Burman  languages which essentially are SOV languages, Liu speculates that the 
common  protolanguage  of  Chinese and  today's  Tibeto-Burman  languages  may  have 
been  an  SOV language1'.  As for Modern Chinese, the author comes to the conclusion 
Lh  th  that the so-called bu-construction, which came into existence in the 7  18  centuries and 
has been predominantly marking direct objects since the beginning of the 17''' century", 
makes  Chinese  look  like  a  very  untypical  SVO  lang~age'~.  In  this  connection,  he 
mentions  SOV orders  in  the  Qinghai  Xining  dialect  of  Chinese  that  can  only  be 
explained by the influence of Tibetan and some neighboring Altaic languages (p. 56). In 
this respect, Liu follows Light (1979: 163) who also connected the word order features 
of Modern Chinese with influences of  neighboring languages. Light points out that Tai 
language  SVO tendencies  are  reflected  in  southern  dialects,  such  as  Cantonese  and 
Southern Min, whereas Altaic SOV tendencies are reflected in Mandarin. 
Likewise,  Hawkins  (1983) characterizes  Chinese  as  a  language  with  SOV/SVO 
features.  Kroch  (2001:  706) states that  "languages  like Chinese or Yiddish  show  an 
apparent mix of  headedness at the clausal level, so that there is even controversy over 
whether they are VO or OV". 
2.2.  SOV features of Standard Mandarin 
2.2.1. Referring  to the 45 universal  tendencies  correlated with  SOV, SVO and VSO 
orders  ascertained  by  Greenberg (1966) on  the  basis  of  a  sample  of  30 languages 
(which, interestingly  enough, does  not  contain  Chinese), Tai  (  1985: 345f. [=  1973: 
6631) claims that Chinese is an SOV language. He especially stresses the point that the 
following  word  order features can be generalized under  one single general  syntactic 
principle,  the principle  that  SOV languages tend  to  place restricting elements before 
restricted elements: A. relative clause before noun, B. adjective before noun, C. genitive 
before  the  governing  noun,  D.  adverbial  before  the  main  verb,  E.  adverb  before 
adjective,  F.  proper  noun  before  common  noun.  Tai  notes  that  those  and  other 
grammatical  features of  Chinese consistently appear in  rigid  SOV languages such as 
Japanese and Turkish. 
" Ihid., p. 53. 
13  See also Wang Li (1958: 413ff.1, Ohta (1987; 19911, Peyraube (19X9), and Bisnng (1991). 
" Cf. Liu (2000), p. 54. Yeslno questions in Mandarin Chinese revisited 
Given fact A  it is  not surprising that Downing (1978: 383), Mallinson & Blake (1981) 
and Dryer (1992), treating Chinese as an SVO language, are forced to describe Chinese 
relative clauses as an exception. Dryer (1992: 86), whose empirical results are based on 
word order properties of 625 languages15,  sees "evidence of  a very strong tendency for 
VO languages to be NRel: RelN order is found in only one genus (Chinese), while NRel 
order is found in 60 other genera". Mallinson & Blake (198 I: 442) note: "Chinese is an 
SVO language, more or less, with preposed relatives, though it is true that such a type of 
language is rare." 
2.2.2, In  addition to the SOV features of  Chinese listed so far, there are further crucial 
word order features shared by Chinese and prototypical SOV languages. Two of  them 
are reflected in the use of  sentence-final yes-no question particles and the fact that wh- 
phrases remain in situ. 
C. L. Baker (1970: 206f.) was the first to observe the relationship between these two 
facts. Based  on  Greenberg's  (1966) data, Baker hypothesized: First, no language can 
have  a  rule  which  moves  the  questioned  constituent  to  clause-initial  position,  but 
regularly positions a11  morphemes for yes-no questions in clause-final position. Second, 
no  language can  have  a rule  which  moves  a questioned constituent  to  sentence-final 
position, even if  the Q morpheme occurs there. Referring to this hypothesis, Chomsky 
(1973:  234)  posits  that  only  languages  with  clause-initial  COMP permit  a  COMP 
substitution transformation." 
2.3.  The preposition-postposition  parameter 
Greenberg (1966) employed three sets of  order to establish his  'basic order typology': 
first,  the  existence  of  prepositions  and  postpositions,  second,  the  relative  order  of 
subject, verb and object (reduced to the common types VSO, SVO and SOV), and third, 
the position of qualifying adjectives. 
Modifying Greenberg's (1966) second criterion, Hawkins (1983) postulates that the 
word order SVO is not a reliable typological  indicator. In that "SVO does not correlate 
with other word order properties in Greenberg's data in a unique and principled way"I7, 
it even undermines the generality of  a verb-based typology. Contrary to the ambivalent 
SVO order,  VSO and SOV are type  indicators  (though limited  ones).  Yet  what  has 
precedence  over all the others in Hawkins' theory is a word order typology based on the 
preposition-postposition  parameter.  Consequently, he claims that there exist two major 
word  order types,  namely  prepositional  and  postpositional  languages,  each  of  them 
having certain unique families of word order combinations. 
2.4.  The role of postpositions in Modern Chinese 
Contrary to Travis (1984), Ernst (1988) and A. Li (1990), who, more or less explicitly, 
negate the existence of postpositions in Chinese, I will contend that Modern Chinese, in 
IS  Dryer's  method involvcs first grouping the languages into genetic groups, referring to each of these 
groups as a GENUS. These genera are then grouped into six large geographical arcas (ihid., p. 83ff.). 
I,,  Following Chomsky (1973), Huang (1981182: 409, fn.6) claims that COMP is a universal element that 
rnay appcar in various scntencc positions: "It should be no&  for all our purposes it  is not necessary 
that the COMP he assumed to he clause-initial. All that is necessary  is that tliere is a COMP position 
c-commanding S." 
Hawkins (1983),  p. 291. Horst-Dieter Gasde 
essence, is a postpositional language. The need of postpositions has been caused by the 
strong tendency of Chinese to place restricting elements before restricted elements. 
2.4.1. Liu  (2000) notes  that  the fact that  postpositions  play  an  important  role  in  the 
grammar of  Modern Chinese is underestimated  by  many researchers. In  contrast, Liu 
gives a detailed picture of  the role of  different types of  postpositions  in  the syntactic 
structure  of  Chinese  sentences.  As  he  elaborated,  Chinese postpositions  function  as 
'relators',  thereby  realizing  the  'relator  principle'  investigated  by  Dik  (1997). 
According to Dik, a 'relator'  links two constituents to each other, having its preferred 
position between the two relata.18 In  Modern Chinese, relators mainly appear either on 
the border of  an attribute (the dependent) and a noun  (the center) or on the border of  a 
preverbal  adjunct  (the  dependent)  and  a  verb  (the  center).  While  the  corresponding 
relator  in the former case is represented by  the postposition de, the situation  is more 
complicated in  the latter case. 
2.4.2. As pointed out by  Liu (2000), the latter type of postposition can be traced back to 
two major historical sources: relational nouns on the one hand and adverbs on the other. 
Originally, relational nouns expressed a location, such as li ('inner lining'), zuo ('left 
hand'), dzorzg  ('center  of  a circle (occupied  by  a  flagpole)'), shang ('top  part')  etc. 
Later, they were affected by  a process of grammaticalization in the result of which they 
could no  longer be  used  as independent syntactic units. Today, they  are tied  to fixed 
positions  (just  as  other  function  words  are).  More  precisely,  they  are  obligatorily 
combined with  nouns (or noun phrases) preceding them. The meaning of  the nominal 
unit  preceding  a postposition  can  even  be  abstract. Owing to  the  semantic depletion 
which Chinese postpositions were subject to'',  the semantic differences between  them 
dwindled  to  such an  extent  that  they  can sometimes be  replaced  with  each other, as 
(2.  Ia,b) illustrate: 
(2.1)  a.  zai  di-shang  zuo 
In  ground-above  sit 
'be sitting on the ground' 
b.  zai  di-xia  zuo 
in  ground-below sit 
'be sitting on the ground' 
c.  "zai di  zuo 
in ground sit 
Lacking a postposition filling the relator position, (2. lc) is absolutely ungrammatical. 
By  the same token, xin-.shrmg ('heart-above'). xin-zhong ('heart-center'), xin-li ('heart- 
inside'), and xin-xia ('heart-below')  have the same meaning:  'in one's heart'.  Telling 
examples for the combination  of  postpositions  with abstract nouns are: sixiang-li ('in 
one's thinking'), xingdong-shang ('in  one's actions'), and,fuzhan-zhong ('in  (a process 
of) development'). 
'' As for Dik's rclator principles, cf. also Siewierska (1988; 1991). 
14  This  process  wen1  hand  in  hand  with  a  reduction  or  their  suprasegmental  structure,  mainly 
characterized by the loss of thcir etymological tone. Ycslno questions in Mandarin Chinese revisited 
The second historical  source of  postpositions operating on the border  of  adjuncts and 
predicates in Modern Chinese are elements that stem from adverbs, as in: 
(2.2)  a.  Ta (xiang) huli sidelyiyang  jiaohua. 
he  Iikc  fc~x  similarly  sly 
'He is as sly as a fox.' 
b.  Ta(xiang)  hua  yiyang/yiban/ban  meili. 
she  likc  flower  similarly  beautiful 
'She is as beautiful as a flower.' 
Whereas  the  use  of  the preposition  xiang  ('like')  is  optional,  the  postpositions  side, 
yiyung, and yiban (shortened: ban),  respectively, cannot be omitted in this structure. 
Liu (20001 suggests that Chinese postpositions project a postpositional phrase which is 
embedded in  a prepositional phrase, yielding a structure which I will illustrate with the 
help of zui di-shang ('on the ground'): 
(2.3)  [PP  zai [postI,~  [I)P  dil  shawl1 
in  ground  above 
2.5.  Chinese prepositions are coverbs 
2.5.1. Although  lexical  elements  like zai  ('in')  in  (2.1)  and  xiung  in (2.2) are  often 
considered as 'prepositions',  Chinese is by  no means a 'prepositional  language'  in the 
sense of Hawkins (1983). The overwhelming majority of Prep languages in  Hawkins' 
Expanded Sample is distinguished  by  the feature combination  'NG &  el'", while 
Chinese lacks this feature combination2'. 
Both facts clearly show that  'Prep'  does not function  as a "major  typological indi- 
cator""  in Modern Chinese. 
2.5.2. Actually, all  'prepositions'  of  Modern Chinese arise out of  full verbs previously 
used  in  serial  verb  constructions,  where  they  became  subject  to  a  process  of 
grammaticalization  which  is  not  yet  finished.  Despite  the  fact  that  their 
grammaticalization  has  progressed  differently,  they  should  better  be  described  as 
'coverbs',  as  done  by  Paul  (1982), C. Lehmann  (1982), Chu  (1983), Bisang  (1991; 
1992), Gasde  (1993)  and  others,  or  as  'verb-prepositions',  as  done  by  Dragunov 
(1 960[1952]). The verbal historical background of modern "prepositions"  is effortlessly 
recognizable because some of  them still carry aspect suffixes distinctive of  verbs. The 
most striking example is the coverb dui ('towards'), which can be combined with the 
durative-progessive  suffix zhe, the perfective suffix le and the experiential suffix guo, 
such  as in  dui-zhe/le/guo wo  xiao  ('smile to me'12'.  Some of  the lexical  elements in 
question have a fullverb and a coverh meaning, such as zui ('be in' vs. 'in'), gei ('give' 
'' Cf. Hawkins (IY81), p.  73. 'NG'  stands for the word order Noun-Genitive, while  'NRcl'  stands for 
Noun-Relative Clause. 
"  To hc more precise, Chinese has neither NG (hecause it  is a cascless language) nor the word  order 
NPoss (Noun-Posscssive). 
" Cf. ihid., p. 115. 
''  Cf.  Chu (1983), p. 72. Horst-Dieter Gasde 
vs. 'for') and gen ('follow' vs.  'with'). In special cases, one and the same sentence can 
have a coverb and a full verb reading: 
(2.4)  Ni  gen wo zou! 
you  GEN  I  go 
a.  Follow me! 
b.  Go with me. 
But the most tangible proof  of  the non-prepositional  status of  Chinese coverbs is the 
fact  that  nearly  all  of  them, e.g. yong  ('using',  'with  the help of'), duo  ('going  to', 
'leaving for'), zui ('(being) in'), gen ('following',  'with'), gei ('giving',  'for'), and cong 
('from')  are compatible with the A-not-A form (more precisely, with the subpattern A- 
not-AB) in yeslno questions. See the following example: 
(2.5)  Ni  cong-bu-cong Beijing qu Shanxi? 
you  from-not-1.1-om Beijing  go  Shanxi 
'Do you from Beijing go to Shanxi?' 
Paul (1982: 123f.) holds the view that the special character of coverbs can be adequately 
described  only  by  means  of  a  scale  with  verb  and  preposition  as  its  poles.  She 
summarizes that  ha  displays almost  no  verbal  behavior,  thus  advancing  towards  the 
prepositional end of  the scale24,  whereas the verbal character of yong  ('using, with the 
help of') is remarkably strong. 
In  discussing the historical  development of  coverbs, Y. C. Li  (1980) notes that in 
Early Archaic Chinese a few coverbs with 'broad' meanings were gradually replaced by 
many coverbs with specific properties. According to Li, the number proliferated to sixty 
in Modern Chinese. Some of  them, such as zui, cong, yong, ha and others, have been 
utilized throughout the history of the Chinese language. 
2.6.  Summary 
To recapitulate this section, the strong tendency to place restricting elements before re- 
stricted elements, the use of sentence-final particles, the fact that wh-phraes remain in 
situ, and the dominant role of postpositions are the most striking SOV features of Man- 
darin Chinese. 
3.  Chinese as an underlyingly verb-final language 
As we have learned in section 2, Chinese is a postpositional language exhibiting major 
typological  features of rigid  SOV languages such as Japanese, Korean and Turkish. I 
consider  this  to be  a  warrant for treating Chinese as  an  underlyingly  verb-final  lan- 
'"a  is <,Sten regarded as a pure lnarker of the direct ohject or as n case marker. But sec the sections 4.3 
and 5.2.2,  where wc treat ha as a dummy verb syntactically licensing the direct object of the sentence. Ycsino questions in Mandarin Chinese rcvisited 
guage, being perfectly aware of the fact that at the level of S-structure the unmarked 
word order is SVO." 
In  addition, I will  follow  Fukui & Speas (1986:  128) who  postulate  that  functional 
categories project  to  Xu, while  all projections  of  lexical  categories  are X'. This  idea 
implies that  Xu structures  projected  by  functional  categories  are  limited  to  a  single 
specifier position  and  a  single  complement  position,  whereas  the  X' projections  of 
lexical categories are indefinitely iterable, limited only by the Projection Principle and 
other independent principles of  licensing.*"n  consequence, Chinese predicates merely 
contain V' projections in my system. 
Given these two preconditions, the abstract D-structure of a predicate phrase headed by 
a three-place verb like song ('give') is (3.1): 
So far, I am in accordance with Koopman (1984) and A. Li (1990) who propose a head- 
final  structure of  VP as well.  Yet  whereas Koopman  and Li  achieve the S-structural 
word order by NP movement, i.e. by  moving the objects from the left side of  the verb to 
11s  right  side2',  I suppose that  in  (3.1) the verb must be  raised  into head positions of 
higher V'-shells in the sense of Larson (1988; 1990), yielding the S-structure (3.2): 
This derivation involves the idea that @role assignment and Syntactic Licensing of verb 
argumentszx  are two independent syntactic procedures, which can take place at different 
levels of  the derivation  of  sentences and which  can be opposed  with  respect to their 
direction. That is to say, along the lines of the syntactic model outlined by (3.1)/ (3.2), 
the verb is enabled to assign 0-roles from the right to the left at the level of D-structure, 
while Syntactic ~icensin~'"oes  from the left to the right and takes place at S-structure. 
''  Mulder & Syhcsma (1992) make the pretence of having evidence that Chinese is a VO language at D- 
structurc. In  fi~ct,  the notion of D-structure is a construct. Hence, the syntactic structures assumed at 
this abstract level can hardly he 'right' or 'wrong'. Rather, they can serve as a hcuristic means. In this 
sense, the prohlcm is with the help of which assumptions one can explain more phenomena of Chinese 
grammar than  hy  means of others. Thereforc, with  respect to thc question  of  whether Chinese at D- 
structurc should he treated as a VO language or as an OV language, neither the Small Clause analysis 
suggested  by  Mulder  &  Sybesma  for  certain  senlences  nor  the  analysis  of  A-not-A  and  A-not 
questions which I will propose in section 4 can have the status of 'evidence'. In truth, both approaches 
a[-e  no more than hypotheses. 
2b  This appn~ach  has been called the 'Relativized  X'-Thcory'. As for the development of this theory, sec 
also Fukui (1991), Fukui & Saito (1992), Saito &Fukui (1998) and Fukui (2001).  " As  for  that procedure, cf. Goodall (1990: 246), who points  out that such argument movemenl from 
one side of the head  to the other leads to theory-internal  and conceptual difficulties, besides the fact 
that there is very little empirical support for such kinds of movement. 
?X  In inflcctional and agglutinating languages, Syntactic Licensing corresponds to the operation of Case 
assignment. Our conviction  that  only  in  languages  with  a case morphology  Syntactic Licensing is 
taking place  by  Case assignment, is  supported  hy  (Kiparsky (1991:  1): "Abstract  Case and  AGR 
(syntactic elements  assumed  to be  present  in  all  languagcs  independently  of  morphology)  do not 
exist." 
Cf. Koopm~n  (1984: 124), who claims that in Chinesc "Casc"  is assigned to the right. Horst-Dieter Gasde 
For the DO to be licensed, the verbal element V'  has to move to the V-shell head po- 
sition marked with f2..  Having licensed the DO from this position, the verb luoves on to 
the lowest V'-shell head position c-commanding the 10.  From there, it licenses the 10. 
In  Chinese, Vo is strictly tied to V', i.e. it can neither be raised to I" since Infl is a 
deficient  category  in  Chinese  (as outlined  in  section  1.3.1), nor  can  it  be  raised  to 
Forcel" since Forcel' is head-final (cf. section 4.4.2 and section 7.2.4). 
As for the subject (in active sentences), no syntactic licenser is required, just  as the 
subject in  nominative-accusative  languages does not need any authority assigning it the 
nominative." 
The stem of  Chineae verbs can commonly be followed by  certain  (semi-)suffixes  and 
other  elements  such  as  non-referential  objects,  all  of  them  being  constitutive 
components of the head constituent Vo. In other words, the head constituent V" can con- 
sist of a Verbal Complex (VC) with the stem of the verb in the leftmost position of Vo. 
4.  A-not-A and A-not questions 
Keeping in  mind the assumptions about the internal structure of  V' made in  the above 
section, let's turn our attention towards the construction of yeslno questions of the types 
A-not-A and A-not. 
4.1.  The data 
The element A as a constitutive element of  the A-not-A pattern is thought of as a label 
for several  predicative categories, such as verb, adjective, modal, copula, coverb, and 
even postverbal manner adverbial."  In A-not-AB, 'B'  stands for 'direct object'. 
4.1.1.  In  connection  with  a  direct  object  selected  by  a transitive  verb,  the  A-not-A 
pattern can assume the forms 'V-not-VO' as in (4.1) or 'VO-not-V' as in (4.2): 
(4. I) Ni  kan-bu-kan  dianying?  (4.2) Ni  kan  dianying hu-kan? 
you  watch-not-watch  IUIIVI~  you watch rnovic  not-watch 
'Do you watch the movie?'  'Do you watch the movie?' 
In Standard Mandarin, the choice of negation, including that in the A-not-A pattern, de- 
pends on the aspect of the verb. 
In  'zero-marking'  sentences",  the  selected  negation  normally  is  hu,  such  as 
illustrated in (4.1) and (4.2). 
If  the Verb, however,  is marked as aspectually  perfective by  the preverbal  particle 
33  you-  or as carrying the experiential aspect, then the selected negation will be mei.  In the 
10  According (11  Falk (199 1: 199f.). in languages like English or German, nominative case is not actually 
a  case,  liir  nouns  (or NPs)  used  in  isolation  (in  the  'citation  ibrm')  are nominative,  and  there is, 
naturally, no sourcc ibr casc to he assigned to a form in isolation. 
'  In the A-not pattern, however, the clement A can only he rcpresenlcd hy vcrhs (see below). 
Cf.  Klein el al. (20001, p. 765ff.  " Wanp (1965) was the first to assume that the verb-suRix -le  occurring in amrmativc sentences and 
thc preverhal particle you occurring in negative sentences are allomorphs of a perfective morpheme. 
In terms of Huang (1988: 282), that is to say: "Wang ohservcd that the two elements -le  and you, hoth Yeslno questions in Mandarin Chinese revisited 
latter case, the case of experiential aspect, the verb is simultaneously marked by the pre- 
verbal particle you and the verb suffix guo. 
He (1998: 4s.) gives some telling examples of  the interaction  of  aspect and negation  in 
the A-not-A pattern V-not-VO, which is characterized by  an almost bewildering variety 
of formsj4: 
(4.3)  a.  Ta  lai-mei-(you)lai  Meiguo? 
he  come-not-(uou)come  America 
b.  Ta  laile-mei-(you)lai  Meiguo'? 
he  comclE-not-(~~Ujcome  America 
- a & b:  'Has he arrived in  America?' 
(4.4)  a.  Ta  lai-mei-(you)laiguo  Meiguo'? 
he  come-not-(u0uj~ome,~~ America 
b.  Ta laiguo-mei-(you)laiguo  Meiguo? 
he  comec,t.o-not-(uou)cOmeuuo  America 
- a & b: 'Has he been to America?' 
(4.5)  Ta  laiguole-mei-(you)laiguo  Meiguo? 
hc  come,.,o  -not-(~ou)comea~~  America 
'Has he ever been to America?' 
As the above examples show, the preverbal element you  is incorporated in the A-not-A 
pattern.  In  negative  declarative  sentences,  however,  the  preverbal  element you  may 
appear  in  positions  that  are non-adjacent  to  the  verb.  Consider a  sentence  like  the 
following where a rnanner adverbial intervenes between the perfective element you and 
the verb kun 'read': 
(4.6)  Wo guji  ta genben mei you haohaor kan zhe ben shu. 
I  guess  he  at all  not  YOU  carefully  read this  CL  book 
'I guess he did not carefully read this book at all.' 
It turns out that the perfective element you is not a prefix of the verb. 
4.1.2. According to Klein & Li  & Hendriks (2000: 728, 743), aspect expresses a tem- 
poral relation between  the time at which  the situation (process, state, event) described 
by  the sentence obtains (the 'time of  situation', abbreviated T-SIT), on the one hand, 
and the time about which something is asserted by the sentence (the 'topic time', abbre- 
viated TT), on the other. 
Based  on  this  time-relational  definition  of  aspect, Klein  et al. claim  that  Chinese 
aspectual particles "assert that TT precedes, follows, includes, or is included in the time 
having  a  meaning  and  function  similar  to  tha!  of  the  perfective  aspect,  are  in  complementary 
distribution." 
34  Recall  that in  dcclarativcs thc affirmative  forln of  a pcrfectivc  predicate is V-I?, while the negative 
one is nrei-V. On the  other hand, the  negative  form  of  V-jiuo is ~?tei-V-jiu~.  AS the example (4.5) 
exhibits, Lhe  experiential aspcct can  occur  in  cornhination  with  the pcrleclive aspcct. Notice furthcr 
that  the  prcverhal  clcrncnl  you  can  he  deleted  at  the  lcvel  of  PF.  I  have  slightly  modified  He's 
notation. Horst-Dieter Gasde 
of  a situation described by  the sentencen3'. Klein et al. further claim that in the case of 
2-phase predicates such as duo 'arrive' containing a 'source phase'  during which some- 
one 'is not at some place'  and a 'target phase' during which this someone 'is  at some 
place',  the  'distinguished phase'  (abbreviated DP)  is  the target phase  in  Chinese, in 
contrast to the English aspectual system in which the source phase is the DP. 
Along the lines  of  this framework, the perfective  aspect marker le signals that TT 
OVL PRETIME AND T-DP'!  For a sentence like 
(4.7)  Zhang San zhongyu dao-le  jia.  (Klein et al. 2000: 758) 
Zhan  Sen  finally  arl-ivc-LE  home 
'Zhang San finally arrived home.', 
this means that T-DP as well  as a subinterval of  the source phase  are included within 
TT. Klein et al. (2000: 758) illustrate this by means of the following diagram, in  which 
++++ indicates the distinguished phase, .... the source phase of 2-phase expressions, and 
[  ] the assertion time TT: 
In  contrast to le, the experiential verb suffix guo "indicates  that the time about which 
something is asserted falls into the posttime of the distinguished phase"'7.  Consider the 
following sentence given by Klein et al. (2000: 760): 
(4.8)  Zhang San chuguo-guo.  ....... ~~~-~..++++++++  [  ] 
Zhang  Sen  go ahroad-GUO  source  target 
'Zhang San has been to other countries.' 
In  this sentence, both the source phase and the target phase precede TT, which means 
that the resulting state, Zhan San's being abroad, no longer obtains. 
4.1.3. In  contrast to the A-not-A pattern which, if  filled with a transitive verb, permits 
the  forms V-not-VO and VO-not-V, such  as in  (4.1) and  (4.2), the A-not  pattern  is 
strongly tied to VO-not. That is to say, a question  pattern  like V-not-0 in which  the 
negator hu precedes the object does not exist, as indicated in (4.10): 
(4.9) Ni  kan  dianyian bu'l 
you watch movic  not 
'Do you watch the movie?' 
(4.10) *Ni  kan-bu  dianying? 
you watch-not  movie 
At this point, it is important to point out that the A-not pattern is much more deeply roo- 
ted in the Chinese language than the A-not-A pattern. Whereas the A-not pattern  can be 
traced back to Classical Chinese (Pre-Qin Dynasty to Han Dynasty), as noted by Cheng 
et al. (1996: 5 I), it took until the early Middle Ages (Sui and Tang Dynasties) that the 
A-not-A pattern came into use (cf. Ohta (1987: 378)). This means that the A-not pattern 
of  the verb exemplified by  the VO-not form kun diu~zviizg  hu 'watch  movie not' in  the 
example (4.9) above is an  independent pattern which cannot be derived from the VO- 
- p~  - 
15  Ihid., p. 753. 
3h  Ct  ihid., p. 754. 
17  Ibid., p. 759. Yesino questions in Mandarin Chincse revisited 
not-V pattern (2.2), kan dianying hu kan  'watch movie not watch', by ellipsis (see also 
Shao (1996: 110f.)). 
4.2.  A proposal for a unified derivation of A-not-A and A-not questions 
So far we have dwelt on the Chinese data. In  this subsection, the problem of  how the 
predicate of A-not-A and A-not questions is construed will be taken care of. As we will 
see, the analysis of  the subpatterns  (4.1), (4.2) and (4.9) exceedingly depends on the 
syntactic level one starts from. 
4.2.1. Based on the Strong Lexicalist ~~~othesis'f  I propose that both in  (4.1) and in 
(4.2) a  'morphological  word'",  namely  kan-hu-kan  consisting  of  the  verb  stem  kan 
'watch'  and the semi-suffix bu-ka~z,  is directly inserted  in the sentence at D-structure, 
while in (4.9) the same verb stem is followed by  the semi-suffix hu. In connection with 
a  supposed  D-structural  OV  order,  this  involves  that  14.1)  and  (4.2)  share the  D- 
structure (4.1  l), whereas (4.9) is derived from a D-structure like (4.12): 
(4.1 1)  ni [",  dianying  kan-bu-kan]] 
you  movie  watch-not-watch 
(4.12)  [,,-  ni  dianying kan-bull 
yr~u  movie  watch-not 
Note that  the sentence negation  bu  is incorporated into the morphological  word form 
kart-hu-kun and kun-hu, respectively. 
With  respect  to  the three  examples  under  discussion, my  basic  idea is that  semi- 
suffixes can be  'taken along'  or 'left behind'  in the process of  deriving the S-structure 
of  sentences. Whereas in (4.1) the semi-suffix  -hu-kan has been  'taken along' with the 
stem, it has been  'left  behind'  in  (4.2). In (4.9), however, the semi-suffix -hu must be 
oblizatorilv 'left behind'.  - 
Viewing this in connection with our assumptions in section 3 (cf., especially, (3.2)), 
the predicates of the examples concerned are shaped like this at the level of S-structure: 
(4  [v kan-bu-kan,  [v, dianying tl  I] 
watch-not-watch  movie 
(4.2')  [V kanl [v, dianying t,-bu-kan]] 
watch  nlovle  ifor-  rvatch 
(4.9')  [,P  kan, [V dianying tl-bull 
watch  movie  not 
The grammatical  units  kan-hu-kan in  (4.1 1) and  kan-hu  in  (4.12) are  morphological 
words insofar as they cannot be freely interrupted by  any lexical material, except for an 
object in cases like (4.2) and (4.9). That the object in (4.2) and (4.9) gets into a position 
in  between  the stem of  the verb kan and its suffix is a result of  the fact that the verb 
- - 
38  Cf. Di Sciullo & Willialns (1987: 1):  "Just as morphology has atoms, so does syntax, and words are 
commonly taken to hc the atoms of syntax. We will call words in this sensc syntactic atoms." 
'  Cf. Wurrcl (2000). Horst-Dietcr Gasdc 
stem moves into a higher  Vr-shell for purposes of  argument licensing, as depicted in 
section 3. In other words, the object is not 'inserted'  in a position between the verb stem 
and its suffix(es) at D-structure. 
The principles on which our analysis of (4.  I), (4.2) and (4.9) is based also apply to He's 
(1998) examples (4.3) through (4.5) above. As for (4.3a), I claim that you  is a constitu- 
tive element of the suffix complex of the verb, yielding the S-structure (4.3a'): 
(4.3)  a'.  [V lai-mei-(you)lai,  [", Meiguo t, I] 
come-not-(uou)come  Amer~ce 
4.2.2. Considered from a pragmatic  viewpoint, the A-not-AB,  AB-not-A  and  AB-not 
patterns are not pure duplicates of each other. Instead, they represent different regional 
variants. 
Whereas the pattern A-not-AB is used in southern dialects, in the southern variety of 
Mandarin  Chinese  and  in  the  standard  variant  of  Mandarin, the pattern  AB-not-A  is 
used  in the Beijing dialect and in the northern  language area but  not  in the standard 
variant  of  Mandarin  Chinese. The pattern  AB-not  is  used  not  only  in  the  northern 
language area but also in various central and southern dialects, if  '-not'  is realized by 
hu. In  short, in contrast to the pattern A-not-AB which occurs in Standard Mandarin, the 
patterns AB-not-A and AB-not have a regional s~ant.~" 
4.2.3. 1 would like to stress that a uniform derivation of  yeslno questions based on the 
patterns V-not-VO, VO-not-V and VO-not will be impossible if  Chinese is considered 
as a pure SVO language, as favored by Huang (1982; 1991), Mulder & Sybesma (1992), 
Dai  (1 993), McCawley ( 1994), Ernst (1994), N. Zhang ( 1997), Sybesma (1  999), Schaf- 
far & Chen (200  I) and others. 
Huang (1991) is forced to give different accounts for the patterns A-not-AB (V-not- 
VO) exemplified by  (4.1) and AB-not-A  (VO-not-V) exemplified  by  (4.2). As for A- 
not-AB,  he proposes a morphological  word formation mechanism involving a rule of 
verb  copying  followed  by  a  rule  inserting  the  negative  morpheme  'not'  bu.  This 
mechanism fails, however, to work in the case of  AB-not-A because of  the intervening 
object  which  blocks  a morphological  derivation  in  Huang's system. Correspondingly. 
Huang derives the  AB-not-A pattern  not by  a morphological but  by  a syntactic rule. 
More precisely, he derives AB-not-A (VO-not-V) from the syntactic pattern AB-not-AB 
(VO-not-VO)  by  'anaphoric  deletion'.  This  means  that  the  predicate  of  a  yeslno 
question like (4.2) would not have an S-structure like (4.2') given above but rather one 
like (4.2"): 
(4.2")  [VP  kan  dianying] bu  [vP  kan  &aymg] 
watch movie  not  watch mevie 
Such an  analysis directly leads to the conclusion  that  the  AB-not-A pattern  is  'more 
disjunctive'  and  'less grammaticalized'  than the A-not-AB pattern.4' Taking Huang's 
approach as their starting point, most of the authors concerned with A-not-A questions 
'"  I  have  to  thank  Pr<,fcssor Liu  Danqing  (Bcijing)  for  most  of  these  facts  (p.c.). See also Chen & 
Schaffar (1997). 
41  McCawlcy  (1994). for  example, difrcrentiates hetween  "two  syntactically  distinct types"  which  he 
calls 'reduplicativc yeslno clucstions'  and 'disjunctive yeslno questions', respectively (ibid., p. 179). Ycslno questions in Mandarin Chinese revisited 
restrict themselves to investigating the A-not-AB pattern. Our conception is at variance 
with this prevailing trend. 
4.2.4. Superficially, it seems that our analysis coincides with that of Huang, at least as 
far as the pattern A-not-AB is concerned. But on closer ~napection,  this turns out not to 
be the case. In  the theoretical framework of  Huang (1991), a  [+Q] feature located in 
Inflo and the naked  stem of  the verb are separately inserted  in the sentence. Not until 
deriving the S-structure the [+Q]  feature triggers the copying of the verb stem and the 
~nsertion  of a negation: 
In  our approach, however, a full morphological  word form carrying a question feature 
[+Q] is inserted, yielding the D-structural predicate (4.14)~': 
4.2.5. To summarize the assumptions so far, I claim that the AB-not-A pattern is NOT 
'more disjunctive' or  'less grammaticalized'  than the A-not-AB pattern. Under a prag- 
matic viewpoint, the difference between A-not-AB on the one hand and AB-not-A and 
AB-not on the other is that the the fornier is used predominantly in the standard variant 
of Mandarin Chinese, whereas the latter serve as dialectal variants of it. 
My  proposal  that  the  A-not-AB,  AB-not-A  and  the  AB-not  patterns  should  be 
recognized as having the same grammatical status under a synchronic view is supported 
by the fact that all of them obey Island Constraints, as stated by Huang (1991: 31.3f.). In 
contrast, disjunctive patterns  with  the  conjunction  haishi  'or'  do  not  exhibit  island 
effects.  ha; is  to  say, as opposed to  the A-not-AB,  AB-not-A and AB-not patterns, 
disjunctive patterns with  haishi  'or'  are able to appear in subject clauses and relative 
c~auses.~' 
4.2.6. Some residual  asymmetries between  A-not-AB  and AB-not-A questions on the 
one hand  and  AB-not  questions  on the  other  are mentioned  in  Cheng et  al.  (1996: 
section  I.  1).  These asymmetries concern, among others, the use of the element yijing 
'already', which, according to the three authors, is compatible with the AB-not pattern44 
but not with A-not-AB and AB-not-A. As for the A-not pattern, they give the following 
example: 
(4.15)  ta yijing kan-wan shu  meiyou?  (Cheng el al. 1996: 43, (7h)) 
hc already read-linish hook not-havc 
'Did he already finish reading the book?' 
--  '' McCawley (1994:  180f.) correctly  objects to Chomsky's (1991) treatment of  the negative element in 
reduplicative qucstions as a fake negation rather than a real negation, i.e. as an element that does not 
appear in  the dccp structure. In our system, the ncgative clement, incorporated in the morphological 
verb form, docs appear at the lcvel of D-structurc. 
13  Interestingly  cnough,  thc  syntactic  pattern  VP-not-VP  representing  a  horderline  type  between 
clisjunclive qucstions with huishi 'or' on the onc hand and A-nol-A questions on the other does show 
island ei'fecls, as noted hy Huang (1991: 313f.). 
44  Cheng et al. call this pattern Negative Particle Questions (NPQs). Horst-Dieter Gasde 
Basically, this example represents just  the perfective subvariant of the AB-not pattern. 
By  contrast,  the  imperfective  subvariant  of  the  pattern  is  not  compatible  with  the 
perfective aspect-like element ytjing  'already': 
(4.16)  *Ni  yijing  kan  dianyian bu? 
you  alrcady watch  movic  not 
'Do you already watch the movie?' 
It  is highly  questionable whether  the perfective variant of  the AB-not pattern  exem- 
plified by (4.15) above belongs to the AB-not pattern at all: 
While the A-not-A form of the verb is incompatible with the so-called ba-construc- 
tion",  the perfective variant of the VO-not pattern is absolutely compatible, as (4.17) il- 
lustrates: 
(4.17) Ni ba  shu  kanwan-le  mei you? 
you  HA hook read-finish-Asp  not  you 
'Have you finished reading the book?' 
Moreover, the perfective  subpattern of  AB-not, V-leO-mei you, can  be  utilized in the 
standard  variant  of  Mandarin  Chinese  with  no  problems,  while  the  imperfective 
subpattern of AB-not (i.e. VO-hu)  has a regional slant, as stated in section 4.2.2. 
Provided  that  this  is  correct,  then  A(B)-not  is  a  purely  imperfective pattern  which, 
contrary to Cheng et al.'s (1996) claims, is just  as incompatible with yijing  'already'  as 
the A-not-AB and AB-not-A patterns.4" 
4.3.  Additional evidence for our proposal 
In  section 3 I have hypothesized that  internal  arguments of  the verb are licensed  by 
moving the verb to c-commanding head positions of higher V'-shells. In  section 4.2 we 
have applied this principle to A-not-A and A-not predicates, postulating that the stem of 
the verb can  'take  along' or 'leave behind'  its suffixes in deriving the S-structure of  a 
sentence. In  this section, I will show that verb raising in A-not-A and A-not predicates 
is even  obligatory, while it can be dispensed with in  yeslno questions with  mu, under 
certain conditions. 
Let's  come back to the fact that the A-not-A form of  the verb is incompatible with 
the so-called bu-construction and compare the structures (4.18a)/(4.19a), which do not 
contain an A-not-A predicate, with those of (4.18b)/(4.19b) containing an A-not-A pre- 
dicate, yielding ill-formed structures: 
(4.18)  a.  Ni ba shu  nazou-le  ma? 
you RA hook  take away-ASP QP 
'Have you taken away the book?' 
b.  "Ni ba shu  nazou-mei-  you nazou'? 
you BA hook take away-not- You  take away 
-  - 
45  Cf the next section, whel-e the reasons for this incompatibility shall he explained. 
411  Explicitly arguing with Cheng et al. (1996), N. Zhang (1997: 134f.) also strives to underline the com- 
mon syntactic features shared hy A-not-A and A-not questions. Ycs/no questions in Mandarin Chinese revisited 
(4.19)  a.  Ni ba bilu  sheng-le huo ma?47 
you BA fireplace start-ASP fire  QP 
'Did you fire up the fireplace'?' 
b.  *Ni  ba bilu  sheng-mei- you sheng huo'? 
you  BA fireplace  start-not-  You  start  fire 
My account for the difference in grammaticality of the above examples is that the rai- 
sing of the verb is obviously blocked by the element ha in the 'b.'-sentences. 
As for the grammaticality of the 'a,'-sentences, Iclailn that the element ha, which we 
have called a  'coverb'  in  section 2.5, is  in truth a 'dummy  verb'  acting as a syntactic 
licenser of  the direct object of  the verb. Note that ha occupies exactly the same head 
position of a higher V'-shell into which the full verb is raised in the default case.48 
Contrary to the ill-formed structures (4.18b)l(4.19b), the example (4.17) introduced in 
subsection  4.2.6  is  well-formed,  bearing  out that  no  verb rasing takes place  in this 
structure and that this sentence is not an instance of the AB-not pattern. 
To summarize, I'd  like to reiterate that  the ungrammaticality of  (4.18b)/(4.19b) con- 
firms our claim that Vo raising to higher head positions of V'-shells for purposes of ar- 
gument licensing obligatorily takes place  in A-not-A sentences, such  as illustrated by 
means of the S-structures (4. l'), (4.2') and (4.9') in section 4.2.1. 
4.4.  How A-not-A and A-not questions are structured as a whole 
With respect  to the problem of  how A-not-A  and A-not questions  are structured as a 
whole, one of  my  central  tenets  is that  they are typed  in  a clause-internal  functional 
head position which I will baptize Force2" (F2"). More importantly, this position  is not 
identical  to the head position of  the functional Polarity, Phrase (PollP) introduced by 
Drubig (1994) in  order to accommodate such elements like assertive negation  and ele- 
ments like only or  even in English. 
Additionally,  my  subsequent  claims  will  be  based  on  some  central  tenets  of 
Chomsky's  (1995) Checking  Theory.  Reduced  to  its  barest  essentials,  this  theory 
involves  that  each  functional  head  possesses  an  abstract  feature  <F>  that  must  be 
checked within its Checking Domain. This checking procedure can take place either by 
'Merger',  i.e. by  the insertion  of  a lexical element before  'Spell-Out',  or by  'Feature 
Attraction'  at the level of LF. 
4.4.1. As pointed out by Schaffar & Chen (2001), A-not-A and A-not questions convey 
'information focus' without exception, while ma questions are compatible not only with 
'information focus' but also with 'identificational focus' (as we will see in section 7). 
-17  CS. Mei (1980: 25). According to Mei, the bu construction in this example is coming up kom a place 
adverhial like zui hilu-li (lit. 'in the fireplace-inside' = 'in the fireplace'). This is questionable, since 
locative adjuncts are compatible with the A-not-A pattern (cf. Ernst (1994)). 
In  In Gasde (1998), I  have expounded that not only  thc element hu  but  also gei preceding the indirect 
object and the element Bei  in  passive sentences may  serve as dummy vcrhs licensing an argument of 
the verh. Originally, ha was a verb meaning 'grasp' or 'hold'. As f(~r  its I-ole in Modern Chinese, bu is 
oltcn regarded as pul-e lnarker of the direct ohjcct or as a case marker. CC  Zou (1993), for example. Horst-Dieter Casde 
Information  focus is a type of  focus which  is often  called presentational focus, wide 
focus, projective focus, maximally projected focus, novelty focus, or VP-focus. There is 
a general  agreement  that  information  focus has  a  "strictly  incremental  effect  on the 
discourse" (Drubig 1998: 7) insofar as it specifies "new information". Along the lines of 
Kiss (1998), this type of focus conveys "non-presupposed information marked by one 
or more pitch accents. In  terms of  Drubig (1998: l), information focus is "licensed  by 
integration into wider focus domains",  which means that the focus feature is projected 
from a focus exponent. Based on this, Drubig & Schaffar (2001 : 2) claim that licensing 
by embedding is a default mechanism which does not entail any further expenditure of 
encoding. According  to L6pez & Villalba  (2000: 5), non-contrastive  focus is always 
unmarked, i.e. no syntactic operations or morphological markers are associated with it. 
Seen in this light, assertive negation and English elements like only or even which may 
appear  in  Pollo do  not  necessarily  serve  as  "licensers"  of  information  focus,  as 
originally claimed by Drubig (1994: 22f.). Rather, they act as additional indicators of it. 
Whereas  Drubig  (1994) had  declarative  sentences  in  mind, Schaffar & Chen  (2001: 
857f.) establish a relationship between  A-not-A predicates and Drubig's  PollP. More 
precisely, they advocate that  in  A-not-A questions Pol lo is occupied by sorne kind of 
question operator. This is much to their credit. Yet, strictly speaking, Schaffar and Chen 
do not clearly distinguish between the morphological  V-not-V form of  the verb and an 
abstract question feature in  Polo. Instead, they suppose to "analyze the V-neg-V form as 
a question operator  in  Poll" (p. 857). In  consequence, they provide a sentence model 
according  to  which  Poll" can  be  alternatively  occupied  by  0  (affirmation),  bdmei 
(assertive negation), zhi ('only')  and V-bdmei-V (yeslno question). As an unavoidable 
result  of this, VP rzniains  literally empty in  Schaffar & Chen's  (2001: 858) sentence 
model (33).4" 
Deviating from Schaffar and Chen's intuitively very plausible approach, whose central 
idea is that the question operator in A-not-A sentences is located in Poll ",  I will take the 
position  that  the  declarativelinterrogative  distinction  and  the  affirmativelnegative 
distinction denote different syntactic and conceptual levels which should not be mixed 
LIP.  This  view  is empirically  supported  by  the fact  that  affirmative and  negative ele- 
ments occur in both declarative and interrogative sentences (cf. section 5.2.5). 
4.4.2. Starting from this point of view, I will claim that yeslno questions with wta on the 
one hand  and  A-not-A  and  A-not  questions  on  the  other  are  typed  in  two  distinct 
positions. 
Yeslno questions with the question particle ma like 
(4.20)  Ni nazou-le  zhe ben shu  ma? 
you lake away-ASP this  CL  hook  QP 
'Have you taken away this book?' 
are typed in Forcelo (Flu).  Although located at the rightmost periphery of the sentence, 
FI" is a hierarchical position, from which ma c-commands the rest of the sentence: 
""esidcs,  this model incorrectly gives thc impression that the A-not-A form of  the verb can co-occur 
with the sentence-final question particle ma in the same clause. Referring to Laka (19941, N. Zhang 
(1997: 126) claims that the functional head Z,  which apparently coincides with Drubig's  (1994) Poll", 
can  he  either  intcrrogalivc  or  negative.  This  claim  comes  close  to  Schaifar  and  Chen's  (2001) 
approach. Yeslno questions in Mandarin Chincse revisited 
IP  F1"  -  I 
ni nazou-le ihe hen shu  ma? 
Differently  from mu questions, the typing  procedure of  A-not-A and A-not questions 
happens in a clause-internal position, namely in the head position of a functional phrase 
which I will call 'Force2P' (F~P).~" 
This means that simple yeslno questions like (4.21) and (4.22) have Logical Forms 
like (4.21') and (4. 22'), respectively: 
(4.21) Ni  qu-bu-qu? 
you  go-not-go 
'Do you go there?' 
(4.22)  Ni  qu-bu? 
you  go-not 
'Do you go there?' 
That  is  to  say, the  morphological  words  qu-hu-qu  'go-not-go'  and  qu-bu  'go-not' 
bearing a yes/no question feature [+Q]"  are base-generated  in the sentence position V". 
At the level of  LF, however, [+Q] "starts up on its own", moving to F~o'~,  where it is 
'sister adjoined"'  to a correlating weak question feature, <Q >, in order to check it. 
Provided this, my contention is that it is the <Q > feature checked by [+a] that con- 
tributes interrogative force to the whole sentence in A-not-A  and A-not  questions. In 
other  words, I claim that  in  A-not-A  and  A-not  questions the  syntactic procedure  of 
'clausal  typing'  (Cheng (1991)) takes place within the extended predicate, comprising 
F2P and v'.'~   oreo over, I contend that yeslno questions of  this type do not contain a 
Force1 Phrase (FlP), since one clause cannot be typed twice. 
SO  Note that Fl'  and F2P are in complementary distribution. 
5 1  Actually,  [+Q] is  an ahhrcviation  of  the  more complex question  feature  [+Q, -Wh],  which  is  one 
specification of the ahstract clausal typing feature [+I-Q,+I-Whl. It ensues that Wh-questions have the 
fcature spccification 1-Q, +Wh], whilc declarativcs are marked by  [-Q,-Wh]. 
52  Rcmll that 'Artlaction'  inw~lves  movement of a set of grammatical features carried by a head on their 
own (without movcnient of the corresponding phonetic liatures). See Radfnrd (19971, p. 230. 
53  Thc notion  of  'sistcr adjunction'  stems from the GB thcory. To  'sister adjoin'  one constituent A to 
another constituent B is to attach A under the node C immediately dominating B. Opposed to this, to 
'Chomsky-adioin'  A to B means to create a new B-node which immediately dominates both A and B. 
Cf. Radford (1981: 169). 
54  Arguably, thc extended predicate of A-not-A  and A-not questions is  an  instance for a  'phase'  along 
thc lines ill' Chomsky (1998: 20; 1999: 9). Either a verb phrase in  which all theta rolcs are assigned, 
vP, or a full clause including tense and force can he a 'phasc'  in Chomsky's scnse. Horst-Dieter Gasde 
4.4.3. In  contrast to  this  hypothesis, Huang (1982: 532), Li  (1992:  137f.), and Ernst 
(1994: 258) postulate that in  A-not-A questions "the A-not-A operator"  (Huang) / "the 
A-not-A form" (Li) 1  "the verb bearing [+Qu]" (~rnst)"  must raise to "Comp"  at LF. 
Similarly, Cheng et al. (1996: 56ff.) postulate that the negation element in  'Negative 
Particle Questions'  (i.e. 'A-not'  questions) must be  raised to Co in Mandarin  Chinese 
which displays agreement between the aspect of the verb and the choice of the negation 
element, while it is base-generated in C" in non-agreement dialects of Chinese. 
Differently from these hypotheses, I contend that [+Q]-raising to Comp at LF in  A-not- 
A and A-not questions does not take place in Mandarin Chinese. Let's take a closer look 
at Li's and Ernst's arguments: 
Li  (1992)  i5  concerned  with  indefinite  wh-phrases,  the  distribution  of  which  is 
characterized by the fact that they can only appear in polarity environments, i.e. within 
the scope of  a negator or of  a question operator. This is the case in (4.23ab) but not in 
(4.24): 
(4.23) a.  Ta xi-bu-xihuan 
he  likc-not-like  what 
'Does he like somethinglanything?' 
b.  SheiIShenme ren xihuan  ta  ma? 
whii  /what  Inan like  him QP 
'Does anyone like him?' 
(4.24) "SheiIShenme ren  xi-bu-xihuan  ta? 
who  /what  man  like-nnt-like  him 
In  (4.23a),  the  indefinite  wh-phrase  shenme  'somethinglanything'  appearing  as  the 
direct object of the verb is licensed by the A-not-A question operator [+Q] which, in our 
terms, is located in  F2". In  a similar manner, the indefinite wh-phrase sheiLshenme ren 
'anyone'  acting as a subject is in  the scope of the question operator in 'Comp'  (to use 
Li's phrase) in  (4.23b). In  contradiction to this, the subject in  (4.24) lacks a licenser, 
with the result that the whole structure is bad. 
Claiming that  the A-not-A  form undergoes  raising at LF, Li's  problem  is that  she 
cannot explain the asymmetry in  grammaticality between (4.23b) and (4.24). If  in (4.24) 
the  question  operator  is  raised  to  Comp  at  LF,  the  sentence  should  be  just  as 
grammatical as (4.23b). To put it another way, on the precondition of  an LF raising of 
the question  operator, A-not-A  structures like (4.24) should behave exactly like their 
counterparts with ma, because once the question operator has been raised to Comp, it c- 
cornmands the subject. 
i5  Murc  precisely,  Ernst  (1994:  246)  following  Aqvist  (1965),  takes  [+Qu]  "as  representing  an 
imperative  operator  which  requests  information  of  the  listener".  Groenendi.jk  &  Stokhof  (1997) 
criticize  Aqvist's  view  which  is  also  maintained  by  Vanderveken  (1990) Contrary  to  Aqvist  and 
Vandervekcn. Gr(1encndijk and Stokhof regard asking a question as a basic specch act. 
56  Note that in this example the verh xihuun 'likc'  is -  optionally -  truncated to its first syllahlc xi, while 
the se~ni-suRix  ol  the lcxerne  in  question  occurs in  its full form. Dai  (1993: 24) derives vcrb forms 
like xi  hy  a  lormal  operation  of  subtraction  which  deletes the  second  syllable -hum in  xihuun  in 
inflectional  morphology. Note  further  that Dai's  derivation of the xi-hu-xihlmn form deviates from 
that suggested by Huang (1991: 3 lbf.). Ycslno questions in Mandarin Chinese revisited 
In  view of this dilemma (which Li  is aware of) she argues that "indefinite Wh must be 
licensed at S-structure" (p. 138). This arbitrary ad hoc assumption, however, amounts to 
saying  that  the  syntactic  level  of  LF,  otherwise  responsible  for  wh-Movement, 
Quantifier Raising and Scope Interpretation by  definition, is idle in  the particular case 
of question operator raising. 
At this juncture, the question arises what the point of a movement operation without 
any impact would be. 
Li's  Problem  can  easily be  resolved  by  assuming that  the  [+Q] operator in  (4.21) 
remains in F2". 
Ernst  (1994) correctly  observes  that  the  A-not-A  pattern  is  incompatible with  some 
'core  adjuncts',  such  as  epistemic  elements  and  causal  adjuncts,  whereas  yesfno 
questions ending with the question particle mu are allowed to contain such adjuncts: 
(4.25)  a.  "Ta yiding  qu-bu-qu? 
he  definitely  go-not-go 
b.  Ta yiding  qu  ma? 
hc  dcfinitely go  QP 
'Is he definitely going?' 
(4.26)  a.  "Ni yinwei ni-de pengyou de  yaoqiu  qu-bu-qu? 
you because your  friend  PART  demand  gou-not-gou 
b.  Ni yinwei ni-de pengyou  de  yaoqiu  qu  ma? 
you hecause your  friend  PART  demand  gou QP 
'Do you go there because of your friend's demand?' 
Ernst (1994: 245) explains the ungrammaticality of (4.25a) by means of the 'Isomorphy 
Principle' (ISOP)~'. 
In  fact, the  asymmetry  in grammaticality  between  A-not-A  variants  and  the  mu- 
variants in (4.25) and (4.26) can be explained without recourse to Ernst's IsoP, provided 
you  don't operate on  the premise that the verb bearing  [Qu] must be  raised to Comp. 
Considered from a  semantic viewpoint,  it  suffices to say that  the  incompatibility  of 
epistemic modificators  and causal adjuncts with  the A-not-A  form of  the verb arises 
from the  fact that  they  both  must  operate over propositions.  Given  this,  (4.25a) and 
(4.26a) are ungrammatical, because the [+Q] feature raised to FZo at LF, as required by 
our approach, turns the predicate represented by V' into a f~nction.'~ 
Differently, yeslno questions with ma  contain a strong <Q>-feature in Fl0  that has 
scope over the  whole  sentence.  This  feature  is  checked  by  the  question  particle  mu 
which  is  'sister-adjoined'  to <Q> by  Merger.  The question feature in  FIo turns the 
''  This principle reads: It' an operator A has scope over B at SS, thcn A has scope over B at LF. Based 
on this principle Ernst claims that sentences like (4.25~1)  are se~nantically  anomalous, as adverbs like 
);idinx cannot take question operators in their scope. And, due to the IsoP, this anomaly exists not only 
at S-structure but also at LF, because not only the verb bearing I+Qul must raise to Comp at LF, but 
also thc epistemic operator must raise to a pre-field  position io which it has scope over the question 
operator, just as it had at the level of S-structure, yielding an LF like the rollowing (p. 252, (43)): 
(i) yiding2  qu-[Qu], [ta t2 ti ] 
58  For the hypothesis that from a  semantic viewpoinl ye.s/no questions are functions, see Krifka (2001a: 
*  > Horst-Dieter Gnsde 
proposition into a function as well, but in contrast to the A-not-A structures (4.25a) and 
(4.26a), the episteinic modificator and the causal adjunct lie within the scope of ma  at 
every syntactic level in (4.25b) and (4.26b). 
4.4.4. B. Zhang (1999: 296f.) observes that indefinite objects cannot occur in A-not-AB 
and AB-not-A questions, as examples like (4.27ab) show: 
(4.27)  a.  "Nimen mai-bu-mai yi-liang xin  che?  (A-not-AB) 
you  buy-not-huy  one-CL  new  car 
b.  *Nimen mai yi-liang xin che bu-mai?  (AB-not-A) 
you  huy  one-CL  newcar  not-buy 
Zhang does not provide an  explanation for his observation. However, granted that his 
observation is correct, it serves as an additional piece of evidence for my claim that A- 
not-A questions are typed in F2". 
Huang (1987: 249) stresses that it "is well known" that a numerally quantified NP is 
generally specific in Chinese. With respect to our examples (4.27ab) this means that the 
object DP yi-liang xin che 'a new car' must undergo raising across  F2" at the level of 
LF. Yet, exactly this is not allowed for semantic reasons, since a question operator must 
have  scope  over  the  quantifier  at  any  syntactic  level.  In  contrast  to  (4.27ab), this 
requirement is obeyed in (4.28): 
(4.28) Nimen rnai yi-liang xin che ma? 
you  huy  one-CL  new car  QP 
'Are you buying a new car?' 
It should be noted that Ernst's  (1994) Isomorphy Principle does not work in  cases like 
(4.27ab). If  the IsoP were operative in such cases, not only the numerally quantified NP 
yi-licrrzg xin qiche 'a new car' but also the [+Q] operator in F2" would have to be raised 
to "Comp"  at LF: 
.  . 
(4.27') a. *[,.Colnp..[+Q]  rIP  yi-liang xin che [~~nimen  mai-bu-maiw 
one-CL  new  car  you  huy-not-buy 
111 
.  . 
b. *[,,c,,nl,..[+Q]  [IP yi-liang xin che [IPnimen  mai  . . bu-mai[~~  Ill 
nnc-C~  ncw car  you  huy  not-buy 
f 
In  view of this, (4.27ab) should be just as grammatical as (4.28). The fact that this is not 
the case proves once more  that the scope of the [+Q] operator in A-not-A questions is 
restricted to the predicate at every syntactic level. Yeslno questions in Mandarin Chinese revisited 
5.  Yeslno questions with an overt question operator in F2" 
So far we have claimed  that  A-not-A  and  A-not  predicates contain  an  abstract  [+Q] 
feature that  checks a correlating  abstract <Q> feature in  F2" by  the LF operation of 
Attraction. 
In  this section, we will consider several overt question operators which are of theore- 
tical  interest insofar as they  corroborate our hypothesis concerning the existence of  a 
functional F2P. These operators with interrogative force appear both  in  some Chinese 
dialects and in Mandarin Chinese. 
5.1.  Dialectal variants 
The so-called a-operator is used  in  Shanghainese and Suzhounese (both belonging to 
the Wu dialect group): 
(5.1)  a. Nong ming  zao  a  dao Shanghai qu?  (Xu & Shao 1998: 89, Shanghainese) 
you  tomorrow morning PART  to  Shanghai  go 
'Do you go to Shanghai tomorrow morning'?' 
b. [IP nongl ming  zao [rnp [m.  [a] <Q >] [v, tl  [", dao Shanghai qu]]]]? 
you  tomorrow morning  PART  to  Shanghai  go 
(5.2)  a. Li  a  kan  xi?  (Yuan 1993: 101, Suahounese) 
hc PART watch  thcatre 
'Does he go to the theatre?' 
h. [IP  Iil [F~P  [FP  [a] <Q >] rv. tl  [V kan  xi]]]]? 
hc  PART  watch  thcatre 
The interrogative  force  in  (5.1)  and  (5.2) is  exclusively  conveyed  by  the  question 
operator a which we claim to be located in the head position of F2P. In F2", it is 'sister- 
adjoined' to an abstract <Q> feature by the operation of Merge (which takes place at D- 
structure). Correspondingly, the predicates of  (5.1) and (5.2), rlao  Shanghai qu 'go to 
Shanghai' and krrn xi 'go to the theatre', respectively, can neither assume an A-not-A or 
A-not form nor do they contain a question feature. 
The scope of  the overt question operator a is restricted to the predicate. Hence, just 
like  A-not-A  questions'",  yeslno  questions  with  a  are  not  consistent  with  epistemic 
elements like yiding  'definitely'  or causal adjuncts like yinwei izi-de pengyou de yaoqiu 
'because of  your friend's demand'.  And just  like A-not-A  questions, yeslno questions 
made up with  the help of a do not project FI', because the a operator turns V'  into a 
function. 
The same should apply to the karn  operator which is used in  the Southern Min dialect 
spoken on the mainland in the province of Fujian and in Taiwan: 
(5.3)  a.  Li  kam u  chi:?  (Huang 1991: 325) 
you PART  havc money 
'Do you havc money?' 
'"Cf  (4.25a) and (4.2(,a) discussed in  section 4. 
7  1 Horst-Dicter Gasdc 
b.  [IP 1i1  [FZP  IW  [kaml <Q >I [v. t~ [v' u  chi:llll? 
you  PART  have  money 
5.2.  The assertive question operator shi-bu-shi in Mandarin Chinese 
In  the standard variant of Mandarin  Chinese, there is a type of shi-bu-shi which is not 
derived from the familiar "it-cleft"  marker shi. Rather, it is derived from a shi which is 
used to "assert the proposition of a sentence", as expressed by  Yeh (1995: 43). 
My claim is that the A-not-A form of this 'assertion marker' is a pure question opera- 
tor."" Appearing in F2", assertive shi-hu-shi takes scope over the sentence constituent V' 
which may be extended by various VP modifiers6'. 
5.2.1.  First, consider examples like the following, in which the assertive question opera- 
tor .shi-hu-shi  and the full verb are adjacent to each other: 
(5.4)  a.  Ta zuotian  shi-bu-shi  lai-guo?  (Shao 1996: 132) 
he  yesterday  AM-not-AM  come-ASP 
'Did he drop in yesterday?' 
b.  [,p pal  zuotian [~2p  IF2*  [shi-bu-shi] <Q >] [v. t,  [v. lai-guo]]]]? 
he  yesterday  AM-nor-AM  come-ASP 
(5.5)  a.  Ni  shi-bu-shi  xihuan zhe hen shu? 
you AM-not-AM like  this  CL  hook 
'Do you like this book?' 
b.  [,p nil [F~P [shi-bu-shi] <Q >] [v' tl [V xihuanz [,,,  zhe hen shu t2]]]]? 
You  AM-not-AM  like  this  CL  hook 
(5.6)  a.  Ni shi-bu-shi  gaosu-le ta zhe ge xiaoxi'? 
you AM-noL-AM tell-ASP  he  this CL  news 
'Did you tell him this piece of news?' 
b.  NII  [~p  1,-  [shi-bu-shi] <Q >] [v, tj[~.  gaosu-lez (v.  ta [v.  ["c,  t'l 
you  AM-nol-AM  tell-ASP  he 
[v.  zhe ge  xiaoxi t2 ]]]]]]]?62 
this  CL  news 
As Yeh observes, the negative counterpart of  the "it-cleft"  marker shi  is  bu-shi, while 
the negative counterpart of the assertion marker shi is ~LL  or mei(you),  depending on the 
aspect of  the verb. Given this, the fact that the shi-bu-slzi in  (5.4) through (5.6) repre- 
sents the A-not-A form of the assertion marker shi is borne out by the fact that the cor- 
rect  negative  response to  them  is meiyou for (5.4) and (5.6), while  it is hu  for (5.5). 
Based on this, we can say that the predicates of our examples convey information focus. 
hi,  Along these lincs, this type of shi-hu-shi  is rendered as AM-nobAM in the subsequent examples. 
01  Notc that, in terms of  our sentence model (].I), VP modifiers arc in fact  V' modifiers. Regardless of 
this fact, we usc Lhe  morc Familiar notion 'VP modifier' in thc subsequent text. 
(12  Cf. thc ahstl-act sentence str-uclure given in section 3 under (3.2). Ycslno questions in Mandarin Chinese revisited 
5.2.2.  Differently from the examples above, the shi-hu-shi operator in (5.7) and (5.8) is 
adjacent not to the full verb of the sentence but to a dummy verb. In  (5.7), it is adjacent 
to the dummy verb hu treated in section 4: 
(5.7)  a.  Zhang San shi-bu-shi ha zhe ben shu  kanwan-le'? 
Zhang  San  AM-not-AM BA this  C1  hook  finish-ASP 
'Has Zhang San finished this book?' 
b.  Zhang Sani [~2p  [shi-bu-shi] <Q >] [V  tl [",  ha [v, zhe ben shu 
Zhang  San  AM-not-AM  HA  this  C1  book 
kanwan-le I]]]? 
finish-ASP 
Drubig & Schaffar (2001: 4) consider the ha construction as a mechanism to remove de- 
focused arguments from the focus domain. Given this pragmatic approach, the shi-bu- 
slzi operator in (5.7) is obligatorily assertive. 
In the same manner, the shi-bu-shi operator is assertive in the following example, where 
the dummy verb gei serves as a syntactic licenser of the indirect object: 
(5.8)  a.  Ni  shi-bu-shi  gei Li Si ji-le  yi-hen shu? 
you  AM-not-AM  to  Li  Si  send-ASP one-CL book 
'Have you sent a book to Li Si?' 
b.  Nil  Imp [~?~[shi-bu-shi]  <Q >] [v,  tl  [v, gei [V Li Si [V ji-le2 [v yi-ben 
you  AM-not-AM  to  Li  Si  send-ASP one-CL 
shu t2]]]]]]? 
hook 
According to Yeh's negation test, (5.7) and  (5.8) contain the assertive question operator 
ski-hu-shi, for in both cases the correct negative response is mei you. 
5.2.3. Now consider some examples in which  the assertive slzi-hu-slti operator is adja- 
cent to a VP modifier: 
(5.9)  a.  Ni  shi-hu-shi  zai Beijing mai-le  bu-shao dongxi? 
you  AM-not-AM  in  Beijing  huy-ASP not-little  thing 
'Did you buy a lot of things in Beijing?' 
b.  Ni  [p2p  [P?" shi-bu-shi] [v. zai Beijing [v. mai-le, [V bu-shao dongxi ti]]]]? 
you  AM-not-AM  in  Beijing  buy-ASP  not-little  thing 
The ability of the assertive question operator shi-hu-shi to appear in  the above structure 
can be accounted for along these lines of Speas (1990: 49ff.) who rejects the hypothesis 
of Lebeaux (1988) that D-structure includes heads and arguments and nothing else. That 
is  to  say, she rejects the  allegation that  all  adjuncts are  added to  the phrase marker 
AFTER  D-structure. To give evidence for her position, Speas shows by means of English 
examples, which  hold  true for Chinese as  well, that  henefactive,  locative and  instru- 
mental PPs "do not show anti-reconstruction effects". 
As  for benefactives,  compare  the  strong crossover  cases  (5.10a,b)  which  convin- 
cingly prove that these phrases must be present at D-structure: Horst-Dieter Gasde 
(5.10)  a.  *For Maryl's brother, she, was given some old clothes 
b.  *Weile Zhang Sanl de  anquan, tal  duobi-zai  cheng-li. 
Ibr  Zhang  San  PART  safely  he  hide-in  town-inside 
:L'For  Zhang Sanl's safety, he,  was hiding in  the town.' 
In contrast to (5.10), weak crossover configurations like in (5.1  I) are well-formed: 
(5.11) Zhang Sanl shi-bu-shi  weile  tal-de anquan duobi-zai cheng-li? 
Zhang San  AM-not-AM  for  his  safety  hide-in  town-inside 
'Does Zhang San hide in the town for his safety?' 
Given Speas' theory, it seeins justified to regard locatives and benefactives as a part of 
the extended predicate. 
Chinese behaves  like English and other languages in that "focus has a systematic pho- 
nological  manifestation  in  the form of  (sentencelpitch) accentnh3.  This implies that the 
shi-hu-ski operator in (5.9)  and (5.1 1) is assertive on the condition that the VP modifier 
following it does not carry the pitch  accent of  the sentence. If  the modifier does carry 
the pitch  accent, the shi-hu-shi operator preceding it cannot be assertive and the pre- 
dicate lying in the scope of this operator cannot not convey information focus. Instead, 
it conveys identificational focus, as we will see in section 7. 
5.2.4. The predicate  in the scope of assertive shi-bu-shi  can consist of a matrix clause 
and a complement clause. In  that case, the assertive question operator occupies the F2" 
position of the matrix clause: 
(5.12) Zhang San shi-bu-shi  yunxu Li Si he  pijiu? 
Zhang  San  AM-not-AM  allow  Li  Si dunk hecr 
'Has Zhang San allowed Li Si to drink beer?' 
The information focus conveyed by  (5.12) may comprise either the matrix predicate re- 
presenting a control structure in  which the object of the matrix verb controls the PRO 
subject of the complement clause, as in (5.12'),  or merely the predicate of  the embed- 
ded clause, as in  (5.  I 2'1):~~ 
(5.12') Zhang San [F2P shi-bu-shi [v F[yunxu Li Sii [PRO, he  pijiu]]]] 
Zhang  San  AM-not-AM  allow  Li  Si  drink  beer 
(5.12") Zhang San [F~P  shi-bu-shi [v, yunxu Li Sii  [ PROi  he  pijiu]]]] 
Zhang  San  AM-not-AM  allow  Li  Si  drink  beer 
"'  CI:  Rochcmont Kr Culicovcr (1990: 17). 
(1.1  Note that the shi-hu-ski opel.ator cannot appear in the cmbcddcd clause: 
(i)  *Zlinnp San yunxu Li Si shi-bu-shi he pijiu'? 
That is, the operator conccrncd must havc scope over the matrix predicate, cvcn if  only the embedded 
predicate is  'new informalion'.  Von  Stechow (1991: 810 (45)) and Druhig (1994: 20R.) discuss the 
prohlcm  with  thc  help  of  English  focus-sensitivc  particles  like  only  and  others  which  can  be 
ambiguous with rcspect lo focus. See also Taglicht (1984). Yeslno questions in Mandarin Chinese revisited 
5.2.5. The shi-bu-shi operator is obligatorily assertive if  it  is followed by  a modal, a 
negation, or a negation combined with a modal, as observed by Liu & Pan & Gu (1983: 
491ff.): 
(5.13)  a.  Dasuan shi-bu-shi neng sha xijun'? 
garllc  AM-not-AM able  kill germ 
'Is garlic able to kill germs'?' 
b.  Ni  shi-hu-shi  bu  tongyi zhe zhong yijian? 
you AM-not-AM  not  agree  this  kind  opinion 
'Do you not agree with this kind of opinion?' 
c.  Zhe zhong shi,  shi-bu-shi  bu  gai  zuo? 
this  kind  matter AM-not-AM  not  ought  do 
'As for this kind of  matters, should one do them'?' 
The fact  that  the  assertive  question  operator shi-bu-shi is  consistent  with  a sentence 
negation, as (5.13b,c) show, is highly significant, since it vindicates our hypothesis set 
up  in  section 4.4 that  F2"  and  Drubig's  (1994) Pollo are distinct  sentence positions 
which must be strictly distinguished from each other. Whereas F2"  acts as the host of 
the  assertive question  operator shi-hu-shi, Pol" (or, in  terrns of Drubig, Pollo) is  the 
head position which sentence negations appear in. 
The phenomenon  that  yeslno questions with the assertive question operator shi-bu- 
slzi are consistent with a V'-external negator while A-not-A and A-not sentences are not 
results from the fact that the negative element within the A-not-A form of the verb "is 
just  as real as the one in disjunctive questions"6s. In contrast, the predicates in cases like 
(5.13b,c) above lack any negator incorporated into the verb form. 
Notice that the bu element in the shi-bu-shi operator is not aspect-sensitive. This is 
an  easily  verifiable  statement:  assertive shi-bu-shi is  compatible  with  perfective  pre- 
dicates, as the example (5.9) given under 5.2.3 shows. Even in  this sentence, the bu ele- 
ment incorporated into the shi-bu-shi operator cannot be  replaced with mei you  (a shi- 
meiyou-shi operator does not exist in Chinese). In  short, assertive shi-bu-shi is a pure 
question operator whose internal bu element does not negate the predicate of the sen- 
tence. 
5.2.6. Our claim that the shi-bu-shi described in this section is an assertive question ope- 
rator which conveys information focus can be confirmed by two tests: 
First, sentences containing this type of ski-hu-shi are incompatible with Ernst's  'core 
adjuncts', just as A-not-A and A-not questions arehh: 
(5.14)  Ta (*yiding) zuotian ("yiding)  shi-bu-shi  lai-guo'? 
he  definitely  yesterday  definitely  AM-not-AM  come-ASP 
'Was he already here (once) yesterday'?' 
(5.15) Ni  (*yinwei zhe ge guanxi)  shi-bu-shi  xihuan zhe ben shu'? 
you  for  this  CL reason  AM-not-AM  like  this  CL  hook 
"'  McCawley  1994, p. 181. 
he  In contrast to this, the "if-cleft"  question operator slzi-bu-shi is c~~mpatihle  with 'corc adjuncts' Horst-Dieter Gasdc 
Second, sentences containing this type of ski-hu-shi  allow continuations like (5.16A): 
(5.16)  Q: Zai zuotian.de  hui-shang,  ni  shi-bu-shi  tongyi-le  ta-de yijian? 
at  ycstcrday-PART  meeting-above  you AM-not-AM  agree-ASP  his  opinion 
'Did you agree with his opinion at yesterday's meeting?' 
A:  Dui,  erqie ni-de  yijian wo qishi  ye  tongyi-le. 
Correct, and  your  opinion I  basically  also  agree-Asp 
'Correct, and as for your opinion, I basically also agreed. 
Answers like that  in  (5.16) are pragmatically  appropriate, if  the entity concerned ('his 
opinion'  in (5.164)) permits alternatives (such as 'your opinion'). Phrased  differently, 
'his opinion'  in (5.16Q) is not exhaustively used. This fact is relevant in that exhaustivi- 
ty is a significant feature of identificational focus which I will take care of  in section 7. 
5.2.7. To summarize briefly, the occurrence of  overt clause-internal question operators 
confirms our claim about the existence of a functional F2P other than PollP. Further- 
more, it bears out our assumption made in section 4 that there is an abstract <Q> feature 
in  F2" which has to be checked by  an abstract [+Q] feature in the case of  A-not-A and 
A-not predicates. This checking procedure takes place at LF, while the checking of <Q> 
by  the assertive operator shi-hu-shi  happens by merging the question operator with <Q> 
at D-structure. 
6.  Topics in yeslno questions 
At  first glance, the question of  the role topics play in yeslno questions seems easy  to 
answer, because semantically there is no reason why, instead of making a comment, the 
speaker cannot ask a question about the topic, as Huang (1981/82: 397) pointed out. But 
looking at it again, issues like an appropriate typology of  topics, problems like whether 
different kinds of topics are anchored to different syntactic positions, the syntactic status 
of contrastive topics, and others are quite intricate. 
6.1.  Two basic types of topic 
Semantically, there are two basic types of  topics which should be strictly distinguished 
from each other: Frame-Setting Topics (FST) and Aboutness Topics (AT). 
FSTs set an  individual (entity-related), spatial, temporal or conditional frame within 
which the main  predication  holds, i.e. they do not make any direct contribution to the 
descriptive content of  an assertion but supply information about the relevant contextual 
background to which the descriptive content is related." 
ATs  bear  a selectional relation  to the verb  of  the sentence. They are divisible into 
'outer'  and  'inner'  ATs.  An  outer AT is  related  to an  argument position  of  the verb 
which may be occupied by a resumptive pronoun, an epithet0' or an empty element. The 
h7  CI: Chafe (1976). Hairnan (1978) and Maienborn (1996). 
6X  CC.  Lasnik & Stowell (1991: 708): Epithets may function as nun-referential bound variables, provided 
their antecedent is not in a c-commanding A-position. Yes/no questions in Mandarin Chinesc revisited 
inner AT, however, coincides with the unmarked subject. ATs are presented as already 
existing in the discourse, as the item about which knowledge is added.6g 
Our  distinction  between  FSTs  and  ATs  corresponds  to  the  observation  of  Yuan 
(2000:  3)  that  grammaticalized  topics  can  be  traced  back  to two  sources:  discourse 
topics  and sentence-internal  elements.  Asher  (1993) claims that  discourse  topics  are 
propositions. Given this, it is quite natural that many FSTs in Chinese everyday speech 
have the form of  a clause. Let's have a look at the following arbitrary examples which 
contain both FSTs (a-c) and ATs (d-g): 
(6.1)  a.  Ta yaoshi  fei  yao zou ne,  ni  liu-bu-liu  ta?" 
He  if  whatever happens  want go  PART  you  stop-not-stop he 
'If he wants to go whatever happens, will you stop him?' 
b.  (Shuo-qi) shuiguo (a),  ni  xi-bu-xihuan pinguo? 
(talking of)  Cruit  (PART)  you  like-not-like  apples 
'While we are talking of fruits, do you like apples'!' 
c.  Zhiyu qita  wenti,  nimen zuohaole-meiyou-zuohao  yiqie  zhunbei? 
ns for  other  issue  you  finishA,,-not-finish  all  preparation 
'As for the other issues, have you prepared anything?' 
d.  Yi  Hangzhou  bendiren  shuo  ba,  tamen he-bu-he  cha? 
take Hangzhou  native people speak PART  they  drink-not-drink tea'! 
'As for the native people of Hangzhou, do they drink tea?' 
e.  Zhe ge ren, ni  xi-bu-xihuan ta / zhe ge jiahuo? 
this  CLman, you like-not-like  hc /  this  CL  guy 
'(As for) this man, do you like him / this guy?' 
f.  Zhe ben shu  ni  kan-bu-kan? 
this  CL  book you  read-not-read 
'(As for) this book, will you read (it)?' 
g.  Li  xiansheng  ne,  ren-bu-renshi ni? 
Li  mister  PART  know-not-know  you 
'(As for) Mr. Li, does (he) knows you?' 
Based on Yuan's (2000) and Aaher's  (1993) conception, DPs serving as a FST like the 
one in (6.1  b) are the remainder of  truncated clausal structures. Moreover, the optional 
particle in (6.  l b) is in essence a clause-final modal particle." 
Finally, our  view  involves  that  one topic-comment  structure  may  simultaneously 
comprise a FST and an  AT (the subject). This applies to the examples (6.la) through 
(6.  l f). 
6"  Cf. Gundel (1988[19741), Reinhart (1982), Molnir (1991) and others. Note that  our notion of topic 
does not include "secondary topics" in the sense of  Tsao (1990), Xu h Liu (1998) and others. 
'O  Based  i~n  the observation that conditional clauscs and topics are markcd  identically  in a number  of 
unrelnlcd  languages, Hairnan  (1978) postulated  that conditionals are topics. Biq (1988), Tsao (1990) 
Bolland (1993)  Gasde (1991), Gasde h Paul  (l996), and Xu h Liu (1998) have applied this idea to 
Chinese. 
"  Many researchers would interpret this particle as a "topic marker".  Sce Xu B Liu (1998), for example. This conception is consistent with Jacobs'  (2001: 641) claim that "the topic can show 
different  degrees  of  syntactic  integration  into  the  rest  of  the  sentence,  from  full 
integration (the topic has a grammatical function in the main clause of the sentence) via 
loose integration (the topic is realized outside the clause, but coindexed with an element 
within the clause) to total lack of integration  (the topic is neither inside the clause nor 
co-indexed with an element in the clause)". 
6.2.  Topics as speech acts and the syntactic consequences of this postulate 
6.2.1. In  this paper, 1 will  follow Kritka (2000:  1, 5; 2001 b:  I lf.) who postulates that 
"topic selection is a speech act itself, an initiating speech act that requires a subsequent 
speech  act, like  an  assertion,  question, command, or curse about the  entity that was 
selected".  This view was basically also held by  Lippert (196517',  Altmann (l981), and 
Jacobs (1984). 
In  consequence,  both  FSTs  and  ATs  (except for  the  AT  that  coincides  with  the 
unmarked  subject) must be base-generated  in  a structural position from which  they c- 
command the comment. This c-commanding condition is vital especially with respect to 
ATs, which corefer with  a resumptive or empty element serving as an  argument of the 
verb by definition. 
I claim that both types of topic are adjoined to the highest functional pro~ection  of the 
sentence, i.e.  to  FI' in  declaratives  and  mu  questions,  as  suggested  in  my  sentence 
model  ([.I), and  to  IP  (as  in  (6.10) or  F2P  (as  in  6.lg)), respectively,  in  A-not-A 
questions73.  This treatment agrees with Krifka's (ibid.) claim that topics have "to  scope 
out of speech acts". 
6.2.2. Note that, according to this approach, FSTs and outer ATs do not occupy diffe- 
rent sentence positions, as opposed to a conceivable alternative derivation of  sentences 
like (6.lt) by  movement into a prefield position, say into a TopP lying in the scope of 
F1". Yet this derivation, which would imply an abstract sentence structure like 
(6.2)  F  I' > TopP > IP > ... V', 
is disproved by weak crossover configurations like the following: 
(6.3)  Zhe tiao ke'ai de  gout,  tal-de zhuren xi-bu-xihuan tl? 
this  CL  IovcIy PART dog  his  master  like-not-like 
lit. 'This lovely dog, does its master like [it]?' 
The structure that  we  have  tentatively  assumed for  (6.3)  in the  above  violates  the 
Bijection Principle elaborated on by Koopman & Sportiche (1982183: 145f.): 
(6.4)  a. A variable is locally bound by  one and only one element in a non-A-position. 
b. Or, inversely: An element in a non-A-position locally binds one and only one 
variable. 
72  Lippert's (1965) dissertation, though being rarely paid attention to, is ingenious in that it anticipated 
thc  grcatcr part  (11'  what  was  discussed  in  the US  in connection  with  the notions  of  'Chinese-style' 
Topics and  'Topic-Prominence'  hy Li & Thompson (1974; 1976)  Chafe (1976) and others ten years 
later. 
73  CI. (6.  If) and (6.  I .g') below. Yeslno questions in Mandarin Chinese revisited 
(6.3) violates this principle insofar as the topic locally hinds a possessive pronoun74 and 
an  empty category  which  is a variable according to Chomsky's  GB theory7'.  Yet, the 
grammaticality of  (6.3) is predicted if  we start from the premise that  its topic is base- 
generated  in  its peripheral  position,  and if  we  do not  consider the empty category in 
(6.3) as a variable trace. In  terms of Lasnik & Stowell (1991), empty elements like the 
one in  (6.3) are "null  epithets",  while Rizzi  (1997: 293) defines them as "null  con- 
stants".  Along the lines of  Rizzi, a null constant is licensed by  an  'anaporic operator' 
(OP) seeking for an antecedent, to which it connects the bindee. For (6.3), this roughly 
yields the following S-structure: 
(6.3')  [IP [Zhe tiao ke'ai de  gou]~,  [lp [tal-de zhuren] [",OPI  [v,  xi-bu-xihuan el  I]]]? 
this  Cl-  lovely PART  dog  his  master  likc-not-like 
This analysis of  (6.3) does not violate the Bijection Principle, since the topic (which is 
base-generated  outside  the  comment)  binds  one  and  only  one  variable,  namely  the 
possessive pronoun  in  the subject DP (which is used as a variable), while the empty 
element in V' IS bound and licensed by an anaphoric operator which connects the topic 
to the empty element. 
Based  on  this conception, the S-structures  of  (6.lf, g) given  at the beginning of this 
section are (6.lf) and (6. lg'): 
(6.1)  f.  [IP [~,,i,Zhe ben shu]~  [~p  ni2  [v t2  [~?p  [v,  OPI [V  el kan-bu-kan]]]]]]? 
this  CL  hook  you  read-not-read 
g'.  IFZP ITopicLi  xianshengli  ne, [p2p [v. OPi [v. e, [v, ren-bu-renshi  nil]]]]? 
Li  mister  PART  know-not-know  you 
An  inevitable  consequence  of  the  topic  theory  roughly  outlined  above  is  that 
topicalization as a syntactic movement operation does not exist in Chinese sentences. 
6.3.  Contrastive topics 
First, consider the following dialogue in a pet home, where two visitors are discussing 
the loveliness of some dogs: 
(6.5)  Q: (Name) ZHE tiao gou  ni  XI-BU-X~HUAN? 
hut  this  CL  dog  you  like-not-like 
'But (as for) THIS dog, do you like (it)?' 
Al: Dui,  erqie NA tiao gou wo ye  xihuan. 
correct  and  that  CL  dog  1  also  like 
'Correct, and (as for) THAT dog, 1  like (it) as well.' 
14  Cl'.  K(~upmnn  & Sportiche (198211983): If a pr-onoun is locally non-A-hound, it is no longer a pro- 
noun; instead, it acts as a variable. 
" See Chomsky (1982), p. 330. A2: Bu, ZHE tiao gou wo BU  xihuan. 
no  this  CL dog  I  not  like 
lit. 'No, THIS dog, I do NOT like (it) 
A3: #Bu shi,  wo shi  xihuan na tiao go~.7h 
not right  1  SHI  like  that CL  dog 
'Wrong, it's that dog that I like.' 
The question  (6.54) put  by  one of  the  interlocutors contains  a contrastive  topic par 
excellence. 
Phonologically, the question contains two pitch accents, the first one of which marks 
the  topic  as  contrastive, whereas  the  second  one marks  the  predicate  as  conveying 
information focus. 
According to Moln6r (1998: 133), contrastive topics and "operator  focus"  share the 
feature of "exclusion",  i.e. they have the feature [+exclusive], as opposed to information 
focus which has the feature [-exclusive]. Yet, as Molnbr underlines, contrastive topics 
lack the feature of "exhaustivity"  which is a distinctive characteristic of 'operator focus' 
(in our terminology: identificational focus, see below, section 7) . 
This  ambiguous  position  of  contrastive  topics  between  non-operator  focus  and 
operator  focus is the reason  why they have been  baptized  "focus  topics"  by Ernst & 
Wang (I 995: 2391, "topic focus" (huati jiaodian) by Xu & Liu (1998: 228), and "narrow 
focus"  by  Schaffar & Chen (2001: 841ff.). Investigating the distinct syntactic behavior 
of  "thematic  topics"  (TT) and "contrastive  topics"  (CT)  in  Korean,  Cho (1997: 44) 
points out that the "apparent distributional difference between TT and CT  has been one 
of the important reasons to posit a new primitive, that is CT, in the grammar". 
As far as our example (6.5) is concerned, Molnbr's argument that contrastive topics 
are not exhaustive is proved by the pragmatic appropriateness of the answer Al. As we 
will  see in section 7, the inappropriateness of A3 shows that the sentence-initial DP in 
(6.5Q) is no identificational focus. 
Last but not least, our claim that this DP is a contrastive topic is validated by the fact 
that the predicate  appears in  the A-not-A form. Identificational focus is  incompatible 
with the A-not-A forrn of the predicate. 
6.4.  Can Frame-Setting Topics be cleft? 
In  the following, I will claim that in Chinese not only outer ATs but also FSTs cannot 
be cleft, though in the case of locative and temporal FSTs quite the opposite seems to be 
the case. 
6.4.1. Topics can be contrastively used, as depicted in the preceding section. This is not 
surprising in  view of  the fact that not only complex syntactic units but also words and 
even singular syllables of a word can be contrastively used in corresponding contexts. 
Yet, topics cannot be  preceded by  the "it-cleft"  marker shi. This has been noted by 
Chiu (1993: 126, 134), giving only the following example for her contention: 
76  Note that I usc small capitals  111  indicate the location  of pitch ncccnts wilhin inlbrinntion  focus, and 
hold type to mark identificational focus. 
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(6.6)  *shi neiben shu,  Akiu zuotian  mai-de. 
sHI  that  book,  Akiu  yesterday buy-IIE 
Referring to Chiu, Paris (1995: 154; 1998: 152) puts it in the words that "a topic cannot 
be cleft". Basically, what Chiu and Paris have in mind are 'outer ATs'. 
If  their claim is correct, yes/no questions with non-assertive shi-h~-shi~~  preceding a 
topic as in (6.7) must be ungrammatical as well: 
(6.7)  "Shi-bu-shi zhe tian gnu  ni  xihuan? 
SHI-HU-SHI  this  CL  dog  you  like 
6.4.2. On the face of it, there seem to exist several counterexamples to Chiu's claim. For 
example, let's consider the following one: 
(6.8)  4:  Shi-bu-shi ZHE ge ren  ni  feichang TAOYAN'? 
SHI-BU-SHI  this  CL man you very  dislike 
Against all appearances, (6.8Q) does not contain a "cleft" topic, but rather a topic that is 
just  as contrastive as that  in (6.5) above. In  fact, (6.84) as a whole is a 'verum ques- 
tion',  where the information focus is extended over the whole sentence by  definiti~n.~' 
Hence, the meaning of (6.84)  comes close to 
(6.84')  lit. 'Could it be the case that THIS  GUY,  you very DISLIKE (him)?' 
Accordingly,  an  appropriate  rejoinder  to  (6.84) could  be  (6.8Al) or  (6.8A2),  while 
(6.8A3) is pragmatically inappropriate: 
(6.8)  Al:  Dui,  erqie NA ge ren, wo ye  bu  xihuan. 
correct, and  that CL dog  1  also not l~ke 
'Correct, and (as for) that man I don't like (him) either.' 
A2: Bu, ZHE tiao gou wo BU xihuan. 
no  this  CL  dog  I  not  like 
'No, this dog, I don't like (it)' 
A3: #Bu-shi. Wo shi taoyan na ge ren. 
not right  I  SHI dislike  that CL man 
'Wrong. It is that man that I dislike.' 
A4: *Bu, shi na tian gnu wo xihuan. 
no  shi  that CL  dog  I  like 
The appropriateness of Al shows that the sentence-initial DP zhe ge ren 'this guy' must 
be a contrastive topic, since it lacks the feature of  exhaustivity. The difference in the 
pragmatic  appropriateness  between  A2  and  A3  displays  that  contrastive  topics  are 
" The nature of this complex focus and question marker will he examined in detail in section 7. 
'9s  for the notion of  'verum focus', cf. Hahle (1992). See also Kiss (1998: 264). The notion of 'vcrurn 
question' has been  introduced into the relevant lilerature by  Chen B Schaffir (1997: 15f.), as far as I 
know. Horst-Dieter Gasdc 
compatible with the idea of negation, but incompatible with the idea of correcti~n'~.  Fi- 
nally, an answer like A4 is not only pragmatically inappropriate but also grammatically 
excluded by Chiu's claim that topics cannot be preceded by shi. 
Another kind  of  apparent counterexamples  concerns cases  in which  a sentence-initial 
locative or temporal expression is preceded by  shi-hu-shi.  First, consider the following 
case which is apparently well-formed: 
(6.9)  Shi-bu-shi zai Beijing Daxue,  jiuhu  suoyou-de liuxuesheng  dou  gei  ni 
SHI-BU-SHI  at  Beijing  University  almost  all the-SUFF  foreign students  all  toward  you 
liuxia-le  shenke-de  yinxiang? 
make-ASP  dccp-Sum  inlpression 
Arguing with Tang (1983), Paris (1995: 154ff.; 1998: 152ff.) points out that the agram- 
maticality of some clefts is not due to the topicality of the sentence-initial constituent 
that is preceded by shi. Instead, she claims, their agrammaticality can be traced back to 
the  distinction  between  stage-level  predicates  (SLPs)  and  individual-level  predicates 
(LIPS). 
This  claim  is  consistent  with  the  theoretical  framework  of  Kratzer  (1988;  1995: 
126ff.) who posits that  some uses of spatial and temporal  expressions are sensitive to 
the distinction  between  SLPs and LIPs. Both  types of  predication differ in their argu- 
ment  structure.  SLPs  have  an  extra  argument  position  for  spatiotemporal  locations, 
\vhile ILPs lack this position. 
Leaving certain details aside, this means that both types of predication are compati- 
ble with locative and temporal Frame-Setting Topics, but ILPs (statives) are defective in 
that they are incompatible with  locative and temporal VP modifiers, i.e. with locative 
and temporal expressions narrowly modifying only the VP of the sentence. 
In  this connection, compare the following two declaratives, which differ insofar as 
(6.10) contains a SLP while (6.11) includes an LP: 
(6.10) Zai Beijing Daxue,  jiuhu  suoyou-de  liuxuesheng  dou  gei  wo 
at  Beijing  University  almost  all the-Suw  roreign students  all  tobviird  I 
liuxia-le  shenke-de yinxiang. 
make-Asp  deep-SLIW  impression 
a.  'Almost all of the foreign students at Beijing University made a deep 
impression on me.' 
b.  'Almost all the foreign students made a deep impression on me at Beijing 
University.' 
(6.1 1)  Zai zhe ge cunzi-li,  jihu  suoyou-de jumin  dou shi  nii-de. 
in  this  CL village-inside  almost  all the-SUW inhabitants all  be  Cemalc-Sum 
'Almost all the inhabitants of this village are female.' 
In  terms of Kratzer, the 'a,'-reading of  (6.10) and the reading of  (6.11) indicate that the 
spatial expression  involved modifies the restricting predicate of  the quantifier  'almost 
all', whereas the 'b.'-reading of (6.10) signals the spatial expression to modify the main 
predicate of the sentence. Ycslno qucstions in Mandarin Chinese revisited 
In  our terms, this means that the 'a,'-reading of (6.10) and the reading of (6.11) denote 
that the locative expressions concerned act as FSTs, whereas the 'b.'-reading  of  (6.10) 
denotes that the locative expression acts as VP modifier. 
Based on this, consider the yeslno question (6.9) again. This sentence is ill-formed with 
the reading (6.9'a) but well-formed with the reading (6.9'b): 
(6.9')  a.  lit. "'Was  it almost all of the foreign students at Beijing University that 
made a deep impression on you?' 
b.  lit. 'Was it at Beijing University where almost all of the foreign students 
made a deep impression on you'." 
In  the  'a,'-reading of  (6.9), the  sentence-initial  locative expression  serves  as a FST, 
while  it  acts as  a VP modifier  in  the  'b.'-reading  of  this  sentence.  Accordingly, the 
former reading is ruled out (because a topic cannot be cleft), whereas the latter reading 
with the locative expression acting as a VP modifier is permitted, because VP modifiers 
can be cleft. 
The 'b.'-reading  of  (6.9) corresponds to the reading of example (6.12) in  which the 
VP modifier occupies a clause-internal position: 
(6.12)  Jihu  suoyou-de  liuxuesheng  shi-bu-shi dou zai Beijing Daxue  gei  ni 
almost  all thc-SUFF  foreign students  SHI-HU-SHI  all  at  Beijing  University toward you 
liuxia-le shenke-de yinxiang? 
makc-ASP deep-suw  impress~on 
lit. 'Was it at Beijing University where almost all of the foreign students made a 
deep impression on you?' 
To summarize, the yeslno question sentence (6.9)  is well-formed, but is has a VP modi- 
fier reading. Ergo: (6.9) is no real counterexample to Chiu's claim that topics cannot be 
cleft. 
Now, look at the question form (6.13) of the declarative (6.1  1) introduced above. (6.13) 
differs from (6.1 1) in that the locative FST contained in it is "cleft"  by the non-assertive 
focus and question operator shi-bu-shi: 
(6.13)  *Shi-bu-shi zai zhe ge cunzi-li,  jihu  suoyou-de jumin  dou shi  nii-de? 
SHI-BU-SHI  in  this  CL  village-inside  almost all the-SUFF  inhahitants all  he  female-SUFF 
This sentence is absolutely ruled out, because the ILP in it lacks a 'b.'-reading. This fact 
is  borne out by the ag~.ammaticality  of  (6.14), a structure in which the locative expres- 
sion zai zhe ge cunzi-li  'in this village'  directly precedes the predicate: 
(6.14)  "Jihu  suoyou-de jumin  dou zai zhe ge  cunzi-li  shi  nii-de  ma? 
almost  all the-SUFFinhebitants  all  in  this  CL  village-inside bc  femalc-Sumi QP 
As stated above, ILPs lack an extra argument position for spatiotemporal locations. 
Along the lines of Kratzer's framework, not only spatial but also temporal expressions 
are sensitive to the type of  predication they co-occur with. Compare (6.15) below con- 
taining a SLP with example (6.16) whose predicate represents an ILP: Horst-Dieter Gasde 
(6.15) Shi-bu-shi shang-ge xingqi, jihu  suoyou-de  shenqingren dou gei  ni  liuxia-le 
SHI-BU-sHI  last-CL  weck  almost all the-SUFF  applicant  all  toward you make-ASP 
shenke-sum yinxiang? 
dcep-Sum  impression 
a.  lit.  *'Was it almost all last week's  applicants that made a deep 
impression on you?' 
(conceivable reply: This week's applicants were not as good.) 
b.  lit.  'Was it last week that almost all the applicants made a deep 
impression on you?' 
(conceivable reply: The applicants werc not as good this wcck.) 
(6.16)  *Shi-bu-shi shang-ge xingqi, jihu  suoyou-de  shenqingren dou shi nan-de'? 
SHI-BU-SHI  last-CL  week  almost  all the-suw  applicant  all  be  male-SUF? 
Whereas the temporal expression 'last week' in (6.15) has a VP modifier reading that is 
consistent with the idea of clefting, the same expression lacks such a reading in (6.16). 
Correspondingly, a sentence with the temporal expression appearing clause-internally is 
grammatical in the case of (6.17), but ungrammatical in a case like (6.18): 
(6.17) Jihu  suyou-de  shenqingren Shi-bu-shi shang-ge xingqi dou gei  ni  liuxia-le 
almost all the-sumapplicant  SHI-BU-SHI  lasl-CL  week  all  toward  you make-ASP 
shenke-de yinxiang'? 
deep-sum  itnprcssion 
'Was it last week that almost all the applicants made a deep impression on you?' 
(6.1 8)  "Jihu  suoyou-de shenqingren shang-ge xingqi dou shi nan-de. 
almost all thc-sum  applicant  last-CL  week  all  be  male-suFF 
Our examples show that temporal FSTs cannot be cleft, just like locative ones. 
6.4.3. In fact, Chiu's claim that topics are excluded from clefting is correct not only for 
empirical but also for theoretical reasons. 
If  a topic shall be cleft, it must be marked by the "it-cleft"  marker shi or by the com- 
plex focus and question marker shi-bu-shi. Whereas shi assigns the phrase with which it 
is associated a focus feature, shi-bu-shi assigns a focus and a question feature. 
According to the checking theory, both features have to check a correlating feature in 
the head position of  specific functional phrases, as we will see in  section 7. Yet, such 
head positions are not available to topics. For, as separate speech acts, topics are located 
outside the scope of  FI' and  FocP, as indicated in  our sentence model  (I.I), and  so 
neither their focus nor their question feature can be discharged, if  they are associated 
with shi or shi-hu-shi. 
For empirical and theoretical reasons, FSTs and sentence-initial VP modifiers cannot 
occupy the same sentence position. Applied to (6. lo), this means that the FST in  (6.10a) 
is adjoined to FI' while the VP modifier in (6.10h) is adjoined to IP. Although intonatio- 
nally separated from the rest of the sentence, the latter is not a separate speech act. Yesino questions in Mandarin Chinese revisited 
7. Identificational focus in yeslno questions 
In  the previous sections, we have dealt  with the role of  information focus in  Chinese 
yeslno questions. We have learned that not only A-not-A and A-not questions but also 
questions  containing  assertive  shi  or  shi-bu-shi are  tied  to that  type  of  focus, only 
"  relevant  on  the  pragmatic  level  by  specifying  context-incrementing  (or  'new') 
inf~rmation"~".  In  the  terminology  of  Kiss  (1998:  246),  information  focus conveys 
"non-presupposed information marked by one or more pitch accents". 
In  this section, I would like to move on to the second basic type of  focus, which, 
independent of the givenness or newness of the relevant constituent involved, specifies 
some relation  to  a contextually possible  or  relevant  set  of  alternatives over  which  it 
quantifies.81  Kiss (I 998) calls this type of operator focus "identificational  focus". 
In  yeslno questions of Mandarin Chinese, "identificational  focus" in the sense of Kiss is 
prototypically associated either 
with  the use  of  the "it-cleft"  marker  shi  in  combination  with  the  sentence-final 
question particle ma, such as in (7.1 a)82,  or 
with the use of  the compound focus and question  operator  shi-hu-shi, such as in 
(7. ib)'?: 
(7.1)  a.  [shi [Zhang San]] pai  ni  lai-de  ma? 
FM  Zhang  San  send  you come-ASP QP 
'Was it Zhang San that sent you to come?' 
b.  [shi-bu-shi [Zhang San]] pai  ni  lei-de? 
FM-not-FM  Zhang  San  send you come-ASP 
'Was it Zhang San that sent you to come'?' 
For a better understanding, we have called the identificational focus operator shi the "it- 
cleft" marker shi up to now. This is only justified from a functional point of view. From 
a structural point of view, however, this is not quite correct, since no clefting is associa- 
ted with the use of the marker.8%enceforth,  I will call this type of shi the non-assertive 
"focus marker" (FM) shi, as opposed to the assertion marker shi introduced in section 5. 
Accordingly, the A-not-A form of this marker shall be rendered as FM-not-FM in inter- 
linear translations. 
7.1.  Existential presuppositions, exhaustivity and contrastivity as defining 
features of identificational focus 
7.1.1. One characteristic of questions like those under (7.1) and their English analogues 
is that they are based on existential presuppositions."  That is, (7. l a,b) are based on the 
presupposition  that  'someone  sent the questionee to come'. In  contrast, the same ques- 
Xl,  Drubig (1 998)  p. 3.  "  CC1.  Druhig (1998) and Molmtr (1998). 
'' Note that 'inner ATs' can be cleft, as opposcd to 'outer ATs' (cf. section h.4), 
" Following Kiss' notation, 1 use bold type to indicate identificational f<~cus 
" CC1:  Huang (1981/82), p. 396. 
85  Cf. Rooth (1994), p. 390. Horst-Dieter Gasde 
tions without .shi or shi-hu-shi, respectively, are not based on such existential presuppo- 
sitions. 
7.1.2. According to Kiss (1998: 245), an identificational focus "exhaustively"  identifies 
"a  subset of the set of contextually or situationally given elements for which the predi- 
cate phrase can  potentially  hold".  This definition  corresponds to Rooth's  (1994: 390) 
claim that "clefts have an assertion or implicature of exhaustive listing". 
In terms of semantics, sentences like (7. la) are derived as follows: 
According to Rooth (1996: 275), "focus has the effect of structuring the propositions 
denoted  by  sentences:  the  focus-influenced  semantic value  of  a clause with  a single 
focus is a pair consisting of (i) a property obtained by abstracting  the focused position, 
and (ii) the semantics of the focused phrase".K6 
Applied to (7.  la), for example, this yields the following structured meaning: 
(7.2)  <Ax  [sent to come(x,q)], z: 
The property in  (7. la) is the property of being an x such that x sent the questionee q to 
come, while z is the individual denoted by Zhang San. 
In  a  next  step, the identificational focus marker shi combines  with  the  stmctured 
meaning (7.2), yielding (7.3): 
(7.3)  Vx  [sent to come(x,q)] -r x =  z 
(7.3) asserts that nobody other than Zhang San sent the questionee to come. It is exactly 
this assertion the truth value of which is questioned in (7. la). 
Finally, as a yes/no question, (7. la) receives the semantic form (7.4), where the ques- 
tion operator f is instantiated by the yeslno question particle mu: 
(7.4)  <Vf [ f [Vx [sent to come(x,q)] -+ x = z]],  ma> 
7.1.3. Kiss  (1998: 267)  posits  that  identificational  focus  is  always  [+contrastive]  in 
Romanian, Italian and Catalan, while it is [+/-contrastive] in English and Hungarian. 
But given that archetypal  Chinese identificational focus is functionally equivalent to 
the it-cleft construction  in  English, I disclaim that there is any parametric  variation in 
the feature content of  identificational focus in either language. My contention  is that 
identificational focus in Chinese and the cleft-clause of the English it-cleft construction 
are obligatorily [+contrastive]. 
Basically, this is not a novel idea. I refer to the 'Cleft Focus Principle' of Rochemont 
(1986:  133, (17)) according to  which a cleft focus "must  receive a contrastive focus 
interpretation". 
According  to  Rooth (1985;  1992; 1994; 1996), evoking alternatives  is the general 
function of focus. The set of alternatives, however, is restricted. In  any particular case, 
the specific set of  alternatives is "picked  up from a specific discourse context or con- 
strued  pragmatically  in  a  specific  ~ituation"'~.  Related  to  identificational  focus, this 
'I'  Sec also Kritka (1992), p. 17f 
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statement comes close to Rochemont's  claim  that  the cleft clause of  an  it-cleft must 
contain material that is "under disc~ssion"~~. 
The  following examples are intended to illustrate that  Chinese identificational  focus 
phrases regularly contrast with the set of alternatives given in the actual context, regard- 
less of whether the contrast concerned is a more or less implicit or an explicit one: 
First  of  all,  consider  example  (7.5)  below  representing  the  case  of  a  negative- 
contrastive  (or replacive) construction  of  the type  'X, not  Y"',  where the identifica- 
tional focus phrase, the constituent X ('Zhang San's opinion), is identified by exclusion 
of its (only) alternative, the constituent Y ('Xiao Wang's opinion'): 
(7.5)  Q: Zai zuotian-de  hui-shang,  ni  [V shi-bu-shi  [v, tongyi-le Zhang San de 
at  ycsterday-PART meeting-above you  FM-not-FM  agree-ASP  Zhang  San PART 
yijian]], er  bing-mei  tongyi Li Si de  yijian? 
opinion  hut  in  no way  agree  Li  Si  Part  opinion 
'Was it Zhang San's opinion that you agreed with at yesterday's party?' 
Al : Shide, wo zhi shi  tongyi-le Zhang San de  yijian. 
yes  I  only FM  agrce-ASP  Zhang  San  Part opinion 
'Yes, it was only Zhang San's opinion that I agreed with 
A2: Bu-shi. Wo [v, shi [v. tongyi-le Li Si de  yijian]] 
no  I  FM  agree-ASP  Li  Si  PART opinion 
'No. It was Li Si's opinion that I agreed with.' 
A3: #Dui,  erqie wo hai  tongyi-le  Xiao Wang de  yijian. 
correct  and  I  also  agreed-ASP  Xiao  Wang  PART  opinion 
'Correct, and I agreed with Xiao Wang's opinion as well.' 
In  this example, the identification of the subset for which the predicate holds results "in 
the delineation of a complementary subset with clearly identifiable elements", definitely 
meeting Kiss' requirement for an identificational focus that is [+contrastive]"'. 
Now, compare this example to the questionlanswer pair (5.16) reproduced below  as 
an example for the assertive question operator shi-hu-shi located in F2": 
(5.16)  Q: Zai zuotian-de  hui-shang,  ni  shi-bu-shi  tongyi-le  ta-de yijian? 
at  yesterday-PART  meeting-above  you AM-not-AM  agree-ASP  hi5  opinion 
'Did you agree with his opinion at yesterday's meeting?' 
A: Dui,  erqie ni-de yijian wo qishi  ye  tongyi-le. 
Ciirrect,  and  your  opinion I  basically  also  agree-Asp 
'Correct, and as for your opinion, I basically also agreed.' 
Despite the fact that the two structures look very similar, they nevertheless realize dif- 
ferent types of focus. Whereas the object of the verb in (5.16Q) lacks the feature of ex- 
haustivity,  as (5.16A)  shows,  this  feature  is present  in (7.5Q), as (7.5AI,A2) show. 
XX  Ci. Rochemont (l986), p.  13  1. 
8')  Cf. Druhig (1994).  p. 28f 
9n  Cf. Kiss (1998),  p. 268. Additionally,  an  identificational focus like  in (7.5) allows corrections  with  shi, as in 
(7.5A2), as opposed to the information focus in (5.16) which does not. 
Finally,  (7.5Q) is  associated  with  the  existential  presupposition  that  the  questionee 
agreed with somebody's opinion, while (5.16Q) is not associated with this presupposi- 
tion. 
Apart from this, information focus and identificational focus have distinct phonologi- 
cal manifestations.  In  contrast to identificational focus, information focus is consistent 
with more than one pitch  accent, as we have seen in section 6 in connection with con- 
trastive topics. The position  of  the identificational focus is the position  of  the greatest 
phonological prominence within the clause involved. Thus, the focused phrase in (7.54) 
is more heavily accented than the information focus in (5.16Q), for which holds: in dis- 
tributing prominence between  head and argument, the latter takes precedence over the 
former"'. 
In  short, the focus in (5.16Q) does not have the feature [+contrastive], whereas the 
focus in (7.5Q) does have it. 
Next,  consider example  (7.6) below.  Let's assume  that  two people are checking the 
temperatures of some rooms, while looking around in them: 
(7.6)  Q: [shi-bu-shi [ni-de wuzi]] youdian leng? 
FM-no(-FM  your  room  a hit  cold 
'Is it your room that is a bit cold?' 
A: Dui. Qiqu wuzi hao-duo le. 
right  other  rooln  hao-much PART 
'Yes. The other rooms are much better.' 
In  (7.6Q), the identificational focus 'your room' operates "on  a closed set of entities"92 
(rooms) whose members are known to the participants of  the discourse, meeting Kiss' 
requirement for contrastive identificational foci as well. Moreover, the contrast is under- 
lined by  the answer of the interlocutor, (7.6A). 
In  (7.la,b), repeated below, 'Zhang San' is identified as the exhaustive subset of  a set 
consisting of a limited circle of people that have the right to send the questionee to the 
questioner. The identificational focus implicitly contrasts with this set of people: 
(7.1)  a.  [shi [Zhang  San]] pai  ni  lai-de  ma? 
FM  Zhang  San  send you come-Asp QP 
'Was it Zhang San that sent you to come?' 
b.  [shi-bu-shi [Zhang  San]] pai  ni  lai-de? 
EM-not-FM  Zhang  San  scnd you come-ASP 
'Was it Zhang San that sent you to come?' 
All  in all, I consider it important to stress that the borderline between  "clearly identifi- 
able elements"  forining a complementary  subset with  which  an  identificational focus 
contrasts and "not clearly identifiable elements"  is not clear-cut. This relativizes the dis- 
')I  Cf  Druhig & Schaffar (2001), p. 3 
"'  lbid., p. 267. Yeslno questions in Mandarin Chincsc revisited 
tinction between  'contrastive'  and  'non-contrastive'  identificational foci made by Kiss 
(1998). My claim is that contrastivity is an  inherent feature of  Chinese identificational 
focus and English  it-cleft.  To put  it  simply, identificational focus is  always  'contras- 
tive'. 
7.2.  Syntactic anchoring of identificational focus in the sentence structure 
In  my framework, identificational focus is operator focus whose focus feature is com- 
posed of  a 'contrastivity'  feature and an 'exhaustivity'  feature. Whereas the former has 
to check a correlating <contr> feature in the head position of  a functional Contrastivity 
Phrase (ContrP), the latter has to check a correlating <exh> feature in the head position 
of  a functional Focus Phrase (FOCP)."  Conversely, [+contr] and [+exh] composing the 
complex focus feature of  identificational focus must be discharged in  a corresponding 
Spec-head agreement configuration. This kind of feature checking must take place at LF 
at the latest. 
In the following, let's look at the anchoring of subjects, direct objects and various VP 
modifiers acting as identificational foci in the scntence structure of Mandarin Chinese. 
7.2.1. In  Chinese, only  the subject of  the sentence  invariantly  realizes the "focus  ex 
situ"  language type prototypically  instantiated by  languages  like Hungarian  and Ara- 
bic".  I claim that a sentence like (7.la) is derived by syntactic movement of the focused 
phrase which is raised from its base position in V' to its final landing site spec-FocP via 
spec-ContrP: 
(7. la') [i.l[~,,c~,[~hi  /Zhang Si~nl,~~~,  salll[r,~c~~<c~h>I[~u,,t,~  t'~I~~,.,,~<contr>ll~~  111"' pai ni lai-dellll~nal'? 
! 
FM  Zhang  San  send you come-ASP QP 
In  this structure, the identificational focus operator shi has assigned its complex focus 
feature to the subject DP to which shi is Chomsky-adjoined, rendering the focused DP 
into  an  operator  phrase.  Before  the  operator  phrase  arrives  in  spec-FocP  where  its 
exhaustivity  feature  checks  the  correlating  <exh>  feature  in  Foco, it  has  made  a 
"stopover"  in  spec-ContrP in order to check <contr> in Contro by  its [+contr] feature. 
Thus, structures like (7.la')  do not include an IP. 
7.2.2. Direct objects acting as identificational foci realize neither the "focus ex situ" nor 
the "focus  in situ" type. At the level of  S-structure, they may occur in two different po- 
sitions: 
First, they  may appear in  their postverbal  base-position. Examples like (7.54) and 
(7.5.42)  above instantiate this case in which neither the shi operator in  (7.5A2) nor the 
shi-hu-shi operator in (7.54) is adjacent to the identificational focus they are associated 
with. As a result of this, both operators cannot assign  their (complex) focus feature to 
the object DP at issne. Nevertheless, both the  [+contr] feature and the  [+exh] feature 
must be discharged at LF. Consider (7.5A2) as an example for the LF operations trig- 
gered by the identificational focus marker .shi: 
,I  3  As lbr the relative position of hoth phrases with respect to each other, cf. ou r sentence model (I.  I)  " CCf.  Kiss (1998) and Drubig & Schaffar (2001). (7.5.AZ') [,,,,  [,,,.<cxh>l  11,  wo [,.,,,,,,  [,,,,,~<contr>l  LV  shi,+,,,,,,,+,,l,~  [~tongyi-l~  Li Si de  yijianlllll, 
I 
-1 
FM  agree-ASP  Li  Si PART opinion 
While [+conti-] checks <contr> in Contr", [+exh] checks <exh> in Foco,  in  both cases by 
'sister-adjunction'  to the relevant features. 
Second, they may occur in  spec-ContrP, thereby checking <contr> with  [+contr]. See 
example (7.7): 
(7.7) Ni  shi-bu-shi  zhe ben shu  bu  yao? 
you  FM-not-FM  this  CL  book  not  want 
'Is it this book that you do not want to have?' 
, 
you  Fbl-oot-FM  this  CL  book  no1  want 
At LF, the exhaustivity feature of  the operator phrase  must undergo  raising to Foco 
where it becomes 'sister-adjoined'  to the correlating <exh> feature. 
Actually, spec-ContrP is a contrastive sentence position available not only to identifica- 
tional focus phrases (subjects as well as objects) but also to 'object  preposing'  without 
any markers as depicted by  Qu (1994), Shyu (1995), Ernst & Wang (1995), N. Zhang 
(2000), and others. For our purposes, it suffices to say that preposed objects share the 
feature of contrastivity but not that of exhaustivity with identificational focus. 
7.2.3. VP modifiers marked by identificational shi or shi-hu-shi normally remain in situ. 
In  the following example, shi-hu-shi can appear in  every position marked by the symbol 
", taking narrow scope over the modifier directly following it"': 
(7.8)  Xiao Wang "zuotian "zai zheu-shang "yong jiangjin  "gei nii-pengyou mai-de 
Xiao  Wang  yesterday  in  town-above  with  premium  for  girl fi.iend  huy-ASP 
jiezhi? 
rlng 
Since only one shi-hu-shi operator can appear in  one and the same sentence, (7.8) has 
four different identificational focus readings, depending on the actual position of  shi- 
hu-$hi"6.  Moreover, (7.8) reflects the basic order of VP modifiers with respect to each 
other: 
(7.9)  temporal > locative > instrumental > benefactive 
with > for 'preceding + dominating' 
It follows from our approach that, at LF, both the contrastivity feature and the exhausti- 
vity feature carried by  an  VP modifier are attracted by  a correlating feature in  Contr" 
and Foc", respectively. 
',i As lor (7.8). cf. Zhang and Fang (1996). p. 79. 
96  'Was it yesterday that Xiao Wang ...  ?',  'Was it in the town that Xiar, Wang  ...  ?' ctc. Ycsino qucstions in Mandarin Chinesc revisited 
In  fact. the claim that focused adjuncts must undergo LF movement has  already been 
made by  Huang (1982: 532f.). Huang refers to the ungrammaticality of structures like 
(7.  lo), which exhibit typical Island  effect^:^' 
(7.10)  *[,&  Zhangsan shi  zuotian mail de shu]  hen hao.  Huane 1982: 533, (32)) 
Zhangsan  ro  yesterday buy  DE  hook  very good 
*'The book that it was yesterday that Zhangsan bought is very good.' 
Alternatively, at least locative and temporal VP modifiers marked by identificational shi 
or .rhi-bu-.rhi can be raised to spec-FocP via ContrP. This applies to our examples (6.9) 
and (6.15) given in section 6. 
7.2.4. Assertive shi-~LL-shi  as treated in  section 5 and identificational shi-bu-shi share 
the property  of  possessing a question feature. Yet whereas the question feature of  as- 
sertive shi-bu-shi is discharged within  F2P before  'Spell-Out',  the question feature of 
identificational shi-hu-shi must be discharged by attraction at the level of LF. That is to 
say, the question feature [+Q]  conveyed by identificational shi-bu-shi is attracted by  an 
abstract feature, <Q>, located in FI". 
A problem connected with this LF operation is that [+Q]  cannot be  'sister-adjoined' 
to <Q>, because the Force1 Phrase of Chinese is head-final. This typological peculiarity 
of Chinese  most  clearly  manifests  itself  in  the  sentence-final  position  of  the  yeslno 
question particle mu. Compare (7.la)/(7.  la') above with the tree structure (7.la"): 
FocP  FI" 
ma 
Spec  Foc' 
hhi  Zhang Sanl  ,'----- 
Foc0  ContrP 
t'~  t, pai ni  lai-de 
Now,  let's consider the LF of  (7.lb) where F1"  is not directly accessible to the [+Q] 
feature of the operator phrase marked by shi-bu-shi. 
Chomsky's  checking theory  requires  that  feature  checking takes  place  within  the 
'checking domain' of the head whose features are being checked. A checking domain of 
a head Xo includes anything  adjoined to the bead, to X' or XP.'~ 
Therefore checking theory permits that  the question feature of the operator phrase 
under discussion is Chomsky-adjoined to Fl'. I opt for this solution, following Whitman 
(1997: 4) who claims that right-headed X'-structures necessarily  lack a Spec position, 
because  Spec-head  agreement  requires  adjacency  between  the  head  element  and  its 
specifier."  Assuming this to be true, the LF of (7.1  b) must be (7.1  b'): 
'I7  See also Chiu (1993: 130ff.) who cites this and other cxamples. 
" See also Han (1998:  5f.). 
'  By contrast, Kaync (1994) presupposes a left-headed clause structure across languages. Based on this 
assumption, he claims that "final complementizers reflect the leftward movement of IP into Spec, CP 
(p. 53). Kaync's proposal is problematic insofar as it conflicts with natural 'cconomy principles' in the 
dcrivation and representation of  sentences, suggested  by Chomsky (1995: 198): "The  system tries to (7.1)  b.  [shi-bu-shi [Zhang  San]] pai  ni  lai-de? 
FM-not-FM  Zhang  San  send you come-ASP 
'Was it Zhang San who sent you to come?' 
[shi-bu-shi [Zhang San],+Q.~l],  [Co,,rrPt',  ["  t, [v. pai ni  lai-dell]? 
I 
FM-not-FM  Zhang  San  scnd you corne-ASP 
As soon as [+Q] is adjoined to FI', it is able to check the correlating <Q> feature c-com- 
~nanded  by it. 
7.2.5. Referring to Li  (1992), Schaffar & Chen (2001: 861) observe that the indefinite 
reading of wh-expressions  in  subject position is licensed by the shi-hu-shi operator not 
only in (7.1 I) but also in  (7.12): 
(7.1 1)  Shi-bu-shi shenme ren  xihuan ta? 
FM-not-FM  what  rnan  l~ke  he 
'Does someone like him?' 
(7.12)  Shei 1 shenme ren  shi-bu-shi  xihuan ta? 
who  /  what  rnan  FM-not-FM  like  hc 
'Does someone like him?' 
Schaffar  & Chen  conclude  that  Li's  explanation  that  the  binding  of  a  wh-word  is 
achieved via c-command cannot be correct, since the wh-word in  subject position can in 
fact be bound independently of  the position  of  shi-hu-slzi. Schaffar & Chen admit that 
they "cannot explain in detail how this binding is achieved". 
In our system, this binding is achieved by  the requirement that the question feature of 
the shi-bu-shi operator must undergo LF-raising.  Once Chomsky-adjoined to FI' along 
the principles outlined above, the question feature [+Q]  c-commands the wh-expression 
in subject position. Thus, (7.12) does not falsify Li's and our claims. 
8.  Pragmatic use of yeslno question sentences 
8.1.  Neutral and non-neutral contexts 
Linguists  such  as  Chao (1968),  Li  & Thompson  (1981), Yuan  (1993), Xu  & Shao 
(1998), Chu (1998) and B. Zhang (1999) hold the view that A-not-A questions are pro- 
reach PF 'as fast as possible', minimizing overt syntax."  But see D. Xu (1997) and N. Zhang (1997), 
u,h(~  uncritically apply Kayne's proposal to Chinese. Yeslno questions in Mandarin Chinese revisited 
totypical yeslno questions, pure information questions used in neutral contexts in which 
the questioner does not make any assumptions about the possible  answer in  advance, 
whereas ma questions are predominantly used in non-neutral contexts, and include weak 
negative (or, in special cases, positive) pre-assumptions about the possible answer. 
B. Zhang (1999: 298f.) observes  that  mu  questions  often  come close to  rhetorical 
questions, expressing an attitude of total disbelief, or a sceptical attitude, if  they contain 
additional affirmative or negative particles. Even a nzcl  question asked in  an  absolutely 
neutral form can express doubts -for example, if  someone in  a student's mess hall asks 
an about fifty-year old man: 
(8.1  )  Ni  shi xuesheng ma? 
you hc  student  QP 
'Are you a student?' 
On  the  other  hand,  Zhang  does  not  deny  that  ma  questions  can  be  put  in  neutral 
contexts, such as (8.2)  asked as a purely informational question: 
(8.2)  Q: Bisai  jieshu-le  ma'? 
match  fln~sh-ASP  QP 
'Has the match finished?' 
A: Jieshu-le. / Hai mei you jieshu. /  hi-de.'On 
finish-Asp  Ycl  not  Asp  finish,  yes 
Discussing A-not-A questions from a pragmatic point of view, Shao (1996: 120ff.) con- 
vincingly  proves  that  they, just  like ma  questions, can  be combined with positive  or 
negative pre-assumptions: 
(8.3)  Nin shuo zhe ren  ke'e-bu-ke'e?  Wo Ling  nin-de hua, 
you  say  lliis  man  repugnant-not-repugnant  I  hear  your  words 
gang yi  gen  ta shangliang, ta  jiu  hengzhe lai  le! 
only  just  with he discuss  hc already hccome  abusive PART 
'Now you tell me, isn't this person repugnant? I heard what you said; you had 
hardly started discussing things with him before he became abusive.' 
(8.4)  Zhe ge xiaoxi yaoshi chuanchuqu, wo zhe ge  guan  hai  dang-bu-dang? 
this  CL  news  if  get out  I  this  CL  ollicial  slill  perform-not-perform 
'If this news gets out, will I be able to keep my job?' 
8.2.  Concluding remarks 
To summarize, both ma questions and A-not-A questions can serve as neutral informa- 
tion questions, and both types of question can be used in non-neutral contexts  associa- 
ted with negative or positive pre-assumptions about the answer. In  this respect there is 
little difference between them. 
However, ma questions have the decisive advantage of their question operator having 
scope over the whole sentence. This makes them adaptable to different types of  focus, 
i.e., it makes thein consistent with both information focus and identificational focus, as 
IuU  Note  that  neutral  information  questions  are  commonly  answered  hy  repeating  the  verb  in  its 
affirmative or negative form. Horst-Dieter Gasde 
we have seen in  this paper. And it also makes them compatible with  (core) adjuncts 
operating over propositions. 
By contrast, the question operator of A-not-A and A-not questions has a scope that is 
restricted  to  the  predicate.  Yeslno  questions  of  this  type  are  incompatible  with 
identificational focus and Ernst's core adjuncts, because their question operator does not 
undergo  LF-raising to F1' (or "Comp"),  as we have  shown. Instead,  they are typed 
clause-internally in F2". 
Perhaps, it is this semantic-pragmatic advantage of mu  questions that leads the younger 
inhabitants of Shanghai to increasingly prefer the sentence-final question particle va to 
the sentence-internal question operator a mentioned in section 5. 
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If  I  am on the right tack  concerning the reasons for the decline of  the use of the 
sentence-internal  question particle a  and the increase of the use of the sentence-final 
particle va in  Shanghainese, then we have a very natural  explanation for an intriguing 
fact  discovel-ed  by  Lii  Shuxiang (1954,  vol  2, p.  249)"":  the fact that the negative 
particle wu of Classical Chinese which appeared in the sentence final position of yeslno 
questions  has  evolved  into  the  yeslno  question  particle  nza  of  Modern  Mandarin 
Chinese. Conversely, this  means that the modern  question particle  ma can be traced 
back to one of the V(0)-not patterns of Classical Chinese. 
For us, the decisive phenomenon is that the evolution of both the negative particle ve 
in  Shanghainese and the  negative particle  wu in  Classical  Chinese into pure  yeslno 
question particles was accompanied by the extension of the scope of these particles over 
the whole sentence. 1 come to the conclusion that  this evolution was evoked by  the 
pragmatic requirements of language use. 
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Kleanthes K. Grohmann 
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We will see how  it is reasonable to speak of  a minimum distance that an element must 
cross in order to enter into a well-formed movement dependency. In  the course of the 
discussion of  this notion  of  anti-localiry, a theoretical  framework unfolds which is 
compatible with  recent  thoughts on  syntactic computation  regarding  local  economy 
and  phrase  structure,  as  well  as  the  view  that  certain  pronouns  are  grammatical 
formatives, rather than fully lexical expressions. The upshot will be that if  an element 
does not move a certain distance, the derivation crashes at PF, unless the lower copy is 
spelled  out  as  a pronominal  element. The framework  presented  has  a number  of 
implications for the study of  clause-typing, of  which some will be discussed towards 
the end. 
1.  Introduction 
In  a  recent  ZASPiL-contribution, I presented  a  tripartite clausal  system  with  special 
reference to the left peripheral  of  the clause (Grohmann  2000~).  The hypothesis  was 
that the intricate syntax of  the left periphery (topic, focus, Wh, left dislocation etc.) is 
licensed largely by discourse properties, and that the highest domain of  the clause (the 
C-domain  qua an  articulated  Comp) is  responsible for such encoding - without too 
much CP-internal reordering. Apart from motivating this idea, we saw the direction one 
would have to take to analyze other phenomena under such a tripartition. In this paper I 
am  going  to  revise  and  expound  on  the  formal  implementation  of  this  clausal 
tripartition, and briefly  consider a systematic approach to other classes of  pronominal 
elements as well as consequences for a syntactic approach to clause-typing. The formal 
clausal tripartition proposed here is of  interest to the latter issue in two ways. First, as a 
general  point,  given  that  the  model  makes particular  reference  to  spelling  out  sub- 
structures of  the derivation and integrating the (LF and PF) interfaces into a dynamic 
conception  of phrase structure, issues pertaining to the  interaction  of  the syntax with 
other  components  (arguably  needed  to  formally  derive  different  clause  types)  are 
relevant for obvious reasons. Second, and more specifically, some proposals that have 
been  made  in  the  recent  syntactic  literature to  license clause types  in  the  syntactic 
component  will  have to be reevaluated  in  terms  of  redundancy  and structural  well- 
formedness. We  will touch on both issues in the latter part of this paper. 
The initial  question  I am going to ask is  the following.  Given  that  dependencies 
between two positions are subject to locality conditions (as an upper bound on distance, 
usually  captured  by  a Shortest Move or Minimal  Link condition), does the converse 
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Of course, one could point to the Theta Criterion and argue that it alone suffices to rule 
out  a  derivation  such  as  (Ib). After  all,  if  0-roles  are exhaustively  assigned  at  D- 
structure (the component before applications of Move take place), movement into a O- 
position  is  ruled  out  by  force. One of  the  premises  of  minimalism  is  to get  rid  of 
superfluous levels of' representation. It has been argued -  quite successively, we might 
add -  that  the  levels  of  D- and S-structure can  be dispensed with  on  conceptual  and 
empirical  grounds  (Chomsky  1993,  1995; see Hornstein, Nunes  and  Grohmann,  in 
progress  for extensive discussion). The "true"  interface  levels, LF and PF, are all  we 
need, and any filters: constraints, or conditions imposed on the grammar should follow 
from "bare output conditions" -that  is, reflect conditions on LF and PF only. 
If  this is so, the Theta Criterion must be reformulated. Presumably, the gist of it can 
be integrated into a minimalist view of the grammar, most elegantly within a framework 
provided by Hale and Keyser (1993). However, if  the minimalist spirit is to seek, point 
out and  eliminate redundancies,  we  should  take the  issue more seriously.  One such 
attempt can be found in recent work by Norbert ~ornstein.'  It turns out that movement 
into  O-positions  can  nicely  account  for  a  number  of  (at  first  glance)  unrelated 
phenomena. The upshot is that there is reason to believe that ruling out movement into 
0-positions from the start is too strong an assumption. The Theta Criterion as originally 
formulated can be dispensed with, alongside D-structure. This is doubly minimalist: not 
only can the (theory-internal) level of D-structure be eliminated completely; we also can 
dispense with the Theta Criterion as not following from "bare output conditions." If  all 
formal  conditions  on  lexical  items  and  the  computation  (huch  as  "features")  are 
evaluated at LF and PF only, this remnant of  D-structure, whose only intention was to 
filter out ill-formed configurations at D-structure, has no place in the grammar. 
2.2.  Anti-locality in agreement dependencies 
Of  course, this take on the Theta Criterion is not the only one imaginable, and within 
the  minimalist  program  not  the  only  one pursued.  However,  a similar effect  can  be 
found  outside  the  verbal  or thematic  layer.  Consider  (2) from  German,  a  Ian  uage 
which can arguably analyzed as overtly raising all arguments into the middle field:  f 
(2)  a.  "Den  Vater  mag  sein  Sohn. 
the.ACC father  likes his.NOM son 
intended: 'The father likes his son.' 
b.  #[TP  dCn Vater [mag-v-AgrOIi-T [A~~c)P  ti-AgrO [,p  ...]]I 
The ungrammatical output (2a) could be derived by  a hypothetical, but  ill-formed, 
derivation whose relevant steps are shown in  (2b). The thematic subject of the sentence 
could move to  the  object Case position, check accusative,  and  then  move on to the 
grammatical subject position, where it could enter the relevant subject-verb agreement 
relation and check  nominative Case. We could further imagine that only one Case  is 
marked on the DP (here, accusative), and the object DP could be licensed by some form 
of default Case (which happens to be nominative in German). 
But the fact that (2a) is ungrammatical suggests that this derivation is ruled out. The 
traditional  explanation  comes in  form of  the  Case  Filter,  whose update into current 
'  See, for example, Hornstein  (2000) for alternative approaches to retlexivization, control phenomena, 
relativization,  and  other  predication  structures. We will  return  to this hriefly  below.  (The idea  of 
~nove~nent  into 8-positions goes back to BoSkoviC 1994.) 
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criterion-approach  suffers from the same conceptual dilemma as the above-mentioned 
cases that hold on to formal conditions on the grammar in the form of a Theta Criterion 
or  a  Case Filter.  And  rather  than  invoking  non-syntactic explanations, a formalized 
version  of anti-locality could take care of  all these unwanted derivational steps in one 
fell  swoop. An  articulated Comp, as assumed  here, can be  seen as encoding (mainly) 
discourse-relevant properties, and I will hence refer to this as the discourse layer. 
2.4.  Plain proposal 
Above  we  have seen  initial  evidence that points into the direction  of  an  anti-locality 
condition, as  loosely  understood  so far. In  the  following,  we  will  explore  a formal 
understanding  of  anti-locality and consider theoretical  and empirical consequences of 
the approach, which invariably make use of a formal tripartition of the clause. 
A first shot at anti-locality is the hypothesis given  in  (4),  instances of  which were 
illustrated above: 
(4)  Anti-locality hypothesis 
Movement must not be too local. 
We now have to find a way to express a too local dependency. What is the metric that 
measures  this  distance?  As  the  above  discussion  suggests,  movement  within  the 
thematic layer of the clause seems to be out, and so does movement of the same element 
within  the agreement layer, and within  an articulated Comp-layer. On the other hand, 
we  want  movement  across  these  layers,  such  as  argument-raising  to  an  agreement 
position (to check Case and/or @-features)  and Wh-fronting, of cour~e.~  In  other words, 
anti-locality seems to be the restriction that an XP may not move to a position  directly 
part of the same layer, or domain. We will identify these domains properly in a moment. 
For  now, the  following  estimation  suffices for illustration. Two positions  are in the 
same domain if both share, what we might call contextual information. On the basis of 
the above discussion, we can identify three types of contextual information relevant to 
the clause (see fn. 7 below), uniquely  identifying the projections within each of  these 
parts: thematic context (making room for further internal projections, in  terms of VP- 
shells or separate vlV-projections),  agreement context (vis-a-vis  split Infl: AspP, AgrP, 
TP etc.), and discourse context (viz. an articulated Comp, hosting TopP, FocP, CP and 
so on; see also fn. 4). 
This view of contextual information in  the clause structure and the concomitant ban 
on domain-internal  movement is indicated  in (9,  where lal  is the representation  of  a 
context  value,  standing  for  the  three  clausal  contexts just  discussed:  101  (thematic 
context),  141  (agreement  context)  and  lo1  (discourse  context),  respectively.  Without 
touching more on the issue, we can think of la1  to be a lexical property of V, T, C etc. 
Basically,  this  is  the  idea behind  anti-locality:  the  lower  bound  on  locality  forces 
dependencies to span across  a minimum  distance, namely across -  but not within -  a 
given domain of  sorts. Next, we will consider the concept of  such contextually defined 
domains in  more detail (in terms of Prolific Domains), lay out the reason why domain- 
internal  movement  is  ruled  out  (for  PF-reasons), and  why  it  only  concerns  maximal 
phrases, as opposed to heads (which will also follow from PF-conditions). 
'  In  Grohmann (2000b), I suggest that movemcnt inlo the  agreement layer  is  driven  by  the  need  to 
check 4-features, as opposed to Case. Case is taken to he an epiphenomenon, for reasons that do not 
play  a role here (such as the assumption  that feature-checking is unique; see fn. 8, also fn. 11). (Cf. 
Branigan 2000, who also views Case "parasitic"  in nature rather than a trigger for movement.) Kleanthes K. Grohmann 
3.  Capturing anti-locality: Prolific Domains and Exclusivity 
The concept of a contextually defined layer or domain in clausal structure laid out so far 
is  reminiscent  of  earlier  conceptions of  clause ~tructure.~  (6) is the  structure  of  the 
clause as it was basically understood in the Barriers-framework (Chomsky 1986): 
(6)  [ COMP [ INFL [ VP I]] 
Over the past two decades, much effort has been put into a finer articulation of each of 
these projections. Starting with Larson (1988), it became obvious that VP must contain 
more than just one specifier and one complement position. Traditional X'-theory had no 
elegant  way  of  implementing  double  object  constructions,  and  with  the  rise  of  the 
Predicate-Internal Subject Hypothesis (cf. Kuroda 1988, Koopman and Sportiche 1991), 
room was needed to integrate the thematic position  of  "agent"  (the thematic subject). 
Whether we assume Larsonian shells or the more recently made popular approach of a 
light verb v heading its own projection on top of VP (cf. Hale and Keyser 1993, Baker 
1997), the thematic layer arguably consists of more material than a single projection. 
Likewise, much research has targeted what I call the agreement layer of the clause, in 
the spirit of Pollock's (1989) original Split Infl hypothesis. Infl is standardly assumed to 
host an  array of  functional projections (see especially Cinque  1999, and the overview 
provided  by  Belletti  2001). Again,  the  exact  number  and  positions  of  these arc not 
crucial; what is important is an extension of Infl into the layer or domain containing TP, 
AgrP, AspP etc. 
And  regarding  the  left  periphery,  finally,  Rizzi  (1997),  among many  others,  has 
suggested to finer articulate Comp into various projections whose function is to check 
those  formal  features  that  we  take  to  yield  (largely)  discourse  effects,  hence  the 
reference to a discourse  layer  (cf.  also fn. 4; for further reference to  recent  work on 
typologically very different languages, see e.g. Aboh 1998, Poletto 2000, Pusk6s 2000). 
"  Plcasc bear in  mind that there is nothing novel or revolutionary about a tripartite clausal structure. It is 
intuitivc  s  it  is  ohvious,  perhaps  even  necessary  (especially  in  the  light  of  the  "contextual 
information"  I suggest). Whilc tacitly assumed for a long time, I simply try to capture this intuition in 
a  more formal  way  and  contemplate  some of  its consequences  (see also Platzack 2001  for a very 
similar conception of clause structure in  terms of  three domains bearing remarkably similar names, 
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3.1.  A clausal tripartition into Prolific Domains 
Let us  now  work  out a formal way to implement the concept of  anti-locality into the 
grammar. We have seen some motivation to collectively understand certain positions to 
be  related to one another in  terms of  affiliation  with one contextually defined layer or 
domain.  Two thematic  positions  (such  as  "theme"  and  "agent"  in  (1))  can  thus  be 
thought of  as belonging to the thematic domain, two Case-/$-positions  (e.g. "subject" 
and "object"  or nominative and accusative, as in (2)) to the agreement layer, and two 
Comp-positions (e.g. topic and Wh; cf. (3)) to the discourse domain. One condition that 
seems to hold  of  all positions within  the same domain is that movement from one to 
another  is  ruled  out,  as  we  have  seen  above.  But  before  we  can  investigate  this 
hypothesis further, let us formulate the intuitive idea of a contextuall  defined domain.  Y  Let us call each of  the proclaimed domains a Prolific Domain:  'domain',  because 
the relevant area captures material  which exclusively belongs to a specific part of  the 
clause  (thematic,  agreement,  discourse),  and  'prolific',  because  each  such  domain 
consists of more articulated structure (viz. VP, vP, AgrP, TP, Top, FocP etc.). 
(7)  The concept of Prolific Domains (IU) 
i.  8-domt~irt:  part of derivation where theta relations are created 
.  . 
11.  $-domuin: part of derivation where agreement properties are licensed 
iii.  w-domain: part of derivation where discourse information is established 
Beyond the descriptive content of (7), we can define a Prolific Domain as in (8): 
(8)  Prolific Domain 
A  Prolific  Domain  nA  is  a  contextually  defined  part  of  the  computational 
system, (i)  which  provides  the  interfaces  with  the information relevant  to  the 
context, and (ii) which consists of internal structure, interacting with derivational 
operations. 
By  assumption,  the  context  value  lcll  from  (5) contributes  contextual  information, 
defining the three parts of the clause. We return to clause (8i) momentarily; first we will 
tend to clause (ii) of (8). One type of  interaction  with derivational operations we have 
seen so far is the restriction that Move may not apply to a given XP within  a Prolific 
Domain, which  uniformly  rules out unwanted  derivat~onal  steps without  the need  to 
invoke additional, stipulated filters on the cornputati~n.~  We declared at the outset that 
'  Note that the current work only deals with the role of Prolific Domains in the clause. I do not want to 
cxcludc the possibilities that there exist similar domains, with similar propertics, elsewhere (e.g. in the 
nominal Iaycr). At the current point, however, this remains to he worked out. 
A note on the terminology: while the choicc of '0' and '4' is presumably obvious, 'w'  as the label 
lor the C-layer is invented, not so much as to confuse hut to be uniform. Moreover, as the C-layer is 
thc  highest  part  of  the  clause,  capping  it  off, Lhc  last  letter  of  the  Greek  alphabet  might  be  an 
appropriate choicc. There is  a metaphorical mnemonic  for  'w' which  might  be  useful,  too, derived 
l'rc~m  thc Greek word wplp6~im.m  'ripeness, maturity, full growth'.  '  Admittedly, the data coverage from section 2 is only a first stab and might hc considcrcd insufficient 
10  c~~nclusivcly  prwe the  point.  However, the  idea behind  it,  and  the tendency of  such reasoning, 
should be clear, as should the logic behind the current approach in a minimalist sctting (for reasons of 
economy, parsimony etc.). If on thc right track, "standard"  analyses of a number of phenomena must 
hc reconsidered, a task too big for the current article. Rclevant cases that come to mind are instances 
of  participle agreement in Romance (cf. Kayne  1989, Belletti  1990) on the empirical.  or Chomsky's 
(1995)  treatment  of  ohject  Case-/$feature-checking  and  "multiple  subject  constructions"  on  the 
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such  a ban  should be  a direct consequence of bare output conditions, otherwise there 
would  be  little  improvement over previously  assumed conditions, criteria, filters etc. 
Given  that  we now  have the  well-defined  notion  of  a  Prolific  Domain, I posit  the 
following condition holding on the computational system, expressing anti-locality: 
(9)  Condition on Domain Exclusivity (CDE) 
An  object 0 in a phrase marker must have an exclusive Address Identification 
A1 per Prolific Domain IIA, unless duplicity yields a drastic effect on the output. 
1.  .  .  An A1 of 0 in a given IIA is an occurrence of 0  in that IIA at LF. 
11.  A drastic effect on the output is a different realization of 0  at PF. 
Anti-locality, then, is a well-formedness condition on the computational system in terms 
of  exclusivity:  at certain, natural  steps in  the derivation,  (the Condition  on  Domain) 
Exclusivity must be observed. In essence, the CDE says that a linguistic expression (i.e. 
a maximal phrase XP; see section 3.3 below), which obviously needs to be interpreted 
at the (LF and  PF) interfaces, may only occur once in a given  Prolific Domain; this 
occurrence is picked up by LF, so that the expression gets interpreted, and it is picked 
up  by  PF, so that  it  gets  pronounced.  Any copy  of  this  XP,  i.e. each  "non-distinct 
occurrence" of an element in the phrase marker (in the sense of Chomsky 1995, Nunes 
1995), would also show up at LF -  but, if  nothing special happens to its PF-matrix, it 
could not be uniquely identified. In  other words, movement within a Prolific Domain is 
ruled out as a consequence of bare output conditions. 
This leads us to clause (i) of  (S),  also dealing with (the determination of) the "natural 
steps  in  the  derivation"  just  mentioned.  As  already  mentioned  in  passing, we could 
envision  the  tripartite clause structure  in terms of  multiple feeding of  the interfaces. 
Such  a  conception  of  the role  of  the  tripartite  structure  directly implements  current 
thinking  on spelling out parts  of the phrase  marker as the derivation unfolds, directly 
feeding the interfaces; cf. Uriagereka's (1995, 1999) framework of  "Multiple Spell Out" 
or  Chomsky's  (2000,  2001)  recent  proposal  of  cyclic  "phases."  Surely,  there  are 
differences (see section 3.3), but the emerging picture is conceptually very similar. 
Let  us  represent  this  picture  as in  (lo), where  each  Prolific Domain  is  evaluated 
locally,  and where  such  "evaluation"  consists  of  marking  the  relevant LF-  and  PF- 
material.  Convergence  of  the  derivation  yields  exactly  then,  when  the  syntactic 
computation  is  exhausted  and  the  locally  licensed  interfaces  are  well-formed  (see 
Grohmann 2000b, in progress for more discussion). In  the following, we concentrate on 
the interplay of computation and feeding of the interfaces. 
Regarding the "drastic  effect on the output," clause (9ii) already indicates that PF is 
relevant. We know  that deletion  of  moved copies takes place for PF-reasons  (Nunes 
1995). The argument runs as follows. Copies of the same element (here, "0")  are non- 
distinct  [in  terms  of  precedence)  and  subject  to  the  Linear  Correspondence  Axiom. 
However, no element can precede and follow itself at the same time, hence one copy 
must be  deleted (see Kayne  1994, Chomsky  1995, Nunes  1995, I999 for discussion). 
Under the standard operation Move, it is the lower copy that is deleted -  for economy 
reasons: the higher copy has a more complete set of checked features than the lower. 
per  projection,  as  argued  for  in  Grohmann  (ZOOOh),  an  implementation  of  a  featurc scattering 
approach (B la Giorgi and Pianesi  1997) could he a feasible means to handle such cases. These issues 
are dealt with in more detail in Grohmann (in progress). 
110 Clausal Tripartition, Anti-Locality and Clause Types 
LEXICON 
i  f 
PF  LF 
CONVERGENCE 
For the present discussion, we can assume that deletion of the lower copy, as in regular 
instances of movement, is not an option -  otherwise, (1)-(3) should all constitute well- 
formed  structures.  In  fact,  the  CDE  basically  says  "Don't  move  within  a  locally 
designated  area,  unless  it  has  an  effect  on  PF."  The  lower  copy  must  then  "look 
different." We can think of five possibilities what it means to "look different:" 
(1 I)  Two non-distinct copies look different on PF if we 
a.  delete the lower copy, 
b.  #delete the higher copy, 
c.  spell out the lower copy, 
d.  #spell out the higher copy, 
e.  create a new PF-matrix of the moved element 
We can immediately rule out possibilities (I lb,d), as the higher copy needs to be kept 
(more complete). Option  (I la) is not a possibility if  the two copies occur in the same 
Prolific  Domain - this  is  the  quintessential  property  of  anti-locality.  (I le) will  be 
illustrated in section 3.3; it basically implies (head-)adjunction, something irrelevant in 
the current  context. This leaves us  with  (I lc): spelling out the lower copy. We can 
represent this application of "Copy Spell Out" as in (l2a), where '3'  stands for spelling 
out the lower copy of the object that moves within one Prolific Domain (i.e. 0)  by some 
other, yet to be specified, material X. We can summarize the state of affairs as follows: 
(12)  a.  Copy Spell Out:  [nhO ...  03X  . . .] 
b.  #Anti-loculit);:  [nhO ... 8  .  .  .] 
3.2.  Exclusivity: an empirical implementation 
In  section  2,  we  saw  cases  that  illustrate  the  hypothesis  that  movement  of  one 
expression within  a given Prolific Domain is not allowed. However, (9ii) suggests that 
there  are instances  in  which  such  movement  is  allowed - namely,  if  the two copies 
show different PF-realizations, as just discussed. Can such cases be found?' 
4  Space docs not allow a more thorough discussion. Hence, I restrict myself to a vcry basic presentation 
of some of the material dcvcloped in detail in Grohmann (2000b, in progress). 
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Looking at the lowest level of the clause first and adopting a particular hierarchy in the 
0-domain (roughly following Baker 1997), three options of potential movement within 
this domain pertain between the (up to three) XP-positions available: 
Ungrammatical  sentences  such  as  (la) suggest  that  these  options  are  not  found - at 
least, not  as easily. There is an alternative, however:  if  VP  and  vP  form one Prolific 
Domain  (namely,  the  0-domain,  licensing  thematic  relations),  the  move  should  be 
legitimate - if  it  is followed by  Copy Spell Out of  the lower XP, that  is if  the struck 
through element in (13) is not deleted, but replaced by  'X' (cf. (12a)). 
Going  back  to  Lees  & Klima  (1963), Hornstein  (2000) has  recently  proposed  a 
derivational analysis of  local anaphors (also Lidz & Idsardi  1997). This analysis treats 
certain pronouns as grammatical formatives rather than true lexical expressions, subject 
to  Last Resort  (Aoun & Benmamoun  1998, Aoun & Choueiri  1999, Hornstein 2000, 
Aoun, Choueiri  & Hornstein,  in  press;  cf. also "Avoid  Pronoun"  of  Chomsky  1981, 
Aoun  1985). As such, these pronominal elements are not part of the numeration which 
nourishes the derivation, but are introduced in the course of the derivation. Introduction 
of  material forced by Last Resort implies that something is only inserted if  nothing else 
works. A by now natural way to capture such an implementation of  Last Resort and a 
derivational analysis of anaphors would be in  terms of the CDE: Copy Spell Out. If  this 
approach is on the right track, we would have identified  'X'  as a local  anaphor. This 
would generate (14) as the updated version of (13), corresponding to (12a): 
(14)  a.  [,  p AG v [vp Tl;r 3  X V GO]] 
tl 
b.  [,PAG~[vPTHV~~~XII 
The  following  examples  suggest  that  this  approach  is  indeed  plausible,  in  that  it 
correctly predicts the possible ways of reflexivizing l~cally:'~ 
(15)  a.  [,.p  John introduced-v [vp  JBkft 3  himself m&e&ed  to Mary]] 
h.  [,,P  John introduced-v [VP  Mary i&w&ed  to Jekft 3 himselfl] 
c.  John introduced-v [vp  Mary  to &kwy 3 herself]] 
The basic analysis as just  presented is further extended in Grohmann (2000b, ch. 3) to 
cover other  instances  of  local  anaphors, namely  reciprocals.  Comparing the different 
local anaphors (in English), we can observe differences in  interpretation, of course: we 
have to distinguish  identical  referents  from (sub-)sets of  referents  between  the moved 
I0  This is a first stab. It gocs without saying that a discussion of languages with different patterns (e.g. 
with the help of8  rcflcxivizing lnorphelnc or via incorporation) cannot he treatcd here. 
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and the spelled out copies. In  other words, there is an  apparent choice of pronominal 
filler element that gets pronounced (our 'X'). 
For illustration, take two relatively straightforward constructions: 
(16)  a.  John likes himself. 
b.  John and Bill like each other. 
c.  John and Bill like themselves. 
It  is not  unreasonable  to  suppose that  this  "semantic"  distinction  is  encoded on the 
originally  merged  lexical  item.  In  order for John to  be merged  into TH-position  and 
subsequently move into AG-position (followed by Copy Spell Out; cf. (14a)), it needs 
two sets of 8- and $-features. If  this is all it has, Copy Spell Out will be one expressing 
full  identity. Noteworthy,  though,  is the fact that  singular referents  cannot  receive  a 
reciprocal  meaning. Reciprocity presupposes  a plural  referent  set. Following Schein's 
(1993) proposal  that  a plural  noun  phrase basically  expresses  the coordination  of  all 
possible events involving the relevant argument structure, the rough LF of  (16b) looks 
like (l7a), while that of (l6c)  would be something like (17b): 
Thus, merging a noun phrase denoting a multiple member set, the internal  structure to 
John and Bill] presumably has these relations encoded. In that case, if  the relevant 
information is one of  conjoining self-liking events, the filler is a reflexive, and if  it is 
one of conjoining transitive liking events, it is a reciprocal."  (See Grohmann 2000b, ch. 
3 for discussion on inherent reflexives and pro.) 
This analysis also accounts for reflexive ECM-subjects. Following Koizumi (1995) 
and  Lasnik  (1999),  a  plausible  analysis  of  ECMed  subjects  in  Checking  Theory 
involves  the  Agr-position  of  the  matrix  clause.  Coupled  with  the  proposal  that 
movement  into  8-positions is permissible  (BoSkovii:  1994, Homstein 2000; also, see 
section  3.3),  (I8a)  would  receive  the  structural  analysis  of  (18b):  the  point  of 
reflexivizing  Mary  is  the  matrix  @-domain, when  Muiy moves  from  one 0-position 
(SpecAgrP) to another (SpecTP). As far as I can tell, we cannot tease apart all possible 
points of reflexivization; this seems a plausible option. 
(18)  a.  Mary expects herself to win the race. 
b.  [~p  Mary T [? expects, [A,,  May 2  herself ti  [,.p  R4tK.p t, [vp ti  [~p  to-T 
[,,P Mwy winj-v [VP tj the racellllllll 
We now  have  an  instance  of  Copy  Spell Out  forced by  the CDE for the  $-domain. 
Regarding  the  wdomain, one construction  that  comes to mind -  especially  after the 
previous examples of  CDE-driven Copy Spell Out involving pronominal elements -  is 
left dislocation. We can roughly distinguish three types of left dislocation, illustrated in 
(19): Hanging Topic Left Dislocation (HTLD, illustrated by English), Contrastive Left 
Dislocation (CLD, German) and Clitic Left Dislocation (CLLD, Greek): 
I I  These facts suggest that the choice of the filler, restricted  as it is, depends on information internal to 
Lhc  noun phrases. Iiwc Lied  that information to $-features, we would yield a further possible argument 
in  hvor of  $- rather  than  Case-driven movement  (see in. 5  abovc). Insertion  of  a formative in  thc 
rclcvant circumstance (saving a CDE violation) must  he licensed  by  CHL  and  a $-projection  (Agr) 
seems a reasonable place to do so. Kleanthes K. Grohmann 
(19)  a.  This man, I don't know him.  [HTLD] 
b.  Dieserz  Munn, den  kenne  ich  nicht.  [CLD] 
this.ACC man that-one.ACC know  1  not 
'This man, I don't know [him].' 
c.  Afton  ton  andra,  dhen  ton  ksero.  [CLLD] 
this.ACC the.ACC man.ACC not  'm.ACC  know. ISG 
'This man, I don't know ['em].' 
A plausible analysis for topicalization moves the topic to the left periphery (a position 
that  could  be  identified  as  TopP within  a  finer articulated  CP). The German  topic- 
construction  corresponding to (19b) -  that  is, minus the resumptive pronoun -  would 
then  look  like  (20a),  where  the  topic  (here,  XP)  undergoes  the  rough  movements 
sketched in (20b), checking its thematic, agreement and discourse features overtly: 
(20)  a.  Diesen Munn kenne ich nicht. 
b.  [T~~P  XP  TO^^'  . . . [$A  . .  .  .  . . [,A  . . . %  . . .]]]I 
Comparing HTLD  and  CLD with  topicalization,  we  can  observe  that  only  the latter 
shows straight parallels:  only the left-dislocated XP of the CLD-type is Case-marked, 
unbounded, island-sensitive, and may reconstruct -just  like topics, but unlike hanging 
topics."  Regarding the latter, we find the absence of Weak Crossover and Condition A 
effects, the presence of Condition C effects, the possibility of  left-dislocating idiomatic 
chunks, and the impossibility of left-dislocating multiple XPs. 
While all these are good arguments in favor of  movement (of the left-dislocated XP), 
previous approaches had no straightforward way of encoding the resumptive pronoun in 
(19b).  In  the  present  framework,  the  obvious  solution  sticks  out.  Given  that  the 
resumptive  in CLD, but  not  HTLD, is  in topic position,  the left-dislocated  XP must 
occupy a position further left. If  it has moved to this sentence-initial position via TopP 
(to account for the parallels with topicalization), it would have touched down twice in 
the @domain  and thus violate the CDE. Copy Spell Out of  the lower copy in TopP is 
then employed to rectify this move. This is illustrated below: 
(2  I )  [CP XP C  [nIpp XP 3 RP Top .  .  .  .  .  .  XP .  .  . [,A .  . . XP ...  I]]] 
XP, the left-dislocated element in CLD, is part of the initial numeration, while RP (the 
resumptive pronoun) is not; this element is the spelled out copy of XP. In HTLD, on the 
other hand, the RP is part of the numeration and does not form a movement dependency 
with the hanging topic (viz. absence of reconstruction effects and lack of Case-marking 
on the hanging topic, for example). 
Interestingly,  CLLD  shares  the  main  properties  with  CLD, again  clearly different 
from HTLD (e.g. C~nque  1977, 1990, Anagnostopoulou  1997, Villalba 2000). What we 
can observe is that the resumptive element in these cases, the clitic, occurs lower than 
the topic position. One possible route of explanation, in line with the current proposal, 
would introduce the clitic as a spelled out copy of  the to be left-dislocated phrase in a 
lower Prolific Domain, such as the @-domain  (see Grohmann 2000b, in progress). 
12  Scc, Ibr  cxa~nplc,  the collection of papers in  Anagnostopoulou et  al. (1997) fkr recent  (and not so 
recent)  discussion  of  these  constructions  in  a  variety  of  languages,  thcir  dil'fcrent  properties  and 
possihlc approaches. In Grohmann (2000a, 2000d), I develop the arguments for Copy Spell Out in 
case of CLD in detail. The argulnents for the resumptive to bc a spelled out copy of rhc left-dislocated 
element also hold independently of the present framework (cf. Grohlnann  1997). Clausal Tripartition, Anti-Locality and Clausc Types 
In  sum, while  the general observation that  maximal  phrases  may  not  move within  a 
locally defined area seems to be correct, a handful of  apparently exceptional cases can 
be accounted for if  we allow introduction of grammatical formatives in the course of the 
derivation. If, furthermore, the form of these formatives can be predicted by context or 
make-up of  the moving element (cf. reflexives vs. reciprocals), we do not have to say 
too much about such instances of Copy Spell Out. In particular, I want to maintain that 
the idea to introduce such material derivationally does not constitute a violation of the 
Inclusiveness Condition (Chomsky  1995: 228). It is not the case that a new object gets 
inserted. All  formal features (thematic role, agreement properties, discourse function) 
are present -  in the initial numeration as well as subsequent computation. What changes 
is the PF-matrix, a change that is straightforward if  feature bundles are kept separate. 
Zwart  (1997), for example, argues that formal  features  should be differentiated  from 
semantic features and from phonetic features. Copy Spell Out concerns the latter, and it 
is plausible that these get inserted late anyway (cf. Distributive Morphology 2 la Halle 
and  Marantz  1993 and  follow-up  work,  for  example).  The  long  and  short  of  this 
discussion,  brief  as  space  allows, is  that  the  concept  of  Copy  Spell  Out  does  not 
jeopardize Inclusiveness, contrary to Kayne (2001). 
3.3.  Exclusivity: some concepts and consequences 
In  this section, I want to address some theoretical  aspects of  the framework of Prolific 
Domains, that go beyond the discussion above, and point to some possible directions 
this framework could go, in comparison to other, recent proposals. 
We have noted earlier that Exclusivity regards XPs only. Let us now see why this 
should be so. Head movement differs from XP-movement in being adjunction to a head, 
rather than substitution. Take (22) and concentrate on the relevant objects, ZP and x": 
As suggested  above, movement of  ZP is only allowed if  the  landing  site is part of  a 
different Prolific Domain, otherwise the two (non-distinct) copies of  ZP could not be 
interpreted at PF. This PF-violation would be due to the identity of PF-matrices of both 
copies of  ZP. This identity, in  turn, is the result of  XP-movement  as substitution."  If 
another  movement  operation  could  render  the  moved  element  PF-distinct  from  the 
lower copy, one would expect the result well-formed, even if  it takes place within the 
13  In  Grohmann  (2000b, ch.  3), 1 argue  that  XP-movement  must  be  substitution,  i.e. adjunction  to 
[naxitnal phrascs  (as popular  GB-analyses  suggcst  for  topicalization  or  scrambling,  for  example) 
cannot be the result of movement. The reasons for, and the theoretical and empirical consequences of, 
this  postulate  should  not  concern  us  here  (see also  Grohmann  20011,  hut  the  emerging  typology 
distinguishes XP-movement, XP-adjunction and x"-movement  straightforwardly. That is to say, we 
lose a reason, why hcad movement should be suspect and eliminated from the grammar and replaced 
by  a  pure  PF-operation,  as argued  hy  Chomsky  (1995, 2000, 2001) - scc also Zwart  (2001) for 
interpretive effects of head movement as well as phonological consequences. Klcanthes K. Groh~nann 
same Prolific Domain. This is arguably the case with  head movement. Moving X'  in 
(22) adjoins it to the next highest head, Y", resulting in the complex head [x"-Y~]-Y~.  In 
this  case,  the  newly  formed  complex  head  has  a  different  PF-realization  from  the 
original X'  by  virtue of  bearing more morphological  material. Given that all functional 
heads manifest phonetically  in some language, we can assume relatively safely that all 
morphological  material  related to any given functional  head always has some intrinsic 
PF-matrix, regardless of  whether this material  is actually pronounced. In  other words, 
moving an  XP (into a specifier position;  see fn.  13) does not enrich its phonological 
make-up, but moving a head does. In this sense, two copies of  a head within a Prolific 
Domain are distinct and can be interpreted at PF, conforming to the CDE. 
We are  now  dealing  with  essentially the following  (im)possibilities  of  movement 
dependencies: 
(23)  a.  #[&  XP  yo  ...  [a  ... S  ...I]  (anti-local movement) 
b.  [a~  XP  YO  . . .  [Pa . . . 39 ...]I  (XP-movement) 
C. 
R  LXA  xU-yo  . . .  [a  ..  . X  . . .]]  (head movement) 
Returning  to the "bigger  picture"  of  the current framework, as  depicted in  (lo), it  is 
worth noting that such a dynamic conception of  the computation is not novel, nor is it 
the only one around. Modifying Uriagereka's (1995, 1999) concept of cyclic Spell Out, 
Cholnsky (2000, 2001a, 2001b) also splits up the clause into formal sub-parts and sends 
these  off  to  the  interfaces as the derivation unfolds. In  this  model, the relevant  parts 
("phases")  are slightly different -  and subsequently, the consequences of a phase-driven 
framework diverge from the consequences of a domain-driven framework. Nevertheless 
it is interesting to note how they differ, and to observe that these differences do not per 
se argue in favor of one over the other; rather, the choice of phases or Prolific Domains 
depends on  other  assumptions  on the  structure and  mechanisms  of  the grammar one 
wants to hold on to. Here is a basic comparison of some of these differences: 
(24)  Comparing phases (PH) with Prolific Domains (IIA) 
I.  propositional PH vs. contextual IIA 
.  . 
11.  ...  PH and HA are convergent (Spell Out) 
111.  Phase Impenetrability Condition vs. Condition on Domain Exclusivity 
a. AttractIAgree vs. Move (local evaluation) 
b. multiple vs. unique specifiers (no edge) 
The first point regards the licensing of the relevant sub-parts. Chomsky (2000) suggests 
that phases are propositional, and as such identifies vP  and CP as the only phases of a 
clause. In  the present  framework, we basically  identified  vP,  TP and  CP as Prolific 
Domains,  identified  by  contextual  information.  Both  phases  and  domains  are 
convergent sub-parts, that is, they are both locally evaluated and spelled out cyclically. 
Theoretical implications arise in  respect to point (24iii), where the two models diverge. 
As we have seen here, it is a property of the moving element that forces displacement 
(i.e. Move), whereas the "classical"  minimalist approach of Chomsky (1995, 2000) pin- 
points the trigger in  the attracting head (by movement  viz. Agree or without, namely 
through  Agree). Another  formal  difference  is  that  a phase-based  system depends on 
multiple specifiers, to create "escape hedges" for material to get out of  a phase. This is 
done via an  "edge,"  the only possibility for a higher phase-inducing head to attract the 
relevant  material  and  thus  closing  off  the  lower  phase.  By  not  assuming  multiple 
specifiers  (Grohmann  2000b,  2001;  see  also  fn.  13), this  difference  is  by  far  not Clausal Tripartition, Anti-Locality and Clause Types 
detrimental for a domain-based system: a Prolific Domain is evaluated at the point of 
creation, while a (strong) phase is then closed off when the next highest phase enters the 
computation. In  other words, these properties of  the two different systems have to do 
with the fact that two different well-formedness conditions are at work. Movement out 
of  a phase  is  restricted  by  the  Phase Impenetrability  Condition, whereas  movement 
within a Prolific Domain is subject to the Condition on Domain Exclusivity. The upshot 
of this comparison is that the framework of Prolific Domain fares prima facie no worse 
than  a phase-based  system in conception or empirical coverage. In  order to decide for 
one of the two, a number of background assumptions have to be teased apart. 
One final  empirical  aspect I would  like to  consider  here  is  the  determination  of 
possible  landing  sites for two types of  movement, movement within  a clause ("intra- 
clausal")  and across clauses ("inter-clausal").  Given that each full clause consists of  a 
hierarchically  structured  tripartition,  wA  >>  QA  >>  @A, movement  within  a  clause 
cannot jump across one of these, that is, intra-clausal movement must always target the 
next highest Prolific Domain. This is a direct consequences of building up the interfaces 
cyclically: if XP has an interpretive presence at one point of evaluation (i.e. in a Prolific 
Domain, say, at the 0-domain), it must be present  at the next highest also (Q-domain), 
when it finally occurs at the highest level (wdomain). In essence, this forces topicalized 
arguments, for example, to move through  an agreement position, before  landing in the 
discourse layer. We can illustrate a straightforward case with simple Wh-questions: 
(25)  Intru-clausal movement 
a.  [w4 ... XP ... [$A  ..  . XP ... [HA ... XP ..  ,111 
b.  [,A  who did [$A  John wke [HA kiss wke]]] 
It  has  long been  noted  that  successive-cyclic movement  differs  from clause-internal 
movement  in  that  it  targets  the  same projection  in  the  higher  clause. The  classical 
example is Comp-to-Comp movement, as in long Wh-movement, for example. Another 
instance of  this type of  movement is subject raising, where the theta-marked subject of 
an embedded clause moves to the grammatical subject position of that clause (SpecTP), 
before  moving  successive-cyclically to the  matrix  SpecTP. If  this  element  is  a Wh- 
phrase,  it  must  move  on  to  the  matrix  Wh-position  (e.g.  SpecCP  or  SpecFocP) - 
crucially, it does not move to a Wh-position below the matrix clause. 
What this  means  in  the current  framework  is  that  inter-clausal movement always 
targets the next highest Prolific Domain of the same type, as in (26): 
(26)  Inter-clausal movement 
a.  [Cob  XP . . . [$Axe ... [HA . . . [,,  .  . . [$A AT  . . . [HA  . . . 
[OA  [$A *  . . . [HA  . . .lllllllll 
b.  [,,A  who  [,A  wke seems [HA [,A  [$A  wka to be  [HA likely 
[$A  to [HA-  kiss Marylllllllll 
This line is compatible with BoSkoviC's  (2000) take on the EPP and Hornstein's (2000) 
analysis of  raising and control. Regarding the latter, we have observed in  (18) already 
that in  order to spell out an ECM-subject as a reflexive, this subject must have moved 
into the thematic  domain of  the matrix verb. Hornstein  applies this  movement as the 
standard operation  that  underlies control  structures, which  thus differ from raising in 
involving movement into a thematic position. Just as (26) is an instance of inter-clausal 
movement from a $-to  a $-position,  these cases (control  B  la Hornstein  or ECM from Kleanthcs K. Grohmann 
(18)  are  instances  of  0-toe-movement - all  conforming  to the hypothesis  that  inter- 
clausal movement targets the same type of Prolific Domain in the next highest clause. 
4.  A note on clause-typing 
Now  that  we  have sketched the framework of  anti-locality in  syntax, I would like to 
look at one particular consequence for the study of grammar. The general consensus is 
that all clauses need to be formally licensed, or typed (see in particular Cheng 1991). In 
a minimalist  setting, one could envision this clause-typing to be done by  checking of 
formal features. Naturally, a number of other factors play  a role -  and this  is not the 
appropriate place to discuss the theory of  clause typing  in  detail -  so that one would 
have to decide, for example, if  other, plausibly non-syntactic  factors (relating to mood 
or  speech  act)  should be  integrated  into  the  syntax,  and  how  so. Another  question 
regards  the  exact  locus  of  where  clause-typing  should be  done;  while  CP seems  a 
plausible candidate, more has to be said, a point we get back to presently. 
What I want  to do now  is go over some light that the framework of  anti-locality 
throws on Cheng's  clause-typing hypothesis. This brief discussion concerns the typing 
of  Wh-interrogatives.  The particular  proposal  of  Cheng's  is that  clause-typing  (with 
respect  to  Wh-question  formation)  is  enforced  by  a  criterion-like  condition  (Cheng 
1991, ch. 2): all  clauses are  typed  either by  Spec-head  agreement of  a fronted  Wh- 
phrase in  the CP-projection or by the presence of an interrogative particle (in C). 
Given what we have said so far, Cheng's  condition  must be revised.14 Among the 
questions we have to settle in order to implement or develop Cheng's hypothesis is the 
finer articulation of CP (in the wake of Rizzi  1997, for example). The Comp-layer now 
consists of  more than  a single projection - which  was the locus of  clause-typing for 
Cheng. Does this mean that any C-projection can license clause types? It is plausible to 
assume that only one projection is responsible for typing the clause, such as the highest 
C-projection -  aptly called ForceP by ~izzi."  But if  only one (such as the highest) C- 
projection  can  type  the  clause, we  have  to  avoid  movement  via  another,  lower  C- 
projection. 
Referring to the highest clausal Prolific Domain  as the wdomain (viz. "discourse") 
suggests  already  an  area  of  the  clause  that  could  involve  formal  syntax-discourse 
properties,  such  as  needed  to encode speech  acts/illocutionary force (if  so desired - 
possibly  via  other  mechanisms  tying  in  the  pragmatics  of  language).  But  an  XP 
satisfying  one formal  property  cannot also then  check  another, if  both  are  (broadly) 
discourse-related. This is what we have already seen in  (3) above. A regular Wh-phrase 
cannot also act as the topic of the sentence, being required to check a [Top]-feature as 
well as [Wh]. This restriction follows from the CDE.'~ 
Let  us  now  turn  to  the puzzle of  an  articulated Comp-layer  in the context of  the 
clause-typing hypothesis  and the framework of  anti-locality. One question  is whether 
Wh-movement  is  syntactically or  semantically driven.  Under  the  view  that  the Wh- 
operator (or interrogative clause-typer) sits on the Wh-phrase, the prevalent view is that 
14  I will not discuss the empirical adequacy of Cheng's hypothesis (see c.g. Sahcl 1998, Boeckx 1999 for 
some discussion). 
15  As the highest position ofthe  clause, everything beneath would be in the "scopc"  ol  the clause-typing 
element, thus suggesting that Force or C is a plausible locus for typing a clause's force. 
''  There nrc arguments that take certain Wh-phrases to be topics, in  which case the [Whl-property is not 
Ibl.mally checked, such as in contexts of  D-linking (see Grohmann 1998, Cho & Zhou  1999, Citko & 
Grohmann 2000, den Dikken & Giannakiduu 2000, for example). Clausal Tripartition, Anti-Locality and Clause Typcs 
all Wh-phrases must move to SpecCP at some point. This approach goes hack to Huang 
(1982) who proposes LF-movement of Wh-phrases in Wh-in situ languages. There is an 
alternative, namely that  another element types the clause, possibly independent of the 
Wh-phrase. Baker (1970) suggests a Q-morpheme, elaborating an idea by Katz &Postal 
(1964), which was developed further by Cheng (1991). Under the latter analysis, all that 
is  needed  to  license  a question  is  Q  in  C, and  languages  allow  either one of  two 
strategies: (i) move a WH, which by default contains Q, to SpecCP or (ii) generate Q in 
C, which comes in the form of a Q-particle. 
This Q can be a phonologically pronounced morpheme such as Japanese no in (27a) 
or  an  unpronounced, empty  morpheme, asd  would  have  to  be  claimed  in  (27b) for 
Chinese, another Wh-in  situ language. An  implementation  of  this approach  need  not 
postulate LF-movement of the Wh-phrases. 
(27)  a.  Tanako-wa  Mitsue-ni  nani-o  ugetu  no? 
Tanako-TOP  Mitsue-DAT  what-ACC  gave  Q 
'What did Tanako give to Mitsue?' 
b.  Zhungsan  mai-le  shenme .7 
Zhangsan  buy-ASP  what 
'What did Zhangsan buy?' 
The Q-typing approach can  be sketched as  follows. Q could sit on the Wh-phrase in 
SpecCP, as in  (28a) for English, or in  C, as in  (28b). The latter can  he covert, as in 
Chinese (in which case it would have to move), or overt, as in Japanese, for example. 
(28)  Q-typing approach 
a.  CP 
I\ 
WH[+QI  c  ' 
who I\ 
C  ... 
did  I\ 
... WH ... 
you see 
CP 
I\ 
C ' 
. . . 
/-' 
C[+QI 
mw  no 
Tanaka-wa Mitsue-ni nani-o ageta 
I suggest that Wh-movement is independent of  interrogative force. Rather, the clause is 
typed  interrogative by  a question morpheme, the Q-particle (overt or covert). We can 
thus integrate Cheng's approach into a more articulate structure of CP (i  la Rizzi 1997), 
here  understood  as  the  @domain.  But  the  present  approach  does  not  require  Wh- 
phrases  to  move to yield  a well-formed question,  not  even  in  languages that  do not 
make a Q-particle available (see also Hagstrom 1998). Klcanrhes K. Grohmann 
Displacement of Wh-phrases takes place for an additional discourse effect, driven by a 
special feature, the feature [Wh], which might be related to "focus." By separating [Wh] 
from [Q], we can license the interrogative clause across all languages without resorting 
to any kind  of movement of Wh-phrases, and no necessity  to move at LF either (see 
also  Brody  1995,  Hornstein  1995,  Kayne  1998  for  arguments  against  covert  A'- 
movement). If  Wh-phrases  move, they do so for other reasons. It has been  argued that 
languages that  move a Wh-phrase to  a C-related position  (or wposition), canonically 
target FocP. One argument  comes from the complementary  distribution  of  displaced 
Wh-phrases and displaced focus phrases (Horvath 1986, Brody 1990). 
The  problem  for the  "strict"  clause-typing  hypothesis  is  obvious:  if  moved  Wh- 
phrases canonically target FocP, they cannot then move on to CP to type the clause. We 
now  face the following (im)possible constellations to license Wh-interrogatives. Given 
Exclusivity, (29a), where WH represents the moved Wh-phrase, cannot be the right way 
to type clauses -  but it should be if  we wanted to hang on to Cheng's requirement that a 
Spec-head constellation needs to be created tom license clause-typing. 
(29)  a.  #  CP  b.  CP 
I\ I\ 
WH  C '  C ' 
I\ I\ 
...  c0  .  . . 
[Ql I\ 
FocP  FocP 
I\  I 
WH  WIf  Foc'  Foc' 
I\ I\. 
FOC'  .  .  .  FOC" 
[  Whl  ?  [Whl 
Merging the particle with C" in (29a) is no problem, but [Q] cannot then be checked by 
XP-movement. Thus, Q must type the clause by  virtue of being in C. If, however, only 
Q ends up in  C - by  movement (from  '?'  in (29b)) or by  base-generation -  we can 
modify  the  condition  that  clauses  must  be  typed:  Wh-interrogatives  are  universally 
typed by the Q-morpheme  in C; Q may directly merge into C or move from the Wh- 
phrase (see BoSkoviC 1998, Hagstrom 1998, Grohmann 2000b for details). 
5.  Conclusion 
In  this  paper,  I  have  sketched  a  framework  that  takes  into  account  that  locality  on 
movement  dependencies  does  indeed  seem  to  have  a  lower  hound  as  well  as  the 
traditional upper bound. Such a conception  allows us to rule out ungrammatical cases 
which otherwise would have to invoke a number of additional conditions, mainly in the 
form  of  criteria  and  filters.  Moreover,  all  these  additional  conditions  have  to  be 
separately formulated for the different cases. By following a research  agenda that aims 
at eliminating superfluous conditions -  those not driven by bare output conditions -  we 
can capture this "lower bound" or anti-locality effect in a different way. The framework 
presented here does so in terms of an Exclusivity condition, that bans movement within 
a designated area of  the clause. We identified three such areas, which we call Prolific 
Domains, correlating to contextual information licensed within each of them: a thematic Clausal Tripartition, Anti-Locality and Clause Types 
domain, an agreement domain and a discourse domain. Naturally, such a model has far- 
reaching consequences on the analytical level. One such consequence arises for theories 
of clause-typing. I suggested that in the case of Wh-questions, Wh-movement should be 
dissociated  from clause-typing.  This is achieved by distinguishing Wh-features,  that 
drive movement of a Wh-phrase into the @domain,  from a Q-morpheme, which types 
the clause. In  order for the framework of Prolific Domains laid out here to go through, 
other analytical consequences have to be tackled, some of which we have mentioned in 
the text. One particularly interesting topic -  interesting not only from the perspective of 
the present model, but also from a general, formal point of view -  is the issue of clause- 
typing, beyond the little spiel on Wh-interrogatives we have seen. By denoting Q as a 
quintessential  clause-typing  morpheme, the door has been  opened to find other such 
(abstract)  morphemes  for  other  clause  types  as  well  and  proceed  with  a  technical 
implementation along the lines provided towards the end of this paper. These and other 
issues have to be left open for future, fruitful research. 
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1.  Introduction 
The ultimate goal of  this paper is to find a representation  of  modality compatible with 
some basic conditions on the syntax-semantic interface.' Such conditions are anchored, 
for  instance,  in  Chomsky's  (1995)  principle  of  full  interpretation  (FI).  Abstract 
interpretation of modality is, however -  be it "only"  in semantic terms -  already a hard 
nut to crack, way too vast to be dealt with  in  any comprehensive way here. What is 
pursued  instead  is  a case-study-centered  analysis. The case in  point  are the English 
modals  (EM)  viewed  in  their  development  through  time - a  locus  classicus  for  a 
number of  linguistic theories and frameworks. The idea will  be to  start out from two 
lines  of  research - continuous  grammaticalization  vs.  cataclysmic  change - and  to 
explain some of their incongruities.  The first non-trivial  point here consists in deriving 
more fundamental  questions from this research. The second, possibly even less trivial 
one consists in  answering them. Specifically, I will argue that regardless of  the actual 
numerical rate of change, there is an underlying and more structured way to account for 
the notions of change and continuity within the modal system, respectively. 
The main claim is that two primitive relations must have characterized the EM at all 
linguistically reconstructible times: central vs. non-central  coincidence. If  the spell-out 
presented  here  proves  to  be  correct, then,  in  broader- terms,  it  will  fit  Hale's  (1985) 
world  view(s). According to such  views, a principle of  coincidence with two possible 
features (central  vs.  non-central) underlies a series of prima facie  unrelated linguistic 
phenomena, as for instance locational prepositions and temporal  predicates in  (I), but 
also many others (cf. Hale 1985, Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria 2000). Starting from 
the premise of  a quantificational representation of  the EM, I will claim that there is a 
case  for  representing  modality  as  a  similar  predicate,  once  we  have  defined  the 
coincidence relations. The phrase-markers  in  (I) show that  two sets of  locations and 
times, respectively, coincide. 
'  I am indebted to Susanne Winkler for lots of patience and helping me make this paper less of  a cypher 
than  it originally was, to H. Bernhard Drubig for  pointing  out to mc more interesting  things  about 
tense and modality than I could have imagined, ((1  Michael Hegarty fol- making modality make sense 
lo me. and to Utc Wohllcbcn for proofreading thc text -  which ofcoursc docs nut entail that any of the 
shortcomings and mistakes below arc theirs in any ibrm.  '  On the semantic side of thc interface, I assume, for simplicity, the standard classification  of modality 
as exposed in Palmer (1986) and going back at least to Hofman (1976) -  in particular, this entails the 
epistemic vs. root  distinction - up to one significant difference: I  considcr alethic modality  part of 
human  language  and  not  only  of  logical  systems. Cross-linguistic back-up  for  this  view  can  be 
adduced  from Cinque's (1999: 78) study  of  functional  heads.  For English  examples - both  from 
present usage and diachronic ones -  see below. 
ZAS Papers in Ling~listics  24, 2001, 125-143 (la) locational central coincidence  (1  b) temporal central coincidcnce 
a skeleton  P'  TopT (Topic Time)  T' 
I---. 
P  ~hc  closet 
I 
in  (PRESENT as) "within"  AstT (Assertion Time) 
Turning  back  to  modality,  consider  the  sentences  in  (2), where  (2b)  would  not  be 
grammatical  today,  but  where  we  have  abundant  evidence  that  there  were  such 
sentences at earlier stages of the language, say, from Shakespearean texts. 
(2)  a.  William, you must write us a sonnet. 
(2)  b.  William, thou must to the queen. 
What  the  present  paper  attempts  to  account  for  is  an  explanation  of  why  both  a 
functional  element base  generated  in  an  inflectional  node of  the sentence (2a) and a 
lexical element generated in the verbal head (2b), can have similar interpretations at an 
interfacial  level. Both  (2a)  and  (2b) convey the notion  of  obligation, a clear case of 
deontic modality. The relation  of coincidence in  the case of modality will connect two 
sets of possible worlds. In  (2), these two sets are the one related to the speakers, or the 
commanders, and the one related to William, the commandee, respectively. Pursuing a 
slightly modified  analogy to current tense theories, I will call the first set the topical 
world set (TopW), and take it as the external argument of  the modal relation, and the 
latter  assertion  world  set  (AstW),  its  internal  argument.  The  set  TopW  does  not 
necessarily  have to be  related to the speaker, it can by  all means he related to another 
"controller"  present in discourse -  e.g. a set of possible worlds in the AstW of a higher 
clause. By contrast, in all deontics, AstW will denote the set of possible worlds related 
to  the  commandee  and  the  ordered/allowed  event  as  above.  Mutatis  nzuta~ldis,  in 
evidential or epistemics, AstW will denote the inferree and the inferred event. 
Closely linked to the representation of  modality, a further diachronic generalization 
will be  derived as the argument unfolds. Particularly, it will be argued that positing a 
Predicate Phrase (PrP or Pr,,,,)  for the whole diachronic development of  the EM from 
OE  through  ModE  is  a  refinement  of  Roberts'  (1993) sudden-diachronic-reanalysis 
theory of the modals from V to T. I will take the Pr-node to be situated between T and 
V as in Bowers (2001). In  addition to the motivation given therein  for the existence of 
PrP, I will  investigate  a further  argument for the existence  of  PrP. The argument  is 
based on VP-ellipses (Warner 1992, Winkler p.c.) in OE, which provide complementary 
evidence for Pr directly pertaining  to the predication  of  modality  (and tense). 1 will 
argue that a predicate  node has strong explanatory potential for the diachronic  issues 
dealt  with  in  this  paper.  One  benefit  of  the  tense-modality  parallelism  will  be  the 
prediction that modal verbs carry both tense and modal features which they check either 
by merger with PrP in ModE or by movement in OE/ME. From Simple Predicators Lo  Clausal Functors 
2.  Facts, theories, problems 
2.1.  The modals of English: old and new meaning 
Speakers of  ModE following their  intuitions may occasionally be  confronted with  an 
intriguing experience while  reading  OE or  ME texts  and  processing  the  semantics, 
syntax and morphology of  the precursors of may, must, shall, and can as shown in (3)- 
(7). 
(3)  We magon eow sellan balwende gepeahte, hwzet ge don magon.  (Bede, 28.12) 
we  can  you give  sound  advice, (as to) what you do may 
(4)  ...(b  at) alle Cristus wordus mote nede  be trewe.  (Wycliff, [94], 15) 
that  all  Christ's words  must necessarily be true 
(5)  ...  who this book shall wylle lerne ... 
.  .  .  he-who this book shall wish learn.. .  (Dcnison's  1993: 310 example 121) 
(6)  Method hie  ne  cupon 
Creator they not  knew 
(7)  fol.ay is betere bst  feoh bzette nzefre losian ne mreg aonne brette mzg  7 sceal. 
'therefore better is the property which can never perish [lit. never perish not 
can] than that which can and will.'  (Warner's 1992 example 5a) 
In  the linguistic space occupied by the modals, it becomes an intricate problem how to 
map an old meaning into a new one. In a translation, one and the same item can -  and in 
fact must -  be rendered in some cases by its modern correlative and in others by another 
member  of  the class as the two occurrences of  magon in  (3) make clear.'  In  (4), an 
objective  deontic  mote,  reinforced  by  the  adverbial  nede  (the  latter  originally  an 
inflected  noun  coming  close  to  instrumental  meaning)  corresponds  in  ModE  to  its 
former  preterite  form,  which  has  substituted  the  lost  present  form. Considering the 
religious context, and the additional reinforcement, mote nede turns out to have alethic 
meaning. In  (5), we understand the modal shall  more easily but at least as speakers of 
Standard ModE we are puzzled by the fact that something resembling a second modal 
comes right after it. In (6), we cannot bring the modal and the DP method together at all 
given that the pronoun  hie already checks nominative, so we  assume that cubon had 
rather the significance of knowing in this context. The comparative construction in (7) 
is noteworthy for two reasons.  First, negation  precedes the modal  meg,  and second, 
there seem to be two instances of  VP ellipsis licensed by each of the modals mceg  and 
sceul in the final relative clause. 
Direct or oblique objects (for instance with prepositions) as well as adverbials often 
give us the first clues on the meaning of the modal cognates in ME and OE. In addition 
to  this  and to  the  general  context, some approximating  translations  generally agreed 
The  necessity  of  a certain translation  cannot he  absolute; it  is rather  imposed  by the context to a 
certain exLent. For example, equating both instances of inugon with nzny  does not make the sentance 
itsel1 ungrammatical, hut semantically mostly  improbable in the context it is taken from, where it is 
essential for the spekcars to convince the addressees that they truly  are in  a position to impart some 
yond advice. Therefore curl  seems the more appropriate choice in ModE. upon  in  the literature can offer a first orientation. The following paraphrases for some 
OE premodals are for instance adapted from Traugott (1992): 
(8)  a.  magan = be strong, sufficient, in good health, be able to; especially for 
physical ability, whereas cunnan is rather used for mental faculties; 
b.  motan"'= be allowed to; be obliged to; 
c.  sculun"= owe; be necessary. 
If  we take these approximating mappings of  meaning to be correct, we have to handle 
two main  issues. How do we explain the syntactic and semantic differences to modern 
usage? And how can  we account for the OE synchronic discrepancies, notably for the 
two diametrically diverging root meanings of  motan in (8b)? A further question would 
be  whether  the  two  problems  are  interrelated.  Traugott  (1992:197)  rounds  up  the 
difficult descriptive task by giving a characterization in  terms of  the ability to express 
epistemic meaning.  In  such terms cunnan, mugan, and ugan are posited to  lack  any 
trace of epistemicity. On the other hand, mugun, sculrm, beon, and willurz are reported to 
display  some  "marginal  epistemic  colouring".  A  stronger  epistemic  coloring  is 
apparently only to be encountered amid impersonal constructions. The hint is helpful as 
a categorization, but does not answer the questions raised above. 
Visser (1969) sheds some light onto the issues by attempting to explain etymological 
links, sometimes traced back up to Indo-European. Take the two opposing meanings of 
motarz  for example. Two possibilities  are considered. The first one is that  motan of 
obligation developed out of the homonym expressing permission. The alternative story 
for the genesis of the discrepancy, and also the one preferred by Visser (pp.1791, 1797) 
is that both the permission and the obligation reading evolved from an  original "med- 
(related to  Gothic gamut) and meaning  so~nething  like  to have it measured  out for 
oneself;  to ,find  room.  However,  theoretical  backup  from  modal  logic,  and  more 
importantly, synchronic evidence from ModE show that such seemingly contradictory 
overlaps as the first possibility presented by Visser are by all means possible in  natural 
language. For instance may not and must not can still be truth-functionally equivalent in 
ModE. Furthermore, and in relation to the first co-incidence, negation of alethic must in 
ModE is taken over by cannot although can is otherwise less common as an alethic. If  it 
seems difficult to reconstruct the exact relationship between the two readings of motan 
at different stages of the language, then  it is  noteworthy that the two meanings share a 
deontic character, and we can only expect worse from the rise of epistemic readings out 
of the deontic ones. 
Traugott (1989) treats the issue of  metaphorical extension as a potential generator of 
new meaning among the modals. She does not rule such extensions out when it comes 
to the transition of one root reading to another. For instance sculan in its original form 
of  owe+DP  (e.g. debts) may have spread out metaphorically to mean owe+DPIVP (e.g. 
certain behavior). But a theory of  change from the concrete to the abstract as claimed 
for instance cross-linguistically for verbs of  perception  (a standard example being see) 
is rebuked in  the case of  the transition  from root  to epistemic modals. This rejection 
appears to be consistent with  a stronger categorial difference in the syntax of root and 
epistemic modals, respectively -  as proposed by Drubig 2001. Traugott, however, only 
mentions  a process of  "pragmatic  strengthening".  She claims a conventionalization  of 
.3  The two  starred  infinitives  arc not  attested.  Henceforth  I will  use  them  as simple props when  not 
rcrerring to any particular form in the paradigm of any of these verhs. 
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implicature,  but  the evidence presented  is  rather  scarce  and  a  clear  picture  of  how 
pragmatic strengthening might work does not arise. 
2.2.  Arguing for PrP: the syntactic and semantic shifts of the EM 
Both  Roberts  (1993)  and  Roberts  and  Roussou  (1999)  notice  that  the  different 
approaches to the diachronic development of the modals need not be at conflict as much 
as  it  seems - the  null-hypothesis  they entertain  is that  only  the focus of  research  is 
varied. Before proceeding with a closer scrutiny of this hypothesis let us review some of 
the facts. Leaving aside the issues regarding the speed of  the change and any alleged 
causality of the change, we get a visible change of grammatical status for the modals at 
the latest in  the post-Elizabethan  age (Roberts  1999: 1023 dates  it to the  1520s). The 
most conspicuous indications are given in (9). 
(9)  Changes in the modal system of English (16'~  century) 
a.  at the level  of  1-syntax: loss of  argument structure or rather loss of the 
ability  to  take  any  objects  (this  seems  to  a  facilitating,  sufficient 
condition, cf.  van  Kemenade's  1999 overview  on  the  topic,  although 
Roberts 1993 stresses its necessity). 
b.  morphological  make-up:  the  EM  had  previously  been  part  of  the 
preterite-present verb class, a morphologically distinct status, which they 
originally  shared  with  other  verbs.  The  inflectional  poverty  was 
exacerbated with loss of  2""  p. sg. (infinitives had always been rare, and 
the textual evidence even more rare; cf. OED, Visser 1969, and fn. 3) 
c.  behavior  with  respect  to  s-syntax:  most  prominent  syntactic  feature: 
alongside  have  and he, the modals  remain  unique  movables  into T  in 
ModE  after  the  1660s. Pollock's  (1989) tests  with  respect  to question 
formation, negation, and adverbs hold. 
The cataclysmic theory, which roughly states that all relevant morpho-syntactic changes 
occurred  at one point, is due mainly to Lightfoot (1979). Let  us now  briefly  review, 
what the gradual  version of grammaticalization theory says. Goosens (1 987) argues for 
instance  for  a  grammaticalization  scale  parallel  to  a  desemanticalization  process. 
Whereas Traugott, following Coates (1983), takes polysemy to be structured in terms of 
fuzzy, but distinct sets -  such as, say, the deontic and the epistemic -  Goosens favors a 
theory of  continuous transition through tlme from one meaning to another as in  (IOa) 
and (lob). 
(10)  a.  Grammaticalization Scale (Goosens 1987:  1 18) 
Full Predicates > Predicate Formation > Predicate Operators 
b.  Desemanticalization Scale (Goosens 1987: 1 18) 
Facultative > Deontic > Epistemic > Futurity, Conditionality, etc 
Full predicates are reported to be verbs with thematic structure of their own, i.e. which 
do not need an infinitive as an intermediate construction to take a DP complement. An 
example  would  be  cunnan  in  (6)  above.  Deontics  are also  included  into  this  class. 
Predicate  operators  are  defined  as  verbal  forms  lacking  an  independent  thematic 
structure and used  for functional  purposes,  i.e. possessing  a temporal  or conditio~lal character. Should, will, and would in  ModE would be typical examples. Such a binary 
distinction would correspond to a wide-spread taxonomy of main vs. auxiliary verbs, or 
more generally,  to  one distinguishing  functional  vs. lexical  categories.  The question, 
however,  arises  whether  there  was  an  intermediate  stage of  predicate  formation  and 
which verbs it contained. Goosens (1987) defines the items belonging at some point to 
such a putative group as a class containing verbs  which do not assign argument roles 
and takes epistemics to be a prototypical member. This choice is not too fortunate, as 
the investigator  himself  recognizes. Goosens seems to be on the right  track  here, but 
there is one important amendment to be made. I will argue that a predicational phrase 
PrP in  its  own  right  and  extant  at  all  stages of  the  language is the  least  stipulatory 
solution for the diachronic development and for synchronic variation. 
Even if continuity as proposed by Goosens is probably not be the ultimate answer to 
the  transitions  in  the  modal  system,  the  idea  of  incremental  loss  of  meaning 
accompanied by  an  increasingly  outstanding  grammatical  status  has  more  than  just 
intuitive appeal and it will be specified less idiosyncratically and with more explanatory 
potential in  due course. The idea of  rapid reanalysis  A la Lightfoot (1979), elegant as it 
may  be,  also  has  a  number  of  critical  points.  First  and  foremost,  there  is  a  hard 
theoretical  problem. Given that within this scenario we would account for reananlysis 
within the range of one generation, the following question comes to mind: Is a learner's 
internal  grammar  sufficient  to  account  for  historic  change?  If,  in  accordance  with 
standard  assumptions  about  UG,  children  are  always  able  to  recover  the  parents' 
grammar from their  output, which is occasionally defective and never complete, then 
we should not get syntactic diachronic change at  Second, despite the obvious fact 
that the EM system has restructured in a number of ways (magan is generally expressed 
by  modern can, cunnan by  modern  know; arise of  epistemics), such basic  notions as 
volition, obligation  (and margillally  epistemicity in  magun, sculan, beon, and willm, 
according to Traugott 1992) are expressed within the system from OE through ~od~.' 
Granted the various shifts of the modal class from within, how are we to account for the 
overall still class-internal transmission of these basic semantic notions? A third problem 
is the need for an explanation of  the semantic conditions on grammaticalization. It is 
standardly  assumed  that  grammaticalization  of  lexemes  goes  hand  in  hand  with 
bleaching  (see  van  Kemenade  1999). Is  then  bleaching just  an  unstructured  loss  of 
meaning  formed  around  phonological  material?  If  not,  what  is  then  the  common 
semantic skeleton around which so-called bleaching occurs? One argument of this paper 
is that Pr is precisely in charge of this skeleton from the point of  view of  interpretable 
features. Fourth, the lexical roots of  the core modals have remained generally the same: 
the examples (3) through (7) display just  a very restricted sample. If  the verbal nuclei 
' The case ol  creolcs and  language contact is  trivially different  since children  reconstruct the closest 
possihle  approximation  of  a  grammar  if  the  output  they  get  is  non-consistent.  Some problematic 
aspects of thc i-eanalysis  approach arc also reviewed in Kroch (2001). 
KPIOW  is one of the few exceptions, where a meaning previosly expressed within the system has been 
puslied out of it. In fi~ct,  thcre is an i~iteresling  developlncnt ofkrrnw in the immeditr post-Elizabethan 
pcriod notcd in  Gel-gel (2000). Although llistorically not belonging to the prleritc-present class, much 
less heing a premodal in the sense of Lightfoot (1979). know may have been  "wrongly mapped"  into 
the class of vcrbs still undergoing verb movement (i. e, in good company of  the modals) at a time 
whcn do-support was already the overwhelming rule and not the exception (cf. Ellegal-d 1953, Roherts 
1991). An amazing exemplification of  this fact can be found in the diary of Samuel Pepys. In Gergel 
(2000) the explanation goes as follows: Being semantically a verb expressing modality (both dynamic 
and cvidcntial, depending on context) the verb know has initially also been  tricked  into joining the 
same syntax as the other, "cstablished" modals. From Simple Predicators to Clausal Functors 
are the same, then  we might wonder  whether  a cataclysmic reanalysis  from a purely 
lexical status (V) to a fully functional head position (T) might have occurred overnight. 
A final problem is the following: Admitted the morphological change of the modals (e. 
g loss of 2"* sg. ending at the beginning of the l6Ih century, cf. Arnold 1995: 69, loss of 
gerunds and  infinitives) once we look closer  in any pre-theoretical  syntactic terms, it 
turns out that in many cases (we are glossing over double modals here) it were more the 
other verbs' co-occurrence properties changing (e.g, no verb movement after the 1660s) 
than  those of  the modals  (e.g. appearance in  subject-verb inversions both  before  and 
after Shakespeare). 
In  addition, Warner  (1992)  argues  for a  special  auxiliary-wordclass  status  of  the 
modals as early as OE based on impersonal constructions and ellipses. This evidence, 
drawing on various additional corpora as well, poses  a problem for what we may call 
the classical V-to-I reanalysis theory as it stands. An overall dyadic shape of modality - 
whether in T or in V-  may contribute to our understanding of the continuity in terms of 
syntactic auxiliaryhood. Moreover, the fact that the modals could engage into licensing 
verbal  ellipses just  as  in  modern  usage  (see Warner's  discussion  for  viable  criteria 
distinguishing genuine ellipses from cases of argument reduction) forces us  to posit a 
functional head position  above the omitted verb phrase, but also below negation. That 
is,  sentences  like  (7) are  direct  evidence  for  a  structure  as  [TP[NegP[PrP[(VP)]]]], 
where the modal can license the omitted VP from the head position within PrP. 
In  sum, if  we want to depart from the behaviorist null-hypothesis and entertain the 
admittedly more interesting UG-view of perfect language acquisition, then we should be 
able to come up with  a more refined account of  modality in  our particular case. The 
interesting  alternative  hypothesis  we  want  to pursue  is  furthermore also notoriously 
known  to hold  true  in the general  case:  Syntax is significantly more change-resistant 
than the other language modules. 
Motivated by  the historical  issues mentioned  above, we  also obtain  the following 
more general questions : 
(i) Is  a  discrete  notion  of  syntactic category  tenable for the English  modalsl for 
~nodals  and modality in  general given  the variation  of  syntactic height  as observed by 
reanalysis  advocates?  From  a  GB  model  of  language,  an  affirmative  answer  seems 
desirable. From a minimalist computational perspective, even inore so. 
(ii) Assuming there is such a discrete category, what is its representation? Moreover 
where is it situated within the clausal domain? Is it to be assumed around V as in OE or 
rather in T as in ModE? 
(iii) How does syntactic representation correlate with semantic interpretation? How 
come both OEfME and ModE modals -  although in syntactic terms generally different - 
map onto the same modal semantic structure at LF? 
(iv) A  further question pertaining to the modals is their relationship to predication 
processes  (i.e.  saturation  of  properties  as in  Chierchia  1985 inter alia).  Are  the  EM 
predicates in any sense'?  Or are they -  at least partly -outside  the propositional domain? 
(McDowell 1987 and Drubig 2001 claim T-status for deontics and a C-related position 
for epistemics.) 
By  concluding from the evidence adduced in  this  section that  Pr is present in the 
clause, we can disentangle the problem of  where the modality features are located and 
where they must be checked from the issue of  different modal base-generating sites at 
different  stages of  the language. Both in  pre-modern  and  in  present  usage of English, 
the  interpretable  tense  and modality  features  are  checked  in  the predicational  node. 
Thereby  the  issues  raised  above  would  be  solved  in  a  straightforward  way.  The representation of  modality is on this view indeed discrete, its interpretation is regulated 
via the interpretable (hence non-deletable) features in  Pr, and modality and predication 
work in quite similar ways. The checking processes will be explained in more detail in 
4.1  and  4.2. What remains to  be  done is in  fact an  account for the precise types of 
features involved in the predication of modality. 
3.  A characterization of the EM in terms of semantics and syntax 
3.1.  A sample semantic basis for the modals (Mc Dowell 1987) 
One of  the  main  claims of  the present  investigation  is  that  modal  predicates  have  a 
dyad~c  nature  with  essent~ally  two  feature  specifications.  Positing  binary  feature 
specifications for the English modals means that this duality corresponds to their actual 
distribution.  I  will  base  my  argument  on  McDowell  (1987),  a  study  which  shows 
precisely  such a distribution based on an item-by-item inspection conducted for most of 
the EM. Let us see how her methods work for must, a representative which turns out to 
display a deonticlepistemic ambiguity in  sentences as (1 la) with the two paraphrased 
readings (I lb) and (I lc). 
(I I)  a.  John must be a Democrat 
b.  (Necessarily) John is a Democrat 
c.  John is forced/commanded/obliged to be a Democrat 
Negation takes wide scope in both readings, as it can easily be checked. Regardless of 
the correlation existing between  the various readings of other modals and the scope of 
negation,  this  single  counterexample  shows  that  testing  for  scope  cannot  generally 
disambiguate  the  readings.  The  essence  of  the  tests  for  ambiguity  used  instead  is 
rendered in (12) and (13). 
(1 2)  For p and q to be ambiguous, p~q  has to be grammatical and non-redundant. 
(1 3)  For p and q to be ambiguous, pn~q  has to be true (i.e. not a contradiction). 
To  illustrate  this  consider  substituting the  afore-mentioned  sentence  (I l b)  by  p and 
(1 lc) by q. Then the two tests give a positive answer concerning ambiguity. It is worth 
bearing in mind that (I lb) and (I lc) share the same core proposition  (cp) John be a 
Democrat. If the first reading of (I la), i.e. the epistemic one, quasi-asserts the cp, what 
does the second, deontic one do to  it? Since we do not have any other options in the 
framework proposed  by  McDowell, we  would (theoretically) expect (I lb) to quasi or 
fully  assert  it - these  being  the  two  main  illocutionary  acts  used  in  her  study. 
Practically,  it  is self-evident that neither  is the case. McDowell  argues that  it  (fully) 
asserts a proposition  as (14),  i.e. an entirely new proposition, obtained from the same 
core, and therefore related, but not identical to the original. 
(14)  There exists althe command [ that ..(cp)..]. 
Following the line of  research  along the concepts of  assertion  and quasi-assertions  in 
more detail, one gets a useful machinery to distinguish between epistemics and deontics 
pragmatically, but a common denominator for modality in general is not to be expected. 
Such  a  generalization  can  instead  be  given - with  a few  caveats - via Lewis'  well From Simple Predicators lo Clausal Functors 
known model of  possible worlds. The following overview is adapted from McDowell 
(1987: 195) and shall only be used as a fix point to illustrate a number of general facts 
about the EM. 
(15)  Worlds and quantifiers for the English nlodals 
"inevitable"  V 
will 
can 
should 
There are two conspicuous entries we might miss from this table. McDowell posits the 
non-existence of  English duals in the case of  cun and should as quantifiers over K and 
N, respectively.  The universal  counterpart  in  the  case of  compatibility  is speculated 
upon  along  the  lines  of  a  predicate  as  incwituble. Certainly,  most  readings  of  must 
occurring in English do not convey this meaning as it becomes clear from the foregoing 
discussion  - i.e.  they  are  epistemic  or,  in  its  root  meaning,  subjective  deontic. 
Nonetheless, it appears that alethic must comes very close to it. 
Inserting the universal quantifier to check this reading -  in McDowell's framework - 
we obtain: For the set K of compatible worlds the triple (s, p, K) is true iff for all w E 
K, w E p. So the theory of  quantification sustains such a claim too. As for the dual of 
should, sentences as in (16) may come to mind. 
i 
must 
may 
(16)  a.  After such an accident, exchanging phone numbers is the least you could 
do. 
b.  After  the accident last night, giving me her phone number would have 
been the least she could have done.6 
F (future) 
3 
3 
The  normative  character  paralleling  should  is  intuitively  clear,  and  could  easily  be 
double-checked logically. There are two possible reasons why this duality may not have 
been considered. Could is not included into the main classification in  McDowell, but is 
rather derived  via its affinity to can. However, with all due attention paid to the still 
existing correlation  between  the two related  forms, it seems that could has earned  its 
autonomous status among the English modals in  numerous  contexts.'  The fact that  it 
patterns dually with should in cases as above, may in fact lead us into including it. 
W* (epistemcj 
‘d 
3 
6  The only reason 1 am considering a pseudo-cleft structure with a preposed circumstantial PP is that it 
secms to convey the normative meaning in a marc straightforward ,  i.e. non-ambiguous way.  Except 
for the fact that one would have to disambiguate again, there is no other reason against any other non- 
clef1 pattern.  '  For  instancc in  (I ha) we  may substitute  can for corrld, and there is no resulting temporal shift. The 
reason why 1 suggested c<,ulrl instead ol'cun as a completion 111 .shoulrl in McDowell's model is that 
in (I6h) the same substitution makes the sentence ungra~nmatical.  One could ol  course argue for cun 
as the real countel.pal-t in  normative contexts hy claiming roulrl in  (Ihh) as its inflectional form. At 
any rate the issue would  have to be investigated morc thoroughly than can he done here. The point 1 
am rnaking ahout the prescnce of an existential normative modal in English would he valid in either of 
the two cases. 
K (compatibility)  N (normative) 
V 
C (commands) 
V 
3 
bf A  more  serious  objection  would  be  that  the  two  examples  (16a), (16b)  should be 
pragmatically  derived  from  the  fairly  broad  sense  of  operator  of  compatibility  of 
cun/could.  In  fact,  even  though  this  objection  is justified,  it  may  even  be  slightly 
misplaced as such, since it 
can be raised to a more general criticism of the model of possible worlds -  at least in the 
present  version. Compatibility (K) may be too general  as a term,  so that  almost  any 
other possible worlds would also fall under its domain, i.e. not only the normative (N) 
as represented  by  could and should, but  also F, and possibly also C and W".  On the 
other  hand,  if  we  accept  the  division  into  worlds  as  done  by  McDowell,  then  a 
completion of (15) as noted above holds. Moreover, the classification is not extensive 
either. To name just one possible gap consider the well-known quantificational readings 
of  some modals. 
(17)  Cocktail parties can be boring 
(17) is mentioned and quickly done away with in  McDowell as a "sporadic aspectual" 
(p.142).  This misses  the point that  such a reading would have to  be considered in  a 
quantificational approach before any other since it represents quantification per se, i.e. 
without  an  apparent  additional  restriction  besides  the  explicit  one where  the  set of 
cocktail parties is the restrictor. An LF equivalent would be (I  8). 
(18)  Some cocktail parties are boring. 
(19)  Generally,  a spouse will  have a car. That way you  will  have two cars in  the 
Family.  (fi-om an AFN radio-show on " Reasons lo get married") 
Now consider (19), where will seems to complement the quantificational reading of can. 
Here, the intended meaning  is not existential as in  (18). Furthermore  it  is neither  the 
common future interpretation nor a "bare"  quantificational interpretation as paraphrased 
in  (20a) and (20b) respectively. 
(20)  a.  At some interval in the future, the event [a spouse have a car] holds. 
b.  Every spouse has a car. 
If  the  presence  of  will  in  (19)  is  to  fit  a  quantificational  schema for  modals,  and 
particularly to take over as the universal quantifier where can works as the existential in 
(17), then  we  need  an  additional  restriction. This restriction  is indeed present  in  the 
sentence as an adverb, namely gener~ll~.~  The prediction that under the consideration of 
this restriction, will operates as V is borne out in (21) which correctly paraphrases (19). 
(2  1)  In the general case, every spouse has a car. 
Can also fits this slightly restricted scheme, and is at any rate the weaker form of  the 
two modals. Thus one may  consider  will  and cun as duals in  a traditional sense and 
thereby extend the table (I 5) by one column with the heading, say, G for generic modal 
quantification. 
"CF.  Cinque  (1999)  fix  thc  exact  synractic  relationship  betwecn  adverbs  and  functional  heads  as 
carriers of modality  in  the sentence: specifier-head. 
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Having filled a gap in McDowell's model both within its own categories -  with could as 
dual for should in normative readings -  and by extending it by one additional category, 
we may  still be far away from an  extensive classification of  the modals. Besides, the 
absence of mutual exclusiveness has also been  mentioned.%onetheless,  the semantic 
contribution made by classifications of this kind, and also the methods applied deserve 
to  be  kept  in  mind  for their  strong general  character. The  main  result  is the  binary 
modeling schema for the EM. 
There are  also serious linguistic  and  psycholinguistic  factors  which  show  that  an 
opposed-features concept  (binarity)  is  close to  the empirical  facts  of  naturalness  in 
human language."  I remain neutral with respect to such general claims, the crucial point 
for the scope of  this paper being the striking binary nature of  the EM, which shall be 
translated  with  the  notions of  central and non-central  coincidence. The way  this two 
dual  notions  are presently  understood  in  the  literature  (Hale  1985, Demirdache  and 
Uribe-Etxebarria  2000)  makes  them  more  appropriate  as  tools  than  a  strict 
quantificational approach to the modals. In section 4 we will take up this idea again and 
claim it to be a close approximation on the conditions reigning at the syntax-semantics 
interfacial processing of modality. 
3.2.  Additional semantics with respect to diachrony: 
a visibility parameter 
Bybee, Perkins  and  Pagliuca  (1994:176)  propose  that  we  should give up finding the 
right  semantic definition  for modality  within  synchronic frameworks altogether.  The 
alternative  argued for is that  "mood  is best  viewed  as  a set of  diachronically related 
functions, and ... a real  understanding of  modality would emerge from a study of  these 
diachronic relations". 
This  strong claim  about  the role  of  change in  language for the understanding  of 
modality  shall  not  be  represented  here.  More  than  anything  else,  modality  is  a 
synchronically present phenomenon affecting both the truth values of the utterances it is 
involved in and the syntactic structure (merging into the T-node) in ModE and probably 
in  more ways  than  we can find out at all stages of  the language. However, there is a 
practical point to be made here, without any claim about its being a definition. We may 
call it diuchronic visibility,  and maintain it simply as an observation and working tool. 
(22)  The diachronic visibility function 
The  predicational  relations  instantiated  by  the  EM  are  a  function  of  their 
diachronic development, which can be evaluated at all synchronic stages. 
3.3.  A minimalist glimpse at EM syntax 
Following  Lightfoot  (1979),  Roberts  (1993,  and  previous  research),  Roberts  and 
Roussou  (1999)  recast  the  lexical-to-functional  reanalysis  theory  for  the  n~odals  in 
minimalist  terms. The crucial syntactic point  is, however. still the same as in  Roberts 
"  For  a more thorough  discussion of  the possible-worlds  approach,  accessibility, and  also of related 
problems cf Lewis (I 986). 
''  Cf. JackendoR (1990) for a more skeptical view concerning binary modelling, at least with respect to 
certain conceptual structures which according to him seem to he harder to classify in hinary terms, but 
sce Dressler 2000 for a recent  oveview on naturalness  and  the claim that hinary  structures underly 
language conceptualization. (1993): due to their zero-inflection and to the loss of the infinitive they were taking as a 
complenient, the modals reanalyzed from V to T. In  fact Roberts (1993) already has a 
strong minimal-effort  motivation - in  terms of  traces  saved by  such an  analysis. The 
facilitating factors considered are: the morphological loss of  the subjunctive, the opacity 
of  tense, especially on epistemic modals (cf. might in ModE), and as we have already 
seen, the  loss  of  thematic  argument  structure. The bottom  line of  the  new  economy 
considerations is that merge is the preferred  operation over move: Whereas in  OEIME 
the strong feature of T in  English was satisfied by  movement, in  ModE it came to be 
satisfied by merger of  one of  the brand-new reanalyzed  items belonging to the modal 
class. The criticism raised in 2.2 above still holds. Even though the syntactic reanalysis 
is undeniable, there are many issues relating to continuity within this theory which ask 
for an explanation. 
4.  The primitive elements of modality 
4.1.  Central vs. non-central coincidence in modal metric 
In  this  section the binary  semantic classification of  the EM (section 3.1 .) and the dia- 
chronic reanalysis (2.2. and 3.3.) are claimed to correlate with a syntactic representation 
of   nodality  as  abstract  predication  in  terms  of  features  of  central  and  non-central 
coincidence. The diachronic visibility function is be taken as corroborative evidence. 
The answer to the questions about the EM raised in  section 2 can be completed by 
considering a  decomposition  into primitive  elements of  modal  semantics and  syntax. 
This can be done in a manner related to current analyses of  tense and aspect (e.g. as 
exposed in  Stowell  1996, Demirdache and Uribe-Etxebarria  2000),  by  means  of  two 
adposition-like abstract dyadic predicates.  The crucial difference will be to understand 
the non-linearity  of  modality and hence the different meaning of  the otherwise similar 
predicates of central and non-central  coincidence. More precisely, I will argue that the 
primitives of modality are modeled by human language close to AFTER  and W~HIN,  but 
that this two prepositions are to be understood with respect to a modal metric This is the 
main problem with many accounts trying to bring modality onto the same denominator 
with tense: more often than not, they get the right structural  similarity, but neglect the 
different  semantic  metric  which  underlies  tense  and modality,  respectively  (Patridou 
2000, Gergel 2000). 
Different  kinds  of  spatio-temporal  relationship  have  often  been  invoked  in  the 
literature. It should be noted, however, that even for the simple translation from time to 
space (i.e. without even dealing with possible worlds or any other approach to modality 
yet)  the  analogy  fails  unless  space  is  seen  as  on  an  one-dimensional  line,  which 
corresponds to  Hale's (1985) "trajectory."  There is for instance no general metric for 
establishing which of two pairs of two-dimensional co-ordinates is the bigger and which 
one the smaller one -  the real numbers are an ordered set, the complex ones are not, as 
math will have it. With time, however, since it is an ordered one-dimensional set, AFTER 
and WITHIN  make sense, in  fact, even more straightforwardly than with locations -  i.e. 
where the analogy has originally been taken from -  where we have the one-dimension 
restriction as above. 
In  order  to  illustrate  the  distinction  with  respect  to  syntactic  representation  and 
semantic interpretation, let us assume three co-ordinates of meaning for any given truth- 
functional  calculus.  So we  shall  consider  triples  <s,  w,  t>,  where  s  stands  for  the 
speaker, w for the world, and t  is the time the proposition is to be evaluated at. While From Simple Predicators to Clausal Functors 
the variable t seems to behave linearly in our conceptualization of language, w does not, 
so we need  a different  feature for modality. Building  on  the possibility of  modeling 
most modals as duals of some other modal, I argue that the computational system CHL 
only  has  to  read  off  the lexical  entry  which  feature  should  be  fed  into  the Pr-node 
(central or non-central  coincidence). This can  be  done from different  locations in the 
syntactic phrase marker as the diachronic visibility function reassures us. The following 
representation sums up the main ideas. 
One is tempted to introduce the constraints Predicate Tense and Predicate Modality as a 
generalization  independent  of  the  diachronic  development  of  the  language.  Its 
fulfillment is, however, parametrically different for present usage and pre-Elizabethan 
registers. 
(23)  The modals of English -General  syntactic schema 
6odE  modals arc merged  here  in> 
4.2.  Two scenarios for expressing modality in English 
Trnax 
4.2.1.  A modal enters the numeration in ModE 
the  derivation  and  check  the  two 
features  in  the  Pr-projection  by 
In  minimalist vocabulary, we might say that an  item modal (may, must, etc.) will be 
base-generated in T (following the insight from Roberts  1993), and it will eventually be 
mapped  to LF in  the conglomerate of  the final syntactic object with  a feature matrix 
containing similarly designed, but distinct, entries for tense and modality. I take central 
coincidence as the  non-marked  value  both  for tense and for modality. For tense, this 
means  that  PRESENT  yields  the  unmarked  ("minus")  interpretation  for TENSE,  while 
necessity (NEC) yields the unmarked interpretation for modality. This double prediction 
is indeed borne out  in natural language. On the one hand, not only do we not have a 
present operator in  intensional logic, but present tense is morphologically unmarked in 
English, and also tends to go unmarked  in many other languages.  On the other hand 
propositions  which  are  necessarily  true  are  also left  unmarked  in  English  and  other 
languages.  The clearest case of  this phenomenon  is  represented  by  alethic modality, 
TopT ,----I 
merger  of  their  own  TIM  features 
TopW 
----I 
Spec Pr  Pr'  merged  here  and  check 
[lie  relevant  Pr-features 
by  feature  movement  of 
their  lexical  TM entries 
to the Pr-node 
Predicate Tense!  SpecV  V' 
Predicate Modality! 
T=+/- (non-centnor ce~ztr  co-inc)  AstW 
M=+/-  (non-centr.or centr co-incj which  for instance in  the reading of  "&-necessity."  can  optionally be  left out or 
inserted. Thus two plus  two must equal four  is truth-functionally equivalent to two plus 
two -  equuls four.  The modal entry in  the feature matrix of  modul will be otherwise 
free to be epistemic, deontic, and what not, depending on the finer specification of the 
predicational head. In  standard dialects of English it will be, however, unique. This is a 
clearly syntactic, not a semantic constraint (uniqueness of the T position). 
4.2.2.  A "modal" verb entering an English derivation long time ago (in OEME) 
The same specifications with  respect to markedness hold. Take central-coincidence  as 
unmarked. Just as in  the previous case, it will  have different meaning at LF for tense 
and modality, but it will go through the syntactical machinery, Chomsky's (1995) CHL, 
in  the  same guise.  As  a  dyadic  predicational  structure. With  respect  to  modality  it 
relates the topic w-variable to the assertion w-variable. Stowell (1996) proposes a very 
similar procedure  for tense  as  a  (cross-linguistic) abstract predicate. The predication 
process itself is the same as in  modern times, Pr being in charge. We can predicate tense 
and  modalities  via  merger  with  Pr - once the  full  VP merges  with  the  Pr-head  the 
relevant features will be checked and will not be deleted since they are all interpretable 
at the interface to LF. The parametric difference is accounted for in syntactic terms: The 
base-generating host of modul is different on the two scenarios. However, it can get into 
a  checking  relationship  with  Pr  in  both  cases.  Also  parametrically  different  is  the 
following fact: We do not get the uniqueness constraint in  this scenario on modal items, 
since the premodals now come from VP and interact with PrP "from below" -  while T 
was unique per clause above, V is not, i.e. multiple premodal  strings are predicted, and 
there are such cases attested (see sentence 3 for one). 
We may  now  see for a moment  whether central  and non-central  co-incidence  can 
also be  made sense of  intuitively. As a diacritic, we can  take the unmarked value of 
central coincidence to have the approximate meaning of  WITHIN.  In the case of  tense, 
WJTHIN  means  that  the assertion time  is within the topic time. With aspect, which is, 
roughly  speaking, an  embedded tense, it means that  the assertion time  is within  the 
event  time,  in  which  case  we  get  the  progressive.  With  modality,  we  only  get  the 
structural parallelism of dyadic predicate if we are not oblivious with regard to the co- 
ordinate we are dealing with. Therefore, while the notion  of  topic time is now  fairly 
wide-spread in the literature (Klein  1994), there are good reasons to make a concept of 
topic world just as fashionable. Just as with time, it can be influenced by discourse or by 
an embedding context. It will simply be the external al-gurnent of our celebrated dyadic 
predicate."  For  an  embedded clause, it is controlled by  the event time of  the higher 
clause. In  the case of a matrix clause, is controlled by the set of worlds involved in the 
speech  act. This  too  follows closely  the  parallelism  to  tense  pointed  out  in  Stowell 
(1996). 
Furthermore, there are lexical indications for the realization of the abstract predicate 
of  coincidence  from  prepositional  phrases  in  intensional  adverbial  expressions  in  a 
number of languages.12 At this juncture, Cinque's (1999) correlation of  adverbials and 
I I  Stowell  (1990)  rnakcs  a  si~nilar  point  with  respect  to  time.  Stowell's terminology  makes  use  of 
"rclercnce Limc" for such a titlie which can he controlled either by discourse (default option) or by an 
embedding context. I refrain  from this term since it may causc confusion with Reichenbach's  (1947) 
refbrence point R -  fiom which it is radically different. 
" 1 makc use of  the term adverbial as a syntactic objecl following Mc Cawley (1995) -  where adverb 
w<)uld  be just the more restricted, morphological term. Frorn Simple Predicators Lo  Clausal Functors 
functional  projections  can  be  observed  to  work.  Adverbials  and  (modal) functional 
heads  are  in  in  a position  of  functors  semantically,  and  following  Cinque also in  a 
syntactic Spec-Head relation. For instance, in  English  we have an  (evidential) modal 
adverbial  such  as in  x's opinion, i.e. modeled  with  the closest lexical preposition  of 
central coincidence. On the other hand, in  the German x's Meinung nach (x's-opinion- 
ufier-)  evidentiality has been lexicalized as non-central coincidence. 
A further piece of  evidence for the dyadic nature of modal predicates can be adduced 
from the syntax of  quasi-modals. Among other researchers Harley (1995) stresses the 
prepositional  nature of  have. The foundation for this fact is both internal-syntactic and 
cross-linguistic, many  languages  (in  fact  the  majority)  lacking possessive  verbs  and 
replacing  them  by  prepositional  constructions  (here  we  may  take  the  dative  as 
prepositional too). However, it also turns out that numerous languages express different 
modalities by using something close to have (see for instance the overviews in Bybee et. 
al.  1994). As  a matter of  fact, one does not  have to  look  too  far for an  illustration. 
English  makes use of have to as  a quasi-modal, in  particular  as a supletive form for 
13  t~zust.  I take this to be further evidence for the dyadic (abstract) argument structure of 
modality. The role of  to may prove crucial, too, indeed. In  a number of  other English 
quasi-modals such as he to, this element is also available. Here the suggestion can be 
made that  to  enlarges the otherwise poorer  argument structure of he  in  English  (only 
one, internal, argument following Harley  1995) and makes it suitable for the syntactic 
configuration  of  modality,  i.e. it  makes  it  a dyadic relation  between  the  set of  topic 
worlds and that of the assertion worlds. 
Cross-linguistically, let us mention only one more celebrated case of preposition-like 
element becoming a marker of modality. Latin -  at different times -  is known to have 
had both the prepositional possessive (mihi est= "to me (there) is" = "I have")  and the 
verb habeo (="I  have").  It is worth  repeating that both  semantically and syntactically 
they  can  be  regarded  as parallel.  In  most Western  Romance dialects  habeo became 
grammaticalized  as  a  marker  of  futurity.  Interestingly, in  a  second  step the  futurity 
morpheme also came to express (epistemic) modality, e.g.  in  Spanish. Summing this 
story of indirect evidence up, a dyadic "have"  became a marker of dyadic modality via 
dyadic tense. 
4.3.  Tense and modality 
Keeping the different metrics in mind, we still get an ordering process according to two 
main  relationships  in  both  cases.  This  means  that  modality  and  tense  possess  very 
similarly engineered mechanisms in  grammar. If  true, this may be due to an economy- 
driven constraint. However, the principle of FI proves strong enough to require the entry 
for both categories, that is, in the proposal argued for here through the mediation of the 
predicating node. For instance, in  John may leave the modal feature is marked as non- 
central  coincidence  (recall  that  may  can  be  rendered  by  the  existential  3,  and  we 
translated this as non-central coincidence), while the tense feature is non-marked, alias 
PRESENT, alias central-coincidence. 
Just like with  tense, only one feature is obligatory per clause. If  there is a further, 
embedded tense in  a clause than this can be aspect. If  there is a second modality, then 
this  is non-alethic,  and  non-epistemic.  That  leaves us with the result  that tense is to 
"  Fnr  a detailed  semantic and  pragmatic  discussion of  the quasi-modals in  relationship to  the core- 
mndals, see Westney (1995). aspect what epistemic and alethic modality are to deontics and more generally to root 
modals,  a  rough  generalization  given  the differences  between  the two variables,  hut 
which holds at least in terms of embedding and necessity per clause. 
Given the non-linear relationship within modal systems as opposed to tense systems, 
we will not necessarily expect a full parallel to a con.recutio temporun? rule, which, in 
essence, is a morphological  linear back-shifting process to  a fake morphological past 
standing for a syntactic PRESENT (notation as in  Stowell  1996). Surprisingly enough, 
we do get a shift  with  respect to evidentiality in  the mood  system  of  German. After 
verbs  of  saying  Standard  German  requires  the  subjunctive  mood  (a  rather  rough 
translation  for  Konjunktiv).  By  using  the  structural  parallelism  above  saying  tense: 
aspect = epistemicPalethic: deontic, we can predict the restriction that only a subset of 
evidential  verbs  can  trigger  the  shift  to  the  subjunctive in  their  complement clause. 
Recall that in English it is the tense of the higher clause and not its aspect which triggers 
the  morphological  back-shift  rule. By  the  same token,  in  German  it  is  the  episteme 
fcature (or at least a subset thereof) which triggers  the Konjlmktiv, the shifted type of 
mood.'4 Once we rely on  Palmer's  (1986) views that mood  is a grammatical reflex of 
modality it becomes clear that we are dealing with morphologically shifted modality - 
so the phenomenon might be close to a consecutio rnodorum - where all the warnings 
afore-mentioned still hold that a consecutio is hard to make sense of for modality in the 
first place . 
5.  Conclusion 
The present account had the objective of shedding some light onto the history of the EM 
including  the  modern  stages  of  the  standard  dialects.  The  key-tools  have  been  two 
simple  devices:  First,  the  relational  nature  of  modality  and  the  existence  of  a 
predicational node at all recorded stages of English. Second, the prepositional nature of 
any modal node. In  particular, the Pr-head  has  been  supported by  semantic arguments 
starting off from the dual nature of  most modals in English in  section 3.1. By  viewing 
meaning  as  a function  with  a three-coordinate  domain  (s, t, w) and  with  an  eye on 
theories of  tense, I have investigated an adaptation of such theories from the second to 
the third variable pointing out to significant differences, but also to striking similarities, 
which  have given  support to a generalization of  Stowell's (1996) concept of  abstract 
predicates. Further evidence for the idea of the relational nature of modality consisted in 
applying Harley's (1 995) account of have to quasi-modals such as huve to. 
The hypothesis concerning the existence of the predicational projection  assumed the 
syntactic work reviewed in  Bowers (2001) complemented by four pillars of diachronic 
evidence. First, a uniform  syntactic form and  locus have been  given to the relational 
nature of  modality.  Second, Roberts'  (1993) reanalysis  theory  has been  taken up and 
refined  both  syntactically  and  with  respect  to  interface  interpretation  through  the 
predicational phrase. Third, some criticism of the Lightfootian  theory has equally been 
accommodated  and  systematized  (for  instance  Goosens'  1987  conjecture  about 
predicate  formation). Fourth,  data from Warner  (1992)  concerning  elliptical  VPs  as 
I4  Clearly there are radically  different types  of mood  and mood-selection, e.g. the English  mandative 
subjunctive,  or the  suh.iunctive  in  Spanish,  which  cannot  be dealt with  here. Whether they  pose  a 
problem for the prescnt account or whether the two systems can be modelled so that they ultimately 
converge, is for further research to find out. From Simple Predicators to Clausal Functors 
early as in OE have suggested the need for a syntactic licensing head position above the 
elided VP and also strictly below negation since the OE modals are generally preceded 
by negation. 
Moreover, a  framework for discussing both epistemic and deontic modality  in  the 
vein of the frameworks able to deal with grammatical aspect and tense at the same time 
has  been  put  forth  by  using  cross-categorial  features.  The  schema  proposed  here 
explains to a certain  extent different grammaticalizations of  modality,  since the older 
and more recent forms of English can be regarded as different parametric options for 
UG. Using the two main concepts proposed here, we may have an idea why modality 
and tense often ride on the same vehicles (cf. the samples in Bybee et. al. 1994, and for 
a  quick  check-up,  simply the  modals  in  English).  Related  to this,  we also have an 
account for why certain  lexemes often change from tense to modality and vice versa 
such as English  will, originally  a  volitional  marker of  root modality, today mostly a 
futurity and epistemicity marker. This is precisely supported by the related design of the 
two ~~ecifications.'~  Although not explored here, I suspect that the proposal  made here 
is able to handle counterfactuality, as a special combination of mood and tense, a view 
compatible with the approach advocated in Iatridou (2000).lh 
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The paper shows that in  various sluicing types, the wh-phrase in  the sluicing sentence 
as well  as its relatum in the antecedent clause must be F-marked, and  it explains this 
observation with Schwarzschild's (1999) and Merchant's (1999) focus theory. Accor- 
ding to the semantics of  the wh-phrase, it will argue that the relatum of the wh-phrase 
is  an  indefinite  expression  that  must  allow  a  specific  interpretation.  Following 
Heusinger (1997, 2000), specificity will  be  defined as an  anchoring relation between 
the discourse referent introduced by  the indefinite expression and  a discourse given 
item. Because specific indefinite expressions are always novel, contexts like the scope 
of  definite DPs, the scope of  thematic matrix predicates, and the scope of  downward- 
monotonic quantifiers which all exhibit non-novel indefinites do not allow sluicing. 
0.  Introduction 
Sluicing constructions present a lot of  interesting problems that are related to ellipsis, 
specificity,  and  sentence  types.  Thus, it  is  a worthwhile  topic  to show  the interface 
between syntax, semantics and pragmatics as well as to discuss the status of information 
structure within these three domains. 
Before we formulate the problems associated with sluicing constructions like (1) and 
try to handle them, let's first see what is meant by the notion of sluicing. 
(I)  Peter is reading, but I don't know what - 
A sluicing construction consists of two conjoined sentences with the first one being the 
untecedent  sentence  (AS)  and the  second one the sluicing  sentence  (SS). The latter 
consists of a matrix  clause (MC) and an  embedded wh-clause.  And what is characte- 
ristic for sluicing is that the wh-clause, we call it sluicing clause (SC), contains merely a 
wh-phrase. The antecedent sentence includes the antecedent clause  which renders the 
antecedents  for  the  deleted  material  in  the  sluicing  clause.  And,  in  most  cases,  it 
introduces the discourse referent the wh-phrase is related to. We will call the linguistic 
expression that  denotes  this  discourse  referent  relatum. The clause that  contains the 
relatum we label relaturn clause. Usually, but not always the antecedent and the relatum 
clauses coincide. Cases where the relatum of the wh-phrase is not contained in the sen- 
tence that immediately precedes the sluicing sentence are the following - cf. Merchant 
(1999): 
" 
A  revised  version  of  this  paper  will  appear  in Schwahe,  R. and  Winkler  (2002), (eds.), S.  The 
Inre$uces:  Derivhlx  und  l~tterpreting Omitted  Sm~cture.~,  John  Bcnjamins,  Amsterdam  and 
Philadelphia. 
I am grateful to Jason Merchant, Susanne Winkler, Klaus  von Heusinger, and John te Velde for initial 
discussions and  for comments on the various written versions. 
ZAS Pupers in Linguistics 24, 2001, 145.166 (2)  a.  There was a party yesterday. Do you know who was at this party'? 
BETH  was there, but I don't know who else. 
b.  Sheila has some cats and dogs. Do you  know how many dogs and cats 
she has? 
She has five CATS, but I don't know how many DOGS. 
Here, the antecedent sentences are non-exhaustive answers to  contextually given ques- 
tions that relate to a sentence that introduces the relatum of the wh-phrase in the sluicing 
clause. The stress on  the subject in  (2a) or on the object in  (2b) in  the sentence that 
precedes the sluicing clause indicates that there are alternatives given by the discourse. 
Sluicing clauses are mostly embedded in a matrix clause but can also occur alone: 
(3)  a.  A:  What is Hans doing? 
b.  B:  Hans is reading a book, 
c.  A:  Which one? 
Many authors who are concerned with  sluicing phenomena, for instance Chungkadu- 
sawIMcCloskey  (1995)  and  Romero  (2000),  have  observed  that  the  wh-Phrase  may 
escape islands in  a  sluicing  construction  -  cf.  (4a)  whereas  it  cannot  in the corres- 
ponding full fledged version - cf. (4b). 
(4)  a.  Sandy was trying to work out which students would be able to solve a 
certain problem, but  she wouldn't  tell  us  which one{ 
-1 
b.  "Sandy  was trying to work out which students would be able to solve a 
certain problem, but  she wouldn't  tell us which onei she was trying to 
work out [which students would be able to solve ti] 
That the wh-Phrase  seems to be channeled or sluiced through  syntactic islands within 
these constructions was the reason that such constructions were labeled as sluicing.  But, 
as  we  will  see  below,  there  is  no  need  to  assume  islands  with  respect  to  sluicing 
constructions and therefore it would be better to call these constructions wh-ellipsis. But 
let's be indulgent like we are when we use the term atom, which means indivisibility, to 
designate something that is divisible. 
The paper will show that and why the wh-phrase in the sluicing clause as well as its 
related constituent in  a preceding sentence must be focus-marked. Furthermore, it aims 
to determine the possible linguistic contexts for the relata of the wh-phrases. It  will turn 
out that such contexts must allow for a specific reading of  the relatum. The notion  of 
specificity will  be  based  on von  Heusinger's  (1997, 2000) theory of  indexed epsilon 
terms. 
As to the structure of the paper, we will give an overview of sluicing types and their 
syntactic and semantic properties in section one. In section two, we will explain the in- 
formation structural properties of sluicing constructions on the basis of Schwarzschild's 
(1999) and Merchant's (1999) focus theory. And finally in section three, we will turn to 
the context conditions for the relatum of the wh-phrase and its referential properties. Sluicing Phenomena 
1.  Syntactic and semantic properties of  sluicing constructions 
With sluicing constructions it is useful to distinguish between  constructions where the 
antecedent  sentence and  the  sluicing  sentence  are  conjoined asyndetically  and those 
where both  are conjoined by  a connective. Both  types  have  in common  that  the wh- 
phrase in  the sluicing  sentence  is  related  to  a relatum  that  is  implicitly  or explicitly 
expressed by a linguistic item in a preceding sentence or that is contained in  a propo- 
sition that can be derived from a preceding sentence. In most cases, the relatum as well 
as the antecedents for the deleted material in the sluicing clause are given by the ante- 
cedent sentence: 
(5)  a.  Hans is reading a  book (and) l would like to know which one. 
b.  Hans is reading. Guess what! 
c.  Hans is reading a book. Do you know which one? 
That the antecedents and the relatum are contained in a proposition that is derived from 
the preceding sentence show the following examples: 
(6)  a.  Go and buy a book (and) then tell me which one! 
b.  Go and buy a book (and) if you will have bought one, tell me which one! 
c.  #Go and buy a book (and) tell me which one! 
The  interpretation  succeeds  if  it  is  possible  to  derive  a  proposition  from  the  first 
imperative  This proposition  is  supposed  to be  true by  the  attitudinal  subject of  the 
sluicing  sentence.  That  the  anticipated  proposition  'the  addressee  buys  a  book'  is 
considered to be true in  some situation is expressed by  then in (6a) and by the condi- 
tional in (6b). The interpretation fails when both conjuncts are interpreted as being only 
a sequence of  imperatives as in (6c). The reason is that  it must be possible to derive a 
judgement  from  the  imperative  sentence  that  states that  the  addressee  has  bought  a 
book. This judgement  introduces  a relatum  that  is accessible for the wh-phrase.  The 
same holds if the antecedent sentence is a yeslno-interrogative like (7): 
(7)  a.  Did Peter buy a book and do you also know which one? 
b.  #Did Peter buy a book and do you know which one? 
In  (7a), the wh-phrase in the sluicing clause has access to the discourse referent intro- 
duced by  the indefinite expression in the antecedent sentence because ulso relates the 
sluicing sentence and thus the wh-phrase to the positive answer of the yeslno-question. 
In  (6b), on the other hand, the wh-phrase in  the sluicing sentence has hardly access to a 
discourse referent because a positive answer to the interrogative is not implicated. 
The only difference between asyndetic and syndetic sluicing constructions is that the 
former ones allow for the conjunction of  different sentence types (cf. (8)) whereas the 
latters allow only for the conjunction of identical sentence types. 
(8)  a.  Hans is reading a  book. I would like to know which one. 
b.  Hans is reading a book. Guess which! 
c.  Hans is reading a book. Do you know which one? 
d.  Hans is reading a book, but which one? That  syndetically conjoined  sluicing constructions  allow only  for the conjunction  of 
identical  sentence types is due to the categorial  properties  of  the conjunction, which 
coordinates  only  conjuncts of  the  same semantic  type.  This  connective may  be  the 
neutral  conjunction  and,  adversative  conjunctions  like  but  and  however  and  subor- 
dinating conjunctions like because and so  that. Depending on the structural properties 
of  the antecedent sentence and the sluicing sentence, sluicing constructions  may have 
different shapes. 
The antecedent and the sluicing sentence can be conjoined root clauses: 
(9)  a.  Hans reads a book, but 1  don't know which one 
b.  Hans reads a book and I even know which one. 
The antecedent sentence can be  subordinated whereas the sluicing sentence is a main 
clause. 
(10)  a.  They want to hire a linguist who should speak a Balkan language, but 
they don't tell us which.  Merchant (1999) 
b.  Peter  got  stressed because his boss  wants  a  list, but  he  doesn't tell  us 
which one.  Merchant (I 999) 
C.  Hans told us that Maria will come, but not when. 
We will see later that although the antecedent sentence is subordinated, it behaves asif it 
were a root clause, which means that it may function as a speech act by itself. 
The sluicing sentence can be subordinated as well, namely as an adverbial or relative 
clause in a complex sluicing sentence: 
(1 1)  a.  Paul saw that John killed a girl and because he knew which one, he didn't 
go to the police. 
b.  Peter has bought a car and I am sad because he didn't tell me which one. 
c.  Paul  will come tomorrow. The person  who knows  with whom will  get 
the prize. 
d.  Peter wants some money. If  he doesn't tell me what for I won't give it to 
him. 
Finally,  there  are  cases  where  both,  the  antecedent  and  the  sluicing  sentence  are 
conjoined  and subordinated: 
(1  2)  a.  Hans left after his mother had cooked something and he didn't want to 
tell us what. 
b.  Hans got stressed because his boss wanted a detailed list and didn't want 
to tell him how detailed.  Merchant (1999) 
c.  They hired  someone who  speaks a Balkan  language and doesn't tell us 
which. 
d.  If  someone meets a student of his class and does not tell us which one, he 
is impolite. 
e.  Paul told me that he had met a girl and had not known which one. 
Notice that the adversative connectives but and however are impossible if  the sluicing 
sentence is subordinated as in (I  I) and (12) and that in these cases the sluicing sentence Sluicing Phenomena 
can hardly be interpreted as an indirect wh-interrogative. That such sluicing sentences 
do not  allow  adversative  coordination  and  an  indirect  wh-interrogative  interpretation 
will  be explained  in section two once we know  more about the relation  between  the 
antecedent and the sluicing sentence. 
The  following  coordinative  sluicing  schemes  are  meant  to  summarize  the  short 
overview  on  sluicing types. Recall  that  'AC'  stands for the clause that  contains the 
antecedents  for  the  deleted  material  in  the  sluicing  clause  and  that  'SS'  labels  the 
sluicing sentence (matrix clause plus sluicing clause). 
(13)  i.  .  . 
AC  &SS  (9) 
11.  [AS  .... [AC]] & SS  (10) 
iii  AC & [[ SS ] ... ]  (1 1) 
iv.  [ ... [AC & SS] ...I  (12) 
These schemes tell us that the antecedent clause and the sluicing sentence need not be 
conjoined symmetrically in that each of them can be subordinated and that the sluicing 
sentence is always adjacent to the antecedent clause. 
1.1.  Properties of the sluicing sentence 
As already mentioned in the introduction, a sluicing sentence consists of a matrix and a 
sluicing clause and that there are cases like (3) where the sluicing clause is a simple 
interrogative sentence with a deleted IP. 
If  the complex sluicing sentence is a root clause, adversative conjunctions  are pos- 
sible. Due to  the semantics of these conjunctions, which always combine categories of 
the  same type,  as  well  as  to  the  fact  that  the  antecedent  sentence  has  declarative 
sentential force or must allow to derive a judgement, the sluicing sentence cannot be a 
wh-interrogative sentence and thus a direct question act. If  the sluicing sentence were an 
interrogative sentence, it should allow a wh-phrase in  SpecCP. This is not possible as 
we see in the following German example: 
(14)  *Hans sagte, dass er eine schone Frau kennengelernt hat. aber welche 
Hans  told  that  he  a beautiful  women  met  but  which one 
zogert er zu sagen (&ass er kennengelernt hat). 
hesitates he to say  (that he met) 
'Hans told us that he met a beautiful women, but which one he hesitates to say.' 
If we neglect the full-fledged version of (14), it seems to be well formed. But as we see 
in (14'), it is not the wh-phrase that is moved  to SpccCP, but the topicalized sluicing 
clause.' 
'  That  it  is the  sluicing  clause  that  is moved  to  SpecCP of  the  matrix  clause  was  also  shown by 
Merchant (1999: 55) who  goes back to  Ross  (1999). They  use this  observation to  argue  that  wh- 
clauses are CPs but not fiagmcnts. 
149 (14')  Hans sagte, dass er eine schone Frau kennengelernt hat, aber welche 
Hans told  that  he a  beautiful women met  but  which one 
(er kennengelernt hat), zijgert  er zu sagen. 
(he met)  hesitates he to say 
'Hans told us that he met a beautiful women, but which one (he met) he hesitates 
to say.' 
That the sluicing sentence has declarative sentence force is further supported by the fact 
that it can be negated andlor referred to by a sentential pronoun as in  (15): 
(15)  a.  A:  Hans told us that he has met a beautiful woman but he hesitated to 
say which one. 
b.  B:  This is not true since he did say which one. 
That the sluicing sentence does not allow the wh-phrase to be in its SpecCP, that it can 
be negated, and referred to by  a sentential pronoun makes  it clear that it is a declarative 
sentence  and  does  not  indicate  interrogative  sentence  force.  It  is,  however,  without 
doubt that it can perform an indirect interrogative speech act. 
As to the internal structure of the sluicing sentence, the matrix clause, as Ross (1969) 
already mentioned, allows for all and only predicates that s-select questions and c-select 
CPs. Adversative cases additionally need predicates that are adversative and/or must be 
within the scope of an adversative conjunction or particle: 
(1 6)  a.  Peter has bought a book, but I don't know which one. 
b.  Peter has bought a book and I ask you which one, 
c.  Peter has bought a book and I even know which one. 
d.  Peter has bought a book and he hesitates to say which one. 
The sluicing sentence can contain  conjoined sluicing clauses as in  (17), or it  embeds 
two wh-clauses with the first one supplying the antecedent for the sluicing clause -  cf. 
(1 8). 
(17)  A girl has got dirty a table-cloth and I want to know which girl and which table- 
cloth. 
(18)  a.  This report details WHAT IBM did and WHY 
b.  I know that Maria will come and also why. 
The following schemes summarize the internal structure of the sluicing sentence: 
The sluicing clause itself  consists  of  a whP or whPs in  SpecC and  a phonologically 
empty IP -  cf. (19i). We may state that every wh-phrase can function as a sluice. 
If  the relatum of  the wh-phrase of  the sluicing clause is in  the scope of an universal 
QP, the sluicing clause contains either an anaphorical expression or a QP that relates to Sluicing Phenomena 
this  QP as  indicated within  the brackets in (20a) and  (20b).~  Or it contains two wh- 
phrases as in (21). In both cases, a pair-list answer corresponds to the sluicing clause: 
(20)  a.  A:  Every boy was dancing with a girl last night, but 1  cannot tell you 
with which girl (they were dancing eachlevery boy was dancing). 
B:  Peter was dancing with Maria, Paul with Petra, ... 
b.  A:  If John has guests, he cooks, but I cannot tell you what (he always 
cooks on these occasionslif he has guests). 
B:  On Monday he makes pasta, on Tuesday paella, .... 
(21)  Every boy  was dancing with  a girl  last night,  but I cannot tell  you  which  boy 
with which girl. 
The same happens if there is an implicit relatum in the antecedent clause: 
(22)  Every boy was dancing last night,  but I won't  tell  you  with whom (they were 
dancing eachlevery boy was dancing). 
That the sluicing clause with a non-overt relatum may contain an  intervening operator 
phrase  as  the  whP  in  (21) or the  distributing  operators  like euch or mlwuys in  (20) 
contradicts Romero's (2000:  197) claim that an  operator of  any kind cannot intervene 
between the sluiced wh-phrase and its trace. We will come back to this in section 3.2.. 
Additionally,  it  is  not  true  that  implicit  indefinites  must  always  have  narrowest 
scope. There  are  cases where  also  implicit  indefinites  may have  wide  scope, as the 
following example shows: 
(23)  A:  Every child in the kindergarten is dancing, but I do not know with whom. 
B:  With Agnes, I believe. 
For all  examples handled  so far, we may  state that  the wh-phrase  as the  only  overt 
element of the sluicing clause is focus marked. 
As to the phonologically empty IP, all empty material in it must be given. This means 
that  we consider the IP  to  be  internally structured - cf. Merchant (1999, 2001)  and 
Schwabe (2000). The structure of  the  IP  resembles  the  structure  of  the  IP  in  the 
antecedent clause except for the focus marked elements. Unlike Chung et al. (1995) and 
Romero (2000) and like Merchant (1999), we regard the IP  of the sluicing clause to be 
the copy of only the antecedent clause, this means of the IP that immediately dominates 
the antecedents of the phonologically empty material  in the sluicing clause. In that the 
sluicing clause is not a copy of the whole first conjunct, there is no need to explain why 
wh-phrases may escape islands - cf. the discussion centring on example (3). 
1.2.  Properties of the antecedent sentence 
We already  know  from the previous  sections that  the antecedent sentence must have 
declarative sentence force or allow to derive a judgement.  Thus it supplies directly or 
2  The nnaphoriciil  expression they refers to a discourse referent that rcsulls from the semantic operation 
Abstraction. This operation applies to discourse referents in the scope of  an opcrator as every in (20) - 
cf. Kamp & Reyle (1993). Thus the  plural pronoun t/ze).  refers to the scl of objects that are boys and 
that were dancing. indirectly  the  relatum  for the  wh-phrase  and  the  antecedents  for the  phonologically 
empty material in the sluicing clause. 
We also know that the relatum may either be given explicitly as by an indefinite DP, 
(24)  Hans reads a book and  1  even know which one. 
and  it can be given  implicitly by  the unspecified  argument provided by  the argument 
structure of the verb: 
(25)  She is writing, but Ican't imagine wherelwhylwith whom. 
The semantics of verbs such as write provides argument variables and/or variables for 
modification that are not specified by the sentence meaning. As we will see in section 
three, these variables are similar to specific indefinite DPs in that the discourse referents 
they  introduce  are anchored  to  linguistically or contextually given  individuals.  In  all 
cases, the relatum for the wh-phrase must always be focus-marked. 
The form of  the  relatum  is determined  by  the  semantics of  the  wh-phrase  in  the 
sluicing clause. Thus who, what, where, when, why and in what way need an unspecified 
argument  or modifier  variable  as  relatum,  where&$ whichX  and whatX relate  to  an 
indefinite DP. 
There  are  certain  contexts that  prevent  the  wh-phrase  from  having  access  to  its 
potential  antecedent. Contexts of  this kind  are for instance the description of definite 
DPs (26) and (27), complements of thematic matrix predicates (28) and (29), the scope 
of  downward-monotonic quantifiers (30) and (3 I), and the dependency on non-specific 
indefinite DPs (32). 
(26)  a.  *They found the man yesterday who has murdered a women, but they 
won't tell us which one. 
*Yesterday, I bought the book about a politician, but I've forgotten about 
which one. 
(27)  Yesterday, I saw the boy who was reading, but I cannot say what, 
(28)  a.  *Ramon is glad that Sally was dancing with a boy, but Idon't remember 
with which one. 
b.  '"They regretted that they were talking to some girls, but I don't know to 
whom (they talked).  (Romero 2000) 
(29)  a.  "Ramon is glad that Sally was dancing, but I don't remember with 
whom. 
b.  "They regretted that they were reading, but I don't know what. 
(30)  a.  *They hired few people who spoke a lot of  languages -guess  how many! 
(Merchant 1999) 
b.  *Joan rarely read any book, but I don't know which one. 
c.  *They hired no people who spoke a lot of languages - guess how many! 
d.  "John  never makes any joke when he has guests, but 1 don't know which 
one Sluicing Phcnotncna 
e.  "John  rarely sings any song when he has guests, but I don't know which 
one. 
*Paul didn't want to read any book, but I don't know which one. 
(31)  a.  *Few kids ate, but I don't know what.  Romero (2000: 200) 
b.  "Joan rarely fed my fish, but I don't know with which product. 
c.  "They  met no people who were reading, but they did not tell us what. 
d.  *John never cooks himself when he has guests, but I don't know what. 
e.  "John rarely cooks himself when he has guests, but 1  don't know what. 
f  .  *Paul didn't want to read, but I don't know which book. 
(32)  They are looking for some linguist who has written a thesis, but they cannot tell 
you which one. 
That sluicing constructions are not felicitous if  there is a thematic matrix predicate or a 
downward-monotonic quantifier was  also observed by  Romero (2000). She attributes 
her observations to the above mentioned constraint that in  the sluicing clause of  ante- 
cedentless  sluicing, no operator can intervene between  the wh-phrase and the trace of 
this wh-phrase.  In  that  she investigates only antecedentless sluicing, she suggests that 
this a special  property of antecedentless sluicing. But as we can notice with respect to 
(26),  (28), and  (30),  also  antecedent  clauses  with  overt  relata  exhibit  this  context 
restriction. As already mentioned above, Romero's explanation of  this restriction cannot 
be maintained because there are operators that intervene between the wh-phrase and its 
trace - cf. (20) and (2  1). 
The observations made so far, that the relatum  as well as the wh-phrase must be fo- 
cus-marked, that the sentence that contains the relatum  must always be declarative or 
allow  to  derive a judgement  so that  the  discourse  referent  the  wh-phrase  relates  to 
becomes accessible for the wh-phrase and that certain contexts of the relatum do not 
allow for sluicing, result in the following questions: 
i  Why must the relatum and the wh-phrase be focus-marked? 
ii  Why must the relatum sentence always be a judgement? 
iii What are the referential properties of  the relatum and how do they determine the 
respective context? 
As we will see below, the answers to these questions will follow from Schwarzschild's 
(1999) focus theory and its modification by Merchant (1999), from the semantics of the 
wh-clause and of the relatum. The latter we will base on von Heusinger's  (1997, 2000) 
theory on indexed epsilon terms. 
2.  Information structure of the antecedent clause and the sluicing 
clause 
According to Schwarzschild (1999), F-markers are freely assigned and subject to con- 
straints such as FOC,  HEADARC,  GrvE~ness,  and AVOIDF.  FOC  demands that a F-marked 
phrase contains an accent if  it is not immediately dominated by another F-marked node 
whereas. HEADARC  regulates that a head is less prominent than  its internal  argument. 
AvoruF prevents F-marking more phrases than necessary whereby G~vmness  must not be violated. The latter constraint  says that  a constituent that is not F-marked must be 
given. As to Schwarzschild's definition of given see (33):' 
(33)  (I)  Definition qf'Given  (informal version) 
An utterance U counts as GIVEN iff it has a salient antecedent A and 
if  U is of type e, then A and U coreier; 
otherwise: modulo 3-type shifting, A entails the Existential Closure of U. 
(ii)  Exi.~benlirrl  Closure of  U (F-clo (U)) 
The result of replacing F-marked phrases in U with variables and existen- 
tially closing the result, modulo existential type shifting 
It follows from  Schwarzschild's  theory  that only given constituents must be licensed 
and that F-marked constituents may be either novel or given. Turning to the possibility 
of  ellipsis as in  the sluicing clause, Merchant (1999) has shown that  Schwarzschild's 
focus theory  must  be  extended  to  ensure  the  semantic  identity  of  the  phonological 
empty  material  with  the  antecedent  material  it  corresponds  to.  Thus, the  IP  in  the 
sluicing clause can only be deleted if the sluicing clause satisfies e-CIVENness. 
(34)  e- GIVENneSS  (Merchant 1999) 
An expression E counts as e-GIVEN iff E has a salient antecedent A and, modulo 
3-type shifting, 
i  A entails F-clo(E), and  (cf. Schwarzschild 1999) 
.  . 
11.  E entails F-clo(A). 
Note  that  'F-clo'  corresponds  to Schwarzschild's  Existential  Closure in  (33). As  we 
may see with respect to (35), the matching of the information structural properties of the 
sluicing and the antecedent clause with e- GlVENneSS entails that the whP as well as its 
relatum must be F-marked and that the antecedent clause must be propositional. 
(35)  They  hired  a  linguist  who  speaks  a  [BALKAN  languagelp  but  I do not  know 
[which  one^ k+p&] 
Here the antecedent clause is the relative clause of  the first conjunct - cf. (13ii) - where 
only the object a Balkan language is F-marked. Because the IP in the sluicing clause is 
given, it must fulfill e-GlVENness. According to the definition of e-GIVENess  in (34i), the 
antecedent clause entails the existential F-closure of the sluicing clause (35'i). And, vice 
versa, according to (34ii), the proposition derived from the interrogative sluicing clause 
by  existential  type  shifting  entails  the  existential  F-closure  of  the  antecedent  clause 
(35'ii). We get the existential F-closure of  the sluicing clause by binding the variable 
that is given by the focused wh-phrase exi~tentially.~ 
Schwarzschild (1999) defines existential  type shifting as raising  expressions to lype t, by  3-binding 
unfilled arguments. 
J  Following  Stechow  Kr  Zirnmermann  (1984)  and  Kritka  (2001a),  wc  consider  a  question  to  be  a 
runction which results in a proposition iTit is mapped onlo the meaning of its answer: 
i.  A:  Who does Hans love'?  hx E PERSON [love (hans) (xi] 
B: Anna.  anna 
question mapped onto the answer:  hx E  PERSON [love (bans) (x)l (anna) 
= love (hans) (anna) Sluicing Phenomena 
(35')  i.  He speaks a Balkan language +  3x [ speak (he) (x)] 
.  .  (= IIACll) 
11.  3x [ speak (he), (x)]  +  3x [ speak (he) (x)] 
(= IISCIl) 
In  that the antecedent clause must be a proposition, it is a non-restrictive relative clause. 
This means it cannot be interpreted as a restrictive relative clause, since the latter is of 
type  c<e,t><e,t>>. Additionally,  it  is  a judgement  because  the  adversative  sluicing 
sentence can only be related to a proposition that is asserted. 
The next example shows what happens if  the whole IP of the antecedent sentence is 
F-marked. 
(36)  They hjred  a  linguist who  [speaksp a  Balkan   language^]^  but  I do not  know 
[which  one^ heqeah] 
I.  He speaks a Balkan language  -  3x [ speak (he) (x)] 
.  . 
11.  3x [ speak (he), (x)]  -  3x 34  Q (he) (x)l 
P-ellipsis in  the sluicing clause is possible because e-c/vi?~ness  is satisfied. That the 
relatum of the wh-phrase must be F-marked follows, as we may see in (35ii) and (36ii) 
from (ii) in e- GlVENness (34). 
E-ov~~ness  also explains why the VP must be F-marked if  the relatum is expressed 
implicitly. According to (34ii), it must be F-marked so that the existential F-closure of 
the antecedent clause can be entailed by the sluicing clause. 
(37)  She is writingp, but I can't imagine whatp. 
(i)  She is writing  +  3x [write (she) (x)] 
(ii)  i'x  [write (she), (x)]  +  3Q [Q  (she)] 
That the relatum of  the wh-phrase can also be an unspecified argument of  a relational 
noun can be seen in the next example: 
(38)  Maria has [F bought~  ticketsF], but she doesn't tell us for which film. 
Up to now, the antecedent for the sluicing clause was always a proposition  that  was 
expressed by the antecedent clause. But, as we already know from the examples (6) and 
(7) in  section one, there are cases where the sluicing clause relates to a proposition that 
must be derived from the antecedent clause of the sluicing clause -  cf. Merchant (1999: 
239): 
ii  A:  Does Petr rend a hook'?  hl'  j  F (read (p) (h))] 
B:  Yes.  XP  (PI 
question mapped onto the answer:  hf  [ f (read (p) (h))l (hp [p]) 
= read (p) (h) 
iii. A:  Docs Petr read a hook'!  hf [ f (read (p) (h))l 
B:  No.  hp [-PI 
question mapped onto the answer:  hf  [ f(read (p) (h))] (hp l~pl) 
=+cad (p) (b) Kerstin Schwahe 
(39)  a.  Sandy was trying to work out which student solved a certain problem, 
but she wouldn't tell us which one.  Merchant (1999: 239) 
b.  Peter told me who Mary met and why. 
c.  Did Peter buy a book and do you also know which one? 
d.  Go to the party, but do not tell me with whom! 
Similarly to our discussion with respect to (5) and (6), the  propositions that are to be 
derived are something like: 'The student that Sandy has identified solved a problem' for 
(39a),  'Mary met  somebody'  for (39b),  'Peter bought a book'  for (39c), and  'Hearer 
goes  to  the party'  for  (39d). Following Schwarzschild  (1999:  157),  let's  try  to use 
existential  type shifting to  obtain  a proposition  out of the interrogative antecedent in 
(39a) by  binding the free variable there by an existential operator and checking whether 
~-G~~~EN~CSS  (34) is met. 
(40)  i.  3x  3y [student (x) A problem (y) A solve (x) (y)]  + 
3y  3x [student (x) A problem (y) A solve (x) (y)] 
ii.  3y 3x [student (x) A problem (y) A solve (x) (y)]  -- 
3y 3x [student (x) A problem (y) A solve (x) (y)] 
We may observe that e-clv~~ness  is met in  (40), where  the subject in  the antecedent 
clause, which is represented similarly to an indefinite, is copied into the sluicing clause. 
However, (40) does not account for the fact that the subject of the bluicing clause must 
be an ar~aphoric  expression as indicated in (4  I): 
(41)  Sandy was trying to work out which student solved a certain problem, 
a.  *but she wouldn't tell us which (a student solved). 
b.  but  she  wouldn't  tell  us  which  one  (the  student  she has  worked  out 
solved). 
This  example  as  well  as  (39b)  show  that  we  cannot  gain  the  necessary  antecedent 
proposition  by  existential  type  shifting of  the interrogative antecedent clause, but  by 
accommodating an answer to the question that contains an anaphoric expression such as 
'the student that Sandy has identified solved a certain problem'  or 'Mary met the person 
she met'. 
Turning  to  (39c), we  may  notice  that  also  there  it is  not  possible  to  obtain  the 
antecedent  proposition  for the  sluicing clause by  existential  type  shifting the  yes-no 
interrogative. 
(42)  i.  3f 3x[f (book (x) A read (peter) (x))] -t 3x [book(x) A read (peter)(x)] 
ii.  3x [book(x) A read (peter)(x)] 4  3f 3x[f (book (x) A read (peter) (x))] 
The entailment  relation  would  be  invalid  if  the  variable  'f'  were  instantiated  by  a 
negative proposition - cf. fn. 4: 
(43)  i.  3x[book (x) A read (peter) (x)] i.  3x [book(x) A read (peter)(x)] 
.  . 
11.  3x [book(x) A read (peter)(x)] i. 7  3x[book (x) A read (peter) (x)l Sluicing Phenomena 
Since the antecedent proposition cannot be obtained by existential type shifting, it must 
he  derived  in  some other way.  It  can  he  derived by  accommodating  the affirmative 
answer to the question given by the antecedent clause. As to the imperative in (39d), the 
antecedent is the accommodated proposition that represents the action the addressee is 
asked to do. 
So far we have shown and explained that and why the relatum  in the antecedent as 
well as the wh-phrase in the sluicing clause must be F-marked with respect to examples 
that  belong to type  i  and ii  in  (13). That Merchant's and Sch~varzschild's  theory  also 
holds for the types (13iii) and (13iv)  is easy to work out. Additionally, we have shown 
that  if  the antecedent clause is non-propositional, the antecedent proposition must he 
derived by accommodation. 
In section one, we have mentioned that there are contexts that prevent the wh-phrase 
from having access to its potential antecedent. Now we can try to explain this with the 
aid of Schwarzschild's and Merchant's theory. 
3.  Appropriate and non-appropriate contexts for sluicing 
3.1.  The need for specificity 
Recall that contexts that do not allow for Sluicing are the description of  definite DPs 
(26) and (27), the description of  complements of thematic matrix predicates (28) and 
(29), the scope of downward-monotone  quantifiers (30) and (3  I),  and the dependency 
on non-specific indefinite DPs (32). 
(44)  a.  *They found the man who has  kissed  a woman, but  they  won't  tell us 
which one. 
b.  *Ramon regrets that Sally was dancing with a boy, but I don't remember 
with which one. 
c.  "'They hired few people who spoke a lot of  languages -guess  how many! 
d.  '?They are looking for some linguist who has written  a thesis, but  they 
cannot tell you which one. 
With Heim (1982) and Schwarzschild (1999), we regard the referent of a definite DP to 
be an entity which is thematic or given, respectively. But to be given need not mean that 
it must  have been  mentioned  in  the  current  discourse  or that  it  is  prominent  in the 
utterance situation. An entity can also be seen as given if  it is anchored in  the mental 
lexicon of the discourse participants. Then, it can be retrieved from there and introduced 
as  a  novel  discourse  referent  into  the  current  discour~e.~  Let  us  assume that  as  the 
description of definite DPs, also the description of thematic complements and the scope 
of  downward-monotonic  quantifiers  are  thematic,  that  means  given.  According  to 
AVOIDF  and  GlvE~ness,  the  constituents  in  these  contexts  actually  need  not  be  F- 
marked. 
That  according  to  Glv~Nness,  non-F-marked  constituents  must  be  given  does, 
however, not mean that all F-marked constituent must be non-given. Or to formulate the 
That there are definite DPs that denote discourse referents that are novel with respect to the discourse 
is also discussed  in Umbach (2001). She remarks that such definite DPs contain an accent whereas 
definite DPs that are given in the discourse do not. To contain an accent indicates that the definite DP 
is cithcr F-marked itself or is dominated by a F-marked constiluent. question in another way: Are there given elements that can be asked for? Schwarzschild 
(1999: 158ff.) shows that there are cases like (45) where a given constituent must be F- 
marked to satisfy GlVENneSS. 
(45)  Who  did John's mother praise? 
A:  She praised [HIMIF 
Here, the object in the answer must be F-marked because the existential F-closure of the 
answer must be entailed by  the type shifted question. If it were not F-marked, existential 
F-closure could not take place. Now we may ask whether the given definite DP can be 
F-marked.  The answer is yes, as long as it can  be  asked for and  thus the  GIVENneSS 
effect (33) can obtain. 
To demonstrate  this,  we  take  (46a)  as  a  contextually  given  questions. With  this 
question, the whole DP in the answer (46b) must be F-marked. 
(46)  a.  They have found somebody, but I don't know who? 
b.  They found [the man who kissed a WOMAN],. 
According to Schwarzschild's (1999: 170) Foc constraint, Foc-marked material must be 
accented. Therefore woman carries the pitch accent. The question that arises now is why 
the  indefinite  in  thematic  contexts  cannot  be  related  to  by  the  wh-phrases  in  the 
following sluicing constructions: 
(47)  *They found [the man who has kissed a WOMENIF, but they won't tell us which 
one. 
(48)  "Ramon  regrets  [that Sally was dancing with  a BOYIF ,  but I don't  remember 
with which one. 
We suggest that an indefinite in a thematic context cannot be related to by  a wh-phrase 
if the entity it denotes is interpreted as non-specific by the attitudinal subject of the wh- 
interrogative. We consider the latter to be  the subject that poses  the question. It can 
either be expressed explicitly within the matrix proposition  of  the sluicing sentence or 
he the speaker in case the sluicing sentence consists only of  a wh-phrase as given  in 
(3~). 
That the relatum of the wh-phrase must be an indefinite and that this indefinite must 
allow for a specific interpretation for the attitudinal  subject is presupposed  by the wh- 
Phrase. Let's  suppose that a wh-question  is something like an instruction to choose a 
value for a variable out of a value set.6 This value set is denoted by the restriction of the 
wh-phrase.  Thus the  wh-phrase  presupposes first  a value  set  that  is  not  a  singleton. 
Second the wh-Phrase presupposes that the choice of a particular value out of this set is 
possible.  Both  is necessary  to get a coherent answer for the question. As to the ante- 
cedent clause for a question, the value set is denoted by the description of the relatum 
DP or by the semantics of the verb in that clause. This DP can only be an indefinite DP 
because the value set for an indefinite DP is not  a singleton  and because indefinites 
allow the choice of a particular value for the variable they introduce. If  there is a choice 
of  a particular  value for a value  set, we speak, following Farkas (2001), of  a specific 
"  As to the notion uf 'value act' sce Farkas (2001) Sluicing Phenorncna 
interpretation of the indefinite or, to be short, of  a specific indefinite. A definite DP, on 
the other hand, has a value set that is a singleton. This prevents it from serving as the 
relatum for a wh-phrase. 
Let us return to contexts as in  (44) that do not allow a specific interpretation of  the 
indefinite n wornon  for the attitudinal subject they. Notice  that  the antecedent of  the 
attitudinal  subject is not  contained  in  the thematic  antecedent clause, but  in  the non- 
thematic matrix clause. Now  the question arises why  the attitudinal subject of a non- 
thematic  sentence  cannot  have  access  to  a  discourse  referent  introduced  by  an 
antecedent clause as in (44a-c) which contains given or thematic material. 
If  an  indefinite is  given,  a discourse  referent  with  the same description  has  been 
introduced before and has not been assigned a value, and has thus become existentially 
bound. This happens if the discourse referent is not relevant to the subsequent discourse. 
If  it  is not  relevant, it, metaphorically speaking, logs out or goes offline, respectively. 
Then it can go lost and it can hardly be retrieved  anymore.'  A discourse referent goes 
online when  it  is introduced or logged  in  by  an  indefinite expression in  a particular 
sentence (see Heim's  (1982) Novelty condition). If the discourse referent is  needed for 
the ongoing discourse as in  the sequence of  an antecedent clause and a sluicing clause, 
this means transsententially, it must stay online and thus be anchored to the discourse. It 
is  then  anchored  to  a further  discourse  referent  and thus  accessible to  the attitudinal 
subject of  the sluicing sentence. As we can see with respect to the complements of the 
thematic predicates in  (44a-c), they only consist of  one clause which means that within 
this  thematic  context,  the  discourse  is  not  continued.  It  follows  that  the  discourse 
referent  introduced  by  the  indefinite  is  not  anchored  to  the  discourse  and  thus  not 
accessible to the attitudinal subject of the sluicing sentence. 
But what happens if the discourse proceeds in thematic contexts? The next examples 
show that sluicing is possible also in  thematic contexts. Sluicing only obtains there if 
the attitudinal subject is in this thematic context as well. 
(49)  a.  They found [the man  who has  kissed  [a womenthe  (nn,,]~ and who didn't 
tell us which  on]^ 
b.  *They [found the man who has kissed a ~omen,l,,~]p  and I won't tell you 
which one. 
(50)  a.  Ramon  [regrets  that  Sally  was  dancing  with  [a  bOybally]~  and that  she 
didn't remember with which one] 
b.  *Ramon [regrets that Sally was dancing with a  boy,,,,,,]^ and he doesn't 
remember with which one. 
In  (49a) and  (50a). the  discourse  referent  introduced  by  the  indefinite  can  only  be 
anchored to the subject of the embedded antecedent clause and not to the subject of the 
matrix clause or to the speaker. If  it is anchored to the subject of the embedded relative 
'  Krilka  (2001b) tcrms  given  indefinite NPs  as  "non-novel  indefinitcs"  Hc  discusses  them  in  the 
ccrntcxt  of  adverbial  quantification  and  information  structure,  in  cxatnples  like  (i)  and  (ii).  An 
indefinite  NP  in  thc  hackground  is  marked  as  non-novel  (=NN). The difference  in  information 
struclure determines the domain of quantification as in the paraphrases illustrated: 
(i) [A tiesh~~ianl~~  usually wears a BASEBALL cap. "Most frcshmen wear a baseball cap" 
(ii) A FRESHMAN usually wears a  baseball]^^ cap. "Most baseball caps are worn by freshmen" or  complement  clause,  it  can  be  specific  for the  attitudinal  subject  of  the  sluicing 
sentence. 
From  this we may conclude that the discourse referent introduced by the indefinite 
in  thematic clauses can only be  anchored to a discourse referent  that  is introduced by 
this  thematic  proposition.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  respective  proposition  is  non- 
thematic, it can be anchored to a discourse referent either introduced by this proposition 
as in  (51a) or by  an embedding proposition as  in (51b). Or it even 'an  be anchored to 
the speaker as shown in (5  Ic). 
(5 I)  a.  Peter  told  us  that  Karl  kissed  a  womank,,,,  but  hepet,- cannot  tell  you 
which one. 
b.  Peter met a boy who kissed a woman,,,,,,  but he,,,,  cannot tell you which 
one. 
c.  Peter wants to read a Norwegian novelspeuk,,,  but I don't tell you  which 
one. 
That the relatum of the wh-Phrase must allow a specific interpretation for the attitudinal 
subject also holds for the relatum of the whatP as in (52), which is often thought to be 
non-specific. 
(52)  A:  Peter is reading a book, but I do not know what kind of book (the book 
he is reading is). 
B:  The book he he is reading is a BORING one. 
The  whatP  asks  for  a  property  of  a  specific  DP, this  means  it  asks  for  a  further 
predication of  an  online discourse referent.  This is attested in  (52) by the full-fledged 
version of the sluicing clause and by the definite expression in the answer 
Let's conclude: On the one hand, the relatum of a wh-Phrase must be specific for the 
attitudinal subject of  the sluicing sentence. It only can be specific if  it is online for the 
attitudinal subject. On the other hand, an indefinite DP in a thematic context cannot be 
interpreted as being specific if  the attitudinal subject of the sluicing sentence is outside 
this thematic context. Then the information structural  status of  the indefinite tells the 
attitudinal  subject of  the sluicing sentence that  there is a given, but  offline discourse 
referent. That this  discourse referent has gone offline is due to its irrelevance for the 
discourse. This irrelevance is passed on the subsequent discourse so that the discourse 
referent  introduced by the indefinite in  thematic contexts has no choice but to log out. 
This  contradiction  explains  why  the  discourse  referent  that  is  introduced  by  an 
indefinite in a thematic context is not accessible to an attitudinal subject and thus for the 
wh-phrase outside the thematic context. 
In the following section, we will  see how the notion  of  specificity given up to now 
pretheoretically is modelled in Heusinger's (1997, 2000) theory. 
3.2.  The representation of specificity in sluicing 
As  van Heusinger (1997, 2000) explains, indefinite DPs can  vary  in  their referential 
properties  along (at least) two dimensions: scope and  specificity. To represent these 
independent properties  appropriately, we take von Heusingers (1997, 2000) theory, in 
which  indefinite  DPs  are  represented  as indexed  epsilon  terms.  This  is  illustrated in 
(53): Sluicing Phenomena 
(53)  a painting:  &jx  [painting(x)] 
The epsilon operator is interpreted as a choice function that assigns to each (non-empty 
set) one of its elements. In other words, the  referent of an indefinite DP is found by the 
operation of  selecting one element out of  the set that  is described by  the description. 
The selection depends on the context in which the indefinite is located. This treatment is 
similar to that  of  discourse  representation  theories (Heim  1982; Kamp  1981),  where 
indefinites  introduce new  individual  variables or discourse referents. One of  the main 
advantages of using choice function variables instead is the following: Indefinites need 
not  be  moved  or  raised  for expressing different  dependencies.  They  remain  in  situ, 
whereas the choice function variable can be bound by different operations, e.g adverbs 
of  quantification, existential  closure, etc. This causes different  scope readings of the 
indefinites. 
Specificity is taken as an independent referential property of  indefinite DPs (see Fo- 
dor & Sag 1982, En?  1991, Farkas  1995 and 2002). Following von Heusinger (2001), 
we assume that a specific indefinite DP is "referentially  anchored" to a discourse item. 
This can be the speaker or some other index of  the utterance context, on the one hand, 
or some introduced referent, on the other. In  that the discourse referent is anchored to 
some discourse participant, it can stay online and be subject to further linguistic ope- 
rations. 
The anchor-relation  is  represented  by  a  function f from  that  discourse  item  to  a 
certain choice function. In other words, the function f  links the choice of the indefinite 
to the value  of  this  discourse item. This means that  the  indefinite  receives  the same 
scope as the discourse item it depends on. If  the indefinite DP is not anchored and goes 
thus offline, its context index variable is existentially bound. 
Example (54) illustrates the different referential options of the indefinite. The exam- 
ple may be assigned a non-specific reading of the indefinite ("There is some painting by 
Picasso or other such that  John  likes  it"),  as in  (54a). The more prominent  specific 
reading (54b) can he paraphrased as "I can identify a picture and this picture is such that 
John  admires  it".  There  is  another  specific  reading  of  (54), namely  (54c) with  the 
paraphrase  "John  has  a particular picture of  Picasso in  mind, and he admires it, but I 
cannot tell which one".' 
(54)  John admires a painting of Picasso. 
a.  3i  [admireQohn, &jx  [painting(x)])] 
(non-specific) 
b.  admireaohn, &f(speaker)X  [painting(x)l)] 
(specific: speaker-anchored) 
c.  admireuohn, EfGohn)X [painting(x)]) 
(specific: subject-anchored) 
(54b) and (54c) differ in that the indefinite is anchored to different discourse items. 
"he  formulations "has in mind or "can identify" should motivate the specific reading. However, such 
lormulations arc very informal, and in certain contexts even misleading (see von Heusinger 2001 for a 
detailed discussion). The different referential  properties of indefinite DPs are additionally dependent on the 
information  structure  (see  Lenerz  2001)  and  on  other  constructions,  such  as 
coordination (see Schwabe & von Heusinger 2001). 
Having  the two necessary  ingredients: the need  for specificity and the appropriate 
representational  format,  we  can  now  represent  the  different  contextual  behavior  of 
antecedent clauses. 
If  the  relatum  of  the  wh-phrase  in  the  sluicing  sentence  must  allow  a  specific 
interpretation, the context index of the epsilon operator in the semantic representation of 
the relatum  must be substituted by  a function f from some discourse item to a certain 
choice function. This means that the function f assigns to the discourse item a particular 
choice function, and thus a particular element that is assigned to the given set. In  the 
following example the function f relates the particular choice function to the speaker: 
(55)  Peter is dancing with a girl, but I won't tell you with which one. 
peter  was  dancing with  ~f,~~~~k~~)~  [girl (z)], but .... wh  (z): girl(z):  peter  was- 
dancing-with z 
If  the relatum is in  the scope of  a universal  quantifier as in  (56), the function f relates 
the particular  choice function to  a particular boy -  each boy has his own  choice of  a 
particular girl. 
(56)  Every boy was dancing with a girl, but I don't know with which one! 
Every(x): boy(x): x was dancing with E~(,,z [girl(z)], 
but ... wh (z): girl (z): Dist (x): boy (x):  x was dancing-with z 
The answer to such a sluicing sentence would be a pair-list answer such as Peter was 
dancing with Prtra, Paul was duncing with Maria, ....  This example shows that to get 
the specific-narrow  scope reading  in the sluicing clause, there must  be  an  intervening 
operator  between  the  wh-phrase  and  its  trace.  The  distributing  operator  in  (56)  is 
necessary to prevent the cumulative reading. It distributes over the set of boys such that 
each boy dances with a particular girl. Contrary to Romero (2000: 197ff.), the example 
(57) shows that also a sluicing clause with a non-overt relatum may contain an operator: 
(57)  Every boy was dancing last night, but  I won't  tell  you  with  whom  (they were 
dancing each/every boy was dancing). 
She bases her claim on the scope parallelism requirement between the antecedent and 
the sluicing clause (Chung et al.  1995) and on the observation that implicit indefinites 
have always narrowest scope (Fodor-Fodor  1980). In  her framework, the wh-phrase in 
the sluicing clause has wide scope and because the implicit indefinite in  the antecedent 
clause must have narrow scope, the parallelis~n  requirement  is not met. If  there are any 
"apparent  intervenors"  as in  (57) between the wh-phrase and its trace, she translates the 
QP  into  an  E-type pronoun  that  doesn't  count  as  an  intervenor  anymore.  But, her 
proposal  does  not  hold  because  a  distributing  operator  is  needed  to  interpret  the 
predicate  in the sluicing clause - see (56) and (57). And as we have already mentioned 
in section 1.1  ., it is not true that implicit indefinites must always have narrowest scope. 
There are cases like (23) repeated here as (58) that show that implicit indefinites may 
have wide scope: Sluicing Phcnomcna 
(58)  A:  Every child in the kindergarten is dancing, but I do not know with whom. 
B:  With Agnes, I believe. 
We can also construe a context where the indefinite DP in  (56) has wide scope as the 
implicit indefinite in (58). Then the choice of the indefinite DP depends on the speaker 
or some other discourse participant: 
(59)  Every(x): boy(x): x was dancing with &f(speaker~~  [girl(z)l, 
but ... wh(z) : girl(z): Dist (x): boys (x): x was dancing-with z 
The relatum however cannot have a non-specific Interpretation  like the narrow  scope 
one in (60) or the wide scope one in  (61) because it would then not be accessible to the 
wh-phrase in the sluicing sentence. 
(60)  "Every(x): boy(x):  [x was dancing with E,Z [girl(z)]], but ... 
(61)  *3i [Every(x): boy(x): x was dancing with E~Z  [girl(z)]], but ... 
As we have already mentioned, the specific reading of  the relatum cannot obtain if the 
relatum is in  the scope of a definite article or a thematic predicate and the attitudinal 
subject of  the sluicing sentence is not. Because the description  of  definite DPs as in 
(4421)  and  the complement of  thematic  matrix  predicates  as in  (44b) are thematic  or 
given, respectively, the indefinite expression in  them is also given. To be  given means 
for an  indefinite DP that a discourse referent  with the same description has previously 
been  introduced,  but  has  gone offline.  That  it  has  gone offline  indicates  that  there 
wasn't any interest to anchor it. Because there is no need for its anchoring, the discourse 
referent  that  according  to  Heim's  Novelty  (1982)  condition  is  introduced  by  the 
indefinite expression in  the antecedent clause is  also not anchored -  cf. (62) and (63). 
Thus sluicing always fails in such contexts. 
(62)  *gi [They found the man  yesterday who has kissed  &ix [women (x)]] but  they 
won't tell us which one. 
(63)  *3,  [Ramon is glad that Sally was dancing with E,X  [boy (x)]] but I don't remem- 
ber with which one. 
That  indefinite  DPs  in  thematic  antecedent  clauses cannot be  specific for attitudinal 
subjects  outside  this  thematic  context  explains  why  their  context  index  cannot  be 
substituted  with  a  function  f  that  relates  a particular  discourse  item  to  a particular 
choice function. Their context index can only be bound existentially, which blocks them 
from being related to by  the wh-phrase of the subsequent sluicing clause. 
That  thematic  relata  are  unsuitable  antecedents  for  the  wh-phrase  outside  the 
thematic contexts can also be attested with respect to downward-monotone quantifiers. 
Their  scope is given  by  the context as well.  Thus, they can  only contain  non-novel 
indefinite expressions and not render relata for the wh-phrase. 
But as Merchant (1999: 252) and Romero (2000) point out, constructions such as 
(64) are evaluated as well-formed by some informants. 
(64)  a.  ?They hired few people who spoke a lot of languages -  guess how many! 
b.  ?Few kids were reading, but I don't know what (they were reading each). This becomes possible when these informants interpret the expression,few linguists as a 
plural  set and not as a downward-monotone quantifier. The plural set can be related to 
by an E-type pronoun  in the sluicing clause (cf. Evan (1980)). But to obtain the correct 
interpretation  of  the  predicate  in  the  sluicing  clause,  this  set  must  be  distributed. 
Because  the  set  interpretation  does  not  presuppose  given  material,  the  indefinite 
expression  (1  lot of  language can  be  non-given  and  thus  specific  so that  the  choice 
function can be related to a particular discourse item. 
The following example shows that an indefinite DP is not accessible to a wh-Phrase 
if this indefinite depends on a non-specific indefinite DP. 
(65)  They are looking for a linguist who speaks a Balkan language, but they cannot 
tell you which. 
*3, [They are looking for &,x  [linguist(x)] & 
e,x [linguist(x)] speak &f(,jz  [Balkan language (z)]], but ... 
If  the  first  indefinite  DP a  linguist  is  non-specific  and  the  reference  of  the  second 
illdefinite DP a Bulkan lunguoge depends on the first indefinite, the DP a Balkan lan- 
fiuage inherits the non-specificity of this DP. Then sluicing is not possible. 
The indefinite DP u  Balkan language, however, can  be  specific  if  it  is related  to 
some discourse referent  as  for instance  the speaker (66) or to the linguistically intro- 
duced discourse item u linguist which is related by the function f to the subject of the 
antecedent sentence (67). 
(66)  3,[They are look~ng  for&,x  [I~ngu~st(x)&speak  (X)(F~(~,,~~~~,~Z  [B.l.(z)l)ll, but .... 
(67)  They are looking for ~f(~h~~)  x [linguist(x)&speak (~)(E~(~)z  [B.l.(z)])], but 
To sum up this section, we should record that the antecedent or relatum, respectively, of 
the wh-phrase  must allow a specific interpretation for the attitudinal  subject. For this 
reason, the scope of  thematic predicates, the description  of  definite DPs, the scopi of 
downward-monotone quantifiers,  and  the  dependency on  non-specific  indefinite  DPs 
cannot rendcr the needed relata if  the attitudinal  subject is not in the scope of thematic 
predicates,  articles  and  downward-monotone  quantifiers  as  well  as  of  non-specific 
indefinites. If, on  the other hand, the attitudinal subject is  in the  scope of  the above 
mentioned items, sluicing is obtainable. 
(68)  a.  Ramon regrets that Fred kissed a girl and didn't tell him which one. 
b.  Tom criticized the friend who kissed a girl and didn't tell him which one. 
c.  Noone has read a book and didn't say which one. 
d.  They  are  looking  for  a  linguist  who  knows  a  Balkan  language  and 
doesn't tell them which one. 
4.  Conclusion 
The observation that in  various sluicing types, the wh-phrase in the sluicing sentence as 
well  as its  relatum  in  the  antecedent clause must  be  F-marked  was  explained along 
Schwarzschild's (1999) and Merchant's (2001) focus theory. Furthermore, according to 
the semantics of the wh-phrase, it was argued that the relatum of the wh-phrase must be Sluicing Phcnamena 
an  indefinite that must allow a specific interpretation. According to Heusinger (1997, 
2000)  specificity was defined as an anchoring relation  between the discourse referent 
introduced by the indefinite expression and a discourse given item. 
It has turned out that specific indefinite expressions are always novel  or non-given 
and thus F-marked. The reason  is that they introduce a new  discourse referent that is 
contextually  anchored  after  its  introduction.  If  there  were  already  a  contextually 
anchored discourse referent, it could not be an  indefinite that could be used to pick up 
this discourse referent, but a definite expression. Non-specific indefinites, on the other 
hand,  can  be  given  as  well  as  non-giv~n.  In  both  cases,  their  context  index  is 
existentially bound, which means that the discourse referent they denote is not relevant 
for the discourse. A given indefinite merely indicates that a discourse referent with the 
same description has been  introduced previously, has been considered to be irrelevant, 
and therefore has been logged out. 
Because specific  indefinite expressions are always  non-given,  contexts such as the 
scope of  definite  articles,  the  scope of  thematic  matrix  predicates,  and the  scope of 
downward-monotonic quantifiers that exhibit given indefinites do not allow Sluicing. 
To stay online, specific discourse referents that are introduced by indefinites must be 
picked  up  by  an  anaphoric  expression  in  the  next  sentence.  This  explains  why  the 
antecedent 'lause  must be adjacent to the sluicing sentence. 
Indefinites  that  are  in  thematic  contexts can  be  related  to  by  a  wh-phrase  if  the 
attitudinal  subject of  the sluicing sentence is  identical  with  the discourse referent the 
indefinite is anchored to. This discourse referent can only be expressed by  the propo- 
sition the indefinite is contained in. Since the proposition is a thematic context, there are 
no  discourse referents  available the  indefinite  could  anchored  to  be  specific  for the 
discourse outside the thematic context. 
In that, unlike Chung et al. (1995), and Romero (2000), we see specificity as decisive 
for well formed sluicing constructions, we get the possibility of  an unified account for 
Sluicing with  explicit  and implicit relata  and  a more comprehensive and appropriate 
account for the failing of Sluicing in the above mentioned contexts. Furthermore, we 
could show  that  Sluicing is nothing more than  a text  relation  between  an  antecedent 
clause and a wh-question where ellipsis is possible because of Merchant's e-GIVEN~~SS. 
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1.  Introduction 
Indefinite expressions show a contrast in  readings that can be informally illustrated by 
example (1). The indefinite NPs a rnonk and something have readings that contrast with 
the readings  of  serpents, headless men or men with two  heads, besides the contrast 
between singular and plural. This contrast is captured by terms speciJi'c  and non-specific, 
respectively: 
(1)  "But in the abbey there are rumors, ... strange rumors  ..." 
"Of  what sort?" 
"Strange. Let us say, rumors about a monk who decided to venture into the 
library during the night, to look for something Malachi had refused to give him, 
and he saw serpents, headless men, and men with two heads. He was nearly 
crazy when he emerged from the labyrinth ..." (89) 
A specific reading of an indefinite NP is pretheoretically characterized by the "certainty 
of the speaker about the identity of the referent", "the speaker has the referent in mind", 
"the  speaker can  identify the referent",  etc. Another version  of  this characterization is 
that the referent of  a specific NP is fixed or determined before the main predication is 
computed and that it matters which referent we select out of the set of entities that fulfill 
the description. It  is  generally assumed  that  specific  indefinites  are  "scopeless"  like 
proper names or demonstratives, i.e. they always show widest scope, and therefore are 
assumed  to  be  existentially  presupposed.  Furthermore,  the  insertion  of  a  certain 
indicates specificity. 
(2)  Pretheoretical and informal characterization cdspecificity 
(i)  certainty of the speaker about the identity of the referent 
(ii)  the referent is fixed I determined I not depending on the interpretation of 
the matrix predicate 
(iii)  specific indefinite NPs are "scopeless" or "referential terms", i.e. they 
behave as if they always have the widest scope 
(iv)  specific indefinite NPs are referential terms, i.e., they are existentially 
presupposed 
(v)  specific indefinite NPs can be paraphrased by a certain' 
The paper is suhmitted to a special issue of "Journal  of Semantics".  '  There  is  morc lexical  material  that can disambiguate  thc canuasl: Hdspclmath  (1997) investigates 
indefinite pronouns, like someone, anyone, crosslinguistically.  He (1997, 38) observes that "it  is not 
uncommon ibr languages to have two different indefinite series for specific and non-specific".  Prince 
(1981) discusses the use of English this as an specific indefinite article. 
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In  this  paper, I  argue  that  this  informally  given  list  of  characteristics  covers  only  a 
certain  subclass of  specific indefinites. While most  theories of  specificity assume all 
assumptions in  (2), my own proposal is based on the assumptions (2ii) and (2v), while I 
refute assumptions (2i), (2iii) and (2iv) as too general (in many, but not all cases, these 
characteristics follow from the assumptions (2ii) and (2v)). In  particular, I dispute the 
definition  of  specific  indefinites as "the  speaker has  the  referent  in  mind"  as  rather 
confusing if  one is working  with  a semantic theory. Furthermore,  I discuss  "relative 
specificity",  it. cases  in  which  the  specific  indefinite  does  not  exhibit  wide,  but 
intermediate  or  narrow  scope behavior.  Based  on  such data, I  argue  that  specificity 
expresses  a  referential  dependency  between  introduced  discourse  items.  Informally 
speaking, the specificity of the indefinite expression something in  (I) expresses that the 
reference of the expression depends on the reference of another expression, here, on the 
expression a monk, not the speaker. On the other hand, the specific reading of u monk in 
(I) depends on its anchoring on the speaker. Once we have determined the reference of 
u monk we have also established the reference of something. I therefore introduce the 
term "referential  anchoring" to define the semantic function of specificity. 
Some of the examples for illustrating specificity are taken from the novel "The Name 
of the Rose"  by  Umberto Eco, such  as (I). The novel  forms the background  for the 
sentences under investigation and controls the referential properties of the context. I also 
use  translations  of  one  of  the  same  sentences  as  cross-linguistic  evidence  for 
grammatical reflexes of semantic distinction (for a more detailed account toward  this 
contrastive method, see von Heusinger 2001). 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, 1 discuss the often found description 
of specific NPs as a subclass of indefinite NPs as "known/identifiable to the speaker" as 
inadequate.  Modern  semantic  theories  have  shown  (since  Karttunen  1976)  that 
definiteness cannot be explained with recourse to identifiability -  so this should not be 
done for specificity. In  section 3, I discuss the morphological marking of  specificity in 
Turkish. I assume that the specificity marker in Turkish is more reliable than the indirect 
marking  in  languages  such  as  English  or  Italian.  In  section  4,  I  present  different 
instances  of  what  are  called  specific  cases,  such  as  scopal  specificity,  epistemic 
specificity, partitive  specificity, and  relative  specificity. In  section, 5, I present three 
familiCs of semantic approaches to definiteness and specificity: the pragmatic approach 
assumes that specificity is a question of  scope and additional  pragmatic information - 
from  the  early  beginnings,  this  "additional"  information  is  also  represented  as  a 
semantic structure, see Jackendoff's  (1972) "modal  structure".  The lexical  ambiguity 
approach assumes that there are two indefinite articles, an existential and a referential, 
which  then  yield  non-specific  and  specific readings,  respectively. Discourse theories 
present  definiteness  as  familiarity,  but  do not  treat  specific  indefinites  in  particular. 
Extension of discourse theories try to capture the specificity contrast. However, all these 
theories are restricted with respect to the phenomena they describe. This is shown with 
data from Turkish -  there are more cases of morphological  marking of specificity than 
these theories predict. 
In  section 6, I present a more general theory of specificity that is based on the notion 
of  "referential  anchoring"  at  the  level  of  discourse  representation:  a  specific  NP  is 
anchored to another discourse entity. Thus, the specific expression is assigned the same 
scope as its anchor. Specificity and Definiteness In Sentence and Discourse Structure 
2.  Specificity and definiteness 
In this section, I discuss the relation between definiteness and specificity; in particular I 
argue  first  that  specificity  is  not  a  simply  a  subcategory  of  indefinite NPs,  but  an 
independent category that can therefore form a cross-classification. Second I motivate 
that  specificity  is  to  be  analyzed  in  terms  of  an  additional  structure  which  I  call 
"referential  struclure" of a text. 
The category "specificity"  was  introduced for indefinite NPs  as an  analogy to the 
category  "referentiality"  for  definite  NPs.  Quine  (1960,  330,  141ffl  discusses  the 
referential  properties of definite NPs on  examples like (3): The definite NP the dean 
behaves differently  in  the scope of  an  intensional verb like look ,for. He (1960, $31, 
146ff) observes that  a very similar ambiguity can  be constructed with  indefinite NPs, 
such as in  (4). This contrast  was  later termed  specific vs.  non-specific  (Baker  1966, 
Fillmore 1967): 
(3)  John is looking for the dean. 
a.  ... whoever it might be  [non-referential] 
b.  ..., namely for Smith, who is happens to be the dean.  [referential] 
(4)  John is looking for a pretty girl. 
a.  ... whoever he will meet, he will take her to the movies  [non-specific] 
b.  ..., namely for Mary.  [specific] 
The intuitive concept of specificity (see (2)) extremely quickly spread over the linguistic 
community. However it is most often understood as secondary referential  property of 
NPs that applies only to indefinite NPs. Additionally it  has become  very common to 
describe or define specificity in terms of  identifiability by  speaker and hearer, as in (5). 
According to this view, definite NPs are used if both the speaker and hearer can identify 
the referent, specific indefinite NPs, if only the speaker can identify the referent, while 
non-specific indefinite indicates that none of  them can identify the referent: 
(5)  The "identifiability"  criteria for definiteness and specificity 
[  iderztffiecl by  1 definite  1 indefinite  I indefinite 
This view is often ascribed to Givdn (1978), who however gives a more  differentiated 
picture. First, he (1978, 293) defines specificity -  what he calls 'referentiality' -  in the 
following way: 
speaker 
hearer 
1 .I. Rereferentiality [= specificity, KvH] 
In  the terms used her, referentiality  is  a semantic property of  nominals. In involves, 
roughly, the speaker's intent to  'refer to'  or 'mean' a nominal expression to have non- 
empty  references - i.e.  to  'exist'  - within  a  particular  universe  of  discourse. 
Conversely, if  a nominal  is  'non-referential' or  'generic'  the speaker does not have a 
commitment to  its existence with  the relevant universe of  discourse. Rather, in  the 
latter case the speaker is engaged in discussing the genus or its properties, but does not 
commit hidherself to the existence of  any specific individual member of  that genus. 
(+ spec) 
+ 
+ 
spec. 
+ 
. 
non-spec 
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In  this  definition, specificity is defined  in  terms of  (i) existential presupposition  (cf. 
(2iv)) and (ii) in terms of the type of the referent (individuals vs. predicates). The latter 
aspect is generally taken to distinguish between particular vs. generic readings of NPs. 
Givdn (1978, 296) also makes clear that he understands definiteness as a property of 
linguistic  discourse  structure, rather  than  of  the  world:  "The  notions  'definite'  and 
'indefinite',  as far as referential  nominals are concerned, are used here strictly in  their 
discourse-pragmatic  sense, i.e.  'assumed by the speaker to be uniquely  identifiable to 
the  hearer'  vs.  'not  so assumed',  respectively."  However, the  definition  in  terms of 
attitudes of the speaker towards the mental representation of the hearer is quite complex, 
making this definition quite difficult to work with. Therefore, the simplified picture (3) 
is generally used. Haspelmath (1997, 46) uses the categorization (6) for distinguishing 
different classes of indefinite  pronoun^:^ 
(6) (In-)definiteness, (non-)specificity and knowledge of the speaker (Haspelmath 1997) 
The categorization  in  (5) is also used in  the discussion of Dijferential Object Marking 
(= DOM from  German Diflereiztielle  Objektnzurkier~mg,  Bossong  1985). DOM is the 
cross-linguistically widespread phenomenon that describes the morphological marking 
of a subclass of direct objects. One example of this form of object marking is discussed 
in  section  3 for Turkish. In  general, DOM predicts  that  case marking  (of the direct 
object)  operates  on  a  scale.  Bossong  (1985, 6) proposes  the  "Skala  der  Referenz- 
merkmale" ("scale  of  referential features"),  as in  (7). Aissen (2000, 7) builds this scale 
into a larger "Definiteness Scale" (8): 
(7)  Skala der Referenzmerkmale (Bossong 1985) 
[id egoA[id  tu] > [id egoA[-id tu] > [-id egoA[-id  tu] 
definite 
known to speaker 
and hearer 
indefinite 
non-specific  I  specific 
(8)  Definiteness Scale (or Hierarchy) (Aissen 2000) 
Pronoun > Name > Definite > Indefinite > NonSpecific 
unknown to the speaker 
There are two tacit assumptions of  this view on  the relation  between  definiteness and 
specificity  that  I  think  are  incorrect:  (i)  definiteness  is  explained  in  terms  of 
identifiability of the referent, and (ii) specificity is a subcategorization of indefinite NPs 
(which means  that  there  are no  non-specific  definite  NPs).  There  is  no  convincing 
evidence for either of the claims; rather the research has  given  plan  evidence for the 
contrary.  Definiteness  (and  thus  specificity)  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  concept  of 
identification,  as  it  is  illustrated  by  the  following  examples.  The  definite  NPs  tlze 
rightr?ous  nzan  and the doors  in the two fragments (9) and (10) cannot be identified by 
the speaker  and hearer, they do not even refer to identifiable objects, and in  (10) the 
definite NPs do not even refer to any existent object. Example (9) nicely illustrates that 
the  NP  is  definite  because  it  is  anaphorically  linked  to  a  discourse  item  already 
introduced (but not necessarily to an  identified referent  "in  the world"). The indefinite 
known to the 
speaker 
Haspelmath  has  the  three-way  distinction  for  indefinites:  non-specific;  specific + unknown  to  the 
spcaker; and  specific and  known  lo the speaker. This secms to correspond to the  English  unyone, 
sonleone [non-specific], someone [specific]. 
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NP a secret in  (I I) has a clear specific reading, but it cannot be identified by speaker or 
hearer (this is warranted by the plot of  the story). On the other side, the two indefinite 
NPs one of  my nzonks  and an equally terrible sin in  (12) have referents that are well- 
known to both the speaker and the hearer (it is the dead monk Adelmo and the sin of 
homosexuality, respectively). In  a theory  of  identifiability, one would  expect definite 
NPs  instead of  the indefinites. This can  only be explained  in  the  view  of  discourse 
representation:  the  two  referents  cannot  be  linked  to  a  discourse  referent  already 
established -  that is why indefinite NPs are used. 
(9)  [...I And I know that he [= the Evil One] can impel his victims to do  evil in such 
a way that the blame falls on a righteous man, and the Evil One rejoices then as 
the righteous man is burned in the place of his succubus. (29) 
(10)  William asked him whether he would be locking the doors. 
"There are no doors that forbid access to the scriptorium from the kitchen and 
the refectory. or to the library from the scriptorium."  (85) 
(1 I)  The fact is, Benno said, he had overheard a dialogue between Adelmo and 
Berengar in  which Berengar, referring to a secret Adelmo was asking him to 
reveal, proposed a vile barter, which even the most innocent reader can imagine. 
(1 37) 
(12)  It would already be serious enough if one of my monks had stained his soul with 
the hateful sin of suicide. But I have reason to think that another of them has 
stained himself with an equally terrible sin. (33) 
There  is  no  convincing  definition  of  definiteness  (and  specificity)  in  terms  of 
identifiability.  I will  assume here  that  definiteness expresses the discourse pragmatic 
property of familiarity (Karttunen 1976, Heim 1982, Kamp 198  1, and following work in 
discourse semantics). The second question is then  what  is the nature of  specificity. 1 
assume that specificity is a "referential  property"  of NPs. This property cuts across the 
distinction  of  definite vs.  indefinite, like genericity. Prince  (1981, 231) observes that 
both definite and indefinite NPs exhibit different "ways of referring": ' 
(1 3)  a.  A body was found in the river yesterday.  specific 
b.  A tiger has stripes.  generic 
c.  John is u plunzber.  predicative 
d.  I  never saw u two-lzeuded man.  attributive 
[= non-specific, KvH] 
e.  He won't say a word.  negative polarity 
idiom piece 
3  Prince  (1981, 231: "In  their  most usual reading, only  the italicized NP in  (la) [= (13a), KvH] can 
actually he  said  to  be  .specific. The italicized NPs  in  (Ih-e) [= (13b-el. KvHl  are all  non-specific, 
though  of  different  typcs  (generic,  predicative,  attributive,  and  negative  polarity  idiom-piece, 
respectively).  However, definite NPs  exhibit a similar  range of  undcrstandings".  My  use  of  "non- 
specific" correlates to Prince's  "attributive"  since I assume that specific as well  as non-specific NPs 
arc "individualized",  i.e. refer to one individual. Klaus von Heusinger 
(14)  a.  The body was found in the river yesterday.  specific 
[= referential, KvH] 
b.  The tiger has stripes.  generic 
c.  Ronald is the president.  predicative 
d.  They'll never find the man thut will please  them.  attributive 
[= non-specific, KvH] 
e.  He doesn't mean  the slightest thing to me.  negative polarity 
idiom piece 
The exact nature of  specificity will  be  discussed  in section  6. Informally, specificity 
mirrors a more fine-grained structure of  referential relations between  the items used in 
the  discourse  (what  Jackendoff  1972  calls  "modal  structure").  This  structure  is 
independent  of  the  discourse  pragmatic  status  of  the  NP  (expressed  in  terms  of 
definiteness) and the scopal behavior of that NP. Specificity affects definite NPs as well 
as  indefinite  NPs.  A  specific  NP  indicates  that  the  associated  discourse  item  is 
referentially  anchored  to  another  discourse  item,  and  therefore,  inherits  the  scopal 
properties of its anchor (among other properties).4 
(15)  Cross-classification of definiteness and specificity 
operators  ( spec. def. NPs 
referentially anchored to 
discourse referents 
referentially bound by 
This picture is confirmed by the early literature on specificity where often a comparison 
was made between  non-specific indefinite NPs and attributive readings of definite NPs, 
on the one hand, and specific indefinite NPs and referential  definite NPs on the other. 
(cf. Partee  1970). However, the comparison was mainly explained in terms of  scope or 
in terms of  an ambiguity between quantifiers and a referential operator (see section 4.1 
and 4.2) 
3.  Grammatical encoding of specificity 
discourse old 
referential or specific 
def. NPs 
attributive  or non- 
As opposed to definiteness, there are no sets of  specific vs. non-specific articles in Indo- 
European  languages.  This  probably  caused  the  assumption  of  the  purely  pragmatic 
nature of  specificity in contrast to the semantic nature of  definiteness (see section 4.1). 
However,  there  are  many  other  languages  that  mark  specificity  lexically  or 
morphologically.  Lyons  (1999, 59)  summarizes  observations  from  other  languages: 
"Articles  marking specificity, or something close to specificity, rather than definiteness 
are  fairly  widespread."  Specificity  is  also  often  mentioned  with  respect  to  DOM 
("differentiated  object marking",  see above). Bossong (1985, viii) notes that there are 
discourse new 
specific  indef. NPs 
non-spec. indef. NPs 
9  assulne that every NP receives an index that must be either anchared to a discourse item or bound by 
some discourse operator (such as negation, intensional vcrhs ctc.). The second condition  is necessary 
since  h<,lh dclinitc  and  indclinite  NPs  are  terms  which  can  servc  as  antecedents  for  anaphoric 
prtlnouns. In an alternative view, indefinites are predicates thal can receive a "singular termm-reading 
conlextual force. However, in  such a view thcre is no uniformity  of definite and  indefinite NPs. See 
section 6 for more discussion. Specificity and Definiteness in Sentence and Discourse Structure 
more than 300 languages from all over the world that exhibit DOM. In the remainder of 
this  section,  I  present  data  from  Turkish  where  specificity  is  reflected  in  the 
morphological marking of the direct object (which is often subsumed under DOM) and 
of the subject in embedded sentences.' 
3.1.  Turkish 
Turkish is an agglutinating and suffixing language. The main verb is sentence final and 
rnost suffixes are phrase-final. The unmarked  word order is: subject > indirect object > 
direct object >predicate, as illustrated in (16): 
(1 6)  ressam biz-e  resim-ler-i  goster-di 
artist  lpl-dat  picture-pl-acc  show-di.past 
'An artist showed us picture' 
Embedded  clauses  are  realized  by  nominalized  predicates.  The  subject  of  such 
nominalized predicates is in  the genitive (with or without a genitive case ending -  see 
below).  The  genitive  shows  agreement  on  the  nominalized  predicate  in  form  of 
possessive suffix. Embedded sentence can be arguments of superordinated predicates, as 
illustrated in (17): 
(17)  [Turkiye'nin, buyuk 01-dug-unl]-u  hil-ir-im 
Turkey-gen  big  be-NOM-3posI-acc  know-aor- lsg 
'I know the big-being of Turkey' = 'I know that Turkey is large' 
3.2.  Turkish object marking 
A language specific implementation of  specificity is found in  Turkish  (Kornfilt 1997, 
219fn. Turkish does not have a definite article, but  an  indefinite article hir, which is 
derived from the numeral bir, but which differs in distribution. The direct object can be 
realized  by  the  absolut(ive)  without  case endings  or by the  accusative  with  the case 
ending -I. Thus the definite reading of  a book is generally expressed by the accusative 
case ending, as in (18b), while the indefinite reading is realized by the indefinite article 
plus  the  absolutive,  as  in  (18c).  However,  the  combination  of  the  markers  for 
definiteness  and  indefiniteness  in  (18d) expresses  an  indefinite  specific  NP.  (18a) 
expresses a reading  that  comes close to  an  incorporated one (see Lewis  1967, Dede 
1986, Kornfilt 1997 among others) 
(18)  a.  (hen)  kitah  oku-du-m  incorporated 
I  book  read-past- lsg  "I was book-reading" 
b.  (hen)  kitub-z  oku-du-m  [definite] 
I  book-acc  read-past-l sg  "I read the book." 
c.  (hen)  bir kitup  oku-du-m  [indefinite] 
I  a book  read-past- l sg  "I read a book." 
This ohservation goes hack to Kornfilt (1997). I am not aware of othel- work that comparcs DOM with 
thc marking of suhjects in embedded sentence. Kornfilt (1997) assumes that the marking of specificity 
is not restl.icled to the direct object but also to the suhject. However, this is only visible in embedded 
suhjects since the suhject of the matrix scntence never receives a case. Klaus von Heusinger 
d.  (hen)  bir kitab-r  oku-du-m  [indef. spec.] 
I  a book-acc  read-past-lsg  "I read a certain book." 
Direct  objects with  case endings can only receive a specific reading, as illustrated in 
(19a) and (l9b) from Dede (1986, 158):' 
(19)  a.  Bir  ogrenci  an-yor-um.  Bulan-ml-yor-um 
a  student  look-for-prog-  l sg  find-NEG-aor-I sg 
'I am looking for a student. I can't find him'  [specific] 
'I arn looking for a student. I can't find one'  [non-specific] 
b.  Bir ogrenci-yi  ari-yor-um.  Bulanm~yorum 
a  student-acc  look-for-prog-1 sg  find-NEG-aor- 1  sg 
'I am looking for a student. I can't find him'  [specific] 
(*I can't find one)  [non-specific] 
3.3.  Turkish subject marking 
A  similar contrast exists for the subject of embedded  sentences. The predicate of  an 
embedded sentence in Turkish is a nominalized form that  shows agreement with the 
subject,  realized by the possessive  marker -I.  The subject is realized  in the genitive, 
either with the case ending -In, or without the combination of the indefinite article hir 
and the genitive case marks a specific subject (Kornfilt 1997, 219ff, ex. (762)=(20a)). 
Note that the non-specific subject tends to be closer to the predicate, while the specific 
one appears more clause-initial. 
(20)  a.  [koy-ii  haydut  bas-tlg-1n1-I  duy-du-m 
[village-acc  robber  raid-Nom-poss.3sgl-acc  hear-Past- 1 sg 
"I heard that robbers raided the village" 
b.  [bir haydut-un  koy-ii  bas-tlg-1n1-I  duy-du-m 
[a robber-gen  village-acc raid-Nom-poss.3sgl-acc  hear-Past-1 sg 
"I heard that a certain robber raided the village" 
3.4.  A contrastive view 
Even though the data are more complex than the given picture (see footnote 7), I assume 
that the case marking of the direct object and of the embedded subject in combination 
with the indefinite article is a fairly good indicator of a specific indefinite NP. This test 
6  Dede (1986, 157) observes that the condition for case marking of the direct object are more complex. 
Among other conditions, movement is marked hy Lhe  case: "The direct object which is removed from 
its unmarked  position, that is, from immediately preverbal  position  Tor  some rcason such as focusing 
or contrast of another constituent always takes the ACC case endings." 
(i)  Bizi~n  ev-de  ~ay-I  her zaman  Aytiil  yap-ar 
our  house-III~  ica-acc  always  Aytiil  make-aor 
'Aytiil always makes the tea in our family' 
(ih)  *Bizim ev-dc  C~Y  her raman  Aytiil  yap-ar 
Johanson (1977, cited from Johanson 1990, 181) had already observed this: ,,In dem Beitrag Johanson 
(1977, ...  ) wird geltend gemacht, dal3 die vom Akkusativsuff'ix gelragene Idce der ,Spczifiaitht' nus in 
dcr Position unmittelbar vor dcm regierenden Verb systematisch realisicrt werden kiinne und da8 der 
Akkusativ sonst meist als reiner Objektindikator funktioniere." Therefor, I usc only examples with the 
direct object in its base position. Specificity and Definiteness in Sentence and Discourse Structure 
is  in any  case more  robust  than  the  more  indirect  indicators  in  English  or Italian, 
illustrated by the translation in (21). The context of the novel is that one monk indicates 
to  William  of  Baskerville  (the medieval  Sherlock Holmes) that he knows  something 
(specific!), but that he is not ready to disclose it: "[ ...I But in the abbey there are rumors, 
... strange rumors ..." -  "Of  what sort?" 
(21) a.  i  "Strane. Diciamo, di un monaco che nottetempo ha voluto avventurarsi in 
.  . 
11  biblioteca, per cercare qualcosa che Malachia non aveva voluto dargli, e ha  .  . . 
111  visto serpenti, uomini senza testa, e uomini con due teste. Per poco non 
iv  usciva pazzo dal labirinto ..." 
b.  i  "Strange. Let us say, rumors about a monk who decided to venture into the 
.  . 
11  library during the night, to look for something Malachi had refused to give  . .  . 
111  him, and he saw serpents, headless men, and men with two heads. He was 
iv  nearly crazy when he emerged from the labyrinth ..." 
c.  i  Garip dylenti-ler ornegin,  [bir rahib-inl geceyarlsl, [[Mala~hi'nin~ 
kendine 
strange rumor-pl  for example, [a monk-gen  midnight  [[M.-gen 
himself-dat  .  . 
11  ver-mek  iste-me-dig-ill  bir kitab-I  bul-mak  iqin]  gizlice 
...  give-inf  want-NEG-NOM-poss.3sgl a  book-acc  find-inf  to  1  secretly 
111  kitapl~g-a  girmey-e  kalkiq-tig-I,]  (...)  dair  soylenti-ler 
library-&at  enter-to  venture-NOM-poss.3sgl  about  rumor-PI 
'There are strange rumors, for example rumors about [a monk midnights 
secretly into the library venturing [to find a book [that Malachi did not want 
to give him]]]' 
The context of  the novel  strongly suggests that the speaker knows the referent of  the 
indefinite  NP  a  nzonWun  monaco  but  not  the  referent  of  the  indefinite  pronoun 
sonzething/qualcoso. The specificity of  the indefinite a monk  is indicated  in  different 
ways: In the English translation the anaphoric pronoun he in  (2lbiii) doesn't seem to be 
embedded under the NP rumors. If that is the case then the indefinite NP u monk must 
be  specific, otherwise it could not  serve as antecedent for the pronoun.  In  the Italian 
original  the indicative mood  of  the relative clause (ha voluto) indicates that the head 
noun  un monaco is specific. This is confirmed by the Turkish translation,  where the 
subject hir  rahih-in of  the embedded sentence that  ends in  kalkzht~gz  shows double 
marking (indefinite article plus case ending). 
Note  that  the  Turkish  translation  bir  kitabz  for  the  Italian  yuulcosa  or  English 
something in  line (ii) is marked as specific. The specificity of this NP is confirmed by 
the setting of  the novel  (and the lexical meaning of  the word involved): Malachi (the 
librarian) can  only refuse to give something to the monk  if  the monk had  asked for a 
specific  thing.  In  Italian,  the  predicate  uvevu  voluto  in  the  relative  clause is  in  the 
indicative, and thus  indicating that the head  noun qualcosa is specific. In  English, the 
relative clause modifying something contains the proper name Malachi, which again is a 
good indication that the indefinite pronouns is linked to the referent of that proper name. 
In  comparing  the  three  languages, Turkish  marks  specificity clearly,  whereas  subtle 
indicators in English or Italian must be looked for. Klaus van Heusingcr 
3.5.  Unsolved cases 
Specificity is marked in Turkish by the combination of case suffixes and the indefinite 
article. However, a close inspection of  all those cases where we find case marking and 
the indefinite article reveals that we cannot always account for this marking in terms of 
specificity defined as "the speaker has in mind" or as wide scope of the indefinite. This 
was  already the  case  in  (21) with something/qualcose/biv kitabz. The following two 
cases are similar: the indefinite NP bir kitabz in  (22b) cannot be known to the speaker 
(that would contradict the plot of the story) but is still marked a specific. The NP in (23) 
is embedded under the conditional expressed by the conditional suffix -se. It  would not 
make sense to give wide scope to the indefinite or give it a referential reading, still it is 
marked as specific. 
(22)  a.  The day before, Benno had said he would be prepared to sin in order to 
procure a rare book. He was not lying and not joking. (1 83) 
b.  Bir  giin  once Benno az  bul-un-ur  bir  kitab~  elde etmek  i~in 
One day  before  B.  rare find-pass-SP  a  book-acc  procure-inf  to 
seve  seve  giinah i~leye-ceg-in-i  soyle-mi~ti. 
with  pleasure  sin  commit-fut-3sg-acc  say-mih.past. 
Yalan  soyle-mi-yor-du;  hakada  yap-ml-yor-du. (261) 
lie  say-NEG-prog-di.past; joke also  make-NEG-prog-di.past 
(23)  Bir rahip  bir kitab-I almak  iste-r-se,  (...I 
a monk  a book-acc  take  want-Aor-Cond  (...) 
'If a monk wants to take a book (...)' 
These examples can, of course, be understood as showing that the combination of case 
suffix and indefinite article doesn't always indicate specificity. However, as long as we 
do  not  know  what  kind  of  phenomena  we  are  ready  to  subsume  under  the  term 
vpecificity we cannot resolve this problem. 
4.  Types of specificity 
In  the discussion of  specificity, different kinds of  specific indefinites are distinguished. 
The  main  distinction  is  organized  into  two dimensions:  scope and  referentiality.  A 
prototypical specific indefinite is assumed to have wide scope and a referential reading. 
Depending on  the  theory, the one or  other  aspect  is  more  focused  upon.  Following 
Farkas  (1995),  I  present  the  following  groups:  (i)  scopal  specific  indefinites,  (ii) 
epistemic specific indefinite, and (iii) partitive specific indefinite. I discuss an additional 
group (iv) which I call "relative specific indefinites". 
4.1.  Scopal specificity 
Classically, the contrast between a specific and a non-specific reading of an indefinite is 
illustrated by  examples such as (24). The historical  reason  for this is that  in the same 
context definite NPs show different readings (see (3) and (4) above).'  The paraphrases 
1  It is intresting to note that many people who illustrate specificity with this examplc deny that it is also 
a category for definite NPs (see the discussion in section 2). 
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in  (24a)  and (24b) motivate the specific and non-specific readings  in  term of  scope, 
respectively. (24a) can be continuEd with the (24a') since the pronoun her refers back to 
the existential quantifier that is outside of  the scope of  want.  In  (24b), the quantifier is 
inside  the  scope, thus  a  link  to  a pronoun  is  not  possible.  Therefore, we  can  only 
continue as in (24b'): 
(24)  John wants to marry a Norwegian. 
a.  There is a Norwegianl, and John wants to marry her1 . 
a'.  He met herl last year. 
b.  John wants that there is a Norwegian1 and he marries herl 
b'.  He will move to Norway to try to achieve this goal. 
The  interaction  of  the  indefinite  with  other  operators  can  also  be  illustrated  with 
negation, as in  (25), with a universal  quantifier, as in  (26), or it can interact with more 
than  one other operator, as in  (26) and (27). In  these cases we expect three readings, 
which the reader can easily work out. 
(25)  Bill didn't see a misprint.  (Karttunen 1976) 
a.  There is a misprint which Bill didn't see. 
b.  Bill saw no misprints. 
(26)  Bill intends to visit a museum every day.  (Karttunen 1976) 
(27)  Luce expects Pinch to ask him for a book.  (Kasher & Gabbay 1976) 
Karttunen (1976, 377) observes that we can disambig~~ate  a sentence with an indefinite 
and  another operator  by  anaphoric  linkage. While the  indefinite  NP  in  (28)  can  be 
specific or non-specific, it can only be specific in (29).' 
(28)  Harvey courts a girl at every convention 
(29)  Warvey courts a girl at every convention. She is pretty 
4.2.  Epistemic specificity 
The contrast described in  the last section arises in the presence of other operators such 
as negation, universal quantifier or verbs of propositional attitudes. An analysis in terms 
of  scope  seems  to  work  well.  However,  there  are  examples  that  show  the  same 
(intuitive) contrast, but do not contain other operators. In  the specific reading of (30), 
we can continue with (30a), while the non-specific reading can be continued by (30b). 
Kasher & Gabbay (1976) mention examples (31)-(33), where they state a clear contrast 
between a specific and a non-specific reading. This contrast is also often described as 
referential vs. non-referential  terms. The specific indefinite refers to its referent directly, 
while the non-specific indefinite depends on  the interpretation of  other expressions in 
the context. 
X  There are ~xccptions  ~IJ  this  rule,  if  lhe conlinuation includes  a silnilar quantifier as the antecedent 
sentence: 
(i)  Harvey courts ri girl at every convention. She always comcs to the hanquet with him. Klaus von Heusinger 
(30)  A student in Syntax 1 cheated on the exam  (Fodor & Sag 1982) 
a.  His name is John 
b.  We are all trying to figure out who it was 
(3 1)  I talked with a magician and so did Uri.  (Kasher & Gabbay 1976) 
(32)  Olivia is married to a Swede, but she denies it 
(33)  A book is missing from my library. 
4.3.  Partitive specificity 
Milsark  (1974) argues  that  indefinite NPs  can  either  receive  a  weak  (or  existential) 
interpretation or a strong (or prepositional)  interpretation. In  (34) the indefinite some 
ghost  recelves  a  weak  interpretation,  but  gets  a  strong  interpretation  in  (35) 
(presupposing that  there are other groups of  ghosts.)  The reading in  (35) is generally 
called "partitive". 
(34)  There are some ghosts in this house 
(35)  Some ghosts live in the pantry; others live in the kitchen 
Enq (1 99  1, 5f) observes that this contrast between a partitive and a non-partitive reading 
of  indefinite NPs is in  the same way morphologically marked as the contrast between 
specific  vs.  non-specific  indefinite  (see  section  3  above for the  details  of  Turkish). 
Given (36) as the background knowledge for the participants, the speaker can utter (36a) 
expressing the partitive meaning: the two girls must be  included in  the named set. In 
Turkish this is marked by  the accusative suffix  -i on the direct object. Continuing with 
(36b) (without the suffix), the two girls are not included in the mentioned set. (36a) is 
equivalent to (37) with an overt partitive: 
(36)  Oda-m-a  birkaq  ~ocuk  gir-di 
room-poss. l sg-dat  several  child  enter-di.past 
'Several children entered my room' 
a.  Iki klz-1  tanl-yor-du-m 
two girl-acc  know-prog-di.past-1 sg 
'I knew two (of the) girls' 
b.  Iki k~z  anl-yor-du-m 
two girl  know-prog-di.past- lsg 
'I knew two girls' 
[partitive] 
[non-partitive] 
(37)  IGz-lar-dan  iki-sin-i  tani-yor-dum  [overt partitive construction] 
girl-pl-abl  two-pass.3sg-acc  know-prog-di.past-lsg 
'I knew two of the girls' 
Enq claims that partitives denote an unknown subset of a given set, here, two girls from 
the set of given girls. Partitives always exhibit wide scope since the set from which they 
pick some elements out is already mentioned. This means that partitives are complex 
expressions that  are formed  by  an  indefinite choice from a definite set. This view  is Specificity and Definitencss in Scntence and Discourse Structure 
supported  by  the contrast  between  the following three partitive expressions from the 
novel The Name ($the  Rose: the partitive one qfmy nzonks in (38) has a specific reading 
-  it refers to the monk Adelmo, who has been found dead at the beginning of the story. 
In (39), the partitive is rather non-specific, while in  (40), it is a negative one. 
(38)  "It would already be serious enough if one of my monks had stained his soul 
with the hateful sin of suicide. But I have reason to think that another of them 
has stained himself with an equally terrible sin." (33) 
(39)  "In  the first place, why one of the monks?  I11 the abbey there are many other 
persons, grooms, goatherds, servants  ..."  (33) 
(40)  The library was laid out on a plan which has remained obscure to all over the 
centuries, and which none of the monks is called upon to know. (37) 
So it seems that partitives are rather formed by two independent referential functions: 
the first can be specific, non-specific, negative, etc., while the second must be definite. I 
therefore, do not include them in the investigation of specific indefinites proper.9 
4.4.  Relative specificity 
There  are  indefinite  NPs  that  are  neither  wide  scope  nor  referential,  but  are  still 
"specific".  Higginbotham (1987, 64) illustrates this by the examples (41) and (42): 
"In  typical cases specific uses are said to  involve a referent that the speaker 'has in 
mind.'  But this condition seems much  too strong. Suppose my  friend George says to 
me, 'I met  with a certain student of  mine today.' Then I can report the encounter to a 
third party by  saying, 'George said that he met with a certain student of  his today,' and 
the 'specificity' effect is felt, although I am in no position to say which student George 
met with." 
(41) George: "I met a certain student of mine" 
(42)  James: "George met a certain student of  his." 
Hintikka (1986) had made a similar observation in his discussion of  the expression a 
certain. In  (43), he  shows that  the  specific  indefinite  u  certain  +t'omaa  can  receive 
narrow  scope with  respect to  the universal  quantifier  and still  be  specific: there is a 
specific woman for each man. Hintikka suggests that the specific indefinite NP is to be 
represented  by  a  Skolem-function  that  assigns to  each  man  the  woman  who  is  his 
mother. With  Farkas  (1997) we  can  describe  the  dependency  of  the  specific  NP  a 
certain woman from the universal quantifier every marl  by the concept of "co-variation:" 
Farkas builds this dependency into the interpretation process: The value for the specific 
indefinite woman co-varies with the value for man. In  other words, once the reference 
for  man  is  fixed  (during  the  process  of  interpreting  the  universal  quantifier),  the 
reference  for  the  specific  indefinite  is  simultaneously  fixed.  In  (43b), I  informally 
'  Lyons  (1999,  100) expresses  a  similar  view  with  respect  to  thc  partitive  article  in French:  "The 
partitive  arlicle is almost certainly  best regarded  as n  genuine partitive construction, and not  as an 
indefinite article." 
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indicate this  by  indexing  the  indefinite NP with  the variable  bound by  the universal 
quantifier.'' 
(43)  According to Freud, every man unconsciously wants to marry a certain 
woman -  his mother. (Hintikka 1986) 
a.  Vx [Man(x) -> Wants(x, marry(x, f(x))] 
with f: Skolem function from men into their mothers 
b.  Vx [Man(x) -> Wants(x, marry(x, [a woman],] 
These observations  motivate a revision of the pre-theoretical description of specificity 
as  the  "certainty  of  the  speaker  about  the  referent".  It  was  shown  that  a  specific 
indefinite NP need not  depend on the speaker or the context of  utterance, it can also 
depend on other linguistic entities like the universal quantifier even: man in  (43) or on 
the proper  name George in  (42). This was the same dependency we have informally 
stated in  (I), where the indefinite pronoun something depends on the indefinite NP a 
monk. In  thC following sections, I assume that specificity is a marker for an expression 
that is r<ferentiallv unchored to another expression, rather than "absolutely"  related to 
the speaker. Before I give my formal reconstruction  of this idea, I present some current 
approaches to specificity. 
5.  Semantic theories of specificity 
In  the following I discuss three semantic approaches to definiteness and specificity: (i) 
the pragmatic  view;  (ii) the lexical  ambiguity view,  and  (iii) the discourse semantics 
approach. The first two theories share the assumptions that definite and indefinite NPs 
are  both  quantifier  phrases.  The  difference  between  the  quantifier  phrases  is  the 
uniaueness  condition  of  the  definite  article.  The theories  differ  in the conceotion  of 
specificity:  the  pragmatic  approach  explains  scopal  specificity  in  terms  of  scope 
behavior  of  the quantifiers  involved,  while  epistemic  specificity is  seen  as  a purely 
pragmatic notion.-The lexical ambiguity view assumes that there are two interpretations 
of  indefinite NPs: an existential and a referential. The latter has the same properties as 
other  referential  terms  such  as  proper  names  and  deictic  expressions.  Discourse 
semantics, on the other hand, perceives the difference between  definite and indefinite 
NPs  not  in  the  uniqueness  condition  but  in  the  discourse-pragmatic  familiarity 
condition. A definite expression is linked to an  already introduced discourse item, while 
a  indefinite  NP  is  not.  Specificity  is  primarily  treated  as  an  irregular  behavior  of 
indefinites - indefinites  that  can  introduce  their  discourse  referents  in  any  of  the 
superordinated boxes. 
All  three  approaches  in  their  classical  versions  are unable  to  account for relative 
specific indefinites. However, there are extensions of  each of the mentioned approaches 
that  are intended to cover exactly these cases: Schwarzschild (2000) and Yeom  1997 
suggest  domain  restrictions  for  the  pragmatic  approach,  Kratzer  (1998)  proposes 
"'  Farkas focuses on a sorncwhlll different case, namely on indefinites in the scope ot'sorne operator. She 
describes  then  the  narrow  scope  (=  "non-specific")  indefinites  as  "dependent  indefinite".  Thus, 
according to Farkas, dependent indefinites are non-specific. In  my view,  they can he specific if they 
co-vary with the value of an extensional operator like in (43) (see seclion 6 helow). Specificity and Definiteness in Sentence and Discoursc Structure 
dependent  choice functions for the referential  reading of  the indefinite article; Geurts 
(2001) proposes accommodation for discourse semantics approach. 
5.1.  Quantifiers and pragmatics I 
The classical theory of NPs (Frege, Russell, Montague) translates definite and indefinite 
NPs  into quantifiers:  indefinite NPs  are existential  quantifier  phrases,  while  definite 
NPs are translated into a complex quantifier phrase expressing uniqueness of the object 
that falls under the description. Thus, the difference between indefinite and definite NPs 
is semantically expressed in the uniqueness condition. This was the background of this 
classical theory, as the notion of specificity was introduced in the late 60s. When the de 
re-de dicto ambiguity of  definite NPs was applied to indefinite NPs, a similar contrast 
appeared  in  the  context  of  verbs  of  propositional  attitudes,  negation,  questions, 
conditionals, modals, future, and  intensional  verbs (see Jackendoff  1972). I illustrate 
this on the interaction from negation and NPs in (44)-(47): 
(44)  William didn't see the book -  until he saw it in the finis africae. 
a.  Vx 3y [book(y) -> x = y & -See(william,  x)] 
(45)  William didn't see the hook  -he began to wonder if there is one 
a.  7Vx 3y [book(y) -> x = y & See(william, x)] 
(46)  William didn't see a book from the finis africae -  until he saw it in the hands of 
Jorge de Burgos. 
a.  3y [book(y) & ~See(william,  x)] 
(47)  William didn't see a book -  so he knew that they had removed all books. 
a.  73y [book(y) See(william, x)] 
Epistemic  specificity,  as  in  (48),  is  explained  by  pragmatic  principles.  The 
characterization  of  specific NPs as "the  speaker as  the referent  in  mind"  is of purely 
pragmatic  grounds - in  the  course of  discourse,  the  speaker  and  hearer  might  get 
sufficient descriptive material  in order to be able to uniquely identify the indefinite NP 
(cf. Neale 1990, Ludlow & Neale 199 I). 
(48)  A book is missing from my library. 
This  view  was  disputed  by  Jackendoff  (1972)  and  Fodor  (1970). They  argued  that 
specificity  cannot  be  explained  in  terms  of  quantifier  scope - there  must  he  an 
additional structure, what Jackendoff calls "modal structure". However, they had not the 
appropriate means to describe this structure in an adequate way. 
5.2.  Lexical ambiguity approach 
Fodor & Sag (1982) propose a lexical ambiguity of  the indefinite article, giving up a 
uniform analysis of indefinites. Indefinites have either a specific or referential reading or 
they have a non-specific or existential reading. They assume that the contrast between 
the  two readings  is  incommensurable.  They illustrate this  point  by  the  interaction  of 
indefinites with quantifiers as in  (49). The indefinite has either a specific reading or a 
non-specific  reading. The classical approach  to this contrast  is by  means of different Klaus von Heusinger 
scope: the indefinite NP can get wide or narrow scope with respect  to the definite NP 
the rumor, reflecting the specific and non-specific reading, respectively. However, the 
universal  phrase  each  student  in  (50)  cannot  receive  wide  scope  due  to  an  island 
constraint. Thus,  the  specific  reading  in  (49) cannot  be  described  by  a  wide  scope 
existential quantifier. Fodor & Sag propose that the indefinite NP is either interpreted as 
a  referring  expression  or  as  an  existential  quantifier.  The  referring  expression  is 
scopeless  like proper  names  and  demonstratives,  i.e.  it  behaves  as  if  it  always  had 
widest scope, as in (49b). The quantificational interpretation, as in  (49a), must observe 
island constraint like other quantifiers and accounts here for the non-specific reading. 
(49)  John overheard the rumor that a student of mine had been called before the 
dean. 
a.  the rumor > there is a student 
b.  a certain student .> the rumor ... he ... 
(50)  John overheard the rumor that each student of mine had been called before the 
dean. 
a.  the rumor > each student 
b.  *each student > the rumor 
The theory makes a clear prediction: an  indefinite is  interpreted  either as a referential 
term and always receives widest scope, or as an existential quantifier, which has to obey 
scope islands. We can now test this prediction on examples with two quantifiers as in 
(49)  or (51). In  both  sentences, there are two quantifiers beside  the indefinite, which 
stands in  a scope island. According to Fodor & Sag's  theory, we would only expect a 
narrow scope reading by the existential interpretation and a wide scope reading by the 
referential  interpretation,  but  no  intermediate  reading.  While  judgements  on 
intermediate readings are quite intricate, Farkas (1981) observed on examples, like (51), 
that intermediate readings are often very natural. (51) has a reading according to which 
for  each  student there  is  one condition  such  that  the  student  comes  up  with  three 
arguments against the condition. 
(5  1)  Each student has to come up with three arguments that show that some condition 
proposed by Chomsky is wrong. 
a.  each student > some condition > three arguments ... 
The intermediate reading (52a) of (52) clearly states that even such a radical theory of 
ambiguity cannot exhaustively describe the flexibility of indefinite NPs. 
Kratzer  (1998) defends the lexical  ambiguity hypothesis of  Fodor & Sag (1982). She 
assumes  that an  indefinite NP is either represented as an  existential quantifier, which 
obeys island constraints, or as a choice function J; which is bound by the context and, 
therefore, has widest scope. A choice functionf'or 0  is a function that assigns to a set 
one of its elements. In other words a choice function "selects" one element out of the set 
that is expressed by the descriptive material. Following von  Heusinger (1997, 2000) I 
represent indefinite NPs as indexed epsilon terms, as illustrated in  (52). The reason for 
this is to distinguish between the logical representation (epsilon terms) and the semantic 
interpretation (choice functions). The epsilon operator is interpreted as a choice function Specificity and Definiteness in Sentence and Discourse Structure 
that assigns one element to each set."  In  other words, the  referent of an indefinite NP 
is found by selecting one element out of  the set that  is described by  the description. 
Kratzer assumes that the choice function is always anchored in the context of utterance, 
here  indicated  with  speuker.  However, the  intermediate  reading  is  created  by  the 
dependence of descriptive content of the indefinite from  the  value  for professor.  The 
extension  of  the  set  of  books  recommended  by  x co-varies  with  the  value  of  x for 
professor. The choice function picks different elements from different sets. Note that the 
set of  recommended  books can contain more than one book.  It  is the choice function 
that singles out one element: 
(52)  a condition:  E~X  [condition(x)] 
a.  [[E~x  [condition(x)]]] = @([[condition]]) 
b.  @([[condition]]) E  ([[condition]]) 
(53)  Every professor rewarded every student who read a book he had recommended 
a.  Vx[prof(x) --t Vy[stud(y) & read(y, &speaker~[b~~k(~)  & rec(x, z)]) 4 
rew(x, y)ll 
h.  Ila  book he had recommendedll = eSpeak,,z[book(z)  & rec(x, z)]) 
There are two problems with this account (cf. the discussion  in Winter  1997 and von 
Stechow 2000). First, Farkas (1981) showed with examples like (51) that intermediate 
readings are possible even without variables in the indefinite NP. This problem can be 
accommodated if  one assumes that additional material can be copied into the descrivtion 
of the indefinite NP (here: some condition x,find.s dzficult). Second, if the set described 
by the descriptive material of the indefinite is extensionally equivalent for two different 
choices of  p;ofessors  in  (54a), the representation counter-intuitively predicts that they 
invite the same lady. Kratzer (1998), therefore, modifies her approach and indexes the 
choice function  (here the epsilon  operator) with  the variable x that  is bound  by  the 
universal  quantifier. She now can predict that depending on the professor  x, the choice 
from extensional similar sets can be different. 
(54)  Every professor invited a lady he knew 
a.  Vx [prof(x) 4  invite(x, ~~~~~k~~~[~ady(y)  & know(x,y)l))l 
b.  Vx  [prof(x) 4  invite(x, &,y[lady(y) & know(x,y)]))J 
5.3.  Quantifiers and pragmatics I1 
An alternative way to handle the mentioned problems is taken by Schwarzschild (2000) 
who keeps to the classical picture described in section 5.1. He investigates the properties 
of unique indefinite NPs or "singleton  indefinites", such as in (55). 
(55)  Everyone at the party voted to watch a movie that Phi1 said his favorite. 
"  Choice functions have recently become  a fashionable tool  for representing  indefinites  (cf. Kratzer 
1998, Wintcr  1997, von Stechow 2000, von Heusinger 2000 among others). We use the epsilon ope- 
rator  as  the  syntactic  representation  of  the  indefinite  article,  while  the  choice  function  is  the 
corresponding semantic function. Klaus von Heusinger 
Schwarzschild argues that the wide scope reading of  the indefinite NP in  (55) derives 
from the fact that its descriptive material uniquely describes one object. He then claims 
that  all  "referential  indefinites"  (or "specific  indefinites")  are singleton indefinites. In 
other  words,  it  is just  the  descriptive  material  that  causes  the  "feeling"  of  different 
scopes.  He  has  to  assume  additionally  implicit  quantifier  domain  restrictions  - 
something that is necessary for other quantifiers, anyway. A restriction can also include 
variables that are bound by other quantifiers in the sentence. He uses this mechanism to 
account for the intermediate reading (56a) of sentence (56). By domain restriction with 
the additional material that they have worked on most extensively the indefinite uniquely 
describes a problem for each or the linguists (assuming all of  them are working on at 
least one problem). Thus the indefinite some problem  behaves as  having wider scope 
than ever,>  analy.ris It  is interesting to note that the same mechanism of adding a variable 
to descriptive material  of  the indefinite is used to "widen"  the scope (Schwarzschild) 
and to make the scope more narrow (Kratzer above). Schwarzschild is able to explain 
the  different  scope  "behavior"  of  the  indefinite  NP  by  assuming  different  domain 
restrictions on the indefinite that can stay in  situ: none for the narrow scope reading, a 
restriction with a variable bound  by most linguists for the intermediate reading, and a 
restriction somehow connected to the speaker or to more encyclopedic knowledge. 
(56)  Most linguists have looked at every analysis that solves some problem. 
a.  Most linguists -  some problem -  every analysis 
(56')  Most linguists have looked at every analysis that solves some problem that they 
have worked on most extensively 
(56)  b.  Most linguists  ...  every analysis ... some problem 0  narrow scope 
c.  Most linguists ... every analysis ... some problem that 
they have worked on most extensively 
intermediate 
d.  Most linguists ... every analysis ... some 
problem that I  find  most difficult 
that Chomsb  had announced that it is solve  wide scope 
I cannot evaluate this approach in detail, but I would like to hint at some problems: (i) 
the domain restriction always ends up with a uniquely identifying description -  a simple 
domain  restriction  like  that they like would not do. It  is not so clear why  we need 
singletons  in  examples  like  (51)  above.  Furthermore,  the  uniqueness  condition  for 
indefinites  seems to  be  even more disastrous than  for definites. Lewis  (1979), Heim 
(19821, Reimers (1992) among others have convincingly shown that domain restriction 
to uniques  is  not  always possible  for definite NPs.  Second, it  is  not  clear what  the 
difference  between  a  definite NP  and  an  indefinite  NPs  is  if  not  uniqueness  in  the 
classical picture. Schwarzschild would answer that it is familiarity from the discourse 
representation theory, yet it is not clear what the theoretical framework is after all. 
A  related  approach  is  proposed  by  Yeom  (1998,  71),  who  models  the  "generally 
accepted intuition of specificity is that the speaker has something in mind." He extends 
the semantics of indefinites as existential quantifiers by  an additional two place relation 
hccw for has cognitive contact with . One place is filled by the variable bound by  the 
existential  quantifier  and the other must be  salient in  the  local environment (e.g. the 
speaker or the subject of  the sentence). The adjective a certain in English is the overt Specificity and Definiteness in Scntencc and Discourse Structure 
expression for this  relation,  however, specific  indefinites  without  a  certain  do also 
express  this  relation.  Thus, he  can  account  for cases of  relative  specificity  (see 4.4 
above) in  the following  way  (1998, 73). Sentence (57) has two readings:  in  reading 
(57a), there is one woman  such that every Englishmen adores her -  here the cognitive 
contact is licensed by  the speaker. In  the second reading, every Englishman  adores a 
certain  woman  - his  mother  (everyone  potentially  a  different  woman).  Here  the 
cognitive contact is licensed by the variable x for Englishman. Thus, woman co-varies 
with Englishman. 
(57)  Every true Englishman adores a certain woman -his mother. 
Note that it is the same strategy as employed by  Kratzer and Schwarzschild: inserting a 
variable into the descriptive material of  the indefinite, the extension of  the descriptive 
material co-varies with the value for the variable. However, in  Yeom's  approach, there 
is no restriction on the set that fulfills the descriptions -  there could be different woman 
an  Englishman  adores.  Therefore,  the  existential  quantification  looks  more  like  a 
partitive  constmction,  discussed  in  section  4.3 (one  of  the  woman  he has  cognitive 
contact  with).  Remember, Kratzer prevents  such problems  by  using choice functions 
and  Schwarzschild  by  assuming  a  uniquely  identifying  description.  If  we  modify 
Yeom's  approach  towards  Schwarzschild's,  all  the  problems  discussed  with 
Schwarzschild  arise:  (i) uniqueness  is  already  problematic  for  definite  NPs,  (ii)  if 
specific indefinites are also uniques, what is the difference from definite NPs then? 
5.4.  Discourse representation 
Discourse representation  theories  (Karttunen  1976, Heim  1982, Kamp  1981) assume 
that NPs are represented as discourse referents associated with their descriptive material 
(or:  as variables  that  are  associated with  sentences). So NPs  do not  refer  directly to 
individuals but  to discourse  referents. The distinction between  definite and indefinite 
NPs  is  that  of  familiarity:  a  definite expression  receives a  discourse  referent  that  is 
linked  to  an  already  established  discourse  referent,  while  an  indefinite  receives  a 
discourse referent that is not or cannot linked. Discourse referents of indefinite NPs are 
always  inserted  into  the  current  discourse  domain  or  box  while  referential  terms 
introduce their discourse referents in the main box. 
Kamp & Reyle (1993, 290) assume with Fodor & Sag that specific indefinite NPs are 
referring terms like proper names "Specifically  used indefinites act as referring  terms, 
terms that are used to refer to particular things, whose identity is fixed independently of 
the context in which the term occurs." Intermediate readings are represented by placing 
the discourse referent for the indefinite NP into some higher box -  the exact rules for 
this are not given. They neither state conditions that restrict this assumed flexibility. 
Geurts  (2001) explains  specificity  in  terms  of  backgrounding.  He  assumes  that 
"Background material  tends to float up towards the main DRS." Indefinite NPs are not 
ambiguous between a specific and non-specific reading; they always introduce variables 
and  associated  predicates.  The  predicates  are  inserted  into  the  discourse  structure 
according to  their  background  status. This  seems like  another version  of  the  scope 
theory discussed above, even though the predictions are somewhat different. Klaus von Heusingct 
To  summarize,  there  have  been  basically  two  ways  to  model  relative  specific 
indefinites: In the pragmatic approach, domain restriction is used to produce a singleton 
set corresponding to the indefinite NP. In the lexical ambiguity view, choice functions 
are replacing a referential operator and they can depend on other linguistic expressions. 
Choice  function  naturally  glve  one  individual  to  each  set.  However,  here  a  lexical 
ambiguity between  specific  and  non-specific NPs  are  as\umed. In  the next section, I 
preset a unified approach. 
6.  Specificity as referential anchoring 
The main assumption of my proposal is that indefinite NPs are translated into indexed 
epsilon terms. The index on the epsilon term is free. It can either be bound by operators 
like  negation  or the  textual  closure  resulting  in a  non-specific  reading,  or  it  can  be 
anchored to another discourse item such as the speaker or the subject of the sentence. In 
the following, I give a brief sketch of my model. 
Following von Heusinger (1997, 2000) we represent indefinite NPs as indexed epsilon 
terms, as illustrated in (58): 
(58)  a book:  &ix  [book(x)J 
The epsilon operator is interpreted as a choice function that assigns one element to each 
set (see above (52)-(53)). In  other words, the  referent of  an  indefinite NP is found by 
the operation of  selecting one element out of the set that is described by the description. 
The selection depends on the context in which the indefinite is located. This treatment is 
similar  to  that  of  discourse  representation  theories  (Heim  1982; Kamp  1981), where 
indefinites introduce new  individual  variables  or discourse referents. One of  the main 
advantages of using choice function variables instead is the following: Indefinites need 
not be moved or raised for expressing different dependencies. 
This approach  differs from other approaches using choice functions  (Winter  1997, 
Kratzer  1998) in at least two respects. Winter (1997) assumes that the choice function is 
existentially bound  at some level. He would only describe specific indefinite NPs by 
scope  interactions,  anything  else  is  pragmatics.  Thus  he  stands  in  the  pragmatic 
approach  to  specificity  (see  section  5.1).  Kratzer,  on  the  other  side,  assumes  two 
different representations of indefinite NPs: either as choice functions (specific reading) 
or  as  existential  quantifiers  (non-specific  reading).  I  assume  that  there  is  one 
representation of indefinites, namely as indexed epsilon terms. The index, however, may 
either be bound by  some operator such as negation  or existential closure, or it can be 
anchored to  some discourse item. So we can  analyze the readings  of  (59) as the non- 
specific reading (59a), and the two specific readings (59b) and (59c). In (59a) the index 
is  bound  by  an  existential  quantifier  in  the  scope  of  the  negation - therefore,  the 
indefinite has narrow scope with respect to the negation. In (59b) and (59c), the index is 
anchored to the speaker and to the subject of the sentence, respectively. In both cases the 
indefinite receives wide scope with respect to the negation. 
(59)  William didn't see a book. 
a.  73i  See(william, E,X  [book(x)]) 
b.  -See(william,  E~~~~~~~x  [book(x)]) Specificity and Definiteness in Sentencc and Discourse Structure 
There  is  no  difference  between  (59b)  and  (59c) in  terms  of  scope. However,  if  we 
replace  the  subject  with  a  quantifier  phrase  as  in  (43), repeated  as  (60), we  get  a 
different picture. (60a) is the representation for the relative specific reading, according 
to which the choice of  the indefinite depends on the value for man, while (60b) is the 
representation for a speaker specific reading -  here the indefinite has wide scope. 
(60)  According to Freud, every man unconsciously wants to marry a certain woman. 
a.  Vx [man(x) -> want(x, marry(x, &,y  [woman(y)])]  subject specific 
b.  Vx [man(x) -> want(x, marry(x, ~~~,~k~~y  [woman(y)])]  speaker 
specific. 
The same contrast can also be represented in the absence of any other operator, such as 
in  (61). Even though the two representations result  in  the same scope behavior of  the 
indefinite NP, they express a different referential anchoring relation of the indefinite. 
(6 1)  A book is missing from the library. 
a.  3i missing-from(&ix [book(x)], the-library)  non-specific 
h.  missing-from(~~~~~k,,x  [book(x)], the-library)  specific 
7.  Summary 
I argued that the pretheoretical characterization of specificity in (2) above as (i) certainty 
of  the speaker about the identity of  the referent, (ii) the referent is fixed, (iii) specific 
indefinite NP is "scopeless",  (iv) specific indefinite NPs are referential terms, and (v) 
specific indefinite NPs can be paraphrased by  a certain, can only describe a restricted 
set of  specific expressions. I showed on observations from Turkish that not all specific 
indefinites  fall  under  this  characterization.  The  discussion  of  recent  theories  of 
specificity  lead to a  similar result:  Specificity cannot be  described  in  terms of  wide 
scope behavior or in  terms of rigid reference. I argued that the reference of  a specific 
expression depends on the "anchor"  expression. Once the reference for the anchored is 
determined, the reference  for the  specific  term  is  also determined, giving a  specific 
reading of the indefinite. 
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1.  Introduction 
1.1.  Indefinites and scope 
The principal  characteristic  of  specific indefinites is that  they have a predilection  for 
taking wide scope (I will argue eventually that specificity has nothing to do with scope, 
in the grammarians'  sense, but for the time being I will use the notion as an expository 
device for distinguishing between readings): 
(I)  a.  After all that effort and time they now don't know where 40 per cent of it 
is. (New Scientist, 24 April 1999; the neuter pronoun refers to 182 
kilograms  of  plutonium  dumped  into  the  Irish  Sea by  the  Sellafield 
nuclear plant.) 
b.  All critics who were invited to cornrnent on some poems written by a 2- 
year-old bonobo hailed them as mature masterpieces. 
The  indefinite NP '40 per cent of  it'  in  (la) occurs  within the syntactic scope of  a 
negation  sign and an attitude verb, but it is interpreted as if they weren't there; for what 
the sentence means is something like:  '40 per cent of the plutonium  is such that they 
don't  know where it is.'  The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for the indefinite 'a 2-year- 
old  bonobo'  in  (lb). Observations  like these have been  taken  to  show  that  specific 
indefinites always take widest scope, or even that they ate referential expressions (e.g. 
Fodor and Sag 1982), but as examples given already by Kasher and Gabbay (1976) and 
Farkas (1981) demonstrate, neither claim is correct: 
(2)  a.  Now, after all that effort and time, they say they don't know where 40 
per cent of it is. ( New Scientist, 24 April 1999) 
b.  Each student has to come up with three arguments which show that some 
condition proposed by Chomsky is wrong. (Farkas 198  1) 
" 
This is a truncated  and emended vcrsion of a paper that has been out in the open for two years now 
(Geurts 1999h). I have excised a section that in the meantime appeared as a squib in Linguistic Inquiry 
(Geurts 2000a), whcre il is argued that spccific indefinites cannot in gencral be construed in sihl, or in 
other words, that movement of some sort is callcd for; hcre it will he taken for granted that this is so. 
Furthermore,  I  now  take  a  fresh  tack  in  my  attempt at routing  the  widespread  belief  that  specific 
indefinites  'refcr'  to entities that are known to the speaker, though not (or at least not necessarily) to 
the  hcarer  (9  1.2). Paul  Dekker's  comments  made  me  see  that  my  first  attempt  was  not  entirely 
successful, and although I have not yet given it up altogether, I decided to give it a rest for the time 
being. The remainder of the current version is virtually identical to its predecessor. For comments and 
discussion I am indehted to Reinhard Blutner, Paul Dekker, Brenda Kennelly, Rob van der Sandt, and 
Henk Zeevat. 
ZAS Papers in Ling~listics  24, 2001, 191-214 c.  The police  report  might  indicate  that  Mary  wants  to  marry  a  Swede. 
(Kasher and Gabbay 1976) 
((la) occurred  in  a caption, and (2a)  in  the  text,  of  the  same article.) The intended 
interpretation  of  (2a)  presumably  is  that  'they  say  that  40  per  cent  of  the  dumped 
plutonium  is  such  that  they  don't  know  where  it  is,'  and  the  same holds,  mutatis 
mutundis, for the prepositional object in  (2b) and u Swede in  (2c). Hence, in  each case 
the specific indefinite is interpreted as if  it occurred midway between  its actual surface 
position and the outermost scope-bearing expression. 
In all these examples there appears to be mismatch between the position at which an 
indefinite appears and its preferred interpretation. Following many of the more recent 
contributions to the literature, I will assume that this is the hallmark of  specificity (e.g. 
Ahusch  1994, Reinhart  1997, Winter 1997, van Geenhoven 1998). Such mismatches are 
not  the  norm:  indefinites  are often  interpreted  in  situ, and  there  is  some reason  for 
taking  this  to  be  the  default  option. The  reason  is  that  comparatively  'neutral',  i.e. 
semantically  attenuate,  indefinites  have  a  preference  for  in  situ  readings,  as  the 
following pairs illustrate: 
(3)  a.  Several students reported that they had been harassed by a professor. 
b.  Several  students reported  that  they  had  been  harassed  by  a professor 
emeritus from the law faculty. 
(4)  a.  Several students reported that they had been harassed by professors. 
b.  Several  students  reported  that  they  had  been  harassed  by  professors 
wearing false beards and pink gowns. 
Both (3a) and (4a) are more likely to be understood with the sentence-final indefinite 
interpreted in  situ. It is only when  these expressions become  'heavier'  that  a specific 
reading is enforced, as (3b) and (4b) illustrate. Note, incidentally, that  (4b) belies the 
popular view that bare plural indefinites are always construed hz  situ. It may be the case 
that they like such readings better than most other indefinites do, but bare plurals allow 
for specific constmals, too. 
On the strength of  these observations it may be assumed that  in  situ interpretations 
are the rule, and specific interpretations the exception. Van Geenhoven (1998) suggests, 
furthermore, that  wide-scope  constmals  of  specific  indefinites  are  preferred,  ceteris 
pc~rihus,  to intermediate-scope construals. I believe that she right  about this, though it 
must be conceded be that intuitions are rather subtle. At any rate, the argument must be 
along the same lines as previously: 
(5)  a.  Every city was represented by twelve athletes sponsored by a brewery. 
b.  Every  city  was  represented  by  twelve  athletes  sponsored  by  a  local 
brewery. 
(6)  a.  Every newspaper featured multiple reviews of a gothic novel. 
b.  Every newspaper featured multiple reviews of a gothic novel  written  by 
its editor-in-chief. 
Setting  in  situ  readings  aside, it  seems  to  me  that  in  the  (a)  sentences  there  is  a 
preference  for  construing  the  sentence-final  indefinites  as  having  wide,  rather  than intermediate, scope. The balance tips, however, when the indefinites are enhanced with 
material  enabling a  link  with  the universally quantified  subject,  as the  (b) examples 
demonstrate. These  observations  support  van  Geenhoven's  claim that,  all  else being 
equal, wide-scope readings are more easily obtainable than intermediate-scope ones. It 
bears  emphasizing  that  these  preferences  hold  ceteris  purihus  only,  and  are  easily 
overridden  by  considerations  of  plausibility,  as  indeed  the  examples  in  (3)  to  (6) 
demonstrate. 
We  thus  arrive  at  the  following  preference  order  on  the  range  of  possible 
interpretations of indefinite NPs: 
in situ < wide scope < intermediate scope 
Needless to say, this is a puzzling pattern, to put it mildly, but we will see later on how 
it can be accounted for in a principled manner. 
1.2.  No need to know 
There is a widespread belief that in order for an indefinite NP to be used with a specific 
interpretation, the speaker must have a particular individual  in  mind  (e.g. Kasher and 
Gabbay 1976, Fodor and Sag 1982, Manga 1996, Kratzer  1998, Yeom  1998, van Rooy 
1999). It  might  be  thought  that  this  explains the  unmistakable  family  resemblance 
between specific indefinite NPs, on the one hand, and definite NPs, on the other (which 
will be documented at some length in the next section). Just as a speaker employs the 
definite article  to  signal  that  an  individual  is  given  as  part  of  the  common  ground 
between him and the hearer, he employs a specific indefinite if he wants to indicate that 
an  individual is known to him, though not to his audience. In short: while definiteness 
implies givenness to speaker and hearer, specificity implies accessibility to the speaker 
alone.  (For  obvious  reasons,  there  are  no  linguistic  devices  for  signaling  that  an 
individual is accessible to the hearer alone.) 
This view  on  specificity is untenable.  As  Haspelmath  (1997) points  out, there are 
many languages that allow indefinite NPs to be morphologically flagged as 'unknown 
to the speaker', but the use of  such flags doesn't  entail non-specificity. For example, 
German  'irgendein  N'  conveys that  the  speaker doesn't  know  the N  in  question,  but 
may well be used specifically: 
(7)  Wilma hat vor, irgendeinen Schweden zu heiraten 
Wilma intends some-or-other Swede to marry. 
But even in the absence of explicit morphological  clues. there are many cases in which 
it is simply false, intuitively speaking, that the witness of  a specific indefinite must be 
known  to the  speaker.  This  is  especially problematic  when  specific  indefinites  take 
intermediate  scope, but  these  are  not  the  only  cases.  Consider  (la), for example. It 
would  be  patently  wrong  to  say  that  the  author  of  this  sentence  must  have  had  a 
particular  portion  of  plutonium  in  mind; yet there  can  hardly  be  any  doubt that  the 
indefinite '40 per cent of it'  is being employed in a specific sense. Whatever it may be, 
having something in mind is not a prerequisite for specificity. 
Having  arrived at this conclusion, we  should ask ourselves how  we can recognize 
specificity  in  the  absence  of  telltale  scope-bearing  expressions. The  answer to  this 
question, I submit, is that by and large we can't. That is to say, the chief problem for a theory of  specificity is to  account for the interaction  between  specific indefinites and 
further scope-bearing expressions occurring in  the same sentence. (I am still using the 
notion of scope in  a theory-neutral  sense, and these remarks will not prevent me from 
claiming, later on, that indefinites, be they specific or non-specific, don't have scope.) 
Apart from that, I know of only one phenomenon which might fall under the purview of 
a theory of specificity: 
(8)  At the party, Fred danced with an Irish woman, and so did Barney. 
This sentence may or may not be construed as implying that Fred and Barney danced 
with  the  same woman, and  if  this  is to  do with the fact that  the  indefinite  'an Irish 
woman'  is either specific or non-specific, as suggested by  Kasher and Gabbay (1976), 
then  this  is a case in  which  specificity manifests  itself  even  in  the absence of  other 
scope-bearing expressions. 
1.3.  Similarities between specific indefinites and definites 
It  was hinted already that, in certain respects, there is a resemblance between  specific 
indefinites  and definite expressions. In  fact, the  similarities are quite striking, as the 
following observations will demonstrate, and if  these facts may be taken at face value, 
any  theory  of  specificity worth  its  salt  should be  able to  explain  why  definites  and 
specific indefinites are so much alike. 
1.3.1.  Scope 
The hallmark of  specific indefinites is that they tend to take scope over anything else in 
the  sentence,  which  is  characteristic  of  definites,  too.  One example  will  suffice  to 
illustrate this well-worn observation: 
(9)  All critics who were invited to comment on some poems written by Barney's 4- 
year-old son hailed them as mature masterpieces. (cf. (I  b)) 
This is most likely to be read as implying that Barney has a 4-year-old son who wrote 
all the poems presented to the various critics. Of course, definites can take 'intermediate 
scope', too, as (lo) demonstrates: 
(10)  All critics who were invited to comment on some poems written by their spouses 
hailed them as mature masterpieces. 
If  the  possessive  pronoun  is  bound  by  the  subject NP,  it  is  of  course impossible to 
obtain  a  wide-scope  reading  for  the  definite  expression  their  .spouses;  but  an 
intermediate  reading remains  feasible - indeed, it  is  the most  natural  reading in  this 
case. One respect  in which  definites differ from indefinites at large is that it is quite 
difficult to obtain  something akin to in situ readings for the former, whereas we have 
seen  that  the  latter prefer  such  readings. Narrow-scope  readings  for definite  NPs  do 
occur, though: 
(1 1)  That wasn't Fred's wife, you blockhead: Fred isn't even married! But  such examples are clearly marked. Hence, although  definites and  indefinites  are 
quite similar in the way they interact with  scope-bearing expressions, their preferences 
in this regard are different. To summarize: 
definites: wide scope < intermediate scope < in situ 
indefinites: in situ < wide scope < intermediate scope 
1.3.2.  Partitives 
As Ladusaw  (I  982) was the first to point out, the nominal constituent of  a partitive PP 
must be definite or specific; non-specific indefinites and quantified NPs are not allowed 
in this position: 
(12)  Fred is one of  {the / several / *most 1 *all / *sm / +0)  employees who will be 
fired. 
Here sm represents unstressed some, which has a distinct preference for a non-specific 
reading, like the bare plural, indicated by '0'. 
1.3.3.  Indefinite this 
Although formally this is a definite article, it sometimes appears to function as if it were 
indefinite  (see  Prince  1981  for  discussion):  (13)  There  is  this  giant  spider  in  the 
cupboard.  When  used  in  this  manner,  this-NPs  function  as  indefinites  because, 
intuitively,  they  introduce  discourse  entities  that  are  new,  an  intuition  which  is 
confirmed by the following example: 
(14)  Yesterday, our little daughter brought  [a giant spider], into the house, and now 
there is [this giant spider], in the cupboard. 
In  addition, indefinite this-NPs behave more like specific than non-specific indefinites, 
because they typically take wide scope: 
(1 5)  a.  If this giant spider is still in the cupboard, Betty will go berserk. 
b.  There is a giant  spider, and if  it is still  in  the cupboard, Betty  will  go 
berserk. 
c.  If  there is (still) a giant spider in the cupboard, Betty will go berserk. 
(1%)  is more or less synonymous with (15b), rather than (15c), which is precisely what 
one should expect if  'this giant spider' were specific. 
These observations indicate that indefinite this-NPs are expressions that are marked 
for definiteness but,finction as specific indefinites. It is hard to see how this mixing up 
of  form  and  function  could  occur  unless  specificity  and  definiteness  are  kindred 
phenomena. 
1.3.4.  Cross-linguistic  evidence 
Perhaps the most telling piece (or better: collection) of  evidence is that in language after 
language  definiteness  and  specificity  are  lumped  together  into  the  same  morpho- 
syntactic rubric. I will give a handful of more or less arbitrarily chosen examples. Bemba: 
In Bemba, a Bantu language, there is a class of nominal prefixes of the form consonant- 
vowel, and another class of  the form vowel-consonant-vowel. The former are used to 
mark  non-specific  indefinites,  while  the  latter  alternatively  convey  definiteness  or 
specificity. The following examples are from Givdn (1978); here and in  the following 
glosses are as in the original source: 
(16)  a.  m-ana  a-a-fwaaya d-tabo. 
vcv-child he-past-want cv-book 
'The child wanted a book (be it any).' 
b.  m-ana  t-a-&-somene  G-tabo. 
vcv-child neg-he-past-read cv-book 
'The child didn't read alany book.' 
c.  m-ana  a-a-fwaaya g-tabo. 
vcv-child he-past-want vcv-book 
'The child wanted the book' or 'The child wanted a specific book.' 
Samoan: 
Samoan is similar to Bemba in  that it has two articles, one of which signals non-specific 
indefiniteness,  while  the other  combines specificity and  definiteness  (examples from 
Lyons 1999): 
(17)  a.  Sa i ai  ulug2li'i'o  Papa  tane a 'o Eleele  fafine. 
Past exist Art couple Pres P. Art husband but Pres E. Art woman 
'There was a couple, Papa, the husband, and Eleele, the wife.' 
b.  'Au-mai  niu. 
take-Dir Art coconut 
'Bring me a coconut.' 
West Greenlandic Inuit: 
In  West-Greenlandic  Inuit,  an  ergative  language,  transitive  verbs  may  become 
intransitive by incorporating their objects. This shows itself, among other things, in the 
case  marking  on  the  subject,  which  is  absolutive  for  intransitive,  and  ergative for 
transitive subjects. Moreover, it is only in transitive constructions that verbs bear object- 
agreement markers. The object of a transitive construction receives absolutive case, and 
may  be  either  specific  or  definite,  while  incorporated  objects  are  non-specific. 
According to Manga (1996), this is typical of ergative languages. The following sample 
of West-Greenlandic Inuit is from van Geenhoven (1998): 
(1 8)  a.  Angunguaq tikip-p-u-q. 
A.Abs arrive-Ind-Intr-3sg 
'Angunguaq arrived.' 
b.  Angunguaq aalisakka-mik neri-v-u-q. 
A.Abs fish-Inst.sg eat-Ind-Intr-3sg 
'Angunguaq ate fish.' c.  Arnajaraq aalisaga-si.nngi-I-a-q. 
A.Abs fish-buy-Neg-Ind-Intr-3sg 
'It is not the case that Arnajaraq bought {a  1  more than one) fish.' 
d.  Angunguu aalisagaq neri-v-a-a. 
A.Erg fish-Abs eat-Ind-Tr-3sg.3sg 
'Angunguaq ate thela particular fish.' 
St'it'imcets: 
St'it'imcets  (Lillooet Salish) features an indefinite article which can only occur within 
the scope of  a negative expression, a question, a modal, and so on. In  the absence of 
such operators another article must be used, which has a specific-definite function. The 
following examples are from Matthewson (1999): 
:19)  a.  Cw7aoz kw-s ats'x-en-as &  sqaycw 
Neg Det-Nom see-Tr-3Erg Det man 
'Slhe didn't see any men.' 
b.  *~ts'x-en-as  sqaycw. 
see-Tr-3Erg Det man 
'Slhe saw a man.' 
(20)  a.  Hliy-lhkan ptakwlh, pt6kwlh-min lts7a ~ smkm'lhats-a  . . . 
going.to-lsg.Subj tell.story tell.story-Appl here Det woman.Dimin-Det 
'I am going to tell a legend, a legend about a girl . . .' 
b.  Wa7 ku7 ilal lati7  smCm'lhats-a 
Frog Quot cry Deic Det woman.Dimin-Det 
'The girli was crying there.' 
This sample will suffice to show that many languages treat definiteness and specificity 
as related notions, which together stand in  opposition to non-specific indefiniteness. In 
conjunction with the evidence of the preceding sections, this raises the question what it 
is that  definites  and specific  indefinites have in  common. In  my opinion, one of  the 
main criteria for assessing theories of  specificity should be how good their answers to 
this question are. 
1.4.  Specificity and distributivity 
It has been argued by Reinhart (1997) and Winter (1997) that specific indefinites which 
have escaped from a scope island don't allow for a distributive interpretation. Reinhart 
credits Ruys with this  insight; Winter attributes  it (collectively) to Ruys and himself. 
Reinhart cites example (21a) from a manuscript by Ruys: 
(21)  a.  If three relatives of mine die, I will inherit a house. 
b.  There are three relatives of  mine such that, IF they all die, I will inherit a 
house. 
c.  There are three  relatives of  mine such that, if  any of  them  dies, I will 
inherit a house. On the most likely reading of  (21a) the indefinite 'three relatives of  mine' is construed 
with  narrow  scope, but  if  it gets a specific reading  and outscopes the  if-clause, then 
according to Reinhart, Ruys, and Winter, it can only be understood collectively. That is 
to say, if  the indefinite is specific, (21a) is synonymous with (21b), not (21~). 
This observation is not quite correct, however; what Reinhart et al. have found is not 
3 lawful correlation but merely a trend. First, as noted by Matthewson (1999), there are 
native speakers of  English who manage to obtain  a distributive reading for (21a), and 
the  same holds  for parallel  sentences  of  other  languages. Secondly, van  Geenhoven 
(1998) points  out that  intuitions  shift markedly  when  we  vary  the example. Thus it 
appears to be easier to get a distributive reading for the following sentence: 
(22)  If  some relatives of mine invite me for dinner, I will panic. 
In  short, although in environments like (21a) or (22) specific indefinites seem to prefcr 
collective construals, specificity does not entail collectivity. This is bad  news for two 
rather different theories of  specificity. On the one hand, theories that seek to deal with 
specificity  with  the  help  of  quantifier  raising  will  be  embarrassed  by  the  fact  that 
specific indefinites disprefer non-distributive readings. On the other hand, theories that 
rely on choice-functions instead of quantifier raising will find it quite difficult to explain 
the  distributive  readings - a  point  which  Winter  (1997) emphasizes, because  he  is 
confident, apparently, that such readings don't occur (for further discussion, see Geurts 
2000a). 
There  is  one  family  of  theories  that  can  account  for  distributive  as  well  non- 
distributive readings: these are theories which, on the one hand, resemble the quantifier- 
raising approach in that their account of specificity is based on movement, while, on the 
other  hand,  they  agree  with  the  choice-function  approach  that  indefinites  aren't 
quantifier expressions. Two such theories are discussed in the second half of this paper. 
2.  The binding theory of presupposition 
In  the  remainder  of  this  paper  I  present  a  unified  account  of  specificity  and 
presupposition, which is based upon the binding theory of presupposition, so before we 
move on I want to quickly recapitulate the main tenets of that theory; for more extensive 
discussion, see van  der Sandt (1992), Geurts  (1999a), and  Geurts and van  der Sandt 
(1999). 
The binding theory is an extension of discourse representation theory (Kamp 1981), 
and consists of three principal claims. The first of these is that anaphora is a species of 
presupposition,  and  that  the  standard  presupposition-inducing  expressions  (such  as 
definite NPs, factives, transition  verbs,  and so on) differ  from pronominal  anaphors 
mainly in  that  they possess a richer semantic content. This difference explains why in 
general presupposition  inducers, unlike anaphoric pronouns, can be interpreted by way 
of  accommodation, which is the second key notion in the theory. Finally, it is assumed 
that the process  of  presupposition  projection  is subject to certain constraints. It  is the 
status of these constraints that will be especially important in  the following. 
Formulated  in  procedural  terms,  the  binding  theory  predicts  that  if  an  utterance 
contains a presupposition-inducing  element, the hearer will initially attempt to bind the 
presupposition  to  a  suitable  antecedent,  just  as  he  would  try  to  bind  an  ordinary 
anaphor. If  the presupposition cannot be so bound, it will be  accommodated, i.e. it will be inserted in  some accessible discourse representation  structure (DRS). In  general the 
number of  positions  at which  a presupposition  may be  accommodated  is greater than 
one, and if  it is the choice is restricted by various constraints, but before I turn to these, 
let me first illustrate the workings of the theory: 
(23)  If Fred is gay, then his son is gay, too 
This sentence contains (at least) two presupposition-inducing  expressions: the definite 
NP his son, which triggers the presupposition that Fred has a son, and the focus particle 
too, which triggers the presupposition  that  someone different  from Fred's  son is gay. 
Note that  the first presupposition  is  'inherited'  by  the sentence as a whole, while the 
second one is not: normally  speaking, an utterance of  (23) would license the inference 
that (according to the speaker) Fred has a son, but not that someone else besides Fred's 
son is gay. The binding theory accounts for these observations as follows. Suppose that 
the grammar assigns (23) the intermediate semantic representation in (24a). I assume for 
convenience that most interpretative problems have been cleared out of the way already, 
and that the only thing that remains to be done is resolve the presuppositions triggered 
by  his  son  and  roo,  which  are  marked  out  by  single  and  double  underscores, 
respectively. 
(24)  a.  [x: Fred(x), [: gay(x)l*  [g ,  v : x's-son ( u ), gu  (y), m,  gay(u)l] 
b.  [x,  U:  Fred(x), x's-son(u), [: gay(x)] a  [v :  (x),  V,  gay(u)]] 
c.  [x,  u: Fred(x), x's-son(u), [v: v = x, gay(x), gay(v), v #u]  [: gay(u)]] 
d.  [x, U:  Fred(x), x's-son(u), [: gay(x)] a  [: gay(u)]] 
(24a)  is  the  initial  semantic  representation  correlated  with  (23),  in  which  two 
presuppositions remain  to  be  resolved.  One of  these, that  Fred has  a son, cannot be 
bound, and therefore must be  interpreted by  way  of  accommodation. Now  there  is a 
general  constraint  on  presupposition  projection  to  the  effect  that  any presupposition 
prefers  to  be  projected  to  as  high  a  position  as  possible,  and  accordingly  our  first 
presupposition  is  accommodated  in  the  principal  DRS,  which  yields  (24b).  The 
remaining  presupposition,  triggered  by  the  focus  particle,  can  be  bound  in  the 
antecedent of the conditional; this results in (24c) which, assuming that Fred and his son 
are different persons, is equivalent to (24d). 
The binding theory may be summed up in the following three principles: 
(A)  Presuppositions must be projected (i.e., bound or accommodated) 
(B)  Binding is preferred to accommodation. 
(C)  A presupposition must be projected to the highest possible DRS. 
It  will be evident that none of these principles is absolute, although the first two may be 
more  absolute  than  the  third  one.  They  are  all  subject  to  general  constraints  on 
interpretation, which  require that  an interpretation  be consistent, coherent, and so on. 
Before  these  principles  come into  play,  presuppositions  are  merely  representational 
structures, and  are  therefore completely  inert. Principle  A drives  away the inertia by 
insisting that  presuppositions be either bound  or accommodated. Principle B captures 
the insight that accommodation is a repair strategy: in principle, a presupposition wants 
to be bound, but  if  it cannot be bound  it will be accommodated. Principle C may be 
viewed  as  a  generalization  of  a  constraint  first  proposed  by  Heim  (1983).  Heim distinguishes between  two types of  accommodation: global  and local. In  terms of  the 
present framework, a presupposition is accommodated globally if it goes to the principal 
DRS, and locally if  it  is accommodated  in  the DRS  where  it  was triggered.  Heim's 
proposal is that, in general, global accommodation is preferred to local accommodation, 
and principle  C generalizes this  in  two ways. First, this principle applies not  only to 
accommodation  but  to  projection  in  general.  This  makes  some  difference  from  an 
observational  point  of  view  (though  not  much),  and  it  is  surely  more  attractive 
conceptually speaking. Secondly, although it is possible to capture Heim's distinction 
between  global  and  local  accommodation  in  our framework, the  distinction  as  such 
doesn't play a role in the theory. In general, there is a line of accessible DRSs in which 
a presupposition can be accommodated, the two ends of this chain being the main DRS 
and the DRS where the presupposition arises. Global and local accommodation are just 
convenient labels for referring to accommodation in these DRSs, but they do not denote 
special processes. 
I  should  like  to  stress  that  the  fundamental  insight  underlying  this  treatment of 
presuppositions  is  not  a  controversial  one.  It  is  that  presupposed  information  is 
information that is presented as given. Most extant theories of presupposition accept this 
premise, too. What distinguishes the binding theory from other accounts is just  that it 
doesn't draw  a sharp line between  presupposition  and anaphora. Hence, although the 
choice of framework is essential in  some respects, the gist of  my  analysis of specific 
indefinites could be expressed in other frameworks, too. 
To say that  presupposed  information  is  presented  as given  is not  to  say that  it  is 
given. Indeed, the concept of  accommodation merely puts  a label  on  the observation 
that speakers are wont to exploit (in Grice's sense) presupposition-inducing expressions 
in order to convey information that is new. The point is a familiar one, I take it, but it 
deserves to be stressed, because it is sometimes thought that accommodation will be the 
weak spot of  any theory of  presupposition that adopts the notion, as most of  them do 
(see Abbott 2000 for a recent attack along these lines). Even if it could be demonstrated 
that, say, definite NPs are regularly  used to refer to entities that are new  (and Abbott 
maintains that this has been  demonstrated), that wouldn't even begin to show that the 
standard  view  of  presupposition  is  on  the  wrong  track. It  would  merely corroborate 
what we knew already, namely that speakers are adept at exploiting (still in the Gricean 
sense) linguistic devices for their purposes. 
3.  Accommodating indefinites 
Recently, it  has been  suggested by  several independent sources that specificity should 
be handled in terms of, or at least in conjunction with, presupposition projection (Cresti 
1995, Yeom  1998, van  Geenhoven  1998). This  is  an  attractive idea, as I will  try to 
show, but  it  requires  a  dramatic  change of  perspective,  too,  because  it  implies that 
specificity is an  essentially prugmafic phenomenon.  Following these developments, I 
will present my own unified theory of presupposition  and specificity in the next section. 
In  many  respects, my account is related as well  indebted to van  Geenhoven's, which 
will therefore be discussed first. 3.1.  Incorporation vs. accommodation 
The majority position  in  the literature on specificity is that  indefinites are ambiguous 
between  specific  and  non-specific  readings.  Van  Geenhoven  (1998)  doesn't  take 
exception  to this view, but  she develops  it in an  entirely new  way. According to van 
Geenhoven,  non-specific  indefinites  are  ordinary  predicates,  which  neither  possess 
quantificational  force nor  introduce  reference markers or anything of  the  sort. If  the 
indefinite  in (25a), for example, is interpreted non-specifically, it doesn't have narrow 
scope; indeed, it doesn't have scope at all because it is semantically incorporated by the 
verb, as suggested by the paraphrase in (25b): 
(25)  a.  Every man loves a woman. 
b.  Every man is a-woman-lover. 
If, on the other hand, an indefinite gets a specific reading, its semantic representation is 
rather different. Specific indefinites are analyzed  in accordance with the standard DRT 
doctrine  on  indefinites,  save  for  the  fact  that  it  is  stipulated  that  they  must  be 
accommodated. Or in  other words, if  a woman in  (25)  is specific, it is treated as if  it 
were a presupposition-inducing expression whose presupposition has the peculiarity that 
it doesn't want to be bound. Hence, the indefinite is dealt with in  two steps. First, the 
grammar produces the initial  discourse representation  in  (26a), in  which the semantic 
correlate of N  woman is marked as specific, and then this representation is fed into the 
projection mechanism of the binding theory, which treats the indefinite description as it 
would  treat  any  (other) presuppositional  expression, except  that  it cannot  be bound. 
Consequently, it  must be  accommodated, and  since there  is  a general  preference  for 
accommodating things  at the  highest  level  of  representation,  it  is  predicted  that  the 
resulting interpretation will be (26b). 
(26)  a.  [: [x: man(x)](every x)[u: woman(u), x loves u]] 
b.  [u: woman(u), [x: man(x)](every x)[: x loves u]] 
I  find  this  analysis  appealing  for  a  number  of  reasons.  To  begin  with,  it  comes 
essentially  for free, because  all the machinery it employs is already  in place, as  it is 
required  anyway  for  dealing  with  presupposition  projection.  Secondly,  van 
Geenhoven's proposal explains the parallels as well as the differences between definites 
and specific indefinites. The reason why definites and specific indefinites are so similar 
is  that  they  are interpreted by  the same projection  mechanism; the main  difference is 
that definites want, and specific indefinites don't want, to be bound. Thirdly, the theory 
accounts in  a principled  way for the puzzling pattern of  interpretations discussed  in  5 
1.1, which I repeat here for ease of reference: 
in situ < wide scope < intermediate scope 
According to van Geenhoven, indefinites are ambiguous between a specific and a non- 
specific reading, and if  it may be assumed that the latter prevails by  default, then an in 
situ construal is preferred to a reading that involves movement, and if an indefinite gets 
a specific reading, principle  C of  the binding  theory  entails a preference for a wide- 
scope as opposed to an intermediate-scope reading. 
Although van Geenhoven's theory hinges on the premise that specific indefinites are 
construed by way of movement, it should be stressed that this account has nothing to do with  quantifier raising  (or, for that  matter,  any  other  of  the svandard techniques  for 
dealing  with  quantifier  scope). Presupposition  projection  is  a  pragmatic  affair,  and 
therefore  van  Geenhoven's  proposal  can  only  be  seen  as an  attempt  at dealing with 
specificity in pragmatic terms. Quantifier raising, in contrast, takes place at or near the 
syntax-semantics  boundary,  so a theory  based  on  raising  implies that  specificity is a 
grammatical  phenomenon, and  this  view  has  never  been  challenged even  by  authors 
who rejected the rasing analysis. Thus considered, van  Geenhoven's proposal  is little 
short of iconoclastic. 
3.2.  Objections 
Although I applaud van Geenhoven's pragmatic turn, and agree with the fundamental 
intuition underlying  her theory, I have two objections, one of  which I consider to be 
particularly serious. To begin with the major problem, I maintain that van Geenhoven's 
analysis is conceptually incoherent. To my mind, the very idea of a class of expressions 
that insist on being interpreted by  way of  accommodation is a contradiction in  terms. 
Accommodation  is  a  repair  strategy  by  definition.  A  speaker  who presupposes  that 
cp presents cp as given, and if  it is not given it is at the hearer's discretion whether or not 
he wants to play along by  accommodating j. Therefore, accommodation isn't  anything 
like  an  ordinary  rule  of  interpretation;  it  is  a fall-back  option, and  if  one wants  to 
postulate  a  linguistic  category  that  selects  this  option,  there  is  a  fair  amount  of 
explaining to do. 
But can't we simply broaden the concept of  accommodation by  ruling that it applies 
not only to presuppositions but to certain other types of  information, as well? We can, 
of  course, but  there  is a price to pay. A broadening of  the notion  of  accommodation 
entails  that  we  forfeit a  powerful  explanatory  lever  in  our theory  of  presupposition 
projection. For we then  will have to come up with new answers to such questions as: 
What justifies  accommodation?, Why is binding preferred to accommodation?, and so 
on. And as long as I don't see how these questions might be answered, I am not willing 
to pay this price. 
My  slightly  less  urgent  complaint  concerns  van  Geenhoven's  assumption  that 
indefinites  are systematically  ambiguous  between  specific and non-specific  readings. 
Notwithstanding  the fact that this assumption is commonplace in the literature, I don't 
believe  there  is  much  independent  evidence  to  support  it,  but  that  is  as  it  may  be, 
because  nobody  would  deny  that  ambiguities  are  ugly  and  should  be  avoided  at 
practically  any cost. And, come to think  of  it, one should expect that  a specificfnon- 
specific ambiguity can be avoided in a framework based on the insight that specificity is 
a pragmatic phenomenon. 
4.  Specificity and backgrounding 
My proposal is to relate specificity and presupposition to each other, not by reducing the 
former to the latter, as van  Geenhoven has tried, but by  subsuming them under a more 
comprehensive rubric, which I call 'backgrounding'. I will argue that this view doesn't 
suffer from the shortcomings discussed in the foregoing, and, furthermore, that it throws 
a  new  and  perhaps  brighter  light  on  presupposition  as  well  as  on  a  number  of 
phenomena that thus far lacked a systematic account. 4.1.  Foreground and background 
Following Foley and van Valin (1985) and Foley (1994), among others, I understand the 
opposition  between  foreground  and  background  distinction  purely  in  terms  of 
informational  prominence, where  prominence  is  a  relational  rather  than  an  absolute 
notion.  By  uttering  a  sentence a speaker  typically  conveys a considerable  amount  of 
information, only a small portion of which is central to his concerns. The remainder is 
backgrounded  information:  ancillary  matter  that  merely  serves  to  anchor  the 
foregrounded information to the context, or information which is brought in en passant. 
Backgrounded information is not necessarily unimportant, but it is of secondary interest 
in relation  to foregrounded information. Thus the notion  of  background is primarily a 
negative  one:  backgrounded  information  is  what  remains  when  foregrounded 
information is taken  away. It may well be, therefore, that it is impossible to provide a 
single positive description covering all sorts of  background information. But no matter 
how many  reasons for, or ways of, backgrounding there may be, I will  suggest that at 
least some interpretative mechanisms do not discriminate between them. 
A further, and crucial, negative characteristic of  my notion  of background is that it 
doesn't entail givenness; only the converse is true. Backgrounded information may be 
given, or presented as given, but new information  is not necessarily foregrounded. For 
example, enclosing new information in (intonational or orthographic) parentheses often 
serves  to  indicate  that  it  is  of  secondary  importance,  which  is  to  say  that  it  is 
backgrounded, not that it is presented as given. 
My notion  of  background  is  clearly  related  to  Abbott's  (2000) 'nonassertion'  and 
Horn's (2000) 'assertoric inertia'. The basic intuition in each case is that the main point 
of  an utterance enjoys a special pragmatic status, while the remainder is, in some sense, 
downgraded.  What  distinguishes  my  concept  from  the  other  two  is  mainly  that  its 
interpretative effects are more explicit (see below). Apart from that I prefer to avoid the 
notion  of  assertion  in  this  connection,  because  otherwise  I  would  have  to  assume, 
contrary  to  what  I take  to  be  linguistic common  sense, that  assertions  may occur in 
syntactically embedded positions. 
Although  the  distinction  between  foreground  and  background  may be signaled by 
intonational means, I don't  want to  make any substantial claims about the relationship 
between intonation and foregroundlbackground. However, I should like to note that the 
correlation  between  intonational pr0mine.n~~  and  foregrounding  is  imperfect,  at best. 
This observation is not new, but I feel it bears emphasizing nonetheless. Consider the 
following example: 
(27)  The course on postmodern theology will be given by [the  dean]^ 
Suppose, for enhanced clarity, that this is an  answer to the question  'Who is teaching 
the course on postmodern theology this year?', so we can be sure that the non-focused 
part  of  (27) is given, and therefore backgrounded. Now  of  course the focused part  is 
(presented as) given, too, simply by  virtue of the fact that it is a definite NP. But surely 
everything in this statement cannot be given? The solution to this puzzle is not so hard 
to find: the focus on the deun doesn't highlight the dean, but rather the fact that it is he 
who will be teaching the course on postmodern theology. The dean is given; that he will 
play a certain role is foregrounded. 
If  backgrounded information need not be given, there is no reason why it couldn't be 
marked  as new. I want  to suggest that this is not just  an  abstract possibility:  it does happen  that  backgrounded  information  is  marked  as  new;  this  is  precisely  what 
specificity comes down to. 
4.2.  Accessibility and the Buoyancy Principle 
An  utterance is always interpreted within a context, and broadly speaking utterances and 
contexts interact with each other in two ways: the context affects the interpretation of an 
utterance, which in  its turn changes the context in which it occurs. In DRT the context 
of  utterance  is  pictured  as  a  line  of  accessible  DRSs,  and  therefore  the  notion  of 
accessibility is of central importance to DRT (as it is, mututis mutandis, to all dynamic 
theories of meaning). What, exactly, is accessibility? From a technical point of view this 
question is not so hard to answer, but when we interpret the question as being about the 
theoretical  status of  the accessibility relation, many  different answers are possible. In 
Kamp's (1981) original version of DRT, accessibility was associated with anaphoricity 
in  the  sense that  it  was only used  for constraining the interpretation of  anaphora: an 
anaphoric pronoun had to find its antecedent in  an accessible DRS. In  later versions of 
the theory, the notion  of  accessibility gradually  assumed a much  broader significance. 
Thus, as we have seen  in  #  2, in the  binding  theory  of  presupposition  accessibility 
demarcates what is given at the point where an expression occurs. I believe that an even 
broader  view  is  called  for,  and  that  the  accessible  domain  must  be  seen  as  the 
background  against  which  an  utterance  is  interpreted,  where  'background'  is  to be 
understood as explained above. 
When we thus broaden our perspective on the significance of accessibility, it is only 
to  be  expected that  some of  the principles  of  interpretation  hitherto cast  in  terms of 
accessibility will have to be generalized. This applies, in particular, to principle C of the 
binding theory, which I propose to supplant with the following: 
The Buoya~zcy  Principle 
Backgrounded material tends to float up towards the main DRS 
Strictly  speaking,  the  Buoyancy  Principle  isn't  part  of  our  theory  of  presupposition 
projection, because it is not specifically about presuppositions, so all that remains of the 
original  binding  theory  is  two  'axioms',  one saying that  presuppositions  want  to be 
bound, the other, that presuppositions that cannot be bound may be accommodated. The 
theory's  predictions  aren't  affected by  this  change, although they  are  now  seen  in  a 
somewhat  different  light.  In  particular,  I am  no  longer  committed  to  the  claim  that 
presuppositions tend to take 'wide scope' because they are presuppositions; it is rather 
because  they  are backgrounded,  and therefore subject to the Buoyancy Principle, that 
they gravitate towards the principal DRS. But as far as the theory of  presupposition  is 
concerned, the  proposed  modification  isn't  exactly  a  volte-face.  Still, this  relatively 
minor  amendment  may  turn  out  to  be  more  consequential  than  one  should  think, 
because  it  invites  a  rethinking  of  the  binding  theory's  treatment  of  at  least  some 
presupposition  triggers,  as  I  will  argue  in  1 5. The  concept  of  buoyancy  itself  is 
discussed at greater length in Geurts (2000b). 
4.3.  Explaining specificity 
In  keeping with DRT orthodoxy, I regard indefinites as property-denoting expressions 
that  receive  existential  import  when  they  occur  in  argument  positions.  The  main advantage of this division of labor is that it makes for a uniform analysis of indefinites 
occurring  in  argument  positions  and  indefinite  non-arguments,  such  as  predicate 
nominals, for example. To illustrate, it allows us to maintain that a ventriloquist has the 
same meaning in both of the following sentences: 
(28)  a.  Barney is a ventriloquist. 
h.  Betty is married to a ventriloquist 
In  (28a) as well as in  (28b), u ventriloquist merely denotes a property, but only in the 
latter case is this property  applied to a reference marker introduced by  the verb. I will 
assume that, if  this happens, the reference marker in question is labeled as new. There 
are various ways of  accounting for this feature (if it is  one), but that is a topic I don't 
want to go into here. 
Unlike  Reinhart,  van  Geenhoven,  and  many  others,  I  deny  that  indefinites  are 
ambiguous between  a  specific  and  a non-specific  reading:  indefinites  always denote 
properties. If  an indefinite occurs as an argument it may be construed as specific or non- 
specific depending on whether is backgrounded or not, which is to say that the choice is 
a pragmatic  one. Of  course, to say that a given  aspect of  interpretation is a pragmatic 
one is not to deny the possibility that it is conventionally marked in some languages. In 
this respect, specificity is in the same boat as definiteness, which is a pragmatic notion, 
too, and is conventionally marked in some, though by  no means all, languages. 
Following the general  consensus, I take  it that by  default indefinites are construed 
non-specifically, and the most natural way of accounting for this is by assuming that, all 
things  being  equal, an  indefinite will  tend  to be  construed  as part  of  the foreground 
because  it  carries  new  information.  I  still  deny,  of  course, that  new  information  is 
always foregrounded, but it is only natural that the former status tends to be escorted by 
the latter. It is only under special circumstances that new information is backgrounded, 
and if this happens, the expression in question is specific. 
We are now all set to explain the main  facts about specificity, beginning  with the 
interaction  between  indefinites  and  (other)  scope-bearing  expressions.  We have just 
seen  why  indefinites  prefer  to  be  construed  non-specifically;  this  is,  I  suggested, 
because  they  tend  to  be  part  of  the  foreground.  But  if  they  are  backgrounded,  the 
Buoyancy Principle applies, which is to say that, other things being equal, they will take 
wide scope, and only if  all things aren't equal will they take intermediate scope. This is 
precisely  the  order  of  preferences  that  we  wanted  to  account  for.  Secondly,  the 
similarities between  definites and specific indefinites fall into place, too, because both 
types of expressions convey backgrounded information. Thirdly, and by the same token, 
it  is only to be expected that there will be languages which lump together specificity 
with  definiteness, assigning the two functions a single article or case marker, say. On 
the present account, such conventional devices receive a straightforward interpretation: 
they signal that something is part of  the background. Thus a vcv-prefix in  Bemba, for 
example, isn't  ambiguous in any way;  it just  serves to indicate that the expression  it 
attaches to is backgrounded. 
The partitive constraint is explained along the same lines. It is reasonable to suppose 
that, in an expression of the form 'Det a of p', the main duty of  P is to help identify the 
intended a, and  is  therefore backgrounded  (cf. e.g. Kuno  1987). So, properly under- 
stood, the partitive constraint is not that !3  must be either definite or specific, but rather 
that  it must be backgrounded. This explains why definites and specific indefinites can 
occur in partitive constructions, while quantifiers and non-specific indefinites can't. 4.4.  Summing up 
It  will be evident that this analysis of specificity owes a great deal to van  Geenhoven's 
proposal. But my account improves upon van Geenhoven's by giving a coherent picture 
of  the  relation  between  specificity,  on  the  one  hand,  and  presupposition  and 
definiteness, on the  other, while forgoing the premise that  indefinites are ambiguous 
between specific and non-specific readings. Apart from providing a principled way of 
dealing with  specificity, the present  theory offers another attraction  as well, in  that it 
may shed new  light on  matters not directly related to specificity. It  is to these matters 
that we now turn. 
5.  Second thoughts about presuppositions (and sundry other 
matters) 
Being  an  extension  of  standard  DRT, the binding  theory  regards presuppositions  as 
elementa that would like to be bound an antecedent. This is a view that agrees with pre- 
theoretical intuitions about the definite article, for example, but it doesn't seem right for 
some  other  expressions  and  constructions  that  are  standardly  categorized  as 
presupposition  inducers. I want to propose that at least some of these are better viewed 
as instances of backgrounding. 
5.1.  Lexical 'presuppositions' 
Intuitively speaking, the notion  that presuppositions are anaphoroid elements does not 
seem  to  be  quite  appropriate  for dealing  with  lexical  inferences  like the following, 
which have often been  said to be presuppositional in nature (here '>>' is to be read as 
'implies, intuitively speaking'): 
(29)  a.  Leslie is a bachelor 
>>  b.  Leslie is a man. 
(30)  a.  Wilma managed to fry an egg. 
>>  b.  It was difficult for Wilma to fry an egg, 
(31)  a.  Fred accused Barney of nepotism. 
>>  b.  Nepotism is a bad thing. 
It is commonly held that (29a) presupposes (29b), and this claim seems justified by the 
observation that this inference tends to go through even when (29a) is embedded in non- 
entailing environments, such as: 
(32)  Perhaps Leslie is a bachelor 
A  naive  account  of  facts  like this  would  he  to  suppose  that  the  lexical  content of 
huchelor  falls  into  two  parts:  an  assertional  part  which  specifies  that  bachelor  is 
truthfully  predicated only of  unmarried individuals, and a presuppositional part which 
says, among other things, that a bachelor is a man; of course, it is the second half of the 
content of bachelor that triggers the presupposition in (29a) and (32). There are several problems with  this  naive  account. First,  as it  stands, this  analysis implies that  every 
occurrence of  bachelor gives rise to the presupposition  that  the individual it is being 
applied to is a man, and therefore it predicts, for instance, that 
(33)  Betty is allergic to bachelors. 
means something like, 'Betty is allergic to unmarried individuals who are presupposed 
(by someone?) to be men' -  which is not what we want. The solution to this problem is 
fairly obvious: the word buchelor should only be allowed to trigger its presupposition 
when it is being used predicatively. But this seems to entail that bachelor is ambiguous 
between  a  presupposing  and  a  non-presupposing  reading,  which  is  not  exactly  an 
appealing consequence. 
The second problem, which is related to the first, is the following. Suppose that it is 
encoded in the lexicon that predicating bachelor of some individual a carries with it the 
presupposition that a is man. Consider now how the words buchelor and man are related 
to each other: the former is a hyponym of  the latter, and the only distinctive feature of 
the word buchelor is that it applies to unmarried individuals. But at the same time that is 
all  we  are saying, as opposed to presupposing,  when  we call  somebody a bachelor. 
Could this be an coincidence? I think it is pretty clear that it is not. For one thing, other 
hyponyms behave alike: spinster presupposes 'female', woodpecker presupposes  'bird', 
and so on. For another, an  intuitively plausible story about this phenomenon is readily 
available:  if  a speaker wants  to  announce that  Leslie  is  unmarried  and has even  the 
slightest  doubt  about Leslie's  sex  he  would  say that  Leslie  is unmarried  rather than 
risking (29a). I do not want to suggest that spelling out an explanation along these lines 
is going to be trivial, but it is obvious that if such an account could be  made to work it 
would be much more attractive than the one we started out with, which says, in effect, 
that it is a lexical accident that (29a) presupposes (29b). 
There is yet another, and more severe, problem with the suggestion that (predicative) 
bachelor presupposes 'adult male'. It is that this presupposition, if  it is one, is evidently 
not the kind of thing that seeks to be bound in anything like the way anaphoric elements 
seek to be  bound. This becomes quite apparent when  one considers how  the binding 
theory would deal with (32), for example: 
(34)  a.  [x: Leslie(x), perhaps: [: male(x), adult(x), unmarried(x)]] 
b.  [x: Leslie(x), male(x), adult(x), perhaps: [: unmarried(x)]] 
Assuming that (34a) is the semantic representation associated with (32) by the grammar, 
the  binding  theory  predicts  that  the  presupposition  triggered  by  bachelor  is 
accommodated in the principal DRS, because it cannot be bound and there is no reason 
(let  us  suppose)  why  it  should  be  accommodated  locally.  This  yields  the  right 
interpretation  (and as a  matter  of  fact I don't  know  of  any  counterexamples to  this 
analysis  of  bachelor), but  within  the  framework  of  the binding  theory  this  analysis 
causes  something of  an  embarrassment.  The presupposition  supposedly  triggered  by 
bachelor can never be  bound, as there is nothing to bind, so this presupposition would 
be one that, by  its very nature, must always be accommodated, and as I have argued in 
my  discussion  of  van  Geenhoven's  account  of  specificity,  that  is  practically  a 
contradiction in terms. 
The presuppositions allegedly  triggered by  verbs  such  as manage  and accuse  (cf. 
examples  (30) and  (31))  are  dubious,  too,  and  partly  for  the  same  reasons.  Most importantly, it just  doesn't seem to be plausible, from a pre-theoretical  vantage point, 
that the inferences licensed by  these verbs should be of  an  anaphoric nature, and this 
suspicion  is strengthened by  the observation  that it  is next  to impossible to come up 
with examples in which these purported presuppositions must be interpreted by way of 
binding. 
My  proposal  is  to  deal  with  the  lexical  inferences  in  (29)-(31)  in  terms  of 
backgrounding instead of presupposition. According to the theory developed in the last 
section, backgrounded material may be given (i.e. presupposed) but backgrounding isn't 
wedded to givenness, and therefore new information may be backgrounded, too. This, it 
seems to me, is precisely what we witness in the cases under discussion. For example, if 
a  speaker utters  (29a), it  is likely that the essential  bit  of  information  he  intends to 
convey  is  that  Leslie  is  married,  not  that  Leslie  is  an  adult  male.  Therefore,  the 
information that Leslie is a man is backgrounded, which means, I have argued, that it 
will  gravitate  towards  the  principal  DRS,  by  virtue  of  the  Buoyancy  Principle. 
Similarly,  if  someone  utters  (30a),  he  conveys  (30b),  but  he  doesn't  present  this 
information  as  given  (not  necessarily,  anyway).  However,  by  using  this  particular 
expression, the speaker does indicate that the truth  of  (30b) is of less concern to him 
than the fact that Wilma fried an egg. Hence, even if  (30b) isn't given, we may assume 
that is backgrounded. The same, mutatis mutandis, for (31a). 
I have proposed that the lexical inferences  in  (29)-  (31) be explained in terms of 
backgrounding.  This is  not  to suggest, however,  that  these inferences  are alike in  all 
respects,  because  they  aren't.  Speakers'  intuitions  make  a  fairly  clear  distinction 
between  (291, on the one hand, and (30) and (31), on the other. Most speakers would 
say that  if  Leslie  is  a woman, (29a) is false. Whereas, if  it turns  out to  be  easy for 
Wilma to fry an egg, then  it  is  not  so evident  what  we  should say about (30a). This 
statement would be misleading, to be sure, but many speakers would hesitate to simply 
reject  it  as false; similarly  for  (31a). One might  say that, in contradistinction  to the 
lexical entailment in (29), the inferences in (30) and (3 1) are conventional implicatures, 
but in view of  the notorious ill-definedness of the concept of conventional implicature, 
that would do little more than  rephrase the problem. 1 don't  have particularly  strong 
opinions on how the differences between (29) and (30)-  (31) can be accounted for, nor 
am I convinced that  this  issue  is extremely  urgent.  This, however, is  as  it  may  be, 
because what I proposed  in  the foregoing doesn't entail that such differences couldn't 
exist. But these observations reinforce the suspicion voiced  in 5  4.1, that there may be 
various ways of backgrounding, which may not all be equivalent. 
5.2.  Presupposition vs. background 
Over  the  past  few  decades,  but  especially  during  the  presupposition  craze  of  the 
seventies, the label  'presuppoaitional'  has been applied to such a bewildering variety of 
phenomena that the very notion of presupposition has become suspect, as the following 
passage from Neale (1990: 54) illustrates: 
A  great  range  of  disparate  and  unrelated  phenomena  has  been  dubbed 
'presuppositional'  over  the  years,  but  [...I  it  seems  highly  implausible  that  any 
theoretically important notion will do justice to the full range of  data that semanticists 
professing an interest in 'presupposition' seek to explain. 
Needless  to  say, I  am  not  entirely  convinced  that  the  second  half  of  this  claim  is 
justified, but the first half certainly is. All too often, the concept of presupposition has been  used, or rather  abused, without even the shadow of justification.  I have  argued 
elsewhere that  this  abuse was caused  at  least  in  part  because  the diagnostic  tests  for 
presuppositionhood  were (and still are) applied too carelessly, if  they were applied at all 
(see Geurts  1999a). But in  the light of the foregoing discussion I want to suggest that 
there may have been another factor as well, which is that the standard tests don't allow 
us to make a clear distinction between presuppositional and  backgrounding effects, and 
that  at  least  some of  the phenomena  that  have been  categorized,  to  greater or lesser 
acclaim, as  'presuppositional'  are better  seen in  terms of  backgrounding.  The lexical 
inferences  discussed  previously  are  relatively  clear  instances  of  this  category,  and 
further possible candidates for relocation  will be  discussed below. But first I want to 
raise the question how we are going to distinguish between genuine presuppositions and 
instances of backgrounding. 
This is not a trivial question because, as I hinted already, the standard litmus tests for 
presuppositionhood  fail  to distinguish between  presupposition  and backgrounding,  as 
the following observations illustrate (where '>I>' symbolizes the negation of '>>'): 
(35)  a.  If  Germany becomes a monarchy again, the king of France will get 
nervous >z  There is a king of France. 
b.  If  there is a king of France, the king of France will get nervous >/>There 
is a king of France. 
(36)  a.  If  Leslie is rich, he is a bachelor >> Leslie is a man. 
b.  If  Leslie is a man, he is a bachelor >A Leslie is a man. 
(37)  a.  If the king of France gets nervous, his ministers get nervous, too. >> 
There is a king of France. 
b.  If  the king of France gets nervous, then France must be a monarchy >/> 
There is a king of France. 
(38)  a.  If  Leslie is a bachelor, he is rich >> Leslie is a man. 
b.  If Leslie is a bachelor, he is a man >I>  Leslie is a man 
These observations suggest  that  there  are  no  differences  between  the presupposition 
triggered by the definite NP 'the  king of  France', as in  (35) and (37), and the lexical 
inference licensed by the noun bachelor, as in (36) and (38), and the parallels extend to 
all sorts of embedding contexts. Nevertheless, I have argued, there are good reasons for 
believing that lexical inferences aren't  of  a presuppositional nature. But none of these 
reasons provides us with a general criterion  for discriminating between presupposition 
and backgrounding. 
According to the binding theory, presupposed information is presented as given, in 
the same sense that the antecedent of an anaphoric expression is given, and the theory's 
treatment of presupposition is a generalization of DRT's  treatment of  anaphora, which 
is based  on  the  widely  held  view  that  an  anaphoric expression  serves to  retrieve an 
element from the common ground. That is to say, the speaker employs an anaphor not 
merely to signal that a discourse entity x is given, but also as an instruction to the hearer 
that he should identify and recover the intended x, so that new information will have the 
right connections. In  other words, the hearer is expected to ask himself  which entity the 
speaker has in mind. I want to suggest that we can  turn this observation into a useful 
test  for  distinguishing  between  real  presuppositions  and  merely  backgrounded information. The test  goes  as follows: If  x is a genuine presupposition,  then  it  should 
make sense to ask 'Which x do you mean?' when the speaker has just uttered a sentence 
implying the existence of  some x. This admittedly informal criterion indicates that, for 
example, the following are genuine presupposition inducers: 
Pronouns: 
(39)  A:  He is insane. 
B:  Who is insane? 
Definite NP's: 
(40)  A:  The banana has been stolen. 
B:  Which banana has been stolen? 
Quantifier domains: 
(4  1)  A:  Every girl has sent me a postcard. 
B:  Which girls have sent you a postcard? 
Focus particles: 
(42)  A:  Professor Babel has read my paper, too. 
B:  Who else has read your paper? 
On  the other hand, there are various alleged presupposition  inducers that fail  the wh- 
test. The lexical inferences discussed in the previous section are a case in point, as are 
factive verbs and transition  verbs, for example, which are standardly listed among the 
presupposition-inducing expressions: 
Factives: 
(43)  a.  Barney is proud that his daughter is an anarcho-syndicalist 
>>  b.  Barney's daughter is an anarcho-syndicalist. 
Transition verbs: 
(44)  a.  Betty has started taking saxophone lessons [at time t] 
>>  b.  Betty wasn't taking saxophone lessons [before t]. 
The inferences  in  (43) and (44) originate with the factive be proud and the transition 
verb  start,  respectively,  and  they  both  exhibit  the  projection  behavior  that  is 
characteristic of presuppositions. But they also fail the wh-test. In the first case it would 
make no sense to ask which state or fact (or whatever) involving his daughter Barney is 
proud of, and in the second case no hearer would ever wonder which instance of  Betty- 
not-taking-saxophone-lessons  ended at time t. Hence, if  the wh-test is to be trusted, the 
inferences exemplified by (43) and (44) aren't  genuine presuppositions,  and therefore 
they must be explained in terms of backgrounding. 
Zeevat (1992) has proposed a classification of presupposition-inducing expressions 
which  resembles  my  somewhat tentative  distinction  between  genuine presupposition 
inducers  and  expressions  licensing  inferences  that  are  best  understood  in  terms  of 
backgrounding.  Zeevat's  'resolution  triggers'  correspond  to  what  I  call 'presuppositions'  simpliciter;  his  'lexical  triggers',  to  what  I  prefer  to  treat  as 
backgrounding  expressions (the correspondences  are not quite perfect). It would take 
me too far afield  to discuss the theory Zeevat  erects on  his classification, but I would 
like to briefly comment on one of his empirical claims, which, if correct, might be put to 
use for discriminating between presupposition inducers and backgrounding expressions. 
Zeevat  views  lexical  triggers  as  'applicability  conditions'  which  must  be  satisfied 
locally, i.e. ill .situ; and this constraint does not hold, according to Zeevat, for resolution 
triggers. It follows from this that resolution triggers can, and lexical triggers cannot, get 
de I-e construals. The following example illustrates both predictions: 
(45)  Betty believes that the superintendent is a bachelor. 
If  this statement is true, Betty can hardly fail to believe that the superintendent is a man 
(which is the lexical inference triggered by bachelor), but it may well be that she is not 
aware that the person  in question is a superintendent (which is part of the presupposition 
triggered by the definite NP). Unfortunately however, for Zeevat as well as myself, this 
distinction is not as neat as it initially appears to be. Suppose that all Betty knows about 
the superintendent  is that he or she is not married. Would (45) be true or false, under 
these circumstances? Speaking for myself, I believe I might accept the statement as true, 
but even if  other speakers should disagree, they would still have to concede, I think, that 
the matter is not as clear-cut as it seemed to be at first. 
When we turn  away from the standard bachelor-type cases, it becomes even clearer 
that  Zeevat's  observation  is hard  to  maintain. Suppose Fred  tells  his friend  Barney: 
'Wilma fried an egg this morning.' Whereupon Barney reports to his wife: 
(46)  Fred believes that Wilma managed to fry an egg 
Tendentious though it may be, this  statement is clearly correct, and it  need not imply 
that  Fred  believes that  it is (or  was)  difficult for Wilma to  fry an  egg. Therefore, if 
Zeevat's  diagnostic  applied  across  the  board,  this  inference  could  not  be  a  lexical 
presupposition  (in  Zeevat's  terminology)  or  backgrounded  information  (in  mine).  I 
don't know how Zeevat would want to deal with this inference, but since I want to treat 
it as an instance of backgrounding, I cannot employ attitude contexts for distinguishing 
between presuppositions and backgrounded information. 
5.3.  Factives 
Factive verbs are standardly regarded as presupposition-inducing expressions, although 
there is a well-known problem with this view. It is that some factive verbs, at least, do 
not always seem to trigger the presupposition that their complement is true: 
(47)  a.  If Barney should discover that Miss Chambley is rich, he'll propose to 
her. 
b.  If I should discover that Miss Chambley is rich, I'll  propose to her. 
Both  (47a) and (47b) can  be  consistently uttered  by  a  speaker  who  doesn't want  to 
commit himself as to whether Miss Chambley is rich, but unlike (47b), (47a) appears to 
have  a  further  reading,  as  well,  implying  that  Miss  Chambley  is  rich.  In  view  of 
observations such as these it has been suggested that discover belongs to a special class of  'semi-factive'  verbs,  which  are  ambiguous  between  a  presupposing  and  a  non- 
presupposing reading. This unattractive assumption can be avoided if  we approach the 
matter  in somewhat different terms. If  the complement of  a factive verb can be either 
backgrounded  or not, the Buoyancy Principle predicts that something very much  like 
presupposition projection will occur in the former case but in the latter. This view is an 
attractive  one,  I  believe,  because  it  seems  to  correlate  with  our  intuitions  about 
foreground vs. background in  factive constructions. For example, a speaker who utters 
(48a) may be interested primarily in  the fact that Barney knew (48b), or in the fact that 
(4Sb) is true. In the former case, the information in  (48b) is backgrounded; in the latter, 
it is foregrounded. 
(48)  a.  Barney knows that his daughter is an anarcho-syndicalist. 
>>  b.  Barney's daughter is an anarcho-syndicalist. 
Now  if  the  same options  are  available  for the  antecedent  of  (48a), we  predict  that 
backgrounding  the  proposition  that  Miss  Chambley  is  rich  will  imply  that  Miss 
Chambley is rich, whereas this inference will not go through if  the factive complement 
is foregrounded. These predictions appear to be correct. 
5.4.  Concluding remarks 
In  the preceding pages I have argued that a number of  expressions that are standardly 
categorized  as presupposition  inducers are better  viewed as backgrounding devices. I 
suspect, furthermore, that this viewpoint may be of  more general use, and that it may 
help to account for phenomena which have not as yet received a satisfactory treatment. 
Let me mention just two, rather disparate, examples: 
Non-restrictive relative clauses: 
(49)  a.  Fred suspected that Betty, who had been avoiding him of late, had 
discovered about his collection of Neil Sedaka albums. 
>>  b.  Betty had been avoiding Fred of late. 
Felicity conditions on speech acts: 
(50)  a.  Where is my bicycle? 
>>  b.  The speaker doesn't know where his bicycle is. 
Although  it  has  occasionally  been  suggested  that  these  inferences  are  of  a 
presuppositional  nature,  this  position  has  not  gained  much  support  in  the  literature 
(exceptions are Fillmore 1969 and Keenan 1971). Still, both types of  inference seem to 
exhibit the 'wide scope' tendency that is the hallmark of presuppositions. This is harder 
to demonstrate for felicity conditions on  speech acts than for non-restrictive relatives, 
because non-declaratives  dislike being  embedded under operators of  any kind. But at 
least we have conditional speech acts: 
(51)  a.  If my pogo stick is in the attic, where is my bicycle? 
>>  b.  The speaker doesn't know where his bicycle is. That non-restrictive relative clauses behave similarly is easier to show, for instance, by 
embedding (49a) under a weak modal operator, such as perhaps. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that the majority view is correct, and that the inferences 
exemplified by  (49) and (50)  shouldn't  be  granted  the  status of presuppositions.  In 
particular, the preferred interpretation of non-restrictive relatives is plausibly explained 
in terms of backgrounding: non-restrictive relatives are parenthetical remarks, which are 
backgrounded if anything is. So the Buoyancy Principle surely applies to non-restrictive 
relatives, and I conjecture that it applies to felicity conditions on speech acts, too. 
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Nicholas Asher 
1.  Introduction 
Dynamic semantic  accounts  of  presupposition  have proven  to  quite  successful  im- 
provements over earlier theories. One great advance has been to link presupposition 
and anaphora together (van der Sandt 92, Geurts 95), an approach that extends to inte- 
grate bridging and other discourse phenomena (Asher and Lascarides !998a,b). In this 
extended anaphoric account, presuppositions attach, like assertions, to the discourse 
context via certain rhetorical relations. These discourse attachments constrain accom- 
modation and help avoid some infelicitous predictions of standard accounts of presup- 
position. Further, they have interesting and complex interactions with underspecified 
conditions that  are an  important feature of  the contributions of  most presupposition 
triggers. 
Deictic uses of definites, on the other hand, seem at first glance to fall outside the 
purview of an anaphoric theory of presupposition. There seems to be little that a dis- 
course based theory would have to say. I will argue, however, that a discourse based 
account can capture how  these definites function in  conversation. In particular such 
accounts  can  clarify the  interaction  between  the  uses  of  such  deictic definites  and 
various conversational moves. At least some deictic uses of definites generate presup- 
positions that are bound to the context via a rhetorical function that I'll call unchoring, 
which  if  successful entails a type of knowing how. If  this anchoring function is ac- 
cepted, then  the  acceptors  know  how  to  locate the  referent  of  the  definite  in  the 
pres?'lent context. I'll concentrate here just on definites that refer to spatial locations, 
where the intuitions about anchoring are quite clear. But I think that this view extends 
to other deictic uses of definites and has ramifications for an analysis of de re atti- 
tudes as well. 
2.  Different ways to bind presuppositions 
To set the stage for an analysis of  anchoring uses of  definites and the role that their 
presuppositions play there, it is useful to see how varied a role presuppositions of de- 
finites  play  in  anaphoric  uses  of  definites.  According  to  "Dynamic"  accounts  like 
Heim's fhrniliurity  theory (1982), definites presuppose familiar discourse referents. 
Such presuppositions must he satisfied in  the discourse context in the Tarskian sense 
or must be accommodated (i.e., added) to the discourse context. Van der Sandt (1993) 
tells us to find these discourse referents via anaphora resolution -  i.e., try to bind, and 
failing that, accommodate. Geurts extends this view by  including propositional iden- 
tity as a means of binding. 
Nevertheless, there is much more that can be said about binding. Consider bridging 
examples like the following: 
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(1)  a.  I met two interesting people last night at a party. 
b.  The woman was a member of Clinton's Cabinet. 
(2)  a.  John took engine El  from Avon to Dansville. 
b.  Then he picked up the boxcar 
c.  and took it to Broxburn. 
Now what happens to the presuppositions generated by  the boxcar in (2b)? On stan- 
dard accounts, we can't bind the boxcar to any discourse entity in the context nor can 
we satisfy the presupposition that there is a boxcar in the discourse context created by 
the first sentence. So all  the standard theories of  presupposition  would  say that we 
should accommodate a boxcar in the context. This misses an  important aspect of the 
meaning in  this discourse, which we can focus on by asking ourselves: Where ist the 
boxcar? The discourse based account in Asher and Lascarides (1998a) gets this essen- 
tial part of the interpretation of (2) by assuming that the presuppositional material in- 
troduced  by  the definite contains some underspecified elements,  while the bridging 
relation is set to identity if  this produces a well-defined result (thus incorporating the 
insights by  van der Sandt that binding is preferred), but in  this case there is no non- 
absurd identification of  the boxcar with some other discourse entity to be had. How- 
ever,  in  (2b),  there  is  a  discourse particle  or  adverbial  then  that  determines  the 
discourse relation between (2a) and (2b) to be one of Narration. The presence of such a 
discourse  relation  between  (2a) and  (2b)  entails  that  the  event described  in  (2b)  is 
understood  as coming after the event described in  (2a) and as spatially located in the 
location in which the event in (2a) terminates (Dansville). The lexical semantics of pick 
up  adds the information that in effect the boxcar is in Dansville. This suffices to de- 
termine  the  bridging  relation  in  this  case to  be  'in'.  Thus, the boxcar  is  linked to 
Dansville and that is enough to get the right interpretation. Details of the analysis can 
be found in Asher and Lascarides (1998a). 
With  (I), we  also see a need to  supplement  both  the Heim  and van  der Sandt- 
Geurts approaches to presupposition. Again we can't bind the woman to any discourse 
entity in the context nor can we satisfy the presupposition that there is a woman in the 
discourse context created by the first sentence. So all the standard theories of presup- 
position  would say that  we should accommodate a woman  in  the context. But this 
again misses an essential component of the interpretation of  (I): the woman is one of 
the two people that I met last night. The discourse based  anaphoric account gets this 
essential part  of  the interpretation of (1) by a simultaneous resolution of  the under- 
specified bridging and a computation of  the discourse connections between  the pre- 
supposition  generated  by  the woman, the  asserted  component  of  (Ib) and  (la) ac- 
counts for this anaphoric connection and the coherence of the text. More specifically, 
in  this case again, specifying the bridging relation to identity yields an absurdity. But 
if  we specify the bridging relation to be "an  element of', we get a coherent discourse 
and a discourse relation of  elaboration between (la) and (lb). Alternatively, specify- 
ing the discourse relation  to be Elaboration will  coerce the underspecified bridging 
relation to the appropriate value.' 
Other examples of  complex presupposition binding occur when the presupposition 
trigger, the expression that generates the presupposition, is itself a discourse particle. 
That is the case with (3): 
'  Scc Asher and Lascarides (1998a) for mure details, and also section 4 helow 
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(3)  John lives in New York too 
Kripke in  an  unpublished paper observes that (3) can't be  uttered in a null context, 
even if  many people  are known  by the speaker and the audience to live in NY. But 
accounts like van  der Sandt's and Heim's  don't  predict this.  On the other hand, the 
discourse based  account can, of  we assume that the presupposition  of  too is that  it 
generates a specific rhetorical function connecting the assserted content of  (3) to some 
element of  the contextually  given discourse  structure. In  the null  context there is no 
element of  discourse structure to connect to, and so the presupposition of  too can't be 
fulfilled. 
A  Final  example of  binding with  rhetorical  relations  reveals that not only are the 
Heim-  van der Sandt -  Geurts accounts of presupposition incomplete but they derive 
wrong interpretations. Consider (4). 
(4)  a.  If  a farmer goes to the market, he buys a donkey. 
b.  Yesterday, Farmer John went to the market. 
c.  The donkey he bought was expensive. 
d.  This time the donkey was expensive 
e.  This time (?)itdunkey  was expensive. 
Van  der Sandt and Geurts must accommodate the existence of  a donkey in order to 
interpret the presupposition of (4c,d,e). But the donkey in (4) depends on an anaphoric 
link  between  bought  and  went.  Accommodation  yields  incorrect  results.  Heim's 
(1983) theory yields only the satisfaction of an existential presupposition, not an ana- 
phoric one. We need an appropriate instantiation of the conditional (like (4a')) 
(4)  a'  If John is a farmer and went to market, John bought a donkey 
which, when coupled with (4b), gives the donkey referred to in (4c). 
(5)  If  a farmer goes to Paris, he buys a donkey 
Pedro went to Paris. His donkey was expensive 
(6)  A Farmer buys a donkey whenever he visits the market. 
Farmer John visits the market on Wednesdays. His donkeys are meny 
Similarly, for (4) adding an argument for going-to-the-nzarket events. We might call 
this  inferential  binding.  The inferential  binding  in  (4abc) falls  squarely within  the 
analysis given to the bridging examples and to our anaphoric theory of presupposi- 
tions. The rhetorical relation that binds the presupposition to the discourse context is 
the relation of Defeasible Consequence (Asher and Lascarides  1998b), a natural gen- 
eralization of Geurts's notion of propositional binding. Defeasible Consequence holds 
of two propositions p, q iff q is a defeasible consequence of p.'  This relation will bind 
the presupposition to both (4a) and (4b) as both are necessary to derive the presuppo- 
sition that Pedro owns a donkey. 
Defeasible consequence  is  defined  precisely  via a  n~~nmonotonic  logic. See for instance Lascarides 
and Asher 1993, or Asher and Morreau  199  1 Nicholas Asher 
In  these examples, however, we cannot specify the bridging relation to identity. So the 
semantics of the rhetorical relation used to bind the presupposition must determine the 
bridging relation. In these examples the bridging relation ia  set to a witnessing relation 
W. While one term of W should be the discourse referent introduced by the definite, it 
is  less  clear  what  the  other  term  should  be.  If  we  allow  reference  to  quantifiers 
themselves or their logical forms (it is after all  one type of abstract object), then we 
can  take the other term of W to be the quantifier of which the definite produces an 
instance. In  (4), the appropriate quantifier is a donkey in (4a). 
3.  "Deictic binding" and Discourse Function 
Not  all  uses  of  definite  descriptions  fit  so  neatly  into  an  anaphoric  theory  of 
presupposition. Definite descriptions  have deictic uses  within  ordinary  conversation. 
Let's take some simple examples: 
(7)  a.  Now pour the mixture into the pan and gently simmer for 10 mins. 
b.  Move the window to the lower left (on a computer screen). 
c.  Close the window in the bedroom. 
d.  You've just  checked into a hotel and the clerk says: Your room is up the 
stairs and right at the end of the corridor. 
Many of these definites occur in contexts where, e.g., a window on the computer screen 
has already been introduced in  a previous discourse turn. So the presupposition would 
be satisfied here by  linking the discourse referents  introduced by the two NPs. On the 
other hand, this  mere anaphoric connection  isn't  sufficient to carry out the convcrsa- 
tional purpose behind these instructions. In order, for example, to carry out the instruc- 
tion  in (7d), the addressee need to be able to find the referent of the description. Simi- 
larly for (7a,c). The discourse referents introduced by the definites have to be linked or 
anchored to particular  nonlinguistic  elements in the visual  nonlinguistic context. The 
case in  (7d) is a hit  different, but  in  a way  it's  more interesting. The definites your 
room, the corridor have a standard anaphoric analysis but the stairs is somewhat differ- 
ent. We could simply accommodate that there is a corridor on an anaphoric account, but 
we would miss the intended interpretation -  viz, that the stairs be linked to some object 
in  the environment that accomplishes the manifest goal of the speaker, which is that the 
addressee knows how to get to his room. As one would expect, a standard, dynamic ac- 
count of  presupposition, which treats  the presupposition  of  the definite  in (7d) simply 
by  adding it to the context, misses the rhetorical point of the speaker. 
This rhetorical  function of  the presupposition for the speaker in  a given context is 
part  of  what determines conversation. Consider  what  happens  when  this  rhetorical 
function isn't shared by the interpreter or addressee. If  the addressee cannot locate the 
stairs, for instance, it is quite appropriate for him to say: 
(7)  d'.  Where are the stairs? 
We saw earlier that  the presupposition  of  a definite description when  resolved can 
help determine a rhetorical  function for the asserted content of a sentence (viz. (lb)), 
and it seems as though the presupposed material here too has an imprtant role to play 
in this rhetorical function. But what exactly does it do? Nicholas Asher 
are uses of definites that could be bound via identity to a previously mentioned occur- 
rence as in: 
(8f,ii)  P:  Tu as pris sous la voie ferrCe comme je t'avais dit? 
But interestingly Isabelle does not use this binding alone. In order to be able to answer 
the question, she must be  able to identify the railroad tracks in her immediate envi- 
ronment or as something she passed on her journey. She has to "anchor"  the definite 
to some object in the (nonlinguistic) context. To that end, she offers up an object in 
her perceptual context with which to bind la voie ferrie. 
(8g)  I:  D'ici on voit une voie ferrie, an dessus de la place 
Interestingly again, Phillippe rejects this contextual anchoring  of  the railroad tracks 
in (8h); he identifies  what she sees as the Boulevard Peripherique. So it looks like 
deictically used definites do generate familiarity presuppositions; further the satisfac- 
tion of the presupposition is accomplished by linking the definite to some object in the 
nonlinguistic context. Finally, it appears that an upshot of this linking is a mutual be- 
lief that both participants in the dialogue are referring to the same object with the de- 
scription. When this doesn't happen, we get a Correction or some sort of question by 
the other participants, as Phillippe does in (8h). 
Exactly what  is the nature of this Anchoring  ? It's  easy enough to see that it in- 
volves some sort of de re attitude toward the object, but just  saying this doesn't illu- 
minate  an  important  link between  Anchoring  of  a definite  in an utterance and the 
conversational goals of the utterance or of utterances linked to it. Consider 
(8e,i)  I:  Non, en fait, je suis tout an bout de I 'avenue Jean Jaurks. apr&s  la grande 
place. 
au bout de l'avenue Jeun Juur2s is a definite with a novel use. In another context ac- 
commodation  might suffice, but not here with the particular conversational goals of 
finding out where Isabelle is. Or perhaps, the location denoted by the end of the ave- 
nue Jeun Juurds  could be bound to some doxastically accessible discourse referent, 
since Phillippe  lived  in  that  neighborhood.  But  in  Phillippe's  response  to Isabelle 
(8f.i), he makes it clear that this binding isn't sufficient for him to attain his speech act 
related goal of knowing where Isabelle is. In  order to satisfy his conversational goals 
he  needs  a contextual  anchoring that  will  support a de  re  knowledge claim. What 
would suffice is a binding of the presupposed location to some location that he is fa- 
miliar with  and can  locate on his "cognitive  map".  And in fact this is what Isabelle 
wants to do too in view of the goal they both have of getting Isabelle unlost. 
That Anchoring  must be done in order to achieve the conversational goals is also 
well-attested  in  the  map corpus dialogues  (Edinburgh University). I give a sample 
here. 
(10)  a.  A: Start at the extinct volcano, and go down round the tribal settlement. 
And then 
b.  B: Whereabouts is the tribal settlement? 
c.  A:  It's at the bottom. It's to the left of the extinct volcano. 
d.  B:  Right. How far? Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
Ehm, at the opposite side. 
To the opposite side. Is it underneath the rope bridge or to the left. 
It's underneath the rope bridge.  And  then  from the tribal  settle- 
ment go straight up towards  the rope  bridge  and  over the rope 
bridge. Then down three steps and along to above the volcano. 
Is down three steps below or above the machete'? 
Ah. The machete's not on my map. 
Oh. 
Down three lines. 
Right. 
And then along as far as the volcano but above it, and stop under- 
neath the collapsed shelter but away from it a bit, 
Right. 
And go up to about the middle of the map. 
The middle of the map. 
And stop. 
Just slightly above the crevasse? 
That's  not  on  my  map either.  Ehm, go to  your  left  again  into 
about the middle. 
I think that would bring me over the crevasse. 
Well, it's not on my map. 
No? Oh. 
In the MAP Task Corpus dialogues, agent A  is trying to get B  to a given goal in a 
game, in  which  both  A  and  B  have a partially  accurate map  of  the terrain  to be 
traversed. In  this dialogue the instructions to move to a particular place can only be 
carried out once either that place or obstacles to be circumvented have been anchored 
in an appropriate way to their maps. When this Anchoring doesn't take place, then the 
agents can't give or carry out directions and they have to settle on  another means for 
conveying directions. The directions can  only be carried out once the locations  in- 
volved are appropriately anchored. 
I want to draw several  conclusions from  the discussion of  these examples. First, 
like other uses of definites, deictically used definites do generate familiarity presuppo- 
sitions. Second these presuppositions are not accommodated or bound in the way fa- 
miliar from standard, anaphoric theories of presupposition. But that doesn't mean that 
we have to throw out the machinery of  the  anaphoric theory. In  fact, the discourse 
based anaphoric theory of  presuppositions is very useful: we can understand contex- 
tual anchoring as a special sort of presupposition binding; in fact contextual anchoring 
is a rhetorical function of the presupposed information in these deictic cases. For the 
discourse to be felicitous, the presupposition generated by  a deictically used definite 
must be tied to some object in  the nonlinguistic context such that the interpreter be- 
lieves he knows how to identify it or make use of  that object for some conversation- 
ally  salient, discourse purpose. The upshot of  such anchoring is a mutual  belief  be- 
tween  speaker and hearer that they are referring to the same object with the descrip- 
tion. When this doesn't happen, we get a Correction or some sort of question by the 
other participants, as Phillippe does in (8h), and as Isabelle does in (8m). 
Phillippes goal is to get de re knowledge, to know where Isabelle is. But this goal 
itself  is  subservient  to  another  goal  namely  that  of  getting  Isabelle  unlost.  Let's 
assume for now that Phillippe has acquired this goal. and it  is this higher goal that Nicholas Asher 
tells us what sort of de re knowledge this really is; Phillippe needs to know  where 
Isabelle is so that he can give her directions to get her to her destination. And to give 
these  directions he  has  to  construct  a path  from  Isabelle's  present  location  to her 
destination  and  to  do that  he  has  to  be  able to  fix  the  present  location  (and  her 
destination)  on  some cognitive  map; or perhaps  more  simply he  has  to know  how 
himself  to  get  from  where  she is  to  where  she wants to go. So this  de  re claimis 
grounded in  a plan  and finally  in a capacity for  actin. It's  not  knowledge thut that's 
indicative or even constitutive of  de re attitude claims; it's  knowing how to realize a 
cerain  goal.  Boer  and  Lycan  (1986)  propose  that  de  re  knowledge  be  understood 
relative to purposes. I take their proposal to be basically correct. But they still analyze 
de re attitudes in light of  knowledge that -  viz. knowledge of  a proposition containing 
an attributive description. and while this is sometimes the case, it need not be; in the 
map task  it may be  the ability to point to a loction  or to put an agent  in a particular 
location that constitutes knowledge de re of that location. Boer and Lycan are interested 
in stopping the "regress"  of  "who is X?" type questions. But in  so doing they conflate 
the issue of  de re knowledge claims with their justification. De re knowledge is just  a 
matter  of  having  access  to  the  object  that  is  sufficient  for  accomplishing  the 
contextually given goals at hand. The upshot of  our proposal  for contextual anchoring 
amounts  to  the  following  view  of  de  re  attitude:  there  isn't  any  ahsolute  de  re 
knowledge; there's de re knowledge relative to various goals that one might have. 
3.1  Previous approaches to Contextual Anchoring 
The description given of the phenomenon of contextual anchoring of the presuppposi- 
tions  of  definites is  a  quite different picture of  deictically used  definites than  that 
found  in  the philosophical  and  linguistic literature. Here are some approaches that 
might be useful to combine with the Boer and Lycan analysis of de re attitudes I  have 
sketched above. 
contextual evaluations for indexicals and demonstratives (Kaplan 1978) 
value loading (Barwise and Perry 1983) 
DRT's external and internal anchors (e.g., Asher 1986) 
Each one of these theories gives us an account of the satisfaction of the definites. Both 
Kaplan and Barwise and Perry suggest that a definite may be evaluated in the present 
context  or for Barwise  and  Perry  in  any  "conversationally  salient"  situation.  This 
"value  loading",  or "externalist"  type of evaluation yields a singular proposition for 
the  sentence containing the definite.  Such an  account  yields  a connection  between 
deictically used definites and de re attitudes, which seems needed  to account for the 
rhetorical  function of  such definites. Once an agent accepts such a singular proposition 
or comes to believe it, he has a de re believe. 
The problem is that this act of acceptance and the de re attitude as an attitude toward 
a  singular proposition  doesn't  by  itself  link  up easily  to  the  conversational  patterns 
we've already discussed. Consider again the position  of  Phillippe  in (8f.i). Suppose 
that he accepts Isabelle's  assertion whose interpretation yields a singular proposition. 
By accepting this assertion, he comes to have a belief, in this case a de re belief. But 
on the other hand, we'd like to distinguish this case from the sort of attitude that Phil- 
lippe requires  in  order to  satisfy his conversational goals. For instance, in  (Ei), it's 
clear from his response that Phillippe doesn't huve access to that contextual evalua- Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
tion, which is something that these approaches can't explain. And this lack of access 
drives his response to Isabelle's  assertion, and in particular her use of the definite uu 
bout de ['avenue Jean Juuris. 
An  alternative,  "internalist"  approach  to  singular  propositions  and  the  attendant 
construal  of  de re  attitudes  is  to  look  for  some internal,  cognitive  aspect  of  these 
attitudes.  This  is also a familiar  idea in  philosophy, also made famous by  Kaplan - 
though this time it's Kaplan's (1968) paper  'Quantifying  in'. Kaplan's idea was that a 
de re attitude involves a particular sort of name, a "vivid name", for the object and that 
name as a constituent of the attitude object. Vivid names for a particular attitude holder 
are  ones  that  have  a  lot  of  information  assocjated  with  them,  perhaps  information 
suficient to identify the object. But, at least on this construal, vividness isn't  necessary 
for some de re knowledge claims. Knowledge who, for instance, is presumbaly a kind 
of  de re attitude. So now consider the de re knolwedge involved in knowing who lost 
the battle of Hastings for the purposes of a history exam. Here the name of a long dead 
Anglo Saxon king will suffice; what seems important in  this case is not the amount of 
information as the disposal of the possessor of the attitude but the way that information 
interacts  with  the conversational  goals at hand.  The practical  activity in  the example 
about King Harold is just being able to supply the correct answer. We could reconstme 
vividness in terms of  knowing how, but we would still need to supplement this with an 
account of how this attitude toward the referent of the definite interacts with discourse. 
And we lack here any connection with accounts of presupposition. 
A DRT approach to deictically used definites could make use both of internalist and 
externalist components. In  the terminology of  Asher (1986) (see also Kamp  1987), a 
DRT approach to deictically used definites could make use both of external anchors to 
simulate the  truth conditional  effects of singular propositions  and  of  internal  anchors 
that  could  furnish  additional  descriptive  conditions.  The  definite  would  introduce  a 
discourse referent x that would be linked to some object a in the context via an external 
anchor, which  would ensure that the satisfaction of  the discourse representation must 
proceed by  assigning a to x. Additionally, the binding of  the presupposition generated 
by the definite could take place via an internal anchoring of x to some discourse referent 
in  a representation that is part of the agent's cognitive state. Such internal anchors link 
the  interpretation  of  one  discourse  referent  x  in  one representation  R, to  the  inter- 
pretation  of  another discourse referent  y in  another representation Rz; more precisely, 
we say that a pair of  assignments f, g satisfies R, and RZ respectively  given an internal 
anchor between x and y iff f(x) = g(y). Unlike the value loading accounts, this approach 
focuses on the cognitive aspect of these contextual anchorings. 
DRT approaches also give us an anaphoric account of  presuppositions. Roughly, a 
definite  description  introduces  a  presuppositional  component  into  the  discourse 
representation in which a discourse referent is introduced along with the properties that 
are given  by  the  description.  This  discourse  referent  must be  linked  to  some other 
discourse referent in the context, unless the presupposition is to be accommodated. We 
can now postulate that the discourse referent introduced by presupposition generated by 
the deictically used definite binds via an internal  anchor to some discourse referent in 
the interpreter's cognitive state. Nevertheless, a DRT approach says little about the sort 
of knowing how that we've  seen is important in the examples. The uses of  definites in 
these  dialogues establish  that  it's  the  cognitive  access  for certain  purposes  that  are 
crucial  for de re  attitude  claim.  Like  Kaplan's  own  picture  of  de  re  knowledge in 
quantifying in, DRT's conception of  internal anchoring lacks any tie to practical plans; 
in fact there aren't  any constraints  on  internal  anchors whatsover,  which  might well Nicholas Asher 
accord  with  our intuitions  about  beliefs  of  a certain  kind  (footnote Jeshion  here) but 
which doesn't capture the particular sense of  de re attitude at issue here. The proposal 
I've just developed as it stands is still just binding, albeit to a belief context rather than a 
discourse context. We need some story here of  familiarity that goes beyond binding. We 
need an account in which, e.g., the variable associated with Isabelle's location is linked 
to  some cognitively  accessible  discourse  referent  in  a  way  that  allows  Phillippe  to 
accomplish his conversational goals. 
Let's see how this might be cashed out in terms of  the examples in the dialogues. 
The thesis about de re knowledge claims goes hand in  hand with a goal relative notion 
of  contextual  anchoring. Fleshing out this idea is what I turn  to  now. I'll  elaborate a 
theory of  presupposition  and of  the logical form of presupposition triggers (though not 
too much hangs on  this)  which allows a wide variety of  presupposition  bindings. I'll 
also  say  something  about  how  this  account  interacts  with  a  theory  of  cognitive 
modelling. I'll then return to these contextual anchorings. 
4.  SDRT's account of presupposition 
I turn  now to see how to analyze anchoring uses of definites within the anaphoric ac- 
count of presuppositions of  Asher and Lascarides (1998a,  1998b). I nee, however, to 
give a few more details of  the account than  I did earlier. In  this account presupposi- 
tions  are, like assertions,  units  of  information that  must  be  integrated  into  the dis- 
course context. A unit of  information, however, can be integrated into the discourse 
context  in  different ways, ways  which  correspond to the rhetorical  function of that 
unit of information. Accordingly this leads us to a more complex notion of a discourse 
structure than that present say in DRT. A discourse structure is a pair (A, F), where: 
A is a set of labels 
@  is  a  set  of  formulas  representing  clauses  and  relations  on  labels  (between 
clauses) 
F:A+@ 
We'll express the effects of F on A via the notation n:  K. 
While both assertions and presuppositions must be integrated to the discourse con- 
text, presuppositions must be linked via particular discourse relations. Asher and Las- 
carides (1998b) isolated two, Background and Defeasible Consequence. While there is 
no accommodation per se in this framework since the attachment of presuppositions 
is just part and parcel of building a discourse structure, the cases of accommodation in 
the literature correspond to linking the presupposition via the relation of Background. 
Defeasible  Consequence  generalizes  the  propositional  binding  relation  in  van  der 
Sandt and Geurts, while Background imposes thematic constraints that the notion of 
accommodation lacks. Background(p, q) holds iff q and p entail a common topic and q 
specifies properties of  elements in p that set the stage for or serve as an explanation 
for some event described in p or in some proposition linked top  (#q). 
As  discussed  in  the  introduction,  presuppositions  are  understood  as  containing 
incomplete or underspecified elements. This is particularly true in the case of the pre- 
suppositions of definites. In discussing earlier examples, I alluded to an innovation of 
the SDRT view that incorporates an underspecified bridging relation B in the presup- Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
position  of  a definite. The representations of  presuppositions  underspecify the dis- 
course relation by which they attach to the discourse context and the other term of  that 
relation;  as  such  they  are  explicitly  anaphoric elements  whose  proper  interpretation 
must  resolve  all  of  these underspecifications - i.e. find appropriate specifications for 
these underspecifications. 
Here's  an example of  how a presupposition and an assertion would be analyzed in 
SDRT. The asserted component is labelled with  a,  the presupposed  part  with p. The 
asserted part produces a labelled SDRS for for the asserted content of  a clause; another 
SDRS -  viz.(l I b), the "p"  part -  with speech act discourse referent a', and condition a' : 
K,  for the presupposed  content of  this clause, where  K,,  will  be  the DRS discourse 
constituent that represents the presupposition. 
(1 1)  The man walked. 
walk(e,  x)  1  :  hoe  )  1  p' 
n',  R,  v 
x,  u, e', t',  B 
We', x,  u) 
hold(er, t'), 
B=? 
In  the SDRS above, the man denoted by  the definite must be  (bridging) related to an 
antecedent  object  (so  (11)  couldn't  be  uttered  in  a  null  context).  Further,  the 
presupposition  must  be  bound  to  the  context  via  a  rhetorical  relation.  While  both 
presuppositions  and  assertions  must  get  integrated  into  the  context,  they  do so in 
different  ways.  Presuppositions  link typically  with  either Defeasible  Consequence or 
Background.  We'll  add  here  the  relation  of  Anchoring  as  another  relation  that 
presuppositions  can  bear  to  other  elements  in  the  discourse  structure.  When  the 
components above are attached to the discourse context and the various specifications 
of underspecified conditions are effected (as far as possible), then we have an update of 
the  discourse  context  with  the  information  given  by  (I I).  Following  Asher  and 
Lascarides  (1998b),  I'll  represent  update  by  a  three  place  relation  involving  the 
discourse context, the new information and a "resulting"  SDRS that integrates the new 
information into the discourse context. 
In the introduction, I also mentioned that SDRT incorporates a principle of resolving 
B  to  identity  whenever  feasible, thus  capturing  the  preference  for binding  that  is  a 
feature  anaphoric  theories  of  presupposition.  This  accounts  for the  simple  cases of 
binding in 
(12)  Whenever I see a book in a bookstore that I like, 1  try to buy the book. 
We can formalize this principle as follows: Nicholas Asher 
If  Possible Use Identity: 
(KO  [B =?I A J  update(^, K, KD  [B/LA~X  = ~1))  +  (T, a, j [B//Lwayx = ~1) 
This  constraint  says that  as  long as setting the  bridging  relation  to  identity  is  well 
defined J, then the update of the discourse context with K fi will set B to identity. 
As  we saw in  (1) or  (2), sometimes we  cannot resolve  B to  identity. In  that case 
whathappens?  When  we  try  to  resolve  the  bridging  relation  to  something other than 
identity, we do so in a way  that  maximizes dis-course coherence. Since the update 
relation  is  nondeterministic,  there  are  often  many  ways  new  information  can  be 
integrated  into  a  discourse  con- text.  Sometimes  the  resolution  of  underspecified 
elements as in  (1) will  determine how the new  information attaches to  the discourse 
context.  Some  of  these  ways  provide  for  a  more  coherent  discourse  than  not. 
Attachment  and  resolution  of  underspecified  elements  always  tries  to  maximize 
discourse coherence. And to give this constraint some bite, I specify some things about 
the preference order + on discourse structures: 
More  specified,  well  typed  SDRSs  are  always  preferred  to  SDRSs  with  less 
specification - z  +*  z' -. z' > z  . 
SDRSs that violate type restrictions are less preferred than those that don't violate 
such restrictions. 
defeasible consequence > background for presupposed material 
background with a more specific topic + background with a less specific topic. 
where  speech  act  related  goals  or  SARGs can  be  inferred  from  Cognitive 
Modeling, a discourse structure that is more likely to lead to SARG satisfaction 
is more coherent than one that is not likely to lead to SARG satisfaction. 
All of  these constraints on > require probably more explanation than  I can give here. 
The first constraint just  says that if  an SDRS with fewer underspecifications where no 
type constraints on predicates are violated is to be preferred to an underspecified SDRS. 
The second constraint says that anytime a type restriction  is violated that SDRS is less 
preferred to other SDRSs where the type restriction is not violated. The third constraint 
says  that  some  discourse relations  between  presupposed  material  and  the  discourse 
context like defeasible consequence are to be preferred  over a relation  of  background 
between  the  presupposed  material  and  the  discourse  context  (thus  encoding  an 
anaphoric theory of presupposition's preference for binding over accommodation). The 
fourth  constraint  tells  us  that  the  tighter  the  connection  between  the  background 
rnaterial and the foreground material, the better the discourse coherence between those 
two segments, as a tighter connection between background and foreground will allow 
for  a  narrower,  or  more  specific,  topic.  Thus,  in  an  example  like  (1)  maximizing 
discourse coherence or MDC will prefer those SDRSs where the bridging relation in the 
presupposition of the definite is set to some relation other than identity since setting the 
relation  to  identity would require  the identification of  a couple with  a woman, which 
violates type restrictions. But further setting the bridging relation to be "a  member of' is 
preferred on several counts: it specifies the underspecified relation and it also gives rise 
to a Background relation  with a more specific topic than would be otherwise possible. 
For the inferential binding cases like (4),  MDC will specify the bridging relation to the Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
witness  relation  as  we  described  earlier,  because  that  will  allow  us  to  attach  the 
presupposition  with the relation  of defeasible consequence to the SDRS consisting of 
the  first  two  sentences  of  (4),  and  that  is  preferred  to  any  option  on  which  the 
presupposition  is  not  so  attached. Below  I  give  a picture  of  how  the  specifications 
would go. Def-cons is the relation of Defeasible Consequence, Commentary is another 
relation  in  which  the  speaker of  the second constituent expresses an  attitude toward 
some element in the first constituent. 
That leaves our last constraint on > for discussion It has to do with cognitive modelling, 
the part of our story that I turn to next. 
(13) 
4.1.  Cognitive Modeling 
x  %I>  n< 
Def-cons(n, n,,) 
Commentary(n, no 
u = Ed  donkey1 
owns(x,  jj 
n~ :  K4, 
As we've seen anchoring requires linking an epistemic attitude to conversational goals. 
Thus, we need to be able to infer conversational goals from conversational patterns. In 
other work  (Asher and Lascarides  1998, Asher  1999), Lascarides and I have co opted 
some of  the insights  of  Gricean pragmatics and  speech  act theory to link  speech  act 
related  goals or SARGs to discourse structure. On our view, the rhetorical relations in 
dialogue bring considerations about why participants ask, elaborate, request, assert and 
respond  to  what  is  said. In  turn  such  SARGs  help  elucidate  and  further  constrain 
discourse structure. In  order to formulate a precise  notion  of  anchoring for deictically 
used  definites,  I  will  give  some  of  the  principles  for  discovering  SARGs  in  that 
component of SDRT that supplies a rough cognitive model of discourse participants. 
A second feature of  anchoring is that  once the anchoring function of  a deictically 
used definite is accepted by the interpreter, it appears that speaker and hearer mutually 
believe that the definite picks out the same object. Given that we have adopted a largely 
internalist view  of  the de re  attitude involved in  anchoring and that the way dynamic 
semantics models attitudes has nothing to say about knowing how, I'll  show how such 
mutual  belief can be derived from axioms having to do with the beliefs of  the partici- 
pants. 
Cognitive modelling in SDRT follows the basic BDI approach in which we have mo- 
dal operators for belief (K45) (B) and intention  (I)  (KD)s, and a mutual belief operator 
MBG, for any group G with  the usual  axiomatization.We'll assume distributivity of  B 
and I over  >,  as  well  as  the  K  axiom. I'll  suppose that  BApn,  corresponds  to  A 
believing the proposition  content represented in  the SDRS K,.  It is assumed in  SDRT 
that  whenever  an agent  intends  something, he does not already believe that it is true: Nicholas Asher 
IA,-  ~BA~.  Goals are propositions that one intends (a simplification but good enough 
for our purposes here). I'll  start with the simple Grice like axioms for belief modelling. 
The first axiom allows us to infer beliefs from assertions. 
Sincerity: R(a, P) > BelAgmttB,R(a,  PJ 
A second default, competence, transfers the beliefs of  one agent to another, while the 
constraint  on  acceptance gets us from acceptances to beliefs about  what  others have 
said. 
Competence: BA@  > BB@ 
Constraint on  Acceptance: Accepts(a, fi)  > MB,A.~~~~(~~cx 
Let's now  turn to the inference of  SARGs. Inferences concerning SARGs also revolve 
around a Gricean notion of cooperativity. One agent B is cooperative with another agent 
A if  he adopts A's  goals. According to this, B will try to realize A's  goals in  so doing 
help  A.  This  can  be  only  a default, because there  may  be  many  times  when  B  has 
conflicting goals with respect to A. So, a second level to cooperativity is to indicate if 
the  speaker  does  not  share  the  conversational  goals  of  the  other  participant.  These 
principles are expressed by the following axiom: 
Cooperativity: 
(a) 6(@)  > h(@) 
(b) d(@) A  4(@O)  > MA?/B(@) 
Cooperativity doesn't tell us what an agent's goals might be in dialogue, because it may 
not  be  possible to  infer an agent's  goals from what he  says. This is where particular 
linguistic axioms like QRG and RRG come in. 
Question Related Goals (QRG): 
QAP(a, P) > (48entta~&tgm,,a,P) 
This  axiom  states:  if  P is the  answer to the question  a  then  normally  the  agent or 
speaker of  ff  intends to  be  in  a certain  state in  which  P  is  true.  This axiom  applies 
whenever an agent asks a question. A similar axiom holds for requests. 
Request Related Goals (RRG): 
a : ! > LI~.,,,~(~)U 
SARGs  for  assertions  are  more  difficult  to  capture.  We'll  assume  that  knowledge 
relevant to connecting the content of assertions, which we'll  assume here to be sincere, 
to  their  conventionally  associated  SARGs can  be  accessed  by  the  linguistic  system. 
Finally, we'll  assume that if  we compute a SARG via Cooperativity or RRG or QRG, 
then if  the agent's speech act has both a presuppositional  and an assertional component, 
the SARG computed applies to both. 
One final  matter  is  that  in  SDRT questions  can  elaborate  on  other  questions  or 
requests.  We see  this  in  (8b) already  where  Phillippe's  question  is  intended to help Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
elaborate  a  plan  already  implicit  in  Isabelle's  opening  (8a). We  call  the  rhetorical 
relation  that  (Sb) stands in to  (8a)  Question Elaboration or QElab (see Asher  1999, 
Asher  and  Lascarides  1998~).  If  we have  a  Qelab, then  the  SARGs of  the  second 
question include the SARGs of the first. Formally. we express this as: 
SARG additivity: 
(Q-elab(a, b) A SARG(c(, 6)) 4  sARG(~,  6) 
This  ensures  that  Qelab  SARGs are  carried  along  as  discourse  participants  try  to 
answer the original question by asking other questions. We'll group the SARGs that are 
accumulated through nested Qelabs within a cluster. 
5.  Conversational Goals and De Re Attitudes 
We have  most  of  the  parts  in  place  for our presuppositional  account  of  contextual 
anchoring. We needed an  account of conversational goals, and we have just  seen ways 
of  getting  SARGs  from  various  conversational  moves.We  determined  earlier  from 
looking at our examples that these conversational goals were essential in  determining 
the de re attitudes that are part of contextual anchoring. Further, I argued that these de re 
attitudes were really grounded not in  an attitude toward a proposition but in an ability. 
I'll  try  to be  more precise about  what  this  ability consists in  now  using the devices 
available to a  theory  like SDRT. That  means  giving  some analysis of  this  practical 
capacity in terms of a broadly DRIheoretic account of belief. 
Let's  return first to the turn  (Eef). Isabelle first corrects her previous turn  and then 
tries to answer Phillippe's question in (8b). Isabelle uses a deictically used definite, 'the 
end  of  the  avenue  ~ean  ~anrts'  in  her  answer,  that  Isabelle  further  localizes  with 
reference to  'the big square' (la grande place). What is the discourse relation  between 
the  presupposition  of  the  definite  and  the  discourse  context?  Presumably,  the 
presupposition  is to anchor the assertion. Interestingly, Isabelle goes on to elaborate on 
this location where she is, and the point of this elaboration in (8e.ii) is ostensibly to help 
establish  the  Anchoring  relation  between  the  presupposition  of  the  definite  and the 
discourse context. 
To appreciate  the  cognitive  effects  of  Anchoring,  let's  see  what  happens  if  the 
discourse move by  Isabelle which  includes the anchoring is accepted by  Phillippe. If 
this  Anchoring  relation  is  accepted  by  Phillippe,  it  has  a  certain  implication:  that 
Phillippe  will  be  able  to  determine  which  location  Isabelle  describes.  Moreover, 
Phillippe's  knowing  where  Isabelle  is  is  the  SARG derived from (8b) via QRG. By 
SARG additivity this remains a SARG through  (8d).'  By Cooperativity Isabelle takes 
over this SARG and she is trying to satisfy that SARG with her utterance of (8e). Were 
(8e) to be accepted, she would have satisfied that SARG and perhaps also the associated 
SARG of  getting her unlost. In  (89, however, Phillippe doesn't accept the Anchoring 
relation, which is why he asks "Wait a minute, I don't quite see where you are." 
So accepting  an  Anchoring  relation  between  the  presupposition  introduced  by  a 
definite  y  and  some  element  in  the  discourse  context  by  an  agent  A  requires  a 
'  Actually,  in  SDRT theoretic  terms, (8d) attaches to (8h) via Question Elaboration or Q-elab, which 
automatically propagates the SARG  of the first question forward, hut I'll gloss over the details of this 
par1 of the discourse structure here. Nicholas Asher 
computable means of  getting to the referent of  from the present  here and now, the 
present  nonlinguistic  context of  utterance, for some given  purpose  cp.  To this end, I 
define  a  Path  relation  on  discourse  referents  x,  which  is  introduced  by  the 
presuppositional  component of the definite's  DRtheoretic lexical entry and  u,, .,,,  un 
relative to a SARG q  and its associated cluster, P,  (A, x, UI, . . ., u,).  This relation holds 
iff 
ul, ..., LL,,  are accessible in  A's belief state and some of the ul, ...,  u,  are externally 
anchored to distinguishable objects in the present context (e.g., the here and now). 
there is a collection  of  formulas T (ul, ..., u,  ) characterizing correct beliefs of A 
concerning u,,  . . ., u, such that A has a proof from T (ul, .  . ., u,  ) that cp. 
Thus  Anchoring  as  a  discourse  relation  between  a  presupposition  introduced  by  a 
definite and some other element in  the discourse context in the SDRS for an  agent A 
entails that  the  Agent  can  satisfy a current  SARG that  he  has.  The connection  to a 
particular  de re  attitude  grounded  in  an  ability  comes  about  because  in  many,  and 
perhaps in all cases, the SARG that needs to be satisfied specifies a de re attitude (as in 
our dialogue examples)  or requires  for its satisfaction a  de  re  attitude that  is  itself 
grounded in an ability. That is, satisfying a SARG may often involve a practical  ability 
in  addition to beliefs towards attitudes. 
Spelling out the entailment without specifying the SARG further seems difficult. On 
the  other  hand,  in  the  case  of  knowledge  where,  which  is  what  is  at  issue  in  the 
examples culled from the dialogues (8) and (lo), we can be more specific. In such cases 
the path formula could plausibly involve a sequence of locations 1,  ...  I,,,  such that T and 
I, have the following features: 
formulas  of  the  form  C(l,, l,,~) for  1  5  i  5  n,  where  C  is  the  relation  of 
Connectedness. 
T determines distance and orientation information for each I, and with respect to I,.) 
and 1,+1  and 
the initial location 11 is an accissible point in the present non-linguist context. 
The idea is that if  the dialogue agent whose SDRS contains an Anchoring relation  and 
the associated goal is knowing where someone is, then the agent should be in posses- 
sion of  information  that  will  allow him  to compute  a path, a sequence of  connected 
locations that will get him from his present surroundings to the location denoted by the 
definite. Or if  the SARG is a slightly more complex type of knowing where -  say the 
goal is to know where something a is relative to some other location 1,  then the agent 
must be in possession of a path from the location of a to 1. 
With  this  in  mind,  let's  once again  go back  to the  exchange  in  (8ef). Phillippe 
doesn't accept the Anchoring relation. Why? Well, it's manifestly because even though 
Phillippe presumably knows what the end of  ave. Jean Jaurks is, he doesn't know where 
she is. In this case the demands of his SARG to know where she is, can only be satisfied 
if  he can bind the definite to a spatially determinable object from the present context - 
i.e. have his belief structure satisfy a path condition between where Isabelle is and his 
current context, or perhaps where  she needs to go. As his response makes evident, he 
cannot. Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
Other examples from our dialogues bear out the usefulness of thinking in terms of T as 
determining a path.  In  (10) speaker A uses definites that  he can  link to elements in 
hisenvironment  and intends to have B link to elements in  his immediate context (the 
map). A has presumably already linked the discourse referents  via a Path condition. B 
stops  the  flow  of  instructions  when  he  cannot  determine  a  Path  relation.  The Path 
condition is really a constraint on a dialogue agent's attitudes. Path binding is a type of 
internal anchor in  DRT. But what is distinctive about it is its link to practical  activities 
as defined by the discourse and by SARGs. 
6.  Contextual Anchoring as Discourse Function 
We have now seen how Anchoring as a discourse function has entailments concerning 
de re abilities. What remains to be done is to specify how we might infer Anchoring as 
a  discourse  relation  and  to  specify  formally  the  relationship  between  the  discourse 
structure and the  cognitive  constraints.  This  will  be  done through  a pair  of  axioms 
written in the SDRT format. 
Like  other  discourse  relations,  Anchoring  can  also  specify  the  underspecified 
bridging relation in the presupposed information. Given our informal analysis, we might 
think  that Anchoring should somehow specify the bridging relation  to a path relation. 
Here as with inferential  binding, there is a downward flow from the global  discourse 
structure and  its  associated  cognitive  model  to  resolving  certain  underspecifications 
needed in  the binding of presuppositions. 
In those examples of inferential binding, however, the bridging relation cannot be set 
to identity without violating type restrictions. Here the situation appears to be different. 
Consider  the  exchange  in  (8gh). Isabelle  tentatively  accepts  (8g).  She uses  a  Path 
condition  to bind the railroad  tracks to something in her immediate surroundings. The 
path  sequence has length  I, and she has information  about the direction and distance 
that makes it more likely that her current SARGs will be satisfied: the SARGs are that 
Phillippe know whether Isabelle has passed under the railroad tracks (inferred via QRG 
as  a  SARG for Phillippe  and  then  as  a  SARG for Isabelle  via  Cooperativity),  that 
Phillippe  know  where  Isabelle  is and that  Isabelle find her  way  (inferred  via  QRG, 
Cooperativity, SARG additivity). But she's not sure, so she tells Phillippe what the head 
of the Path sequence is in (8h). 
Now  how  does  the  Path  condition  interact  with  the specification  of  the  bridging 
relation? Given the instructions given earlier by  Phillippe to Isabelle, it's easy enough 
for Isabelle to set the bridging relation to identity. This would be sufficient to bind the 
presupposition via Background to the asserted constituent or to Background's topic. But 
this  won't  achieve Phillippe's  SARG, which  is determined by  his question -  namely, 
this is the SARG of  knowing whether Isabelle passed under the railroad tracks he told 
her about. Further, we can assume that Isabelle also has the SARGthat Phillippe know 
whether  she  went  under  the  railroad  tracks  or  not.  This  follows  from  QRG  and 
Cooperativity: QRG tells us that Phillippe has as a SARGthat he know the answer to his 
question; Cooperativity transfers this SARG from Phillippe to Isabelle. 
In  order to  satisfy  this  common  SARG, Isabelle  has  to  do two  things;  she does 
indeed  have  to  link  the  railroad  tracks  mentioned  to  those  given  in  Phillippe's 
instructions, and  she has  to  bind  the  location  of  that  bridge  to  some location  in  her 
journey  or where she is now. And if  this analysis is right, then  we need both to have 
Anchoring determine a Path  condition  while  also allowing  in  the  relevant  cases the bridging relation to be set to identity. This would result in the most coherent discourse 
structure according to MDC because it leads to a satisfaction of  a given SARG and it is 
also the one mandated by  If  Possible Use Identity. So it  appears that whenever setting 
the bridging relation to a Path relation  would help achieve some recognizable SARG, 
we infer Anchoring as a discourse relation; and in  turn Anchoring then determines the 
existence of a Path condition relation. But an inference to an Anchoring relation doesn't 
clash  with  the  principle  of  setting  the  bridging  relation  to  identity  If  Possible  Use 
Identity; rather it complements it. 
I have formalized this using the underlying nonmonotonic logic of  SDRT. We infer 
Anchoring by default whenever resolving B to a path relation would normally allow the 
agents  involved  to see  to  it  that  (formalized  via  the  operator  stit) their  SARGs are 
realized. Below we use  [B = ?I@) to mean  that Kp has the underspecified conditions 
B = '?. 
Anchoring: 
((5  a,  p) A Sarg(P, Q) A [B =?I  (P)  A (Kg [B -re Pgl +  0  stit(agent (P), $1))  > 
Anchor(a, P) 
Constraint on  Anchoring: 
(Anchor (a,  P) A tB (x, y)I(P) A Sarg(a, PI) + 
(K,  A KO A (BA  Anchor(a, P) 4  [v'l  Path#(a,  x, v')])) 
The constraint on anchoring says that an anchoring relation entails that its terms must be 
true  propositions  and  further  that  if  an  agent  believes  Anchor(a;  P), then  the Path 
condition must be satisfied by  agent A. Let's  now see how this axiom works. Let's go 
back to (8g) and its context once again. Isabelle first processes Phillippe's question. She 
isolates out the presupposition  of  the definite la voie ,ferric  in a constituent Kc,,,,, and 
the assertion K,,ii. Given what we have said earlier about cooperativity, she attemptsto 
cooperate with Phillippe's SARG  of knowing the answer to this question and she does 
her best to tell him. But in order to give him an answer, she has to be able to anchor the 
presupposition and thus satisfy a Path condition linking the bridge to some element in 
her trajectory, which  I assume can be reconstructed from her here and now, or in  her 
here  and  now itself.  So Isabelle's  SDRS looks something like this, if  we  ignore the 
processing of definites like Phillippe and you and the manner adverbial clause: 
In  the above, v is the discourse referent for the railroad tracks introduced in Phillippe's 
previous  instructions  and  one  that  is  presumably  now  cognitively  accessible  in 
Isabelle's cognitive state The bridging relation has been set to identity between x and v. 
u is some discourse referent in Isabelle's cognitive state that is an internally anchor for 
the presupposed material. And it is in virtue of u that the Path condition is satisfied. Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
But Isabelle is not sure whether the Path condition has been satisfied. So she attempts to 
clarify or elaborate on  what the putative Path condition is that she has found for x. In 
SDRT we  model  this rhetorical  function by  attaching (8g) to ne.ii,,  with  the discourse 
relation Elaboration  (for details on  this relation see Ashes  1993, Lascarides and Asher 
1993). This  Elaboration  also  constitutes  an  indirect  answer  (Asher  and  Lascarides 
199%) to the question in  R e.ii , and it is precisely this Elaboration and indirect answer 
that Phillippe rejects in (8h). 
Let's see how our approach fares with discourse initial deictic definites. Consider the 
initial turn (IOa) where A mentions the tribal settlement. Here there is presumably no 
discourse referent already introduced in the discourse that could serve as a link, and so 
resolving the bridging relation to identity in  this case is not possible. We'll assume that 
B  is  able to anchor  the  presupposition  generated  by  the  extinct  volcano, but  as  his 
question demonstrates, he is not able presumably to determine a Path condition for the 
discourse referent x introduced by  the tribal settlement. So presumably the question in 
(lob) is intended to help get an appropriate Path condition for x and once that question 
is  answered B can  anchor the presupposition to the asserted content of (10a). In  this 
case since 'If Possible Use Identity' because this axiom cannot he used, MDC resolves 
the Bridging relation to the Path condition, once the Anchor relation is established. 
7.  From Acknowledging Path Binding to Mutual Belief 
A final  element  in the  analysis  of  anchoring is to  account for the fact that  when  an 
Anchoring  function  has  been  acknowledged, the two participants  in the  conversation 
have  the  mutual  belief  that  the Path  relations  link to the same  location. This comes 
about after the interpreter accepts an  Anchoring relation proferred by  the speaker; this 
means that the Path condition is satisfied not only by  the speaker but the interpreter as 
well. Because the Path relation must be satisfied by  both the speaker's and the hearer's 
beliefs if  Anchoring, we say that Anchoring is a kind of coordination. 
How do we acquire mutual belief in communication? Due to Fisher (1988) we know 
that if  communication  is synchronous, then mutual belief can be had. Suppose there is 
enough simultanous exchange of  information to have it qualify as synchronous. This is 
in  fact encoded  in our constraint on  agreement: a signal  of  agreement to a previous 
contribution  in which  a discourse structure like Anchoring holds  gets  us to a mutual 
belief that the presupposed material is serving as an Anchor. Now consider any of 
the  conversational  turns  where  an  Anchoring relation  is  proposed  and then  accepted 
(e.g.,  1 Ocd). 
(10)  c.  A:  It's at the bottom. It's to the left of the a e extinct volcano. 
d.  B:  Right. How far? 
By  sincerity we  have  that  A  attaches the presupposed material  given  by  the extinct 
iiolcuno with  Anchoring to his  turn. By  signaling  an  agreement with Right B  also 
adopts this discourse structure for A's turn. We can now conclude given our assump- 
tions that there is  mutual  belief  in this discourse structure (and that  if  you  will  we 
have that discourse structure in the common ground). But now how to we get to that 
mutual belief that both path bindings link to the same object? How do we even repre- 
sent this fact? We can relatively easily answer the latter question: among the beliefs of 
a dialogue agent A  are also beliefs about other dialogue participants-let's  say for the moment just  B. Given that there is a shared belief that both participants have a path 
binding (from Anchoring), A can internally anchor the last discourse referent u of B's 
Path condition as in Asher (1986) or more recent work of  Kamp. Here I'm going to 
use the older notation and represent internal anchors as equalities within the embed- 
ded belief context. So we'll represent this internal anchoring for A as an equality x~  = 
x,~  in A's representation of B's belief  state and similarly for B. In  effect this says that 
B's beliefs about xs are also in effect a belief about A's individual concept. 
We'll suppose that Anchoring has been proposed and accepted as in (IOcd). So it's 
~nutually  believed that each agent's cognitive state satisfies the Path condition for the 
discourse referent introduced by the presupposition of the definite. This means: 
AssumeA represents B's cognitive state as having a formula $(x")  in it for the 
definite while his own has $'(x~). 
By competence we have B,(BR$(xB)  > BA$(xB). 
By distributivity of belief over > and DMP: BABB$(x8),  which then in K45 yields 
B,$(xH),  and so by K 
BA($(xB)  A P(xn)). 
And since 4 entails a uniqueness clause, first order logic yields: 
Since this is derived from mutually believed information, B can pursue the same 
reasoning and reason that A has also done this reasoning. Hence by our jump to 
the mutual belief axiom, we get 
That seems to me to suffice for internal anchoring however it's  represented. Notice 
that postulating this equality in A's belief state leads to no binding problems because 
A supposes through competence that there is an x~ of which B  has his beliefs. 
8.  Conclusions 
I've shown that a discourse based, anaphoric theory of presupposition has an interesting 
stol-y to  tell  about  at  least  some  deictic  uses  of  definites.  In  lnany  of  these  uses 
presuppositions  are  anaphorically  bound  to  the  discourse  context  via  a  particular 
discourse relation, Anchoring, whose semantics and conversational function is directly 
linked to the participant's  conversational goals. Anchoring entails a de re attitude, but it 
is one that is linked to an increased capacity for satisfying at least some conversational 
goals. Our investigation has confirmed the view that de re attitudes involve some sort of 
knowing how. We have seen how Anchoring, when  accepted by  all participants, leads 
to a mutual belief in coordinated reference -  viz. that all the particpants are referring to Deixis, Binding and Presupposition 
the same thing and can single it out at least insofar as that's required for conversational 
purposes. SDRT gave us the framework within which to analyze the discourse function 
of these uses of definites, and the modest set of defaults that SDRT  uses in developing a 
theory  of  conversational  goals  or SARGs was  helpful  in  deducing  SARGs for the 
Anchoring analysis. 
Further  tasks:  Presumably  definites  outside  the  context  of  spatial  localization 
dialogues can also be Anchored. So one idea for further research is to see how to extend 
this analysis to other definites -  deictically used pronouns and the like. Moreover, it 
seems that  almost all  words  have presupposition  like  associated  information  whose 
failure to be anchored (bound) lead to similar corrections as those we've studied here. 
Consider these metalinguistic bits of anchoring information in the examples below due 
to Ginzburg that are called into question by B's responses. 
(14)  a.  A:  John kowtowed. 
b.  B:  Kowtowed? 
(15)  a.  A:  Chris inebriated Pat. 
b.  B:  Inebriated? 
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The paper characterizes three different domains in the German middle field which are 
relevant for the interpretation of  an indefinite. It is argued that the so-called 'strong' 
reading  of  an  indefinite is  the  basic  one  and  that  the  'weak'  reading needs  special 
licensing which  is mirrored  by  certain syntactic requirements. Some popular claims 
about the relation between the position and the interpretation of  indefinites as well as 
some claims about  scrambling are discussed  and  rejected. From  the  findings also 
follows that the strong reading of  an indefinite is independent of  its information status. 
Introduction 
That  the  interpretation  of  an  indefinite depends on  its environment has  received  the 
attention  of  linguists for quite  some time.  This  variability  of  indefinites  is  of  great 
interest  because  many  important  issues  arise:  the  design  of  the  syntax-semantics 
mapping, the function of scrambling, the influence of  information structure on syntax 
and semantics, and the influence of prosodic phrasing on the position and the meaning 
of indefinites. 
In  the following, I would like to discuss some of the claims found in the literature. I 
will  confront them mainly with the behavior  of  bare plurals in  the middle field of  the 
German  clause, the realm  of  scrambling. Although German  belongs to the languages 
which have already been  widely  discussed with  respect to the behavior of  indefinites, 
there are still  a lot of data which might further stimulate the discussion. I will try to 
account for some of them with a proposal of my own. 
1.  Where strong indefinites can be situated 
Diesing (1992) considered examples like the following: 
(1)  a.  weil  ja  doch Kinder  auf der StraRe spielen 
since PRT  PRT children on  the street  play 
'since children do play on the street' 
b.  weil Kinder ja doch auf der StraBe spielen 
According to Diesing, the subject of  (la) gets an existential interpretation, whereas the 
subject of (Ib) is interpreted generically. Diesing adopted the DRT view of indefinites 
I wish to thank Cliris Wilder and an anonymous reviewer. 
The paper will also be published  in Theoretical Ling~fistics  27. cdited hy Klaus von Heusinger and 
Kerstin Schwabe. 
ZAS Papers in  Linguistics 24, 2001, 237-255 (Kamp  1981): Indefinites  do not  have  quantificational force of  their own; rather the 
variable introduced by an indefinite has to be bound by another element of the structure. 
Diesing took modal particles like ja doch as indicators of the VP boundary. To capture 
the difference in meaning between examples like in (I),  Diesing formulated her famous 
mapping hypothesis for the relation between syntax and semantics: 
(2)  a.  Material  situated in  the VP will be mapped  into the nuclear scope (i.e. 
into the domain of  'existential closure'). 
b.  Material  outside  VP  will  be  mapped  into  the  restriction  of  a 
quantificational structure. 
The mapping in (2) is supposed to apply on LF. However, according to Diesing, the S- 
structure positions of  indefinites in the German clausal middle field already correspond 
to their positions on LF. Therefore, with regard to the middle field, the mapping in  (2) 
operates on S-structure. In (la) the indefinite stays inside the VP. According to (2a), it is 
interpreted existentially. In  (Ib), on the other hand, given Diesing's assumptions, the 
bare plural  is outside the VP. (2b) says that  it has  to be  mapped into the restrictive 
clause of  a  quantificational  structure.  According  to Diesing, such  a  quantificational 
structure may arise from an implicit generic operator. This is the case in (Ib), and the 
indefinite gets a generic reading. 
According  to  (2),  every  indefinite  inside  the  VP gets an  existential  reading.  The 
existential  reading  is  often  called  'weak  reading'.  All  the  other  readings  are  called 
'strong'.  The generic reading of (lb) is one of the strong readings. Other strong readings 
are exemplified in (3) : 
(3)  a.  da  zwei Linguisten ja  doch etwas  dagegen hatten 
since two  linguists  PRT PRT  something against  have 
'since two of the linguists had something against it' 
b.  weil  ein Artikel von Otto ja  doch bald  erscheinen wird 
because an  article by  0.  PRT PRT  soon appear  will 
'because an article by 0.  will soon appear' 
The indefinite in (3a) is understood partitively, i.e, the sentence talks about two linguists 
belonging to a contextually given set. The indefinite in  (3b) has a specific reading, i.e. 
the speaker has a certain article by Otto in mind. 
That Diesing considers each of the examples in  (1) as unambiguous is crucial for her 
approach. However, this assumption is problematic. Although an example like (lb) has 
in  fact only  the  generic reading,  the  sentence in  (la) is  actually ambiguous (cf. e.g. 
Haider & Rosengren  1998, Frey  & Pittner  1998). It has  an  existential  and a generic 
reading. The same is true for the following examples: 
(4)  a.  weil  Otto ja  doch FuBballubertragungen anschaut 
because 0. PRT PRT soccer broadcasts  watches 
b  weil  hier  wer  Bucher uber  Wissenschaftler kauft 
because here someone books  about scientists  buys 
c.  weil  Abgeordnete Ostforderprogramme  ablehnten 
because deputies  support programs for East Germany  rejected About the Whereahouts of Indefinites 
The objects in (4) can  have a generic or an  existential reading. In  these examples the 
two readings are differentiated by different intonations (cf. Biiring 2001). The generic 
reading is forced by  stressing the object and the predicate, the existential reading is the 
result  of  stressing the object only. However, in  (la) and in  the following example the 
different readings of the subjects are available under the same intonation: 
(5)  da  ja doch junge Frauen diese SENDung angeschaut haben 
since PRT  young women this  broadcast  watched  have 
This shows that it is not the intonation itself which differentiates the generic and the 
existential  reading  of  indefinites.  That  in  (4)  the two readings  of  the  sentences are 
associated with  different  intonations  is  because  a generic phrase  can  not be  a focus 
exponent but an existential one can.' Thus, if  an object in (4) is generically interpreted it 
can not be the constituent with primary accent. 
Note  that  (4b,  c)  show  that  a  generic  bare  plural  may  stay  inside  the  VP 
independently  of  Diesing's  assumption  about  the  position  of  modal  particles.  The 
subject of  (4b) is an indefinite wh-pronoun. Such an element cannot be scrambled (e.g. 
Waider  1993). Since the subject stays in its base position, the following object certainly 
is inside the VP. The preferred reading of  the subject in (4c) is the existential reading. 
Thus, according to Diesing, it is situated inside the VP. It follows that the object must 
be in  the VP as well although it can be interpreted generically.2 
Other strong readings are also possible for an indefinite which is situated in the VP: 
(6)  a.  Hans mochte heute  wem  einen Artikel zeigen (und zwar seinen ersten in 
H.  wants  today  s.0.  an  article  show  (namely  his  first  in 
Phonologie)  (speciJi'c) 
phonology) 
b.  weil  wer  zwei Linguisten in seinem Haus beherbergt  (partifive) 
because s.0. two linguists  in his house  accommodates 
In (6a) the speaker has a certain article written by Hans in mind. (6b) may talk about two 
linguists who belong to a given set. 
The data considered so far show that (2b) has to be rejected. Instead the following 
holds in German: 
(7)  An indefinite NP in its base position can get a strong reading. 
The same is true for Dutch, another scrambling language, cf. de Hoop (1992). 
I  Neither can a universally quantified NP be a focus exponent (cf. (ia)); howevcr, a definite NP can play 
[his role (cl'  (ibj  or (5)): 
(i)  a.  Heule hat Otto jedes HEMD gehugelt  (on/? narrowfocu.~) 
Today has 0. cvery shirt  ironed 
h.  Heute hat Otto scin  hlaues HEMD gebiigclt  (wide  fbcus po.ssihlc) 
Today has 0. his  hlue  shirt  ironed 
These  data are also problematic  for approaches  like Tsai (2001), where  the strong reading of  an 
indefinite is always the result  of  interpreting a copy in  a movement chain of the indefinite which is 
outside the domain of existential closure. 2.  The domain of the weak reading 
The possibility of a weak reading of an indefinite in the middle field is restricted: 
(8)  *weil  die Polizei Linguisten gestern  verhaftet hat  (weuk ueading) 
because the  police  linguists  yesterday arrested  has 
The indefinite in (8) is situated in front of a temporal adverbial. In this position it cannot 
get an existential interpretation. 
However, there are adverbials in front of which an indefinite can get a weak reading: 
(9)  weil  die Polizei Linguisten im  Stadtpark  verhaftet hat 
because the police  linguists  in the municipal park arrested  has 
In  (9) the indefinite precedes a locative adverbial. An indefinite preceding e.g. a manner 
adverbial or an instrumental can also get the existential reading: 
(10)  a.  Heute hat Otto Kolleginnen zLrtlich umarmt 
Today has 0. colleagues  tenderly  embraced 
b.  Heute hat Otto Passanten mit seinem Gesang erschreckt 
Today has 0. pedestrians  with his  singing frightened 
Analyzing different data from those considered here, Frey & Pittner (1998) argue that 
the  different  adverbial  types  have  different  base  positions  in  the  middle  field. For 
example, it is  argued that  the base position of  a manner adverbial  is next to the base 
position  of the verb (or verbal complex) and that locative and instrumental adverbials 
belong to the class of adverbials whose base positions are right below the base position 
of the highest argument of the verb. In contrast, temporal adverbials belong to that class 
of  adverbials  whose base positions are right  above the highest argument.'  This is the 
highest position occupied by adverbials which relate to the eventuality denoted by the 
clause. Thus, the difference between (8) on the one hand and (9) as well as (10) on the 
other  should be  related  to  the  fact  that  in  (8) the  indefinite  is higher  than  the base 
position of the temporal (and, ergo, of the base of the subject) whereas in (9) and (10) it 
is below  the base  of  the  subject.  This leads to the following  characterization  of  the 
domain for the weak reading of indefinites (cf. also Haider & Rosengren  1998, Frey & 
Pittner  1998): 
(1 1)  An  indefinite that depends on a verb and occurs in the middle field of a German 
clause can be existentially interpreted only  if  it  is situated  inside the minimal 
maximal  projection which  contains all  the base positions of  the dependants of 
the verb and all the licensers of the indefinite. 
This  category  will  be  called  the  minimal  domain  of  the  associates  of  the 
indefinite (MDA). 
'  Adverhials of the same class are not ordered with respect to each other. See Frcy & Pitlner (1998) on 
how other adverbial types fit into these distinctions. About the Whereabouts of Indefinites 
An  element depends on a verb if  it is an argument of  the verb or if  it belongs to 
the  adverbial  types  that  specify  the  eventuality  argument  of  the  verb  (e.g. 
temporals, locatives, instrumentals, manner adverbia~s).~ 
We may assume that in German, for every indefinite dependent on the verb the syntactic 
category corresponding to its MDA is the VP (or v~)." However, it is obvious that the 
MDA does not correspond to Diesing's  concept of  the VP and that (I I) does not give 
the same results as Diesing's condition (24.  These are the differences: 
(i)  As (9) and (lo) show, certain adverbial types have their base position inside the 
MDA. 
(ii)  Scrambling is possible inside the MDA. 
(iii)  According to (7),  strong indefinites may occur in the MDA. 
The following examples, in which the MDA(= VP) is marked by parentheses, illustrate 
these properties: 
(12)  a.  weil  [ein Kollege  Pressemitteilungen,  einer Kollegin t, vorliest] 
because  a  colleague press statements.Acc  a  c0lleague.D~~  reads 
'because a colleague reads press statements to a colleague' 
(Acc-obi. can he existential or generic) 
b.  weil Pressemitteilungen, [ein Kollege einer Kollegin t, vorliest] 
(Acc-Obi.  only generic) 
c.  weil  [in einigen Jahren Orkane  im  Mittelmeer  entstehen] 
because  in some  years  hurricanes in the Mediterranean Sea arise 
(Subj. exi,stentirrl or generic) 
d.  weil Orkane, [in einigen Jahren ti im Mittelmeer entstehen] 
(Subi. only generic) 
e.  weil [friiher in Hinterhofen, die Jungen t, FuRhall spielten] 
because in former times in backyards the boys soccer played 
(Locative existential or generic) 
f.  weil in Hinterhofen, [friiher die Jungen t, FuBball spielten] 
(Locative only generic) 
g.  weil in Hinterhofen, [die Jungen t, FuBball spielten] 
(Locative only generic) 
4  Arguments arc meant to he  subcategorized phrases  which refcr to ohjects in contrast to predicative 
phrases. 
We assume that if'n PP is dependent on a verb, so is the complement OF the head P. 
For the simplicity of the discussion we assume that thc adverhial types mentioned here are adjoined to 
the verbal projection. 
6  In  English an indefinite subject in  Spec,IP can get a strong and  a  weak  interpretation. Because  in 
English thc subject gets its case in Spec,IP the MDA of the suhject corresponds to IP in English. In 
German, casc is licensed in the theta-positions and the MDA always corresponds to VP. The same is 
true for Dutch. A subject in Spec,IP has a strong reading only (cf. de Hoop 1992). This is expected 
because in  Dutch a subject can get case in its base position, i.e. like in German it does not have to 
move to be fully licensed. In  (12a) the accusative is scrambled across the other object but is still inside its MDA. 
An  existential interpretation is possible. In  (l2b) the same argument has left this domain 
and thus gets only a generic interpretation. In  (12c) the subject is in  its base position, 
and it can get a strong or weak reading. In  contrast, the subject in  (12d) is in front of  a 
temporal  adverbial and thus has left the MDA. It is interpreted generically. In  (12e) a 
locative  is  scrambled  to  a position  between  a temporal  adverbial  and the  subject. A 
temporal in its base position marks the upper boundary of the MDA but still belongs to 
it. Therefore the locative in (12e) is inside its MDA, and it can have a weak reading. In 
(12f) the locative is scrambled outside its MDA. Thus only the generic reading is left. 
The same is true for (l2g). Note the difference in meaning between (12e) and (l2g). The 
latter  does  not  contain  a  temporal,  therefore  the  MDA is  'closed'  right  above  the 
subject. 
Before we end this section, a remark is necessary. The preceding observations hold 
for indefinites  under  normal  intonation. If  they  are  assigned  a heavy  pitch  as in  the 
following examples, they behave differently: 
(13)  a.  weil  PulLOverI Maria t, verschenkt hat (aber keine HEMden) 
because pullover  M.  given away has (but  no  shirts) 
b.  Hans hat FIsche, gestern t, gefangen (keine KRABben) 
H.  has fish  yesterday caught  (no prawns) 
In  (13) the  indefinites  are  contrastively  focused.  They  can  get  an  existential  inter- 
pretation  although they are moved out of their MDAs. These are examples of so called 
focus  scrambling,  which  is  discussed  in  Neeleman  (1994). Focus  scra~nbling  is  an 
instance of  A'-movement and differs from the standard reordering in  the middle field. 
For example, focus scrambling (in contrast to regular scrambling) necessarily undergoes 
reconstruction for the purpose of  semantic interpretation. The readings of the sentences 
in (13) are therefore expected. Other examples of focus scrambling are given in (14): 
(14)  a.  weil ~RUN~/*griinl  Otto die Wand tl streichen mijchte 
because green  0.  the wall  paint  wants 
b.  weil  ALle Filmer/alle  FILmel mindestens einer tl gesehen hat 
because all  films  at least  one  seen  has 
(only:  3) 
(14a) shows that, for example, a resultative can be focus scrambled hut the same phrase 
cannot undergo standard scrambling. The sentence (l4b) has only the reading that would 
arise  if  the  moved  phrase  were  in  its  base  position.  This  confirms  that  the  moved 
element is obligatorily reconstructed. 
3.  On some claims about scrambling 
De Hoop (1992) states that: 
(15)  Weak indefinites cannot be scrambled. About the Whereabouts of Indefinites 
Her conclusion is based on Dutch examples like (l6), the German equivalent was given 
in (8). 
(16)  *dat de politie taalkungigen gisteren  opgepakt heeft 
that the police linguists  yesterday anested has 
Other  authors  (e.g. Lenerz  1977, 2001, Choi  1999) also assume  (15). However,  in 
section 2 it was argued that scrambling of a weak indefinite is possible inside its MDA. 
If  we replace the temporal  adverbial in  (X),  which  is an element at the boundary of  the 
MDA, by a locative, which is inside the MDA, the sentence becomes fine as was shown 
in (9), repeated here for convenience: 
(9)  weil [die Polizei Linguisten, im Stadtpark t, verhaftet hat] 
Therefore we may conclude that de Hoop (1992) arrived at (15) by considering only a 
subset of the different adverbial types. The underlying assumption was that the different 
adverbial types all have their base outside the VP. However, our findings show that this 
assumption is highly dubious. 
That a weak indefinite may scramble as long as the target position is inside its MDA 
was  also shown  by  the  indefinite  object  in  (12a). The reason  that  de Hoop did not 
consider sentences like (12a) could be that scrambling of an object across another one is 
just not an option in ~utch.' 
The effects of  scrambling are not well  understood  and there is much  disagreement 
among the syntacticians working on this subject. Specifically, it is not known what the 
effect of  scrambling  as  in  (9) or (12a, e) is.  But  whatever  this  effect  might be, the 
examples show that it does not destroy the possibility of  an existential interpretation. 
Note that examples like (9) and (1221, e) and the fact that strong indefinites may stay in 
situ (cf. (7)) contradict an often articulated claim about scrambling, according to which 
it is triggered by a certain property of strong NPs. Diesing (1997) for example suggests 
that the reason for scrambling is that definites and strongly interpreted indefinites have 
to escape existential closure. Besides not acknowledging (7) she overlooks the fact that 
7  The criticism against de Hoop (1992) also applies to Choi (1999)' bl:l  it is no1 appropriate for Lenerz 
(1977, 2001). Lenerz considers examples like the f(1llowing as pieces of evidence for (15): 
(i)  Wem  hast  du  cin Buch gegeben? 
to whom have you a book  given 
*Ich habe ein Buch demleinem Studenten gegehen 
I  have a book  the-DATIa-DAT student given 
Note however that an additional factor may he involved which disfavors scrambling of the indefinite in 
this case. I1 seems that a constituent which fills the upen position indicated by a preceding wh-phrase 
wants to precede other non-familiar elements in the clause: 
(ii)  Wem hat Otto was mitgebracht'? 
to whom has 0.  something hrought 
a.  Otto hat eine~n  Nachbarn  Apkl mitgchracht 
0.  has a-DAT neighbor apples brnughl 
h.  ?,?Otto  hat kpfel, einem Nachbarn t, mitgehracht 
(iii)  Was hat Otto wem mitgebrachtl 
What has 0.  to whom brought? 
a.  ?'?Otto hat einem Nachbarn Apfel mitgebracht 
h.  Otto hat ~pfcl:  einem Nachbarn ti mitgchracht 
Note that the weak object in (iiib) is scrambled. scrambling can occur inside VP. For Delfitto & Corver (1997) the trigger for scrambling 
is the feature [+familiar], which has to be checked in the syntactic structure. All strongly 
interpreted indefinites but no weak ones are supposed to carry this feature. Again, it is 
not accounted  for that a weak  indefinite can, and a strong indefinite does not have to 
scramble. 
A  view on  scrambling that is inspired by phonological  considerations is offered by 
Neeleman  & Reinhart  (1998). According to that  view, scrambling is triggered by the 
need to destress a constituent. A constituent is destressed if  and only if  it  is discourse- 
given (D-linked). In  a scrambling language scrambling is preferred  to get the result of 
destressing  a constituent.  Therefore, according to Neeleman  & Reinhart, a discourse- 
given constituent is scrambled in order not to he the target of the nuclear stress rule. 
However, this cannot be the whole story about scrambling. First, as we have seen, a 
weak indefinite may scramble, and such an element is not discourse-given. Second, it is 
possible to scramble the indirect object of a ditransitive verb: 
( 17)  weil  heute F~ssballspielern~ Linguistinnen tl Blumen  schickten 
since today soccer players.DAT female-linguists ~~OW~~S.ACC  sent 
The indirect object in (17) can be interpreted generically or existentially. Note that in its 
base position the indirect object could have the same interpretations and would not be 
the target of the nuclear stress rule, so destressing cannot be the reason for scrambling in 
this  case. Third, Neeleman  & Reinhart  consider  generic indefinites  as  somehow  D- 
linked. However, as predicted by (7), the indefinite in the following sentence can have a 
generjc interpretation: 
(1 8)  weil die Polizei gestern Linguisten verhaftet hat 
because the police yesterday linguists arrested has 
In  (18) there is the option for the generic indefinite to scramble. Given the assumptions 
of Reinhart & Neeleman, we would expect that it must scramble. This, however, is not 
true. 
Buring (2001) subscribes to (15). In order to explain the deviance of Lenerz' example 
which  was given  above in  Fn. 7 under  (i), he formulates a prosody-based constraint. 
According to this constraint the nuclear scope consists of complete accent domains all 
of which contain focus. The nuclear scope can start at any focal accent domain and then 
continues until  the  end of  the clause. According  to Buring,  Lenerz'  example is  bad 
because there is no position  to insert the boundary of existential closure: Inserting it in 
front of the accusative would violate the constraint that the nuclear scope only contains 
phrases  with  focus, inserting it after the accusative would leave this element without 
existential force. 
Buring's  constraint  is  not  compatible with  our findings.  Although  for Buring  the 
boundary  for existential  closure  is  not  given  by  a  certain  syntdctic  category  but  is 
influenced  by  prosody  and  information  structure,  Biking's  approach, like  Diesing's, 
assumes that existential closure starts at a certain  boundary in  the clause and keeps its 
force till the end of the clause. Therefore a sentence like (4c) should not have a reading 
with an existential subject and a generic object. The object follows a weakly interpreted 
subject and should be  affected by  existential closure. But the sentence does have the 
reading in question. About the Whereabouts of Indefinites 
4.  Indefinites as members of a complex predicate 
In  this  section we will look at a domain which  is reserved  for the weak reading. No 
strong reading is possible here. This is illustrated by  the following examples: 
(19)  a.  Der Kanzler hat nculich Akten griindlich studiert 
the chancellor has recently documents thoroughly studied 
(indefinite can he ~~ak  or strong) 
b.  Der Kanzler hat neulich grundlich Akten studiert 
(indefinite only weak) 
The indefinite in  (19a) can  get a weak  or a strong  reading.  The indefinite follows a 
temporal adverbial and precedes a manner adverbial. It is inside its MDA. However, if 
we let the indefinite follow the manner adverbial as in  (19b) only the weak reading is 
available. 
In Frey & Pittner (1998) it is argued that manner adverbial5 have their base position 
next  to  the  verb  or  to  the  complex  predicate8. This  is  motivated  by  data  like the 
following: 
(20)  a.  ??Der Kanzler hat heute grundlich diese Aktcn studiert 
the chancellor has today thoroughly these documents studied 
b.  "Der Kanzler hat heute grundlich jede Akte studiert 
the chancellor has today thoroughly every document studied 
On the other side there are elements which can appear between  a manner adverbial and 
the verb. Besides an indefinite like in (19b), this is, for example, true for resultatives: 
(21)  Karl hat die Vase behutsam sauber gewischt 
K. has the vase  carefully  clean  wiped 
In  the literature it is often argued that resultatives  form a complex predicate with the 
verb (e.g. Neeleman  1994, Winkler 1997). Therefore, one should investigate whether an 
indefinite such as in (19b) can also participate in the formation of complex predicates. 
If  in  German  an  auxiliary  combines with  a  modal,  the  standard  order of  the  verbal 
elements does not sound very good. Instead the inversion of the modal is preferred: 
(22)  a.  (?)dass Hans heute dieses/jedes Hemd bugeln mussen wird 
that H.  today this  /every shirt  iron  must  will 
b.  dass Hans heute diesesljedes Hemd wird biigeln miissen 
c.  "dass Hans heute wird dieses Hemd bugeln miissen 
d.  "dass Hans heute wird jedes Hemd bugeln miissen 
(22a) shows the  standard  order of  verbal  elements  and  (22b) the  inversion.  (22c, d) 
illustrate that an  argument cannot be carried along in such an  ~nversion  structure. This 
suggests that only elements of the complex predicate can participate in the inversion. 
R  If  a  Gcrtnan  clause contains  auxiliaries  or  rr~odals  a complex  predicate  is  formed, cf.  e.g.  Haider 
(1993). Interestingly, indefinites can  be part of the inversion (cf. (23a)). The same is true for 
resultatives (cf. (23b)): 
(23)  a.  dass Hans heute wird Hemden bugeln mussen 
b.  dass Hans heute die Vase wird sauber wischen miissen 
Under  the  assumption  that  inversion only  affects elements  of  the complex predicate, 
(23a) shows that indefinites can belong to a complex predicate. 
Unlike a resultative, a depictive cannot be part of a complex predicate (cf. Neeleman 
1994, Winkler 1997). This explains the following contrast: 
(24)  a.  *Maria hat heute grundlich Patienten betrunken untersucht 
M.  has today thoroughly patients drunk  examined 
b.  Maria hat heute spielerisch Patienten unter den Tisch getrunken 
M.  has today playfully  patients  under the table  drunk 
All the elements following a manner adverbial have to be part of a complex predicate. 
The indefinite  and the resultative  in  (24b) both  fulfill this requirement. However the 
depictive  in  (24a)  cannot  belong  to  the  complex  predicate  and  therefore  causes 
ungrammaticality. 
Neeleman (1994) argues convincingly that a stranded preposition incorporates into a 
con~plex  predicate in  Dutch. In  German, preposition stranding only occurs in  the split 
construction with rla-. It seems that in this case, too, the preposition is part of a complex 
predicate: 
(25)  a.  Da hat Otto sorgfiltig mit gearbeitet 
There has 0.  carefully with worked 
'0.  has carefully worked with this' 
b.  *Da hat Otto mit sorgfaltig gearbeitet 
The stranded preposition is ungrammatical before a manner adverbial ((25b)). Under the 
assumption that stranded prepositions are part of a complex predicate the following data 
confirm that the same can be true for indefinites in contrast to arguments: 
(26)  a.  &a  hat  er mit  Hunde vertrieben 
there has he with dogs  chased-away 
'he has chased away dogs with it' 
b.  "da  hat  er mit diesen/jeden Hund vertrieben 
there has he with  thislevery  dog  chased-away 
'he has chased thislevery dog away' 
Finally note that an indefinite but not a full argument can be part of  a nominalization 
with a verbal base: 
(27)  a.  das Hemdenbugeln 
the shirts-ironing 
b.  *&as  jedes-Hemd-Bugeln 
the every-shirt-ironing About the Whereabouts of Indefinites 
According to the DRT view, an indefinite enters the syntactic structure as a predicate. 
The binding  of  its  variable is done by other elements of  the structure. In  the special 
cases  considered  in  this  section  the  indefinite  is  part  of  a  complex predicate.  It  is 
reasonable  to  assume that  in  this  case the existential  binding  is  induced  by  the verb 
itself. We may think of this as a mechanism similar to the one which allows to omit an 
argument as in: 
(28)  Otto isst gerade 
0.  eats at-the-moment 
'0.  is eating' 
As is well known, in such examples the omitted arguments are interpreted existentially. 
The following rule seems to be reasonable: 
(29)  Indefinites  which  are  part  of  a  complex  predicate  are  bound  by  existential 
closure induced by another element of the complex predicate." 
In  most cases it makes no significant difference whether the existential binding of  an 
indefinite is induced by the predicate in the course of complex predicate formation as in 
(30a) or whether it happens inside the MDA as in (30b). Therefore the sentences in (30) 
seem to be synonymous: 
(30)  a.  weil Otto heute sorgfaltig ein HemdHemden gebugelt hat 
that 0.  today carefully  a  shirt  /shirts  ironed  has 
b.  weil Otto heute ein HemdIHemden sorgf'altig gebugelt hat 
However, there are  verbs  where  there is such  a difference.  This js  illustrated by the 
following examples (from Eckardt, to appear): 
(31)  a.  &ass Hans geschickt eine Flote schnitzte 
that H.  skillfully a flute  carved 
b.  "dass Hans eine Flote geschickt schnitzte 
The verb in (3  1) is a verb of creation. Such a verb denotes an event which describes the 
creation of a new object rather than a treatment of  a given one. As (3 la, b) show, with 
such verbs an existential indefinite can only occur after a manner adverbial, i.e. in our 
view it has to be part of the complex predicate formation. The binding of the indefinite 
has to be induced by the verb. 
4  This  slatement  is  not  quite correct. In  an  cxample  like  the  following, which  describes  a  habitual 
property, thc object  has to follow  a manner  adverbial  and  therefore  is part of  a complex predicate 
according to our considerations: 
(i) a.  dass Otto sorgGltig Brichnarken sammell 
that 0.  carefully stamps  collects 
b.  *dass Otto Briefmarken sorgfaltig sammclt 
As Hans Kamp (p.c.)  has pointed out, the object in (ia) has neither an existenrial nor a generic reading. 
Examples like (ia) are very complicated from a semantic point of view, and I am not in a position 
to discuss them here. Intuitively, it certainly makes sensc that their objects should be part of a complex 
predicate. This  observation  makes  sense. A  verb  of  creation  expresses  that  after  the  event  of 
creation is completed, the appropriate object will exist. However a sentence like (31a) 
can be true although the event of creation is not completed and consequently the object 
does not exist in the model. This shows that the existence of the object docs not have to 
become part of  the described event but is just  part of the intentions or plans which are 
denoted by  the verb. The syntactic correspondence of this fact is that the indefinite has 
to belong to the complex predicate like in (3 la). 
In  contrast, the existential requirement which is expressed by  a weakly  interpreted 
indefinite bound  in  the MDA has  to  be fulfilled by  the described event, i.e, from a 
sentence like  (30b)  it  follows  that  there  exist(s)  a  shirtl~hirts.'~  Now,  in  (31b) the 
indefinite has to be bound  in  the MDA and the predicate  of the sentence is a verb of 
creation. Thus, the existence of the object follows and it does not follow. This semantic 
contradiction causes the ungrammaticality of the sentence. 
Let  us  conclude  this  section  with  a  remark  on  van  Geenhoven  (1998).  Van 
Geenhoven  assumes  that  bare  plurals  denote  properties  and  that  every  weakly 
interpreted  bare  plural  in  German  is  incorporated  into  the  verb,  i.e. to  be  part  of  a 
complex predicate is supposed to be the general case for weak bare plurals and is not, as 
we  assume,  restricted  to  indefinites  occurring  below  the  base  position  of  manner 
adverbials. 
There are problems with this approach. First, as (4c) shows, an existential bare plural 
can precede a generic one. Because incorporation presupposes  adjacency, the generic 
indefinite  also  ought  to  incorporate.  However,  this  is  not  compatible  with  van 
Geenhoven's assumptions. Second, it cannot be explained why the object in (19a) has a 
weak and a strong reading, whereas the object in (19b) can only be weakly interpreted. 
Third, van Geenhoven assumes that the type mismatch which is created by the demand 
of the verb for an object and the fact that bare plurals denote properties is solved by  a 
operation on the predicate, which introduces an existential quantifier over instances of 
the property.  Since this is a lexical  operation, it  follows that  every weak  bare plural 
should have narrow scope with respect to any other operator in the clause. However, as 
the example (47b) in  section 6 below will show, this is not true for an  indefinite which 
gets its existential reading in its MDA. 
5.  Strong indefinites and information status 
Some authors assume that strong indefinites are topics, cf. e.g. Jager (1996), Erteschik- 
Shir (1997). Since there are many different notions of topic around, an evaluation of this 
claim would require a careful discussion of the different concepts. This can not be done 
here. Rather it will be shown that the claim is not compatible with the findings of Frey 
(2000) about a topic position in German. 
'(I  Correspondingly,  the  ohject  of  an  opaque verb  like  seek  has  to follow  a  manner  adverbial  if the 
sentence ought to have the de dicto reading: 
(i) a.  weil Otto intensiv eine Frau gesucht hat  (de riicto possible) 
because 0.  intcnsively a woman sought has 
b,  weil Otto eine Frau intensiv gesucht hat  (only de re) 
Thus, if the object occurs in front of a manner adverbial the sentence implies ils existence. About the Whereahours of lndcl'i~iitcs 
In Frey (2000) it is argued that there is a designated position for aboutness topics in 
the middle field of  a German clause. This position  is right  above the base position of 
sentence  adverbials,  Sentential  adverbials  are  those  adverbials  which  express  the 
speaker's evaluation  of  the proposition  expressed by  the clause. The base position  of 
sentence adverbials is higher than the base position  of  any other element of the clause 
(cf. Frey & Pittner 1998). Two of the various phenomena which support the thesis of  a 
designated topic position are the following: 
(32)  Da  wir  gerade von Hans sprechen. 
Since we right now of H. speak  'Speaking about Hans' 
a.  Nachstes Jahr wird den Hans erfreulicherweise eine vornehme Dame 
Next year will the-Acc H.  fortunately  a  fine  lady 
heiraten 
marry 
b.  #NBchstes  Jahr wird  erfreulicherweise den  Hans eine vornehme Dame 
heiraten 
(33)  a.  Sein, Vater wird dem Otto, wahrscheinlich das Auto ausleihen 
His father  will the-DAT 0.  probably  the car  lend 
'Probably, Otto's father will lend him the car' 
b.  "Sein, Vater wird wahrscheinlich dem Otto, das Auto ausleihen 
The context  in  (32) forces Hans  to be  an aboutness topic  in  the following  sentence. 
(32a,  b)  show  that  under  such  circumstances  the  item  in  question  has  to precede  a 
sentence  adverbial. The examples in  (33)  contain  cataphoric pronouns. According to 
Kuno (1972) and Reinhart  (1995) cataphoric pronouns  can  corefer only with  topics. 
Under  this assumption, (33a, b) also show that there  is a designated topic position  in 
front of the scntential adverbials in the middle field. 
In  section  1  it was shown that  indefinites in  their base position  can  have a strong 
reading. Obviously, these strongly interpreted indefinites can not be topics according to 
Frey  (2000).  But  even  indefinites  which  are  positioned  higher  than  the  MDA and 
therefore only have the strong reading are not necessarily topics. This can be shown as 
follows: As mentioned above, the base position of sentence adverbials is higher than the 
base positions  of  any other elements. So we can  scramble an indefinite to a position 
between  the base  position  of  a  sentential adverbial  and, say, the  base  position  of  a 
temporal adverbial: 
(34)  weil  erfreulicherweise Viter an Weihnachten mit der Eisenbahn spielen 
since fortunately  fathers at Christmas  with the model railway play 
The indefinite  in  (34) can  only  be  strongly  interpreted. Given  (I I) this  is expected 
because the indefinite is higher than a temporal adverbial and therefore must be outside 
the MDA. However, according to Frey (2000) this indefinite cannot be a topic because it 
is still below the sentential adverbial. The following data confirm this: 
(35)  Da wir gerade von Vatern sprechen. 
'Speaking about fathers' 
a.  Ich habe gehort, dass Vater erfreulicherweise an Weihnachten mit der 
I have heard  that  fathers fortunately  at  Christmas  with the Eisenbahn spielen 
model railway play 
b.  #Ich habe gehort, dass erfreulicherweise VBter an Weihnachten mit der 
Eisenbahn spielen 
(36)  a.  Ihre, Angehorigen werden fleiBigen Linguisten, erfreulicherweise helfen 
Theirrelatives  will  diligent  linguists  fortunately  help 
b.  *Ihre, Angehorigen werden erfreulicherweise fleiBigen Linguisten, helfen 
Thus we arrive at the following claim: 
(37)  The strong reading of an indefinite is not a sufficient condition for its status as a 
topic. 
Let us now consider sentences with a so called individual level (K-)  predicate: 
(38)  weil  Linguistinnen  klug sind 
because female-linguists clever are 
The applicability of an il-predicate to its argument is not restricted to certain times and 
places. As is well known, the subject of an L-predicate can only have a strong reading. 
Thus in (38) the bare plural has only the generic reading. 
Let  us  have  a look  at the  standard  account of  the fact that  the  subject of  an  IL- 
predicate  is strongly  interpreted.  It  goes  as  follows  (e.g. JBger  1996,  Erteschik-Shir 
1997, de Swart 2001): Every sentence needs to have a topic. In  sentences with a stage 
level  predicate  this  role  can  be  played  by  the  event  argument  because  stage  level 
predicates talk about a specific situation located in time and space or a generic type of 
situation.  This  is  not  possible  in  the  case  of  U-predicates  because  they  describe 
properties which are not tied to particular situations. Therefore the subject argument has 
to  be  the  topic.  Topics  must be  strong NPs  because  only  these  encode a  notion  of 
'aboutness' or 'familiarity'. 
This chain of reasoning is in conflict with the thesis of a designated topic position in 
the German  middle field. It  can easily be  shown that, although the subject of  an  IL- 
predicate is interpreted strongly, it does not have to be in this position: 
(39)  a.  weil offensichtlich Linguistinnen intelligent sind (generic) 
because obviously female-linguists intelligent are 
b.  weil erfreulicherweise ein Student FuBball liebt (specific) 
because fortunately  a student  soccer  loves 
Thus (37) also holds for sentences with L-predicates. (39a, b) together with the findings 
of Frey (2000) show that the fact that individual level predicates necessarily have strong 
subjects cannot be deduced from the assumption that every clause has to have a topic. 
In the next section we will try to give an account of the strong reading of the subjects 
of IL-predicates which differs from the standard one. Ahout the Whereabouts of Indefinites 
6.  A cartography for indefinites 
The  findings  of  the  preceding  sections  have  revealed  the  following  domains  at  S- 
structure for the interpretation of indefinites in the middle field of a German clause: 
(40)  The relation between position and meaning of indefinites in German: 
a.  The domui~z  of  complex predicate formation  (below the base position of 
manner adverbials): An indefinite can only be weakly interpreted. 
b.  The minimal domain of the as,sociate.s of'an indefinite which is dependent 
on a  verb (MDA) (the minimal maximal projection  which  contains the 
base  positions  of  the  verb's  dependants  and  all  licensers  of  the 
indefinite): The indefinite can be interpreted weakly or strongly. 
c.  The domain above ofMDA : The indefinite is rlecessarily strong. 
(40a) was already motivated in  section 4. Let us now make some speculations on how 
the conditions in (40b, c) could be justified for bare plurals. 
Chierchia (1998) investigates the  relation  between  the  different  meanings  of  bare 
plurals in different languages. He argues that in languages like English or German bare 
plurals can either denote kinds or properties. Thus, if  in  these languages a bare plural 
occurs  in canonical  argumental position, it unambiguously denotes  a kind. However, 
bare arguments also occur with non-kind-selecting predicates. Chierchia assumes that in 
this  case  the  type  of  the  predicate  is  adjusted  by  introducing  a  quantification  over 
instances  of  the  kind.  Chierchia  argues  that  in  episodic  contexts  this  yields  the 
existential quantification. He shows that this process is even operative with DPs like the 
one in the following sentence: 
(41)  a.  That kind of animal is ruining my garden 
b.  3x ["that  kind of animal(x) A ruin my gardenix)] 
The sentence (41a) has the interpretation (41b). The type shifting operation "  maps a 
kind to the (plural) property of being an instance of the kind. Chierchia calls the general 
mechanism which is operative here 'Derived Kind Predication'  (DPK): 
(42)  DPK:  P(k) = 3x ["k(x)  A P(x) ]  for P  a predicate  which  applies to objects 
which are non-kinds and k a kind. 
Thus Chierchia assumes that  in  the context of an  event specification it is possible to 
deduce the existence of an instance of the kind for which the predicate of the sentence 
holds. The same mechanism is extended to bare plurals: 
(43)  a.  Lions are ruining my garden 
b.  ruining my garden ("lions)  (where "  yields a kind from the 
corresponding property) 
++  (via DKP) 3x [""lions  (x) A ruin my garden(x)] 
We can use Chierchia's proposal in the following way: It is a standard assumption that a 
verb's theta grid contains an argument position  for the eventuality which is denoted by the  clause  ('the E-position').  Among the  eventualities  at  least  events  and  states  are 
differentiated,  however  there  might  be  more  subtypes.  Like  the  other  argument 
positions, the E-position has to be saturated by an element in  the syntactic stn~cture.  The 
saturation of the E-position  occurs after the other argument places are saturated. Many 
syntacticians assume an Asp(ect)P(hrase) right above the VP. It is reasonable to assume 
that the instantiation of the E-position with a specified event is linked to an appropriate 
AspP. Adopting this assumption we can make the application of DPK dependent on an 
appropriate AspP and arrive at the following constraint": 
(44)  A bare plural dependent on a verb can have a weak reading only if the head of its 
A-chain  is  situated  in  its  MDA,  and  the  accompanying  AspP of the  MDA 
licenses the specification of an event. 
The generic  interpretation  of  a  bare  plural  is derived  by  Chierchia  via  a process  of 
accommodation of  variables over instances of  the kind  in  the restriction of a generic 
operator. Let us assume that this process is in principle always available. Thus, if  the 
predicate of a sentence applies to objects which are non-kinds and gets a bare plural as 
an  argument it is possible to derive a universal statement about the instances of the kind. 
This results  in a generic sentence. Thus, we assume that  the strong reading of a bare 
plural is given for free whereas, according to (44), the weak reading of a bare plural is 
the special case which needs extra syntactic licensing.'2 
That the weak reading of an indefinite is dependent on the specification of a singular 
event is shown by the following data: 
(45)  a.  I consider firemen available 
b.  John believes students of this class to be intelligent 
c.  Max halt Studenten dieses Kurses fiir intelligent 
M. considers students of-this course intelligent 
The  bare  plurals  in  (45) only  have  the  generic  reading.  (45a) is  of  special  interest 
because uvuilahle is not an individual predicate. However, the adjective by  itself cannot 
specify  an  event  and  the  matrix  predicate  does  not  specify  an  event  in  the  given 
example. Therefore no singular event is specified by the sentence. The same is true for 
the remaining sentences (45c, d), no specified event is characterized. 
I'  To  keep  the  following  statement  simple,  it  is  assumed  that  scrambling  constitutes  an  A-chain. 
However, this assumption is not crucial for our considcrations. 
'"he  other strong readings of indefinites are in principle also available in every argumcntal position. 
This is true, e.g,  of the specific reading of a singular indefinite (cf  (3h), (621)). 
There are approaches  which  treat  singular indefinites  as choice  functions.  Von  Heusinger  (to 
appear)  argues  that  specific  indefinites  are  choice  functions  which  depend  on  the  speaker  or  a 
referential  expression  in  the  clause.  Adopting  this  view  we  can  relate  the  fact  that  the  specific 
interpretation of a singular indefinite is always available to the fact that at least the speaker is always 
available as a possible anchor tbr the specific interpretation. If we assume that the weak interpretation 
of a singular indefinite is represented  by a choice function which is dependent on the specification of 
an event (cf. Lenerz 2001), we can further derive that the weak reading <]fa  singular indefinite is only 
p~~ssihle  in the rcstricted environment described in (44). About the Whereabouts of lndelinitcs 
Chris Wilder  (p.c.) made an  important observation  with  regard  to constructions like 
(45). If  such  sentences  are changed such  that  the  matrix  clause specifies  a  singular 
event, the bare plurals also change their interpretation: 
(46)  a.  I have considered firemen available 
b.  John has believed students of this class to be intelligent 
c.  Max hat Studenten dieses Kurses fiir intelligent gehalten 
d.  John has believed that students of  this class are intelligent 
e.  Max hat geglaubt, dass Studenten dieses Kurses intelligent sind 
The accusative  objects  in  (46a, b, c) can  be  interpreted existentially. Note  that their 
MDAs have accompanying AspPs which now specify episodic frames.13 In contrast, in 
(46d, e) the specification of  an event by the matrix predicate does not give rise to the 
existential interpretation of the bare plurals in the finite complement clauses. The bare 
plurals in these examples are not in  a licensing relation  with the matrix predicates. In 
sum, the data in (45) and (46) constitute nice evidence for the condition in  (44). 
In  the last  section  we  discussed  the  reading  of  the  subject  in  sentences  like the 
following: 
(38)  weil  Linguistinnen  klug sind 
because female-linguists clever are 
According to an often articulated explanation the subject of an %-predicate has to be a 
topic.  and  therefore  has  only  the  strong  reading.  We  refuted  the  claim  about  the 
obligatory topic status. However, to explain why the subject of  an IL-predicate has the 
strong reading,  we do not have to assume that  it  is  necessarily  a topic.  (44) already 
explains  data  like  (38)  or  (39). Because  individual  level  predicates  do  not  specify 
situations located in time and place, such predicates are not accompanied by an episodic 
AspP. Therefore according to (44) the weak interpretation of an indefinite subject is not 
possible. 
Let us conclude by a look at the scope of  a bare plural. The following sentences are 
both  unambiguous.  The  scope  relation  between  the  quantified  NP  and  the  weakly 
interpreted indefinite corresponds in both sentences to their linear orderI4. 
(47)  a.  Sie hat heute  fast jedem Kollegen Zimmer ihrer Villa gezeigt  (only: V3) 
She has today almost every colleague rooms of her villa shown 
b.  Sie hat heute Kollegen fast jedes Zimmer ihrer Villa gezeigt  (only: 3V) 
Note that  this  is not expected if  the  scope of  existential  closure is the VP.  On this 
assumption  both  sentences  should  exhibit  the  same  scope  relation  between  the 
universally quantified NP and the indefinite. If  one assumes that in the German middle 
field scope  relations  are  fixed at  S-structure, then  both  sentences  should have wide 
scope of the existentially interpreted indefinite. If  one believes that in German scope is 
"  In (46a) and (46h) the matrix predicate licenses the case of the accusative ohjcct and thereforc belongs 
lo its MDA, cf. (I  I). For the German example (46c) it can easily hc shown that fur intelligent halten 
constitutes a co~nplcx  predicate. 
14  Thc same scopal behavior could he shown for generically interpreted indefinites. determined at LF and that a universally quantified NP has to leave the VP at LF both 
sentences should have the reading with wide scope of the universal NP. 
In  fact the unambiguity of the sentences in (47) shows that in the middle field the 
scope relation between an indefinite and a quantifier is determined by the c-command 
relations  at  S-structure.  In  this  respect,  an  indefinite  behaves  like  any  other  scope 
sensitive element in German. Therefore, the operation which derives the reading of an 
indefinite cannot be a lexical operation on the predicate (as van Geenhoven 1998 has it) 
because the syntactic position  of  a bare plural  is  crucial  for its  scope. The semantic 
mechanism which derives the reading of an indefinite has to apply during the semantic 
processing of the syntactic structure. However, it has to be applied very locally, i.e. this 
additional  step of  semantic processing  has  to be carried  out right  after the semantic 
processing of the lexical material of the indefinite. This operation cannot wait till the 
interpretation process reaches the VP level. 
References 
Biiring, D. (2000): What Do Definites Do That Indefinites Definitely Don't? In: FBry, C. & W. 
Sternefeld (eds): Audiatur  Vex Sapientiae:  LI  fe.~tschrift,for  Arnim von Stechow. Berlin: 
Akad. Verlag (studia grammatica 52), 70-100. 
Chierchia, G. (1998): Reference to Kinds Across Languages. In: Ncitural Lailguu~e  Semantics, 
6. 339-405. 
Choi, H.-W. (1999): Optimizing Structure in Context ;  Scrambling and Infjrmation Stnrctrrre. 
Stanford: CSLI Publications. 
de  Hoop,  H.  (1992):  Case  configuration  und  noun  phruse  interpretation,  Ph.D.  thesis, 
Groningen. 
Delfitto, D.; N. Corver (1997): Feature primitives  and the syntax of  specificity. Ms., Tilburg 
University. 
de Swart, H. (2001): Weak readings of indefinites: type-shifting and closure. In: The Linguistic 
Review  18. 69-96. 
Diesing, M. (1992): Indefinites. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Diesing,  M.  (1997):  Yiddish  VP  Order  and  the  Typology  of  Object  Movement.  Natural 
Language &Linguistic Theory 15. 369-427. 
Eckardt,  R.  (to  appear):  Manner  Adverbs  and  Information  Structure  -  Evidence  from the 
adverbial  modification  of  verbs  of  creation.  In:  Fabricius-Hansen,  C.  et  al.  (eds.): 
Approacliit~g  the Granzmar qfAdjuncts. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Erteschik-Shir,  N.  (1997):  The  Dynumics  of  Focus  Strcicture.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Frey, W. & K. Pittner  (1998): Zur  Positioniemng  der  Adverbiale  im  deutschen  Mittelfeld. 
Linguistische Berichte  176.489-534. 
Frey, W.  (2000): Uber die syntaktische Position der Satztopiks im Deutschen. In: Schwabe, K. 
et al. (eds.): Issues on Topics. Z4S Papers in  linguistic.^ 20. 137- 172. 
Haider, H. (1993): Deutsche Syntax -  generativ. Tiibingen: Narr. 
Haider, H. &I.  Rosengren (1998): Scrambling. Sprache und Pragmutik 49. Lund. 
Jiger, G. (1996): Topics in Dynamic Semantics. Dissertation, Humboldt-Universitiit zu Berlin. 
Kamp, H. (1981): A Theory of  Tmth and Semantic Representation. In: Groenendijk, J. et al. 
(eds.): Formal Methods in the Study of language. Mathematical Centre, Amsterdam, 277- 
321. 
Kuno, S. (1972): Functional  Sentence Perspective: A Case Study from Japanese and English. 
Lirzguistic Inqcii~y  3. 269-336. 
Lenerz, J. (I 977): Zur Abfnlge norninaler Satzglieder im Deutschen. Tiibingen: Narr. About the Whereabouts of Indefinites 
Lenerz, J. (2001): Word  order variation: Competition or Co-operation. In: Miiller, G. & W. 
Sternefeld: Competition in Syntax. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 249-281. 
Neeleman, A. (1994): Complex Predicates. Doctoral dissertation, Utrecht UniversitylOTS. 
Neelernan,  A. & T. Reinhart  (1998):  Scrambling and  the PF  Interface.  In: Butt.  M. & W. 
Geuder  (eds.):  The  Prqjection  of  Arguments:  Lexical  and  Compositional  Factors. 
Stanford: CSLI Publications, 309-353. 
Reinhart, T. (1995): Interface Strategies. OTS Working Papers. Utrecht University. 
Tsai, W.-T.D. (2001): On Object Specificity. In: JBger, G. et al. (eds): Papers on Predicative 
Constmctions. 24s Papers in Linguistics 22, 173- 190. 
van  Geenhoven,  V.  (1998):  Semantic  Incorporation  and  Indefinite  Descriptions.  Stanford: 
CSLI Publications. 
van Heusinger, K. (to appear): Cross-linguistic Implementations of  Specificity. In: Jaszczolt, K. 
& K. Turner (eds.): Contrastive Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford: Pergamon. 
Winkler, S. (1997): Focus and seconday predication.  Berlin: Mouton de Gmyter. 